Judgment Heard the counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner is a Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling its products, which according to the respondents, are the milk or the milk products and are covered under the Entry No.9 of Clause 8 of the Schedule appended to the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, describing the commodity falling under Section 2(1)(a) of the Act of 1960 as all the products of the petitioner are either milk as such or milk products, which falls under the category of animal husbandry products. The petitioner's contention is that the State Government issued one notification on 21.8.1984 and excluded the “liquid milk” from the 'milk', the Entry No.9 under the heading of the 'Animal Husbandry Products', therefore, the liquid milk stands excluded. However, the petitioner's all products are not liquid milk and are specific products and when these products as such, by their names, were not in the Schedule referred above, the State of Bihar introduce some of the petitioner's products by their trade name in the Schedule by notification, which is issued on 10.04.2001. Before this notification, out of the State of Bihar, the State of Jharkhand was created and it may be true that the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, was adopted by the State of Jharkhand, but the notification dated 10.04.2001 neither could have been adopted nor it was adopted. It is submitted that the notification to include the certain products in the Schedule of the Act of 1960 is the legislative Act and after creation of the State of Jharkhand, only the State legislature could have taken a decision to amend, alter or modify any statutory Schedule. A decision taken by the State of Bihar to add and include some products in the Schedule was within their legislative competence of the legislature of the State of Bihar. Therefore, that notification has no force in the State of Jharkhand. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that when an Entry is not in any Schedule and is sought to be introduced by way of notification, then, that means that in original Schedule that product was not included. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the issuance of the notification by the State of Bihar clearly indicate that the products of the petitioner were not included in the Schedule. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the issuance of the notification by the State of Bihar clearly indicate that the products of the petitioner were not included in the Schedule. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that in the Schedule the “milk” is a specific entry and the petitioner's products are having distinct and specific names and they have their own specific uses, like the 'Amul Spray' is baby food and a milk powder meant only for infants and in the same way, where other products are prepared, they are having their own specific uses and their names are known and therefore, they are required to be in the Schedule by their own name (trade name, generic name or commercial name) in view of the fact that even the State legislative wisdom in the State of Bihar intended to include the products of the petitioner's own company, then it included the petitioner's product by their own commercial name. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Subhro Sanyal also submitted that after creation of the State of Jharkhand, the Entry of “milk”, though may be in the Schedule, but that has not been again notified under Sections 3 and 4 after creation of new State, therefore, entry in schedule as such cannot create any liability without declaration under Sections 3 and 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. Versus State of Bihar, reported in (1999) 9 SCC 620 has considered the facts of the case of one another manufacturer of the baby food in the trade name of “Lactodex' and “Raptakos” and after seeing all ingredients of those products, Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly declared that those two products are not covered under the category of the “milk” or the “milk products”, and therefore, held that no market fee can be levied. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the said judgment was considered in the case of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samity, Narsinghpur Versus Shiv Shakti Khansari Udyog and Others reported in (2012) 9 SCC 368 and the ratio of the said judgment has been again approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the said judgment was considered in the case of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samity, Narsinghpur Versus Shiv Shakti Khansari Udyog and Others reported in (2012) 9 SCC 368 and the ratio of the said judgment has been again approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court delivered in case of Indian National Shipowners' Association Versus Union of India reported in 2009 (14) S.T.R. 289 (Bom.) in support of its earlier arguments that if there is a introduction of the new entry and inclusion of certain services in that entry presupposes that there was no earlier entry covering the said service. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to the supplementary affidavit filed on 08.08.2011 which was filed after the order of this Court dated 07.07.2011 whereby this Court directed the petitioner to furnish the ingredients of its products in question by simply stating that how much of the dried milk powder is used quantity wise in their products by weight and also give details of Protein, Fat, Carbohydrates, Vitamins A, D, B6, B12, C and K, Thiamine, Riboflavin, Micotinamide, Folic Acid, Pantothenic Acid, Biotin, Choline, Calcium, Phosphorus, Iron, Copper, Iodine, Maganese, Zinc, Sodium, Potassium, Chloride, Magnesium and Calories which remain in the dried milk and how much quantity in the above referred contents is increased in the process of manufacture of the product. Along with its affidavit one Annexure has been annexed giving details the contents of one of the product. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted another supplementary affidavit dated 25.08.2011 and gave the composition of its other products. In sum and substance, the contention of the petitioner is firstly, from mere mentioning of the 'milk' in the Schedule appended to the Bihar Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1960 will not include the petitioner's product which are meant for specific purpose and meant for differently used. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that if intention of the legislature was to levy market fee on the products which are manufactured by the petitioner then each product of milk manufactured by the petitioner should have been added in the Schedule as was sought to be done by the State of Bihar which issued notification to include the specific articles in the Schedule. It is also submitted that in fact the entry 7 & 8 in the name of Butter and Ghee are also only species of the milk and the milk is a generic name, therefore, once Butter and Ghee have mentioned specifically in the entries in the Schedule, then the State should have added the word 'baby food' also in the schedule which has not been added, and therefore, the State should not have levied the market fee. Learned counsel confined his argument only for one product, i.e. “Amul Spray” and candidly did not seriously question levy of market fee on other products except it's product chocolate. 5. Controverting the arguments, the learned counsel for the Marketing Committee, Sri V.P. Singh, Sr. Advocate vehemently submitted that the issue is no more resintegra in view of the fact that the Full Bench of this Court after considering the Belsund Sugar Co. case (Supra) in the case of Lipton India Ltd. Vs State of Bihar reported in (2003)4 J.C.R. 197 has held that “Anik Spray” is a dried skimmed milk powder and is a milk product and its basic ingredients of 'milk' remains in the skimmed milk powder and therefore, the respondents can demand the market fee on the sale of Anik Spray. It is submitted that the product of the petitioner is not different then the product of the Lipton Company which is also manufacturing the commodity of the same nature. It is submitted that different names will not make the actual product different, if that is not in fact different. Not only this, the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner of Sasa Musa Sugar Works Vs. State of Bihar reported in (1996) 9 SCC 681 , Belsund Sugar Co.(Supra) and several other judgments have been considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Plywood Association and Others Vs. State of Jharkhand and Others and connected petitions wherein it has been held wood includes plywood, ply board which are though commercially having different names, but are agricultural produce. 6. It is also submitted that the definition of agricultural produce is given in the Sub Clause (a) of Sub Section1 of Section2 of the Act of 1960 which is very wide and it covers all the products of the categories mentioned in the definition clause, which includes, animal husbandry products. 6. It is also submitted that the definition of agricultural produce is given in the Sub Clause (a) of Sub Section1 of Section2 of the Act of 1960 which is very wide and it covers all the products of the categories mentioned in the definition clause, which includes, animal husbandry products. Milk is animal husbandry product and all the items produced and manufactured by the petitioner are only milk product. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that in view of the binding judgment of Full Bench of this Court, which has attained the finality also and which has been rendered after considering the judgment of the Belsund's case (Supra) products in questions except chocolate are the milk products, and therefore, the respondents have rightly levied the market fee. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that, before the creation of State of Jharkhand all the laws, which were in force, and which have been adopted, they stand adopted with all the notifications which were issued prior to the creation of the State of Jharkhand because of the plain and simple reason that once one Act is adopted, all Rules and actions, orders and notifications issued under those orders, also stand adopted. However, learned counsel for the respondents could not controvert the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner that subsequent to the creation of the State of Jharkhand, if the notification issued by the State of Bihar than that is not binding upon the State of Jharkhand and is not enforceable in the State of Jharkhand. 8. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the facts of the case. We are of the considered opinion that the definition as given in Section2(1)(a) of Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 and adopted by the State of Bihar is unambiguously clear and it includes all produces, whether processed and unprocessed, manufactured or not of agricultural, horticultural, plantation, animal husbandry, forest, sericulture, pisciculture and includes the live stock or poultry as specified in the Schedule VIII. There is entry of the word 'milk'. By notification dated 21.08.1984 from the 'milk', 'liquid milk' has been excluded. Meaning thereby, as back as in the year 1984, the legislature took conscious decision to exclude “liquid milk” “from the ambit of levy of market fee and kept” other than “liquid milk” for levy of market fee. There is entry of the word 'milk'. By notification dated 21.08.1984 from the 'milk', 'liquid milk' has been excluded. Meaning thereby, as back as in the year 1984, the legislature took conscious decision to exclude “liquid milk” “from the ambit of levy of market fee and kept” other than “liquid milk” for levy of market fee. If the word 'milk' is in the Schedule, after the notification dated 21.08.2008 was not intended to mean the 'dried milk' or milk in the powder form, then the legislature would have deleted the entry 'milk' itself from the said Schedule. We are unable to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that milk is a generic name and Butter and Ghee are its species and are not independent goods, therefore, Butter and Ghee have been mentioned in the Schedule separately. In our opinion, Butter and Ghee are distinct commercially and publically known to be a separate commodity which is being fully understood by the layman even in common parlance, therefore, Butter and Ghee have been included separately in the said entry. But specific entry of Butter and Ghee in the Schedule does not indicate that narrowed down entry of milk (excluding liquid milk), which means dried milk, milk powder or not within such definition. 10. However, a question now remains is with respect to the petitioner's product particularly of products which are sold and particularly one in the name of baby food for which much stress is there. It has been strenuously argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is producing said product with the help of very sophisticated machineries and under the advice of scientists and are preparing food for the infants which includes in it Vitamins and essentials ingredients for the nourishment of the infants and the petitioner's product has not been included in the schedule by their name generic, commercial or trade name. 11. 