JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dilip Gupta, J.—Ishan Systems Pvt. Ltd. having its registered office at New Delhi has filed this petition for quashing the order dated 10th July, 2012 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Delhi by which the application filed by the petitioner under Section 17(1) of ‘’The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002' (hereinafter referred to as the 2002 Act’) has been rejected. 2. The petitioner had filed the said application under Section 17(1) of the 2002 Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III at Delhi for quashing the auction notice dated 31st October, 2011 issued by M/s. Phoenix ARC Private Limited, Mumbai for sale of the property of the petitioner as also the auction proceedings held on 5th December, 2011 at New Delhi. 3. It is for this reason that a preliminary objection was raised by Sri Naveen Sinha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for M/s. Phoenix ARC Private Limited, Mumbai and Sri Suresh Dutt Dobhal, learned counsel appearing for M/s. Optiemus Infracom Limited, New Delhi that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition as the order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III at New Delhi has been challenged and no cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In this connection learned Senior Counsel for the respondents have placed before the Court the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ambica Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2007) 6 SCC 769 . It is also their submission that in any case the petitioner has an equally efficacious alternative remedy of filing an appeal under Section 18 of the 2002 Act before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal at Delhi and reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and others, (2010) 8 SCC 110 . 4. Sri Chetan Sharma and Sri Ravikant, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner have, however, submitted that this Court will have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter as the property in question is in NOIDA which is within the jurisdiction of this Court. 4. Sri Chetan Sharma and Sri Ravikant, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner have, however, submitted that this Court will have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter as the property in question is in NOIDA which is within the jurisdiction of this Court. Learned Senior Counsel have emphasised that the relief claimed in this petition is also for a direction upon the respondents to deliver physical possession of the property situated at NOIDA and, therefore, under Article 226(2) of the Constitution this Court will have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition as part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. They have pointed out that it is for this reason that this Court had not only entertained Writ Petition No. 8409 of 2012 earlier filed by the petitioner but had also issued certain directions. It is also their submission that as the constitutional right of enjoyment of property of the petitioner under Article 300-A of the Constitution has been infringed and the order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III at Delhi is perverse since the provisions of Rules 8 and 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules’) have not been followed, this Court should entertain the writ petition and for this purpose have placed reliance on the decision of the Orissa High Court in M/s. Jholei Baba Agency v. State Bank of India, AIR 2009 Orissa 109 and the Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in M/s. Sterling Agro Industries Ltd. v. Union of India and others, AIR 2011 Del 174. It is also their submission that since the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal had earlier formed an opinion while deciding the appeal filed against the grant of interim order by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the petitioner should not be compelled to avail of the alternative remedy provided for under Section 18 of the Act. In this connection learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner have placed before the Court the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana and others, (1985) 3 SCC 267 ; Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others, (1998) 8 SCC 1 and Asha Prasad v. Chandrakant Gopalka and others, (2003) 12 SCC 347. 5. 5. The first question that arises for consideration in this petition is whether this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition because if this Court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition then the submissions advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner on merits of the case or the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents about alternative remedy will not be required to be examined. 6. In order to examine the preliminary objection, it would be useful to briefly examine the facts leading to the auction notice and the auction of the property. 7. It transpires from the record of the writ petition that Vijaya Bank having its office at New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the 'Bank’) sanctioned loan to the petitioner which has its registered office at New Delhi and for this purpose property was mortgaged in favour of the Bank but the Bank after classifying the loan as a Non-Performing Asset issued the notice under Section 13(2) of the 2002 Act on 31st October, 2009 and demanded an amount of Rs. 42,74,98,205.85 with interest from the petitioner. Notice under Section 13(4) of the 2002 Act was also issued and on 7th May, 2010 the Bank took symbolic possession of the secured assets of the petitioner. On 30th June, 2010 the Bank assigned the secured assets/securities in favour of respondent No. 2-M/s. Phoenix ARC Private Limited, Mumbai by a registered deed and on 16th July, 2010 the Bank gave the symbolic possession of the secured assets to M/s. Phoenix ARC Private Limited, Mumbai. 8. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid proceedings initiated under the 2002 Act by the Bank and the assignee Company in various proceedings. A writ petition was filed in the Delhi High Court, an application was earlier filed under Section 17(1) of the 2002 Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal at Delhi and transfer applications before the Supreme Court but without any success. In fact in the appeal filed by M/s. Phoenix ARC Private Limited and Vijaya Bank before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, a statement was made on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner would have no objection to the assignment of the debt by the Bank in favour of M/s. Phoenix ARC Private Limited, Mumbai and that it was ready to surrender the physical possession of the secured assets to the assignee Company. The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, accordingly, directed the Authorised Officer of the M/s. Phoenix ARC Private Limited, Mumbai to take physical possession of the property but gave liberty to the petitioner to question the auction proceedings if the same were not conducted in accordance with law. 9. Accordingly, M/s. Phoenix ARC Private Limited, Mumbai took physical possession of the secured assets and thereafter issued the auction notice on 25th July, 2011 for sale of the property on 5th September, 2011 with Rs. 125 Crores as the reserve price. This notice was assailed by the petitioner by filing an application No. 367 of 2011 under Section 17(1) of the 2002 Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and on 1st September, 2011, the Debts Recovery Tribunal permitted M/s. Phoenix ARC Private Limited, Mumbai to hold the auction but confirmation of sale was made subject to the outcome of the application. As no person turned up in terms of the auction notice dated 25th July, 2011, another auction notice was issued by M/s. Phoenix ARC Private Limited, Mumbai on 8th September, 2011 with a reduced reserve price of Rs. 112.5 Crores and the sale was scheduled to be held on 10th October, 2011 but this time also no one appeared. Another auction notice was then issued by M/s. Phoenix ARC Private Limited, Mumbai on 31st October, 2011 for sale to be held on 5th December, 2011 with the same reserve price of Rs. 112.5 Crores. This time two bids were received from M/s. Wishtree Developers Pvt. Ltd. for Rs. 112.75 Crores and from M/s. Optiemus Infracom Limited (respondent No. 1 in this petition) for Rs. 113.01 Crores. A letter dated 5th December, 2011 was thereafter issued by M/s. Phoenix ARC Private Limited, Mumbai declaring M/s. Optiemus Infracom Limited, New Delhi as the highest bidder and it was required to deposit the remaining 70% amount within 15 days. Another letter dated 5th December, 2011 was sent by M/s. Phoenix ARC Private Limited, Mumbai to M/s. Optiemus Infracom Limited, New Delhi to confirm the sale of the immovable property on as is where is basis. This fact was brought to the notice of the Debts Recovery Tribunal in S.A. No. 367 of 2011 and when the matter was taken up on 12th December, 2011, the petitioner withdrew the said S.A. No. 367 of 2011. This fact was brought to the notice of the Debts Recovery Tribunal in S.A. No. 367 of 2011 and when the matter was taken up on 12th December, 2011, the petitioner withdrew the said S.A. No. 367 of 2011. The petitioner then filed another application under Section 17(1) of the 2002 Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal at Delhi. On 19th December, 2011, the Debts Recovery Tribunal issued notice to the opposite parties and directed the Authorised Officer not to confirm the sale but liberty was given to receive the balance amount of the sale consideration from M/s. Optiemus Infracom Limited, New Delhi. 10. This interim order dated 19th December, 2011 was assailed by both M/s. Optiemus Infracom Limited, New Delhi and M/s. Phoenix ARC Private Limited, Mumbai before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in two Appeals which were numbered as M.A. No. 456/11 and M.A. No. 457/11. The Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi by the order dated 24th January, 2012 set aside the interim order dated 19th December, 2011 with a direction to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Delhi to dispose of the application in accordance with law without being influenced by any observation/expression of opinion made in the order. 11. The petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 8409 of 2012 before the Allahabad High Court to assail the order dated 24th January, 2012 passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi. The writ petition was disposed of on 14th February, 2012 with these observations : “........................... Having examined the records of the present writ petition, this Court finds no good ground to interfere with the order of the appellate authority. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case on record, following directions are being issued: (a) The Debt Recovery Tribunal shall proceed to consider and decide the application made by the petitioner being S.A. No. 714 of 2011 at the earliest possible without granting any unnecessary adjournment to either of the parties. In any case, the application must be finally decided within two months from the date a certified copy of this order is filed before the Tribunal concerned. (b) Any observations made by the appellate authority under the order impugned shall not prejudice the rights of either of the parties nor the Tribunal shall be influenced by any observations made by the appellate authority under the order impugned in any manner. (b) Any observations made by the appellate authority under the order impugned shall not prejudice the rights of either of the parties nor the Tribunal shall be influenced by any observations made by the appellate authority under the order impugned in any manner. (c) The auction purchaser is restrained from making any further transfer of the property in question. Any constructions raised shall abide by the orders to be passed in the pending application before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. With the aforesaid observations/directions the present writ petition is disposed of finally.” 