JUDGMENT Mr. Ranjit Singh, J.: - The petitioner seeks quashing of the Arbitration Award dated 20.02.2008 and order dated 15.04.2010 passed by respondent No. 2/Registrar, Cooperative Societies, holding that the appeal against the arbitration award would not be maintainable before him. The petitioner also prays for writ of mandamus commanding respondent No. 2 to decide an appeal filed by it before the Registrar. 2. Respondent No. 3 was allotted the work for construction of LIG houses in Sector 15, Panchkula in terms of three different agreements. The petitioner sought reference of the dispute in regard to the construction work of 58, 76 and 82 LIG houses in Sector 15, at Panchkula against Haryana Housing Board. On 28.12.1987, the Arbitrator Sh. M.L. Dhami passed three awards allowing amount of Rs.95,328/-, Rs.1,05,240/- and Rs.1,11,750/- lakh in favour of the petitioner with regard to the abovesaid work. The payment was made by the Haryana Housing Board to the petitioner. 3. Respondent No. 3 sought reference of some more dispute against the petitioner with regard to the work of construction. Respondent No. 2 appointed Sh. S.P. Grover, Engineer-in-Chief as an Arbitrator under Section 103 of the Haryana Co-operative Societies Act, 1984 on 08.09.1985. The Arbitrator gave three awards on 19.05.1996, which are annexed as Annexures P-2 to P-4. The petitioner as well as respondent No. 3 filed an appeal against the same under Section 114 of the Act. The appeals were dismissed on 15.04.1997. The petitioner made payment of the awarded amount to respondent No. 3 with interest at the rate of 15% in accordance with Awards. 4. In the year 2007, respondent No. 3 again sought reference for appointment of Arbitrator with regard to the working of construction of same LIG houses. This time, respondent No. 2 appointed Sh. P.S. Rawat as Arbitrator. The petitioner moved an application for change of Arbitrator on 14.02.2008. The application for change was delivered on 15.02.2008 but the arbitration proceedings were closed on the said date. The award was pronounced on 20.02.2008. The Arbitrator, however, was changed by respondent No. 2 on 28.03.2008. The changed Arbitrator namely Sh. V.N. Grover made an Award but respondent No. 3 did not appear and was proceeded exparte. The petitioner filed an appeal against the same on 15.04.2010 but was dismissed being not maintainable. The revision against the same was also dismissed on 03.08.2011. The Arbitrator, however, was changed by respondent No. 2 on 28.03.2008. The changed Arbitrator namely Sh. V.N. Grover made an Award but respondent No. 3 did not appear and was proceeded exparte. The petitioner filed an appeal against the same on 15.04.2010 but was dismissed being not maintainable. The revision against the same was also dismissed on 03.08.2011. The petitioner has, accordingly, challenged these orders through the present writ petition. Pleading that these are liable to be quashed being illegal, his appeal would be maintainable against the award so passed. 5. In support, the counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the provisions of Section 114 (1) (k), which provides that the appeal would lie against the decision or the award made under Section 103. Pleading that award passed is under Section 103, Registrar, the counsel would submit that the appeal against the order would be maintainable. In support of his submission, he has also relied upon Harchand Singh versus The Khiala Kalan Agricultural Co-operative Service Society Ltd., Khiala Kalan teh. Mansa, Distt. Bhatinda and others 1983 PLR 161 . 6. The respondents have opposed the prayer as made. Counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 would refer to an agreement, Annexure P-1, annexed with the petition, where the parties had agreed to refer to the disputes if any arising between the parties to the sole arbitrator and under the provisions of Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. The relevant clause in this regard reads as under:- “If, at any time, during the progress of the work or after completion or at any time during the continuance of this agreement, any dispute or differences arise between the Federation and the Society the same shall be referred to the arbitration of the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Haryana as the sole arbitrator and the provision of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, shall apply. The decision, so given shall be final and binding upon the parties.” 7. Counsel would, accordingly, contend that in view of this agreement, the arbitration was to be held under the Arbitration Act, 1940 and not under the Cooperative Societies Act. Plea is that there is no question of any implied inclusion of the provisions of Cooperative Societies Act in view of the specific agreement between the parties as referred to above. 8. Counsel would, accordingly, contend that in view of this agreement, the arbitration was to be held under the Arbitration Act, 1940 and not under the Cooperative Societies Act. Plea is that there is no question of any implied inclusion of the provisions of Cooperative Societies Act in view of the specific agreement between the parties as referred to above. 8. In the reply filed, it is urged that the respondent is the Cooperative Labour and Construction Society Ltd. and is engaged in construction of different projects on contractual basis. One agreement executed between the petitioner and the answering respondent is attached with the petition. By making reference to the clause of agreement concerning the Arbitration, it is urged that bare perusal would show that the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would apply to the proceedings, which were commenced after coming into force the said Act. It is, accordingly, pleaded that the appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 114 of the Haryana Cooperative Societies Act was rightly dismissed by the Registrar being not maintainable. The plea, accordingly, is to dismiss the petition, which lacks in merit. 9. The Division Bench in the case of Harchand (supra), in my view, was considering the proposition in the entirely different context. The issue before the Division Bench arose out of FAO, where it was contended that the civil Court had jurisdiction to try an application under Section 33 and that it had erroneously held otherwise. In this context, the Court noticed that though Section 33 of the Arbitration Act refers in terms to an arbitration agreement yet by virtue of Section 46 of the said Act, it would become applicable to every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force. The Court has, accordingly, observed that the Arbitration Act would apply to the statutory arbitration including those under the Societies Act unless there is an express or implied bar in the latter or its provisions are inconsistent with the same or any rules made thereunder. Thus, the view, which would emerge from this is that the Arbitration Act would apply to the statutory arbitration including those under the Societies Act unless there is an express or implied bar. Besides the issue in the Harchand’s case (supra) is considered in clearly different context. The Court was never considering the procedure to be adopted by the Arbitrator between two parties. Besides the issue in the Harchand’s case (supra) is considered in clearly different context. The Court was never considering the procedure to be adopted by the Arbitrator between two parties. In this case, there is specific agreement, where the petitioner and respondent No. 3 agreed to abide by the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1940. 10. Counsel for the respondent has come up with some justification and has referred to the case of Punjab State Cooperative Supply and Marketing Federation Ltd. versus M/s Shiv Rice and General Mills, 2000 AIR (Punjab) 333 to urge that after commencement of 1996 Act, Act of 1940 would apply only in the cases, where the claim for appointment or reference of dispute to Arbitrator was pending on the date of commencing of 1996 Act where no proceedings for arbitration were pending on that date, the proceedings would be governed by Act of 1996. Though this does not exactly deal with the issue that the petitioner had raised in the petition but, in my view, the arbitration proceedings, in this case, would have to be governed in terms of agreement. The agreed terms cannot be excluded from consideration by implying that this was an arbitration between two cooperative societies and on that count arbitration proceedings would be governed under the provisions of the Arbitration Act. If the intention was to apply the Cooperative Societies act, this was required to be so mentioned and there may not have been much need to abide by the some agreed terms in this regard. 11. Taking these facts into consideration, the opinion formed by the Registrar cannot be faulted, where he has held that the appeal is not maintainable against the Arbitration award, which is primarily being governed by the Arbitration Act and not by the Co-operative Societies Act. The petitioner may invoke its remedy against this award as provided under the Arbitration Act. No case for interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction against the impugned order is made out. 12. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. ---------0.B.S.0------------