11. We are of the considered opinion that in the Schedule as far as possible, the items are mentioned to make the coverage of the item clear and sometimes generic names are mentioned so as to cover the large number of the product of the generic name but so is done for clarification purpose but not for the purpose to exclude other product of main entry in the Schedule which are covered by virtue of Section 2(1)(a) of the Act of 1960. However, giving a brand name or trade name in the Schedule, is normally not known. In our opinion, the fee is on the commodity and its product under the Act of 1960 and not on the trade name and in our opinion it cannot be on the basis of trade name because of the reason that trade name itself is not goods and trade name is a property of holder of the trade name and governed by specific central law. Not only this, mentioning of the trade name in the Schedule, will make the law absolutely unworkable because of the plain and simple reason that same and similar products may be produced by several manufactures and in that situation, all products of their trade name will be required to be mentioned in the Schedule which is not possible. The problem will not be solved by mentioning all manufacturer's all products name in the Schedule but problem will be grave as same or new manufactures are likely to come up with their new trade names for the same product and from the same agricultural or animal husbandry produce. Then, in that situation, it will be absolutely unworkable for any Government to issue notification for including the commodity by trade name. Therefore, so far as the petitioner's contention that in the State of Bihar one notification was issued to include some of the petitioner's product by their trade name like Amul Spray necessarily means that commodity was not included in the Schedule is not intended to be included by the legislative wisdom cannot be accepted. In that situation, one more problem will be there as, when any one will be selling the product without any trade name and as such, then he will not be liable to pay the fee, but if he sells the commodity by using the trade name, then he will be liable to pay the fee. In that situation, one more problem will be there as, when any one will be selling the product without any trade name and as such, then he will not be liable to pay the fee, but if he sells the commodity by using the trade name, then he will be liable to pay the fee. Therefore, in Schedule, it is sufficient to give the generic or commercially known name of the commodity all their products covered under Section 2 (1)(a) of the Act of 1960 are subject to levy of market fee. 12. More thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is based on the finding given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Belsund Sugar Co. case (Supra) wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court mentioned in the judgment, the ingredients in detail of the “Lactodex' and “Raptakos” and declared that above two products are meant for use of the infant who cannot take milk in its natural form. Learned counsel for the petitioner also tried to distinguish the Full Bench judgment of this Court delivered in the case of Lipton India Ltd. and submitted that in the Lipton India Ltd. case, the Full Bench judgment was rendered because the writ petitioner did not place before the Full Bench the material particulars in the pleadings, and therefore, the said commodity which was under consideration before the Full Bench of this Court, was held to be agricultural produce. However, it is not disputed that Lipton's product is also the dried milk and in the form of powder. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the ingredients of the products of the petitioner's baby food are same as of “Lactodex' and “Raptakos” therefore, in view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court judgment delivered in the case of Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd., the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court cannot be relied upon. 13. We are of the considered opinion that the definition of the Animal Husbandry in the Act is very clear and the product of the petitioner, particularly in the name of the category of baby food is dried milk powder only. This product is produced, by machines, by spraying the milk on the Hot Rollers to evaporate water contents of the milk resulting into remaining the solid contents of the milk in powder form. This product is produced, by machines, by spraying the milk on the Hot Rollers to evaporate water contents of the milk resulting into remaining the solid contents of the milk in powder form. Undisputedly, if water is added, then the said milk powder gives properties of the milk and looking to the process as such indicated and the ingredients as has been shown in the Annexures annexed with supplementary affidavit as Annexures32 & 33, we are of the considered opinion that the milk powder is only physically changed form of liquid milk. In the petition, it has not been explained if dried milk or milk powder are not falling in the 'milk' then what is the meaning of the deletion of the 'liquid milk' from the 'milk' by notification dated 21.08.1984. The said notification was not before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as is apparent from the reasons given in the judgment of Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. The liquified powder milk can be used for all same purposes for which liquid milk can be used, therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner's product, particularly the milk powder for which much stress has been given by the petitioner is the solidified form of milk and certainly falling in the milk product. So far as Butter and Ghee are concerned, they are already specifically included in the Schedule in the entry nos. 7 & 8. All milk powder, skimmed milk powder or any milk powder sold under any of the trade name by the petitioner falls in the category of 'milk' as well as milk product. However, learned counsel for the petitioner, at this stage, submitted that for other products, the petitioner may concede that they may be covered for levy of the market fee, but Amul Spray being a baby food specifically meant for infant is not covered. However, we have rejected that contention of the petitioner. 14. We are of the view that Amul Cheese, Amul Cheese Sprayed as well as Sagar Tea Coffee, Amul Shreekhand, Amul Whole Milk Powder, Sagar Skimmed Milk, Bal Amul, Amulya, Amul Spray are the milk products. However, we are of the considered opinion that the Amul Chocolate is a independent and separate product and the respondents cannot levy the fee over Amul Chocolate. 15. However, we are of the considered opinion that the Amul Chocolate is a independent and separate product and the respondents cannot levy the fee over Amul Chocolate. 15. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner with respect to the non issuance of the fresh notification under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 1960 are concerned, we are of the opinion that there is no force in the submission because of the reasons that laws which are in force before the creation of the State of Jharkhand, if adopted, then, they stand adopted along with the notification and the orders passed under the Act which were issued prior to the creation of the State of Jharkhand. 16. Therefore, the writ petition of the petitioner is dismissed, however, no order as to costs. 17. The interim order dated 13.03.2002 is vacated.