12. The Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Delhi by the order dated 10th July, 2012 rejected the application filed by the petitioner under Section 17(1) of the 2002 Act and it is against this order that the present petition has been filed. 13. The Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal have been constituted under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the 1993 Act’). 14. The “Tribunal” has been defined under Section 2(o) of the 1993 Act to mean : “(o) “Tribunal” means the Tribunal established under sub-section (I) of section 3.” 15. Section 3 of the 1993 Act deals with the establishment of Tribunal and is as follows : “3 Establishment of Tribunal.—(1) The Central Government shall, by notification, establish one or more Tribunals, to be known as the Debts Recovery Tribunal, to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on such Tribunal by or under this Act. (2) The Central Government shall also specify, in the notification referred to in sub-section (1), the areas within which the Tribunal may exercise jurisdiction for entertaining and deciding the applications filed before it.” 16. The “Appellate Tribunal” has been defined under Section 2(a) of the 1993 Act to mean as follows : “2(a) “Appellate Tribunal” means an Appellate Tribunal established under sub-section (1) of Section 8.” 17. The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal is established under Section 8 of the 1993 Act which is as follows : “8. Establishment of Appellate Tribunal.—(1) The Central Government shall, by notification, establish one or more Appellate Tribunals, to be known as the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on such Tribunal by or under this Act. Establishment of Appellate Tribunal.—(1) The Central Government shall, by notification, establish one or more Appellate Tribunals, to be known as the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on such Tribunal by or under this Act. (2) The Central Government shall also specify in the notification, referred to in sub-section (1) the Tribunals in relation to which the Appellate Tribunal may exercise jurisdiction.” 18. The relevant portion of Sections 17, 18 and 19 of the 1993 Act also need to be referred to and are as follows : “17. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals.—(1) A Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide applications from the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions. (2) An Appellate Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain appeals against any order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act. 18. Bar of Jurisdiction.—On and from the appointed day, no Court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction, powers or authority (except the Supreme Court, and a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to the matters specified in section 17. 19. Application to the Tribunal.—(1) Where a bank or a financial institution has to recover any debt from any person, it may make an application to the Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction— (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the lime of making the application, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of making the application, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.” 19. The Debts Recovery Tribunal-III at Delhi has a specific jurisdiction as prescribed by the notification issued by the Central Government and the petitioner had filed the application under Section 17(1) of the 2002 Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III at Delhi constituted under Section 3(1) of the 1993 Act. The Debts Recovery Tribunal-III at Delhi has a specific jurisdiction as prescribed by the notification issued by the Central Government and the petitioner had filed the application under Section 17(1) of the 2002 Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III at Delhi constituted under Section 3(1) of the 1993 Act. This application was numbered as S.A. No. 714 of 2011 and the description of the parties in the application is as follows : “M/s. Ishan Systems Pvt. Ltd. Through its Director, Shri R.S. Yadav, Registered office: V-255, Arvind Nagar, Ghonda, Delhi-110053. .... Applicant Versus 1. M/s Phoenix ARC Pvt. Ltd. Dani Corporate Park, 7th Floor, 158 CST Road, Kalina, Santa Cruz (E), Mumbai-400 098 (Maharashtra) Also at M/s. Phoenix ARC Pvt. Ltd. G-9, Vikaspuri, New Delhi- 110018. 2. M/s. Optiemus Infracom Limited 317, Competent House, F-14, Connaught Place, New Delhi 110 001 Also at M/s. Optiemus Infracom Limited K-20, 2nd Floor, Lajpat Nagar - II New Delhi- 110 024 .... Defendants.” 20. In the said application, the petitioner made the following averments for the purposes of jurisdiction of the Tribunal : “The applicant declares that the Applicant Company and Defendant reside and work for gain at Delhi within the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Tribunal. .......................... Hence this Hon’ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate this Application.” 