Judgment The present first appeal has been preferred by the defendants before this Court challenging the judgment and decree dated 16-1-11996 passed by Additional District Judge, Dhar in Civil Suit No. 7-A/85 (Motilal and two others vs. Shankar s/o Bheema Kulmi and seven others). 2. In the present case, a suit for partition, separate possession and mesne profits was filed by the plaintiffs Motilal, Kalu and Devkunwerbai. The genealogy of the parties of the suit is as under :- Shankar (Defendant No. 1/appellant No. 1) Rukhmabai (wife) (Defendant No. 2/appellant No. 2) Devkunwerbai (wife) Plaintiff No. 3/respondent No. 3 Motilal (plaintiff No. 1/respondent No. 1) Kalu (plaintiff No. 2/respondent No. 2) Ghanshyam Deft. No. 3/Apt. No. 3 Kailash Deft. No. 4/Apt. No. 4 Jagdish Deft. No. 5/Apt. No. 5 Rupchand Deft. No. 6/Apt. No. 6 Kamal Deft. No. 7/Apt. No. 7 3. A suit was filed by the plaintiffs on 12-5-1978 claiming themselves to be an indigent persons and a trial Court vide order dated 5-10-1981 permitted the plaintiffs to prosecute a suit as indigent persons. A written statement was preferred by the defendants and the plain averments were denied. Various amendments were carried out during the pendency of the suit. The suit properties are agricultural land and houses and the trial Court has held the appellants/defendants to be entitled for 7/10 share in the suit properties. The trial Court has also held that the sale deed marked as Exhibits-D-2 to D-8 were null and void being under consideration and therefore the defendants preferred this present appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 4. In the present case, the plaintiff/respondent No. 3 was the wife of appellant No. 1 Shankar and plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 were alleged to be sons of appellant Shankar borne from respondent No. 3, Devkunwerbai. Appellant No. 2 is the second wife of appellant-Shankar and appellants No. 3 to 7 are sons of appellant Shankar borne from appellant No. 2. Judgment delivered by the trial Court reveals that it was held by the trial Court that no divorce according to the custom of caste was proved between the appellant-Shankar and respondents No. 1 and 2 were not borne after divorce. The trial Court has also held that appellant No. 2 is legally married wife of appellant No. 1 and appellants No. 3 to 7 are their sons. The trial Court has also held that appellant No. 2 is legally married wife of appellant No. 1 and appellants No. 3 to 7 are their sons. On this basis, shares were declared in respect of appellants No. 2 to 7. It is pertinent to note that no appeal or cross objections have been filed by the respondents and therefore the findings have attained a finality. In the present appeal it is noteworthy to mention that the defendants in paragraphs-10 and 11 of the written statements have categorically pleaded that the suit lands were in ancestral land. The principle of Hindu law are not applicable to all the lands held by Pakka Tenant and Bhumiswami. Pakka Tenant as defined under section 54(vii) of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act (Act 66 of 1950) reads as under :- "(vii) Pakka tenant - means a tenant who has been or whose predecessor in interest had been lawfully recorded in respect of his holding as a "Ryot Pattedar", "Mamuli Maurusi", "Gair Maurusi", and "Pukhta Maurusi" when this Act comes into force or who may in future be duly recognized as such by a competent authority. Explanation - The term "Pukhta Maurusi" includes Istmurardar tenants, Malikana Haq-holder tenants, Hakkiyat Mutafarrikat, Sharah Mauyyana and Sakitulmilkiyat tenants." 5. The aforesaid Act came into force with effect from 6-6-1952. Section 82 of the Act reads as under :- "82. Devolution of rights on the death of a male Pakka tenant. - When a male Pakka tenant dies, his interest in his holding shall devolve in accordance with the order of succession given below - Class I - Son, grandson (son's son), great grandson (son's son's son), widow, predeceased son's widow, predeceased grandson's widow and predeceased great grandson's widow. Explanation I - A grandson whose father is dead and great grandson whose father and grandfather are both dead shall inherit equally with the son. Explanation II - - The widow of the deceased or if there are more widows than one, all his widows together shall take the same share as that of a son. The widow of a predeceased son shall inherit in like manner as a son if there is no son surviving of such predeceased son, and in like manner as a son's son, if there is surviving a son or son's son of such predeceased son. The widow of a predeceased son shall inherit in like manner as a son if there is no son surviving of such predeceased son, and in like manner as a son's son, if there is surviving a son or son's son of such predeceased son. The same rule shall apply mutatis mutandis to the widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased son. Class II Unmarried daughter. Class III Married daughter. Class IV Father. Class V Mother (if she is a widow). Class VI Step-mother (if she is a widow). Class VII Brother of the whole blood. Class VIII Brother of the half blood (being a son of the same father). Class IX Daughter's son. Class X Brother's son. Class XI Brother's son's son. Class XII Father's father. Class XIII Father's mother (if she is a widow). Class XIV Sister. Class XV Sister's son. Class XVI Paternal Uncle (father's brother) Class XVII Paternal uncle's son (father's brother's son). Class XVIII Paternal uncle's son's son. Class XIX Father's father's son. Class XX Father's Father's mother (if she is a widow). Class XXI Father's paternal uncle. Class XXII Father's paternal uncle's son. Class XXIII Father's paternal uncle's son's son. Explanation --If there are more heirs than one of the same class other than Class I (who shall inherit per stirps) all shall share equally." 