Rameshwar Singh Malik, J.;— CRM No.45560 of 2012 The applicant seeks condonation of delay of 104 days in filing the application for seeking leave to file appeal against the judgment of acquittal. 2. After hearing the learned counsel for the applicant, this application is allowed for the reasons stated therein and the delay of 104 days stands condoned. CRM A-656-MA of 2012 3. The instant application under Section 378 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (`Cr.P.C.' for short), has been filed by the applicant, seeking leave to file appeal against the judgment of acquittal dated 21.10.2011 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Narnaul, whereby the accused-respondents were acquitted of the charge framed against them. 4. The criminal law was set into motion by the complainantapplicant moving an application to the police of Police Station Mahendergarh alleging that the accused-respondents have committed the offences in question. However, in order to avoid repetition and also for the sake of brevity, it would be appropriate to refer to the facts noted by the learned trial Court, which read as under:- “The prosecution case, in brief is that prosecutrix (name not disclosed in view of directions by Hon'ble Apex Court in such cases) wife of Bhim Singh, Rajput by caste resident of village Pathera moved an application to the police of police station Mahendergarh to the effect that on 18.6.2010 at about 11 PM, she was watching the television in her house and her parent's in-law were sleeping outside. It is alleged that finding her alone in the house, Pardeep Kumar son of Jagdish, Brahmin by caste, resident of village Pathera entered her room and gagged her mouth and Pardeep took her on the roof and torn away her clothes and raped her and threatened to kill her, if she would inform anybody and requested to initiate strict action against the accused. On the basis of this information, the present case was registered under sections 376, 452, 506, 212 IPC vide FIR No.217 dated 19.6.2010. Investigation set in to motion and the accused were arrested. On completion of investigation, challan under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was prepared and presented in the court for trial.” 5. On presentation of the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., the relevant documents were supplied to the accused, in accordance with law. Investigation set in to motion and the accused were arrested. On completion of investigation, challan under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was prepared and presented in the court for trial.” 5. On presentation of the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., the relevant documents were supplied to the accused, in accordance with law. However, the offences having been found to be exclusively triable by the court of session, the learned Magistrate vide order dated 9.12.2010, committed the case to the court of session, for its trial. 6. Having found a prima facie case to be made out, the charge was framed for the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 506 IPC, against accused-respondent Pardeep, whereas his co-accused Jagdish was charge sheeted for the commission of offence punishable under Section 212 IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 7. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 14 prosecution witnesses, besides tendering the relevant documents in its evidence. On conclusion of the prosecution evidence, separate statements of the accused were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Entire incriminating material brought on record was put to the accused. They alleged false implication and claimed themselves to be innocent. However, the accused did not lead any evidence in their defence. 8. After hearing both the parties and appreciating the evidence brought on record, the learned trial Court held that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held that since the statement of the prosecutrix herself was full of improbabilities, the case of the prosecution could not be said to be proved. Accordingly, giving benefit of doubt, the accused-respondents were acquitted of the charge framed against them. 9. Feeling aggrieved against the impugned judgment, the applicant has approached this Court by way of instant application. That is how, this Court is seized of the matter. 10. Learned counsel for the applicant has vehemently contended that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence in the right perspective. He further submits that sufficient evidence was brought on record to bring home guilt against both the accused respondents. He concluded by submitting that since the impugned judgment of acquittal was based on a misconceived approach, the same was not sustainable in law. 11. He further submits that sufficient evidence was brought on record to bring home guilt against both the accused respondents. He concluded by submitting that since the impugned judgment of acquittal was based on a misconceived approach, the same was not sustainable in law. 11. Having heard the learned counsel for the applicant, after careful perusal of the record of the case and giving thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present one is not a fit case for granting leave to file an appeal against the judgment of acquittal. The reasons are more than one, which are being recorded hereinafter. 12. Firstly, it is the own case of the prosecution that the prosecutrix was all alone in the house at about 11.00 p.m. and her parents-in-law were sleeping outside the house, at the time of alleged occurrence. It is further pleaded case of the prosecution that the accused respondent Pardeep gagged the mouth of the prosecutrix, lifted her and took her to the roof top all alone. This does not appeal to reason at all because the prosecutrix was not a minor girl but was grown up and married woman. Further, none of her parents-in-law has been produced as witness for the reasons best known to the prosecution. In this view of the matter, it is unhesitatingly held that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 13. Secondly, a close perusal of the medical evidence would also show that no external or internal injury of any kind was found on the body of the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix was not below 16 years of age but she was major. The circumstances show that neither the prosecutrix had put any resistance nor there was any sign of struggle on her part because of which there was no injury of any kind on her body. Thus, the story put-forth by the prosecution does not inspire confidence. 14. Thirdly, after a critical examination of the evidence, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that on the basis of evidence of the prosecution, it was not safe to record conviction of the accused brespondents. Thus, the learned trial Court has committed no error of law while passing the impugned judgment. 15. 