Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 1677 (PNJ)

Ram Lal v. Pawan Kumar

2012-12-01

RAJAN GUPTA

body2012
Rajan Gupta, J.;— Notice of the main case was issued to respondent no. 2 in the court. Mr. Jagjit Singh, Advocate has accepted the notice on behalf of respondent no. 2-insurance company. With the consent of parties, this court proceeds to dispose of the main case. Appellants have filed this appeal to impugn the order passed by tribunal seeking enhancement of compensation. Learned counsel for the appellants has primarily raised the plea that claim being under section 163-A of the Act, multiplier should be according to age of the deceased and not the parents. Plea has been opposed by learned counsel representing respondent no. 2. According to him, adequate compensation has been granted by the tribunal. Thus, award passed by the tribunal needs to be upheld. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. An accident occurred on 11.01.2009 when Vikas @ Sonu (deceased) along with Sandeep and Manoj was coming from Sonepat to Bahalgarh Canter Union in a Canter being driven by him. When he reached between Petrol pump and Canter Union, then all of a sudden a cow came in front of the vehicle. In order to save the cow, he swerved his Canter towards left side. The vehicle suddenly turned turtle. Vikas @ Sonu sustained grievous injuries on his person. He was shifted to General hospital, Sonepat but he succumbed to his injuries on the way. A claim petition was preferred by parents of the deceased claiming compensation. Tribunal came to the conclusion that accident had occurred on account of rash and negligent driving by driver of the offending vehicles. While deciding compensation, it assessed income of the deceased as `3,000/- p.m. It deducted 1/3rd therefrom as expenses for personal use. As the deceased was a bachelor, age of parents was taken into consideration and applicable multiplier was found to be 16. Applying multiplier of 16, it arrived at a figure of `3,84,000/-(`24000x16). Another sum of `2,000/- was granted on account of funeral and last rites. Total compensation was, thus, worked out as `3,86,000/-. Only plea raised before this court is that claim being under section 163-A of the Act, multiplier should be according to age of the deceased and not parents. I do not find merit in the plea of counsel for the appellants. In the judgment of the apex court reported as Vijay Shankar Shinde & ors. Only plea raised before this court is that claim being under section 163-A of the Act, multiplier should be according to age of the deceased and not parents. I do not find merit in the plea of counsel for the appellants. In the judgment of the apex court reported as Vijay Shankar Shinde & ors. vs. State of Maharashtra (2008) 2 SCC 670 , the issue of multiplier to be applied in claim under section 163-A was considered. The apex court observed as follows:- "6. We have given anxious consideration to these contentions and are of the opinion that the same are devoid of any merits. Considering the law laid down in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Charlie AIR 2005 SC 2157 , it is clear that the choice of multiplier is determined by the age of the deceased or claimants whichever is higher. Admittedly, the age of the father was 55 years. The question of mother's age never cropped up because that was not the contention raised even before the Trial Court or before us. Taking the age to be 55 years, in our opinion, the courts below have not committed any illegality in applying the multiplier of 8 since the father was running 56th year of his life. 7. The learned Counsel relying on the 2nd Schedule of the Act contended that the deceased being about 16 or 17 years of age, a multiplier of 16 or 17 should have been granted. It is undoubtedly true that Section 163A was brought on the Statute book to shorten the period of litigation. The burden to prove the negligence or fault on the part of driver and other allied burdens u/s 140 or 166 were really cumbersome and time consuming. Therefore as a part of social justice, a system was introduced via Section 163A wherein such burden was avoided and thereby a speedy remedy was provided. The relief u/s 163-A has been held not to be additional but alternate. The Schedule provided has been threadbare discussed in various pronouncements including Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. AIR 2004 SC 2107 . 2nd Schedule is to be used not only referring to age of victim but also other factors relevant therefore. Complicated questions of facts and law arising in accident cases cannot be answered all times by relying on mathematical equations. Ltd. AIR 2004 SC 2107 . 2nd Schedule is to be used not only referring to age of victim but also other factors relevant therefore. Complicated questions of facts and law arising in accident cases cannot be answered all times by relying on mathematical equations. In fact in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Trilok Chandra (1996) 4 SCC 362 , Ahmedi, J. (As the Chief Justice then was) has pointed out the shortcomings in the said Schedule and has held that the Schedule can only be used as a guide. It was also held that the selection of multiplier cannot in all cases be solely dependent on the age of the deceased. If a young man is killed in the accident leaving behind aged parents who may not survive long enough to match with a high multiplier provided by the 2nd Schedule, then the Court has to offset such high multiplier and balance the same with the short life expectancy of the claimants. That precisely has happened in this case. Age of the parents was held as a relevant factor in case of minor's death in recent decision in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Syed Ibrahim and Ors. AIR 2008 SC 103 . In our considered opinion, the Courts below rightly struck the said balance." In view of law laid down by the apex court in Shinde’s case (supra), I am of the considered view that tribunal has rightly applied the multiplier according to age of the parents. Accordingly, no interference is required in appellate jurisdiction of this court. Appeal is without any merit and is hereby dismissed. As the appeal has been heard and decided on merits, application for condonation of delay does not survive.