6. This Court in the case of Ramsingh and others vs. Sohan Singh and others, reported in 1982 RN 349 has held as under :- "8. The short question raised in this appeal therefore, is whether the principles of Hindu Law regarding ancestral property can be applied to| be the case of an agricultural holding. This Court in the case of Ramsingh and others vs. Sohan Singh and others, reported in 1982 RN 349 has held as under :- "8. The short question raised in this appeal therefore, is whether the principles of Hindu Law regarding ancestral property can be applied to| be the case of an agricultural holding. Relying upon the decision reported in 7953 JLJ 355, Chanaram Chandami Ahir vs. Pyari Bahoo, wherein it has been held that a female pakka tenant under section 83 of the Madhya] Bhart Tenancy Act is under no disability in respect of right to transfer of holding and that she may transfer her rights in the holding subject to the] restrictions contained in section 70 of the Act the fact that on her death or (remarriage rights in the holding devolved upon the nearest surviving heir (such heir being ascertained in accordance with section 82 of the last male Pakka tenant, if she has not already transferred the holding, it was contended that the argument that a female pakka tenant is merely a holder of the limited estate having been negative in this case. The same would apply to the case of a Pattedar tenant who has every right to dispose of the same under the rights acquired by him under the said land Revenue and Tenancy Act." 7. This Court again in the case of Chainsingh vs. Ramchandra, reported in 1992(1) MPJR 299, in para 11 has held as under :- "11. The plaint contains a bald assertion that the property alienation by Jagannath was coparcenary property. Not a word has been stated in the plaint to show how the property had come to acquire such character whether it was a property inherited from the ancestors property or was in accretion to the existing co-parcenary property or was a self-acquired property but thrown into common hotch pot and c. At the stage of trial, looseness in the plaint-averments allowed the plaintiffs to lead shifting evidence. The witnesses examined for the plaintiffs gave different versions to suit that convenience without particularizing anything. Some said that the land was inherited by Jagannath from his late father. Someone stated that it was purchased by Jagannath with the aid of joint family funds. Someone stated that part of the property was secured by Jagannath on lease from the proprietor before the abolition of proprietary rights. Some said that the land was inherited by Jagannath from his late father. Someone stated that it was purchased by Jagannath with the aid of joint family funds. Someone stated that part of the property was secured by Jagannath on lease from the proprietor before the abolition of proprietary rights. No inference as to the property being coparacenary property could have been drawn from the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs except by adopting an approach of treating the statement made by the plaintiffs' witnesses as gospel truth without an attempt of scrutinizing their work; a process adopted by the Courts below out wholly impermissible and unsustainable in law. In the opinion of this Court in the back drop of the facts of the case, the burden lay heavily on the plaintiffs to allege and prove the character of the property with factors handing the property coparacenary character. That having not been done, the issue should have been decided against the plaintiffs." 8. This Court again in the case of Devilal vs. Surjubai, reported in 2006 R.N. 207 in paragraphs-11 and 12 has held as under :- "11. As I have observed supra, this issue had also come up for consideration on more or less same set of facts in the case of Chain Singh (supra), when his Lordship/RC Lahoti, J. (as his Lordship then was) while non-suiting the plaintiff not only on facts also proceeded to rule that in a suit relating to land which is governed by tenancy laws the devolution of rights of parties is governed by the tenancy laws then in force and not by reference to the provisions of personal law (Hindu Law). That was also a case filed by the plaintiff in which a declaration in relation to land was claimed that it is a coparcenary property and hence, it could not be sold. The learned Judge re-affirming the view taken by this Court in two cases examined the issue in more detail and while nonsuiting the plaintiff both on facts as also on the issue of law extracted supra, held as under :- "Para 12. Not only the plaintiffs have utterly failed in proving that the property was coparcenary property assuming that such an averment was capable of being made and accepted, this Court has to discard the case of the plaintiffs for yet another and stronger reason. 13. Not only the plaintiffs have utterly failed in proving that the property was coparcenary property assuming that such an averment was capable of being made and accepted, this Court has to discard the case of the plaintiffs for yet another and stronger reason. 