14. Thirdly, after a critical examination of the evidence, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that on the basis of evidence of the prosecution, it was not safe to record conviction of the accused brespondents. Thus, the learned trial Court has committed no error of law while passing the impugned judgment. 15. Further, before arriving at the judicious conclusion, the learned trial Court has recorded cogent findings, which read as under:- “To nail the coffin, the prosecution has completely failed to explain as to why the accused would lift the victim all the way from the room to the roof top when there was ample time and space available to him in the room without any fear of being caught especially when prosecutrix was alone in house. Still further, it was allegedly summer time and it has not been denied before me that people do sleep outside their houses and on their roof top. In that case, her being taken to the roof for committing rape upon her is neither believable nor plausible. The genesis of occurrence like the fact that the accused was previously known to the prosecutrix, has not been brought on record but he being known to prosecutrix is apparent from the fact that prosecutrix herself gave name of accused in her complaint on basis of which FIR was lodged. Further, the circumstances, especially his coming in the night from the roof side, do indicate that the accused knew the complete area/house very well and also knew that the prosecutrix was alone in the house. This is also not possible unless the accused was known to the family or to the prosecutrix and in that case some genesis of occurrence could have been brought on record. Though discrepancies as such do not throw out case of prosecution but they are seen in light of other evidence on record and the material discrepancies are writ large in evidence in as much the prosecutrix brought out that her salwar string was broken but same was found to be so and after making necessary observations, the salwar string was kept in sealed cover on case file. Still further, the prosecutrix brought out in cross-examination that after the occurrence, she raised alarm but there is no such evidence despite the fact that she admitted that people used sleep in open on their roof tops, it being summer season. Still further, the prosecutrix brought out in cross-examination that after the occurrence, she raised alarm but there is no such evidence despite the fact that she admitted that people used sleep in open on their roof tops, it being summer season. Not only this, it is really very curious and surprising that though her parents-in-law were sleeping outside the house at time of occurrence but still neither her father-in-law nor mother-in-law stepped into the witness-box to corroborate or support the occurrence especially when they came to know about occurrence from Smt. Bhopal, at that time. The prosecutrix also stated in her cross-examination that large number of persons from village gathered there and even Sarpanch and Numberdaar were informed but no such person has been examined. Still further Smt. Bhopal (PW5) who alleged to have seen the prosecutrix after the occurrence on the roof of the house has failed to support the prosecution case and rather turned hostile. Even previous statement of Bhopal u/s 161 CrPC though not admissible, fails to throw any light because it is not understood as to how she alongwith Rajwati entered the house and reached roof top to find prosecutrix there because as per prosecutrix, the main gate was closed from inside. Be that it may be, the fact remains that even her husband, has also not stepped into the witness-box despite the fact that mother in law Rajwati and Husband Bhim Singh were cited as prosecution witnesses but were given up as unnecessary vide statement dated 21.2.2011. The facts after the occurrence or subsequent conduct play an important role in unraveling the occurrence and reaching the truth but all these facts are completely absent on file. The learned counsel for complainant strongly relied upon State of Maharashtra Vs. Chandra Prakash Kewal Chand Jain AIR 1990 SC 658 to contend that corroboration is not necessary and conviction can be made on sole statement of prosecutrix in rape cases. There is no doubt that the conviction can be based on the sole statement of the prosecutrix as such type of offences are generally committed on sly or by influential persons where nobody dares to come forward. In present case, there is no evidence that the accused was influential person though acting on sly has been alleged. There is no doubt that the conviction can be based on the sole statement of the prosecutrix as such type of offences are generally committed on sly or by influential persons where nobody dares to come forward. In present case, there is no evidence that the accused was influential person though acting on sly has been alleged. But in such cases also, the statement of prosecutrix should at least be plausible believable and trustworthy and in that case also not only the previous conduct of accused or subsequent conduct of accused/prosecutrix is important but other surrounding circumstances are taken into account and her statement is to be read in totality of such circumstances, at par with the victim. A careful reading of all judgments show that the victim generally relates the occurrence to somebody like mother, father, husband, sister or any other near relative or neighbour etc. in whom she reposes faith and even such narration is acceptable evidence as subsequent conduct of prosecutrix in absence of direct evidence but there is no such evidence on record. Even in case of Chandra Parkash (supra), there was evidence of husband and entry in hotel register and further the accused were police officials and it was proved on record that prosecutrix remained with accused for complete night and involvement of police official was proved beyond doubt. Whereas in present case, this court is left with the sole discrepant statement of the prosecutrix without any evidence of subsequent conduct. This court is not looking for corroboration but once the bald statement of the prosecutrix alone which too is fanciful and unreliable, at least there should be some other assuring evidence or any other circumstantial evidence. Reliance in this regard can be placed on State of UP Vs. Pappu @ Yunus AIR 2005 SC 1248 , where all the aspects including absence of injuries and sole statement of prosecutrix being sufficient for conviction were considered and the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that rape victim is on higher pedestal than injured witness but if the court finds it difficult to accept her version on its face value, than it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony and assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice would do. There is no rule of law that the courts must convict all the accused, if there are allegations of rape, what ever the case may be, if victims say so. In case of Pandurang Sita Ram Bhagwat Vs. State of Maharashtra 2005 AIR 643 SC, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that it is not universal truth that story set up prosecutrix must be believed just because no lady would put her honour at stake, but each case has to be examined on the touchstone of the factual matrix thereof. Reliance in this regard can also be placed on case of Bakhtaur Singh Vs. State of Punjab 2006(3) RCR(Cr.) 642. Therefore, once statement of prosecutrix is full of improbabilities and does not inspire confidence, than no conviction can be based on such sole statement.” 