21. The relief sought in the application is as follows : “In the premises stated herein above, the Appellant above named most respectfully prays that this Hon’ble Tribunal may kindly be pleased to : (a) quash the auction notice dated 31.10.2011 vide tender document dated 1.11.2011 and auction proceedings dated 5.12.2011 being in violation of the Securitization Act as the property of the applicant has been attempted to sell the property at a throw away price; (b) quash all the proceedings with regard to auction of property bearing No. 2A, Sector 126, Expressway, Noida based on under-valuation of the property; (c) restrain the Defendants/Respondents from any further steps either to create third party or by delivering possession or by delivering the title by the defendant No. 1 to the defendant No. 2 on the basis of the auction conducted in gross violation of the Rules 8 and 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. (d) pass such other or further order (s) that this Hon’ble Tribunal deems just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the instant case and in the interest of justice and equity.” 22. It is seen that the petitioner had specifically stated in the application filed under Section 17(1) of the 2002 Act that the Debts Recovery Tribunal at Delhi will have the jurisdiction to entertain the application since the applicant-Company and the defendants reside and work for gain at Delhi. 23. It has, therefore, to be seen whether the Allahabad High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution against an order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal at Delhi. The provisions of the 1993 Act referred to above leave no manner of doubt that the order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal at Delhi can be assailed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution in the Delhi High Court and not in the Allahabad High Court. 24. In this connection reference needs to be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sita Ram Singhania v. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Ltd. and others, (1999) 4 SCC 382 . It was observed by the Supreme Court that since the proceedings were initiated in State of Madhya Pradesh, the Allahabad High Court will have no jurisdiction and the observations are : “1. We see no reason why the High Courts in such matters filed by the defendants in suits instituted by the banks before the Debt Recovery Tribunal should more or less as a matter of course grant stay of proceedings before the Tribunals. The very purpose of setting up the Tribunals will be lost by granting stay merely because there is challenge to the notification constituting the Tribunal. In the present case, the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that as the proceedings were initiated in the State of Madhya Pradesh, the Allahabad High Court had no jurisdiction. 2. The special leave petition is dismissed.” 25. It will also be appropriate to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ambica Industries (supra) relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the respondents and the relevant portion is quoted below : “3. The appellant herein carries on business at Lucknow. It was assessed at the said place. 2. The special leave petition is dismissed.” 25. It will also be appropriate to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ambica Industries (supra) relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the respondents and the relevant portion is quoted below : “3. The appellant herein carries on business at Lucknow. It was assessed at the said place. The matter, however, ultimately came up before Central Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), New Delhi in Appeal No. E/2792/02-NBC. The said Tribunal exercises jurisdiction in respect of cases arising within the territorial limits of the State of Uttar Pradesh, National Capital Territory of Delhi and the State of Maharashtra. 4. Having regard to the situs of the Tribunal, an appeal in terms of Section 35-G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was filed before the Delhi High Court. A Division Bench of the said Court relying on or on the basis of an earlier Division Bench judgment in Bombay Snuff (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, 2006 (194) ELT 264 (Del) opined that it had no territorial jurisdiction in the matter. ................ 13. The Tribunal, as noticed hereinbefore, exercises jurisdiction over all the three States. In all the three States there are High Courts. In the event, the aggrieved person is treated to be the dominus litis, as a result whereof, he elects to file the appeal before one or the other High Court, the decision of the High Court shall be binding only on the authorities which are within its jurisdiction. It will only be of persuasive value on the authorities functioning under a different jurisdiction. If the binding authority of a High Court does not extend beyond its territorial jurisdiction and the decision of one High Court would not be a binding precedent for other High Courts or Courts or tribunals outside its territorial jurisdiction, some sort of judicial anarchy shall come into play. An assessee, affected by an order of assessment made at Bombay, may invoke the jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court to take advantage of the law laid down by it and which might suit him and thus he would be able to successfully evade the law laid down by the High Court at Bombay. 14. Furthermore, when an appeal is provided under a statute, Parliament must have thought of one High Court. 14. Furthermore, when an appeal is provided under a statute, Parliament must have thought of one High Court. It is a different matter that by way of necessity, a tribunal may have to exercise jurisdiction over several States but it does not appeal to any reason that Parliament intended, despite providing for an appeal before the High Court, that appeals may be filed before different High Courts at the sweet will of the party aggrieved by the decision of the tribunal. ................... 17. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that in terms of Article 227 of the Constitution of India as also Clause (2) of Article 226 thereof, the High Court would exercise its discretionary jurisdiction as also power to issue writ of certiorari in respect of the orders passed by the subordinate Courts within its territorial jurisdiction or if any cause of action has arisen therewithin but the same tests cannot be applied when the appellate Court exercises a jurisdiction over a tribunal situated in more than one State. In such a situation, in our opinion, the High Court situated in the State where the first Court is located should be considered to be the appropriate Appellate Authority. The Code of Civil Procedure did not contemplate such a situation. It provides for jurisdiction of each Court. Even a District Judge must exercise its jurisdiction only within the territorial limits of a State. It is inconceivable under the Code of Civil Procedure that the jurisdiction of the District Court would be exercisable beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the district, save and except in such matters where the law specifically provides therefor.” 26. It is, therefore, clear that the High Court at Delhi alone would have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in relation to orders passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III at Delhi or the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal at New Delhi and the Allahabad High Court will not have the jurisdiction. 27. It is, therefore, clear that the High Court at Delhi alone would have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in relation to orders passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III at Delhi or the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal at New Delhi and the Allahabad High Court will not have the jurisdiction. 27. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner have, however, urged that since the property that was auctioned is situated in NOIDA which is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and a direction has been sought in this petition for possession of the property, part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and, therefore, the writ petition can be entertained by this Court under Article 226(2) of the Constitution. In this connection learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner have asserted that it is for this reason that this Court had earlier entertained Writ Petition No. 8409 of 2012 filed by the petitioner against the order passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi. 28. It is not possible to accept this contention of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. As noticed hereinabove, the petitioner-Company has its registered office at New Delhi. The loan was advanced by the Bank at New Delhi and the auction proceedings were held at New Delhi on the basis of an auction notice issued by M/s. Phoenix ARC Private Limited, Mumbai. The sale was confirmed at Mumbai The relief claimed in the application filed under Section 17(1) of the 2002 Act was for setting aside the auction notice and the auction proceedings. The petitioner had approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal at Delhi asserting that the applicant-Company and the defendant reside and work for gain at Delhi which is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. As noticed above, Section 19(1) of the 1993 Act provides that the application could be filed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant or each of the defendant actually and voluntarily reside or carry on business or work for gain. 29. As noticed above, Section 19(1) of the 1993 Act provides that the application could be filed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant or each of the defendant actually and voluntarily reside or carry on business or work for gain. 29. In the application filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, there is no prayer for delivering the physical possession of the premises to the petitioner and indeed it could not have been made as physical possession of the property was given to the assignee Company on the basis of the statement made by the petitioner before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. All that was pleaded in the application filed by the petitioner before the Debts Recovery Tribunal was for setting aside the auction notice and the proceedings as it was given on a throw away price to M/s. Phoenix ARC Private Limited, Mumbai. The prayer made in this petition for delivery of physical possession of the premises to the petitioner is beyond the relief claimed in the application and it appears that same prayer has been made only for the purpose of asserting that part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and, therefore, the Court will have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 30. In Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and another, (2004) 6 SCC 254 , the Supreme Court examined 'cause of action’ and 'lack of territorial jurisdiction’. The appellant-Company was registered at Mumbai and it had obtained a loan from the Bhopal Branch of the State Bank of India. A notice was issued for repayment of the said loan from Bhopal in terms of the provisions of the 2002 Act. Writ petition was filed in the Delhi High Court by the appellant and it was sought to be asserted that since the constitutionality of a Parliamentary Act was in question, the Delhi High Court would have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The writ petition was dismissed by the Delhi High Court on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The appeal before the Supreme Court was dismissed and in this context the Supreme Court observed : “6. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitutes the cause of action. The appeal before the Supreme Court was dismissed and in this context the Supreme Court observed : “6. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitutes the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean that every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. Its importance is beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily. 7. Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India reads thus: “(2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories." 8. Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under : “20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises.—Subject to the limitation aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction - (a) - (b) * * * (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. “ 9. Although in view of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure the provisions thereof would not apply to a writ proceedings, the phraseology used in Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Clause (2) of Article 226, being in pari materia, the decisions of this Court rendered on interpretation of Section 20(c) of CPC shall apply to the writ proceedings also. Before proceeding to discuss the matter further it may be pointed out that the entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved before the petitioner can obtain a decree is the material facts. The expression material facts is also known as integral facts. 10. Keeping in view the expressions used is Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter. ................... 18. The facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on the Court. .................... 27. When an order, however, is passed by a Court or Tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words, as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority.” 31. In this connection the decision of the Supreme Court in Aligarh Muslim University and another v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd. and another, (1994) 4 SCC 710 , also needs to be referred wherein the Supreme Court observed : “2. We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction. The contracts in question were executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, even the contracts provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction. The arbitrator was from Aligarh and was to function there. The contracts in question were executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, even the contracts provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction. The arbitrator was from Aligarh and was to function there. Merely because the respondent was a Calcutta-based firm, the High Court of Calcutta seems to have exercised jurisdiction where it had none by adopting a queer line of reasoning. We are constrained to say that this is case of abuse of jurisdiction and we feel that the respondent deliberately moved the Calcutta High Court ignoring the fact that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of that Court. It clearly shows that the Litigation filed in the Calcutta High Court was thoroughly unsustainable.” 32. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner have relied upon paragraphs 31 and 32 of the Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in M/s. Sterling Agro Industries (supra) which deals with forum convenience. The said paragraphs are quoted below : “31. The concept of forum conveniens fundamentally means that it is obligatory on the part of the Court to see the convenience of all the parties before it. The convenience in its ambit and sweep would include the existence of more appropriate forum, expenses involved, the law relating to the lis, verification of certain facts which are necessitous for just adjudication of the controversy and such other ancillary aspects. The balance of convenience is also to be taken note of. Be it noted, the Apex Court has clearly stated in the cases of Kusum Ingots (supra), Mosaraf Hossain Khan (supra) and Ambica Industries (supra) about the applicability of the doctrine of forum conveniens while opining that arising of a part of cause of action would entitle the High Court to entertain the writ petition as maintainable. 32. The principle of forum conveniens in its ambit and sweep encapsulates the concept that a cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court would not itself constitute to be the determining factor compelling the Court to entertain the matter. While exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the Court cannot be totally oblivious of the concept of forum conveniens. The Full Bench in New India Assurance Co. While exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the Court cannot be totally oblivious of the concept of forum conveniens. The Full Bench in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra) has not kept in view the concept of forum conveniens and has expressed the view that if the appellate authority who has passed the order is situated in Delhi, then the Delhi High Court should be treated as the forum conveniens. We are unable to subscribe to the said view.” 33. This decision does help the petitioner as from the facts mentioned above it cannot be urged that the Allahabad High Court would be more convenient for the parties. 34. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 35. It is true that the earlier Writ Petition No. 8409 of 2012 filed by the petitioner was entertained by the Court but the issue as to whether this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition was not examined by the Court. It is also seen that the writ petition was disposed of on the first date without hearing the respondents. 36. Learned counsel for the petitioner are, therefore, not justified in asserting that this petition should be entertained for the reason that the earlier writ petition was entertained. 37. Thus, for all the reasons stated above, the preliminary objection raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition deserves to be accepted and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed for this reason. 38. It is, therefore, not necessary for the Court to examine the other issues raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner or the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents. 39. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. ——————