13. The suit property consists of tenancy rights in agricultural holding the devolution whereof is governed by the tenancy laws which have been in force from time to time in this part of the country. It is not disputed that between 1951 and 1959 M.B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 was in force. Thereafter, came into force the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. Earlier, the Kanoon Mai operated in the field. Each of these provided a specific schedule governing the devolution of tenancy rights in agricultural holdings. In view of that law can it be said that the tenancy rights inherited by Jagannath from his late father or the rights acquired by him under a lease given by an ex-proprietor (assuming it was so) were not his personal rights but were coparcenary properties governed by the principles of Hindu Law? 14. In Yudhishter vs. Ashok Kumar, AIR 1987 SC 558 , a question arose whether the property inherited by a Hindu male from his father under section 8 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would be H.U.F. vis-a-vis his own sons. Following the earlier Apex Court decision in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur vs. Chander Sen, AIR 1986 SC 1753 , their Lordships held :- "-----------it would be difficult to hold that property which devolved on a Hindu under section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would be HUF in his hand vis-a-vis his own sons. If that be the position then the property which devolved upon the father of the respondent in the instant case on the demise of his grandfather could not be said to be HUF property." The same principles would be applicable if the rights were inherited by Jagannath from his father in accordance with the schedule of succession provided for by tenancy law in force for the time being. 15. This Court was posed with a similar question in similar set of facts in SA No. 203/80 (G) (Gyansingh and others vs. Ghanshyam and others) decided on 15-11-1991. One Matadin recorded Bhumiswami of the land had alienated his rights in the holding through a registered deed of sale dated 25-1-1963. 15. This Court was posed with a similar question in similar set of facts in SA No. 203/80 (G) (Gyansingh and others vs. Ghanshyam and others) decided on 15-11-1991. One Matadin recorded Bhumiswami of the land had alienated his rights in the holding through a registered deed of sale dated 25-1-1963. He had inherited the rights from his father at a time when M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 was in force. His wife and sons brought the suit challenging the alienation alleging the rights of Matadin to be joint Hindu Family property of the plaintiffs with Matadin. This Court having referred to the provisions contained in sections 82 and 70 of M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 respectively providing for the devolution of rights on the death of a male pakka tenant and voluntary sale of holdings, as also the pari materia provisions contained in sections 164 and 165 (both unamended) of M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 held : "The abovesaid provisions clearly indicates that in the matter of rights of a pakka tenant under the M. B. Act and the rights of a Bhumiswami under the M. P. Code, there have been special provision governing the devolution of the rights and the rights of transfer. Section 164 of the M. P. Code clearly stated that the provisions had to take effect notwithstanding any law, custom or usage to the contrary. Such specific words were not to be found expressly contained in section 82 of M. B. Act, but the result would be the same inasmuch as a special provisions governing the devolution of rights of a male Pakka tenant contained in a special local law would necessarily exclude the applicability of the general law." This Court concluded by holding :- "The validity or otherwise of the alienation made by a Pakka tenant/Bhumiswami shall have to be judged by reference to the provisions contained in such local enactments and not by the principles of personal law. The lower Appellate Court was, therefore, right in holding that the right acquired by Matadin in the holding from his father was capable of being alienated by him if the alienation did not infringe any provision of the tenancy laws. The lower Appellate Court was, therefore, right in holding that the right acquired by Matadin in the holding from his father was capable of being alienated by him if the alienation did not infringe any provision of the tenancy laws. The question of judging validity of the sale by applying touch-stone of legal necessity, offered by the personal law, did not arise." This Court upheld the dismissal of the suit seeking declaration of title and recovery of possession as against transferee. 16. In S. A. No. 409/61 (I), Dagdibai vs. Shyamrao and others decided on 16-4-1964 an alienation made by a female Pakka tenant was challenged by the reversioner as having been made without legal necessity. P. K. Tare, J., as his Lordship then was, turned down the challenge holding that the rights acquired by a female pakka tenant under the tenancy law did not permit the nature and scope of the male tenant's right being determined by reference to the principles of Hindu Law. It was held :- "Her personal law would have no place in the scheme of succession provided by the Act. Therefore, the concept of a reversionary interest of a reversioner being in a position to challenge the alienation by a limited owner cannot be made applicable to such a case." 17. In Jhabarsing vs. Soudansing (S. A. No. 297/62) (I) decided on 24-12-1965, the rights in agricultural holding were inherited under the provisions of the Indore Land Revenue and Tenancy Act which provided a special schedule of inheritance by its own alienation made by the holder was challenged by taking resort to the principles of Hindu Law. The Court noticed the definition of Pakka tenant as given in section 54 of M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, which