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2012 DIGILAW 1698 (PNJ)

Harnek Singh @ Babba v. State of Punjab

2012-12-03

MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR

body2012
Mehinder Singh Sullar, J.:— (Oral) The matrix of the facts and material, culminating in the commencement, relevant for disposal of the instant petition and emanating from the record, is that, initially in the wake of complaint of complainant Jagir Singh son of Arjun Singh-respondent No. 2 (for brevity “the complainant”), a criminal case was registered against petitionersaccused Harnek Singh and others, by means of FIR No. 81 dated 24.4.2012 (Annexure P-1), for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 420 IPC (offences u/ss 465, 468 & 471 IPC were lateron added, vide DDR No. 37 dated 4.5.2012 (Annexure P2), by the police of Police Station Sadar Tarn Taran. 2. The police exonerated petitioner Nos. 2 to 5 and reiterated the allegations only against petitioner No.1.During the course of investigation of the criminal case, good sense prevailed and the parties have amicably settled their dispute, by way of compromise deed dated 9.11.2012 (Annexure P3). 3. Having compromised the matter, now the petitioners-accused have preferred the present petition, to quash the impugned FIR (Annexure P-1) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, invoking the provisions of Section 482 Cr. PC, inter-alia, pleading that with the intervention of respectables, the parties have amicably settled their disputes, as per compromise deed (Annexure P3). They belong to the same village and intend to promote harmony between them. They have redressed their grievances and have no ill-will against each other. The complainant and other respondents have no objection, if the criminal case registered against the petitioners-accused, by virtue of FIR (Annexure P-1) is quashed. On the strength of aforesaid grounds, the petitioners-accused sought to quash the impugned FIR (Annexure P-1) and all other consequent proceedings arising thereto, in the manner depicted here-in-above. 4. At the very outset, it will not be out of place to mention here that earlier, petitioners Harnek Singh and others had filed CRM No. M- 28196 of 2012 for quashing the impugned FIR (Annexure P1) on the basis of compromise (Annexure P2) therein, when the case was registered u/s 420 IPC only (file attached). Since the police subsequently added the offences punishable u/ss 465, 468 and 471 IPC, so, the earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn, to enable the petitioners to file a fresh petition after adding all the offences. 5. Since the police subsequently added the offences punishable u/ss 465, 468 and 471 IPC, so, the earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn, to enable the petitioners to file a fresh petition after adding all the offences. 5. In the earlier petition, the trial Court was directed to record the statements of all the concerned parties, with regard to the genuineness and validity or otherwise of the compromise (Annexure P-2) between them, by this court, by means of order dated 12.9.2012. 6. In compliance thereof, the trial Court, having recorded the statements of all the concerned parties, concluded, vide report No. 1153 dated 18.10.2012 that they have amicably settled their dispute voluntarily without any kind of pressure or influence. The compromise is genuine and for their welfare. 7. Not only that, even now in the present petition, complainant Jagir Singh has filed affidavit, reiterating the factum of compromise (Annexure P3) and has stated that he has no objection if the criminal case registered against the petitioners, by way of impugned FIR(Annexure P1) is quashed. 8. Meaning thereby, it stands proved on record that the parties have amicably settled their disputes, by virtue of compromise deed (Annexure P3), affidavit of the complainant and the pointed report of the trial Court. 9. What cannot possibly be disputed here is that, the law with regard to the settlement of criminal disputes by way of amicable settlement between the parties is no more res integra and is now wellsettled. 10. An identical question (recently) came to be decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court in SLP (Crl. ) No. 8989 of 2010, titled as Gian Singh Versus State of Punjab and another., decided on September 24, 2012. Having interpreted the relevant provisions and considered a line of the judgments on the indicated points, it was ruled (para 57) as under:- “57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F. I. R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc., cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personnel in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding. ” 11. Such thus being the legal position and the material on record, now the short and significant question, though important, that arises for determination in this petition is, as to whether the present criminal prosecution against the petitioners deserves to be quashed in view of the compromise or not? 12. Having regard to the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, to my mind, it would be in the interest and justice would be sub-served, if the parties are allowed to compromise the matter. Moreover, learned counsel for the parties are ad idem that, in view of the settlement of disputes between the parties, the instant petition deserves to be accepted in this context. 13. As is evident from the record that, with the intervention of respectables, the parties have amicably settled their disputes, as per compromise deed (Annexure P3). They belong to the same village and intend to promote harmony between them. They have redressed their grievances and have no ill-will against each other. The complainant and other respondents have no objection, if the criminal case registered against the petitioners-accused, by way of impugned FIR (Annexure P-1) is quashed. The factum and genuineness of the compromise between the parties is also reiterated by the trial Court in its indicated report. Thus, it would be seen that since, the compromise is in the welfare and interest of the parties, so, there is no impediment in translating their wishes into reality and to quash the criminal prosecution to set the matter at rest, to enable them to live in peace and to enjoy the life and liberty in a dignified manner. Thus, it would be seen that since, the compromise is in the welfare and interest of the parties, so, there is no impediment in translating their wishes into reality and to quash the criminal prosecution to set the matter at rest, to enable them to live in peace and to enjoy the life and liberty in a dignified manner. Therefore, to me, the ratio of the law laid down and the benchmark set out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh's case(supra), “mutatis mutandis” is attracted to the facts of the present case and is the complete answer to the problem in hand. Sequelly, the impugned FIR (Annexure P-1) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, deserve to be quashed in the obtaining circumstances of the case. 14. In the light of the aforesaid reasons, the instant petition is accepted. Consequently, the impugned FIR No. 81 dated 24.4.2012 (Annexure P-1) and all other consequent proceedings arising thereto, are hereby quashed. The petitioners-accused are accordingly discharged, from the pointed criminal case, in this regard.