Judgment SHAFFIQUE, J. 1. This writ petition is filed by the Registrar General, High Court of Kerala challenging Ext.P1 order passed by the District Court, Kozhikode in Arb.O.P.No.143 of 2007. The said application was filed by the 1st respondent herein under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred as the Act) to set aside an Arbitration award passed by the Arbitrator, appointed as per order dated 24/5/2006 in A.R.No.60/05 by the High Court exercising power under section 11(6) of the Act. The Arbitrator passed an award permitting the 2nd respondent herein to recover an amount of Rs.66,35,616/- with interest @ 9% per annum from 30/06/2006 till realization from the 1st respondent. 2. Before the District Court, the 2nd respondent raised a preliminary issue regarding maintainability of the application under Section 34 of the Act contending that since the Arbitrator was appointed by the High Court, by virtue of section 42 of the Act only the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 34 of the Act. 3. While considering the preliminary issue, the court below found that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition on a finding that since the Arbitrator was appointed by the High Court exercising power under section 11(6) of the Act, in view of Section 42 of the Act, the petitioner will have to approach the High Court alone since the 'Court' as mentioned under Section 42 of the Act, can only mean the High Court and therefore all further applications in the arbitration proceedings are to be filed before the High Court. The District Court also found support from the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Damayanti Builders v. Union of India [2003(3)Arbitration Law Reports 530] in which it is held that the 'court' as stated in Section 42 is the court before which an application under Section 11(6) of the Act has been filed. Hence the District Court returned the petition to the 1st respondent for presentation before the appropriate court. 4. Hence the District Court returned the petition to the 1st respondent for presentation before the appropriate court. 4. When the 1st respondent submitted a petition before the High Court on the basis of the aforesaid order, the matter was listed as defective and by an order dated 08/06/2009 in the unnumbered Arb.O.P, one among us, having taken note of the impugned order, directed the Registry to take suo motu proceedings in order to consider whether the aforesaid order is liable to be set aside in exercise of powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. It is in pursuance of the said order that the Registrar had filed the above writ petition and when the matter came up for hearing, one among us, as per order dated 01/07/2011 opined that this matter requires a decision by a Division Bench and hence this matter has come up before this Bench for hearing. 5. The main ground on which Ext.P1 order is challenged is that the definition of court under Section 2(e) of the Act does not include the High Court and therefore even reading Section 42 as a whole, it does not give any indication that the High Court should exercise the power to adjudicate an application under Section 34 of the Act. 6. Sri.K.R.B.Kaimal the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner inter alia contended that Section 11 of the Act, confers jurisdiction to appoint Arbitrator or Arbitrators on the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him, on a request made by a party. Whereas under Section 42 of the Act, the application is to be filed before a 'court' and 'court' is defined under Section 2(e) of the Act which clearly excludes the High Court. Section 2(e) reads as follows: 2(e) :"Court" means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes; Section 42 of the Act reads as follows: "42: Jurisdiction. - Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Part or in any other law for the time being in force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement any application under this Part has been made in a Court, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court." 7. Senior Counsel Sri.K.R.B.Kaimal also points out that the power exercised by the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India under section 11 of the Act had been considered by a Constitution Bench in B. P. and Co., v. M/s. Patel Engineering Ltd. [2005 (8)SCC 618]; It is held in Paragraph 15 that: "Here the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India is given the power to designate another to exercise the power conferred on him under Section 11(6) of the Act. If the power is a judicial power, it is obvious that the power could be conferred only on a judicial authority and in this case, logically on another Judge of the High Court or on a Judge of the Supreme Court. It is logical to consider the conferment of the power on the Chief Justice of the High Court and on the Chief Justice of India as presiding Judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court and the exercise of the power so conferred, is exercise of judicial power/authority as presiding Judges of the respective courts. Replacing of the word 'court' in the Model Law with the expression "Chief Justice" in the Act, appears to be more for excluding the exercise of power by the District Court and by the court as an entity leading to obvious consequences in the matter of the procedure to be followed and the rights of appeal governing the matter. The departure from Article 11 of the Model Law and the use of the expression "Chief Justice" cannot be taken to exclude the theory of its being an adjudication under Section 11 of the Act by a judicial authority". The departure from Article 11 of the Model Law and the use of the expression "Chief Justice" cannot be taken to exclude the theory of its being an adjudication under Section 11 of the Act by a judicial authority". It is further held in paragraph 18 that: "It is true that the power under Section 11(6) of the Act is not conferred on the Supreme Court or on the High Court, but it is conferred on the Chief Justice of India or the Chief Justice of the High Court. One possible reason for specifying the authority as the Chief Justice, could be that if it were merely the conferment of the power on the High Court, or the Supreme Court, the matter would be governed by the normal procedure of that Court, including the right of appeal and the Parliament obviously wanted to avoid that situation, since one of the objects was to restrict the interference by Courts in the arbitral process. Therefore, the power was conferred on the highest judicial authority in the country and in the State in their capacities as Chief Justices. They have been conferred the power or the right to pass an order contemplated by Section 11 of the Act." Still further it is held in paragraph 47 that: "Once the matter reaches the arbitral tribunal or the sole arbitrator, the High Court would not interfere with orders passed by the arbitrator or the arbitral tribunal during the course of the arbitration proceedings and the parties could approach the court only in terms of Section 37 of the Act or in terms of Section 34 of the Act. 8. It is therefore argued that when 'Court' is specifically defined and powers are conferred on the Court as provided under various provisions of the statute such jurisdiction cannot be exercised by the Chief Justice of India or the Chief Justice of High Court whose power is well defined under section 11 of the Act and if an interpretation as stated in the impugned order is taken the appellate powers under Section 37(1) of the Act to be exercised by the Appellate Court, which is the High Court becomes meaningless. It is therefore argued that Damayanti Builders (supra) was not good law. 9. It is therefore argued that Damayanti Builders (supra) was not good law. 9. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent also placed reliance on various judgments of the Supreme Court to indicate that the 'court' as defined under the 1996 Act is only the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, which may include a High Court if it has ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Since High Court of Kerala does not have original civil jurisdiction, it is not a 'court' as defined in section 2(e) of the Act and has no jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 34 of the Act. In Nimet Resources Inc. v. Essar Steels Ltd. [(2009) 17 S.C.C. 313] while considering the question regarding the Forum for filing an application under Section 14(2) of the Act, in a case where an Arbitrator was appointed by the designate of the Chief Justice of India, it is held that once the Legislature has defined a term in the interpretation clause, it is not necessary for it to use the same expression in other provisions of the Act and it is well settled that meaning assigned to a term as defined in the interpretation clause unless the context otherwise requires should be given the same meaning. In the said case, it was found that an application under Section 14(2) of the Act for removing an Arbitrator had to be filed before the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a District and not before the Chief Justice who appointed the Arbitrator. 10. In the decision reported in Garhwal Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Krishna Travel Agency [(2008)6 S.C.C.741] a similar view had been taken by the Supreme Court which is clear from paragraph 8 and 9. "8. Apart from these four cases, which have been brought to our notice, the position of law is very clear that in case the argument of learned counsel is accepted, that would mean that in every case where this Court passes an order, be it on appeal from the order passed by the High Court under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, this Court will become a Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction. If the argument is further taken to its logical conclusion that would mean that the parties will have to approach this Court by making an application under Section 34 i.e. for setting aside the award. If the argument is further taken to its logical conclusion that would mean that the parties will have to approach this Court by making an application under Section 34 i.e. for setting aside the award. The expression "court" used in Section 34 of the Act will also have to be understood ignoring the definition of "court" in the Act. 9. There is another facet of the problem. The party will be deprived of the right to file an appeal under Section 37(1)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. This means that a valuable right of appeal will be lost. Therefore, in the scheme of things, the submission of the learned counsel cannot be accepted. Taking this argument to a further logical conclusion, when the appointment is made by the High Court under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, then in that case, in every appointment made by the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 11(6), the High Court will become the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction, as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act. That is certainly not the intention of the legislature. Once an arbitrator is appointed then the appropriate forum for filing the award and for challenging the same, will be the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction. Thus, the parties will have the right to move under Section 34 of the 1996 Act and to appeal under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. Therefore, in the scheme of things, if appointment is made by the High Court or by this Court, the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction remains the same as contemplated under Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act." 11. In Punjab Agro Industries Corporation Limited v.Kewal Singh Dhillon [(2008)10 S.C.C.128] and in Rite Approach Group Ltd. v. Rosoboronexport [(2006)1 S.C.C.206], the Supreme Court while referring to Patel Engineering (Supra) had clarified the position that an application under Section 34 or 37(2) of the Act for that matter in an application to be filed before a court will be the court as defined under Section 2(e) of the Act and not the Chief Justice of the High Court which has passed an order under Section 11(6) of the Act. In Sulekha Clay Mines v. Union of India (2000 (1) KLT 69 a learned judge of this court while holding that Rule 2(c) of the Kerala Arbitration and Conciliation Court Rules, 1997 was inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and declaring it as invalid, held that the Principal Civil Court in a District is the District Court as defined in S. 2(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure and the 'Court' for the purpose of the Act is only the District Court being the Principal Civil Court of the District. 12. The court below took the view that since the Arbitrator was appointed by the High Court exercising power nder section 11(6) of the Act, any further application which includes application under section 34 of the Act could be filed only before the High Court. This according to us is not the correct view. 'Court' is defined under the Act as the Principal Civil Court of Original jurisdiction, which no doubt is the District Court. High Court of Kerala does not exercise original civil jurisdiction. Still further, under Section 11 of the Act a request for Arbitration is to be made to the Chief Justice of the High Court and not to a 'court' as defined under the Act. Therefore the Court mentioned in section 42 of the Act is the court as defined in section 2(e) of the Act. 13. From the above discussion, it is clear that the impugned order Ext.P1 is bad in law and is liable to be set aside. Damayanti Builders (supra) being against the settled position of law as discussed above is not good law. 14. We find that an application for setting aside an arbitration award which was filed in 2007 was returned as not maintainable by Ext.P1 order dated 30/03/2009 and though a similar petition under Section 34 was filed before this Court, it remained as unnumbered and consequently the 2nd respondent is unable to execute the award. Under these circumstances, we pass the following orders: i) Ext.P1 shall stand set aside. ii) Arb.O.P.No.143 of 2007 shall be presented by the 1st respondent before the District Court, Kozhikode within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Under these circumstances, we pass the following orders: i) Ext.P1 shall stand set aside. ii) Arb.O.P.No.143 of 2007 shall be presented by the 1st respondent before the District Court, Kozhikode within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. iii) The District Court shall consider Arb.O.P.No.143 of 2007 on merits and dispose of the same as early as possible and not later than six months from the date of presentation of the petition.