refers to the person entered as such on the date of coming into force of that Act. V. R. Nivaskar, J. held :- "In my opinion the definition of pakka tenant in Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act indicates that the person who is or whose predecessor - in - interest has been recorded as a Pattedar tenant in the erstwhile Holkar State Territory is such a tenant. In this case, defendant Nos. 2, 3 and the father of defendant No. 4 were the recorded tenants at the commencement of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. In this case, defendant Nos. 2, 3 and the father of defendant No. 4 were the recorded tenants at the commencement of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. They, therefore, became Pakka tenants with rights to alienate the property with the permission of the Collector Succession to them is provided for as indicated in section 82 of the Act. Thus, there is basic change in the Scheme of the Act and whatever right existed before on the principle of survivorship or reversion were no longer to remain in force. To this extent, the vested rights, as claimed by the plaintiffs were, intended to be affected. The decision in AIR 1926 Privy Council 100 (supra) and 1949 Madhya Bharat Law Reporter HI (supra) will have no application because under the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act the record at the time of coming into force of the Act as a Pakka tenant determined the title." 18. It follows that insofar as the rights in agricultural holdings are concerned, they are governed by the provisions of the tenancy law governing them. The nature of the right acquired by a Bhumi Swami by inheritance is to be determined by reference to the provisions contained in the relevant tenancy law governing devolution of such rights. Having inherited the right, the Bhumiswami holds the land as full owner thereof and not in any capacity determinable by reference to the provisions of personal law. His right to alienate the land is also governed by the tenancy law and not by reference to the provision of the personal law applicable to him." The aforesaid principle of law also specially applies to the facts of this case. Because, admittedly the land in question was governed by tenancy law Kanunmal Gwalior which governed its devolution. I have already held that on the death of Khema in 1945, the land was inherited by Pritvi Raj in his personal capacity and became exclusive owner. The plaintiffs had thus, no right to seek a declaration by relying on personal Hindu Law that the suit land was a Joint Family Property." 9. Keeping in view the aforesaid judgments, the plaintiffs/respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 cannot claim any share in the life time of Shankar. The present suit is filed on 12-5-1978 against Shankar, who was at that time Bhumiswami and his father had died as Pakka Tenant. Keeping in view the aforesaid judgments, the plaintiffs/respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 cannot claim any share in the life time of Shankar. The present suit is filed on 12-5-1978 against Shankar, who was at that time Bhumiswami and his father had died as Pakka Tenant. This fact is clear from Khasra entry Exhibit-P-17. After the death of Bhima his son Shankar had acquired rights of Pakka tenant and during the life time of Shankar his sons have no right at all. 10. It is also noteworthy to mention that plaintiffs/respondents were excluded from the family of Shankar about 30 years before the date of filing of the present suit. This plea is in existence in paragraph-10 of the written statement. Devkunwarbi DW-1 admitted in paragraph-12 of the statement that she got 20 acres of land of her father. PW-1, Deokunwarbi plaintiff in para-3 admitted that 40 years ago she was excluded by Shankar and subsequently after 10 years Motilal and Kalu were excluded. Motilal, PW-3 in paragraph 3 of his statement admitted exclusion from family by Shankar. Thus, the fact of exclusion from the family is more than 12 years prior to the filing of the suit and it is an admitted fact and therefore, by virtue of the provisions contained in Article 110 of the Limitation Act, the suit was barred by limitation. Article 110 of the Limitation Act reads as under :- By a person excluded from a Twelve years When the exclusion joint family property to becomes known to enforce a right to share the plaintiff, therein. 11. Thus, keeping in view the aforesaid statutory provisions of law, suit was barred by limitation and therefore the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court deserves to be set aside. 12. It is pertinent to note that the plaintiffs/respondents could not have challenged the alienations (Exhibit-D-2- to D-8). Those alienations (Exhibit-D-2 to D-8) in respect of the suit property were recorded by Bhumi Swami Shankar. Shankar's sons and his wife in the life time of Shankar could not have challenged those alienation at all. 13. Keeping in view the aforesaid judgments delivered in the case of Ramsingh and others vs. Sohan Singh and others, reported in 1982 R.N. 349 and Devilal vs. Surjubai, reported in 2006 RN 207, the impugned judgment and decree deserves to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside. 13. Keeping in view the aforesaid judgments delivered in the case of Ramsingh and others vs. Sohan Singh and others, reported in 1982 R.N. 349 and Devilal vs. Surjubai, reported in 2006 RN 207, the impugned judgment and decree deserves to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside. Thus, the appeal stands allowed. Decree be withdrawn, accordingly. No order as to costs. C. c as per rules. Appeal allowed.