16. Learned counsel for the applicant failed to point out any piece of cogent evidence which might have been altogether ignored by the learned trial Court, so as to convince this Court to take a different view than the one taken by the learned trial Court. It is the settled proposition of law that whenever two views are possible, the view which goes in favour of the accused, is to be followed by the Court. 17. The view taken by this Court also finds support from the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Arulvelu & anr. vs. State represented by the Public Prosecutor and anr. 2009(4) RCR (Crl.) 638. The relevant observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para Nos.39, 40 and 41 in the case of Arulvelu's case (Supra) read as under: 18. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 , a two Judge Bench of this Court of which one of us (Bhandari, J.) was a member had an occasion to deal with most of the cases referred in this judgment. This Court provided guidelines for the Appellate Court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused. The following principles emerge from the cases above: 1. The accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 2. The power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. The accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 2. The power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law, but the Appellate Court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court. 3. The appellate court should always keep in mind that the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses. The trial court is in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 4. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. 5. If two reasonable or possible views can be reached - one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction - the High Courts/appellate courts must rule in favour of the accused. 40. This Court in a recently delivered judgment State of Rajasthan v. Naresh @ Ram Naresh 2009 (11) SCALE 699 again examined judgments of this Court and laid down that "An order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused. This Court has dealt with the scope of interference with an order of acquittal in a number of cases." 41. Careful scrutiny of all these judgments lead to the definite conclusion that the appellate court should be very slow in setting aside a judgment of acquittal particularly in a case where two views are possible. The trial court judgment can not be set aside because the appellate court's view is more probable. The appellate court would not be justified in setting aside the trial court judgment unless it arrives at a clear finding on marshalling the entire evidence on record that the judgment of the trial court is either perverse or wholly unsustainable in law. 19. In `Mrinal Das & others, v. The State of Tripura', 2011(9) SCC 479 , decided on September 5, 2011, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after referring to many earlier judgements, has laid down parameters, for interference against a judgement of acquittal, by observing as under :- 20. 19. In `Mrinal Das & others, v. The State of Tripura', 2011(9) SCC 479 , decided on September 5, 2011, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after referring to many earlier judgements, has laid down parameters, for interference against a judgement of acquittal, by observing as under :- 20. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons”, for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed.” Similarly, in the case of 'State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram alias Vishnu Dutta, (2012) 1 SCC 602 ', the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “7. A judgment of acquittal has the obvious consequence of granting freedom to the accused. This Court has taken a consistent view that unless the judgment in appeal is contrary to evidence, palpably erroneous or a view which could not have been taken by the court of competent jurisdiction keeping in view the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, this Court shall be reluctant to interfere with such judgment of acquittal. 8. The penal laws in India are primarily based upon certain fundamental procedural values, which are right to fair trial and presumption of innocence. A person is presumed to be innocent till proven guilty and once held to be not guilty of a criminal charge, he enjoys the benefit of such presumption which could be interfered with only for valid and proper reasons. An appeal against acquittal has always been differentiated from a normal appeal against conviction. Wherever there is perversity of facts and/or law appearing in the judgment, the appellate court would be within its jurisdiction to interfere with the judgment of acquittal, but otherwise such interference is not called for.” Thereafter, in the above case a large number of judgments were discussed and then it was opined as under:- “10. There is a very thin but a fine distinction between an appeal against conviction on the one hand and acquittal on the other. There is a very thin but a fine distinction between an appeal against conviction on the one hand and acquittal on the other. The preponderance of judicial opinion of this Court is that there is no substantial difference between an appeal against conviction and an appeal against acquittal except that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal the Court keeps in view the position that the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused has been fortified by his acquittal and if the view adopted by the High Court is a reasonable one and the conclusion reached by it had its grounds well set out on the materials on record, the acquittal may not be interfered with. Thus, this fine distinction has to be kept in mind by the Court while exercising its appellate jurisdiction. The golden rule is that the Court is obliged and it will not abjure its duty to prevent miscarriage of justice, where interference is imperative and the ends of justice so require and it is essential to appease the judicial conscience.” No other argument was raised. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered view that the learned trial Court has not committed any error of law while passing the impugned judgment of acquittal. No patent illegality or perversity has been pointed out, which is sine qua non to interfere in a judgment of acquittal. No case for interference has been made out. Resultantly, the present application stands dismissed.