Rameshwar Singh Malik, J.:— The instant application under Section 378 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ('Cr. P. C. ' for short), has been filed by the complainant, seeking leave to file appeal against the impugned judgment of dated 25.7.2011, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Faridabad, whereby the accused-respondents were acquitted of the charges framed against them. The criminal law was set into motion by the applicantcomplainant with the allegation that the accused have committed the offence in question. However, in order to avoid repetition and also for the sake of brevity, it would be appropriate to refer to the facts as noticed by the learned trial court and the same read, as under:- “A complaint was filed in the court of learned Ilaqa Magistrate, Faridabad by complainant Raj Singh. It was stated therein by the complainant that he is a poor person. He is an agriculturist and brings up his family. There was a litigation between the complainant and accused regarding partition proceedings with regard to the agricultural land. He (complainant) referred an appeal in the Court of SDM, Ballabgarh, which is still pending, For this reason, the accused nursed grudge against complainant and asked him that why he filed an appeal. When he goes to his fields, then accused misbehave with him and abuse him. The complainant submitted that on 23.9.2008 at about 5:30/6:00p. m., he was present at his fields. In the meantime, all the accused in furtherance of their common object came over the fields of the complaint. The accuse Raj Singh was having a Ballam in his hand; whereas accused Ajit, Surjeet, Bhagat Singh, Shiv Singha nd Maharaj Singh were having lathis and dandas in their hands. There was a wire fencing around the fields of the complainant and all the accused started removing the fencing. When the complainant tried to stop them from doing so, accused No. 1 Randhir stated that "Are O koli Ke Aulad, Aaj Teri Chhori Ko Chod Dunga" and by saying these words, he pulled him on the ground after him in the grip of his arms. After that the other accused namely Raj Singh, Ajit, Surjeet Bhagat Singh, Shiv Singh and Maharaj said that they should kill the complainant for filing the appeal. After that the other accused namely Raj Singh, Ajit, Surjeet Bhagat Singh, Shiv Singh and Maharaj said that they should kill the complainant for filing the appeal. Upon this Shiv Singh and Maharaj used filthy language qua mother and sister of complainant and further used words "Iss Chamar Koli Ko Iski Chamargati Ka Maja Chakha Do'. After that all the accused began to thrash him by kicks and fists and used filthy language towards the complainant. The complainant raised hue and cry and on hearing the same, Sunil son of Pohap Singh, Rajbir son of Bar Singh, Jai Chand son of Gulzari, Bijender Solanki son of Virender Singh, Isak Khan son of Hamid Khan, Raj Kishore son of Nand lal and Sumer Singh son of Chiranji Lal came at the spot and they saved the complainant from the clutches of the accused, otherwise would have killed him on that day. In the presence of these persons also, all the accused used filthy language towards complainant and stated that " Are O Koli Ke, Aaj to Tujhe Inn Gram Walo Ne Bacha Liya Hai, Agar Tune Aage Koi Karyawahi Hmare Khilaf Ki To Tujhe Jaan Se Maar Denge' Complaint further submitted that on 24.9.2008, he moved an application before SHO, Police Station Sadar Ballabgarh, for taking necessary action against the accused but the police did not take any action in this regard. When the police did not take any action, then he submitted a complaint on 27.9.2008 which was forwarded for registration of a case by the Area Magistrate under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. On which formal FIR No. 213 dated 4.10.2008 was registered at Police Station Sadar Ballabhgarh, under Sections 323, 506 and 427 IPC and as also under Section 3 of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The Investigating Agency, however, submitted a cancellation report. Thereafter, a protest petition was filed by the complainant which was treated as a private complaint and after recording preliminary evidence, learned JMIC summoned the accused to face trial under Sections 323, 427, 506 IPC and Section 3/33 of Scheduled Castes and Schedules Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, vide order dated 22.9.2009. After appearance of the accused, the case was committed to the court of Sessions vide order dated 30.3.2010. Thereafter the case was assigned to this Court. After appearance of the accused, the case was committed to the court of Sessions vide order dated 30.3.2010. Thereafter the case was assigned to this Court. ” A prima facie case was found to be made out against the accused and accordingly all the accused were charge sheeted vide order dated 4.5.2010 passed by the learned trial court for the offences punishable under Sections 148/323 read with Section 149/427/506 of the Indian Penal Code ('IPC' for short) and Section 3 (1) (xi) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined as many as 7 PWs, besides tendering relevant documents in evidence. After conclusion of the prosecution evidence, separate statement of the accused-respondents were recorded under Section 313 Cr. P. C. All the incriminating material brought on record, was put to the accused who alleged false implication and claimed themselves to be completely innocent. Opting to lead the defence evidence, the accused examined as many as 6 DWs, besides tendering relevant documents in their evidence. After hearing the parties and on perusal of the evidence brought on record, the learned trial court, vide its judgment dated 25.7.2011, held that prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, giving the benefit of doubt to the accused, they were acquitted of the charge framed against them. Feeling aggrieved against the above said judgment of acquittal, the applicant-complainant has approached this Court, by way of instant application. That is how, this Court is seized of the matter. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that complainant has proved his case, beyond reasonable doubt. However, the learned trial court has miserably failed to appreciate the evidence, in the right perspective. He concluded by submitting that since the impugned judgment was based on misconceived approach, the same was not sustainable in law. Having heard the learned counsel for the applicant, after going through the record of the case and giving thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present one is not a fit case for granting leave to file appeal against the impugned judgment. We say so for more than one reasons, which are being recorded hereinafter. We say so for more than one reasons, which are being recorded hereinafter. Firstly, it was the own case of the complainant that the alleged incident took place on 23.9.2008, whereas he filed complaint under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. before the learned Illaqa Magistrate on 27.9.2008, i. e. after four days of the alleged incident. This inordinate delay has gone unexplained. Further, the applicant has admitted in his cross examination that SHO did not receive his complaint. The complainant, while appearing as PW1, did not even allege that the accused persons have abused him by his caste. Thus, a serious doubt has been created in the prosecution story. Secondly, the evidence given by all the prosecution witnesses, when read together, makes it clear that the prosecution witnesses have contradicted themselves to such an extent that material discrepancies have come to light. These discrepancies go to the root of the case creating a serious doubt in the prosecution story. In view of what has been discussed above, it was neither prudent nor safe to record the conviction of the accused-respondents because the complainant failed to bring home the guilt against the accused. Thirdly, the learned trial court, before arriving at a judicious conclusion, also recorded the cogent findings, which read as under:- "Thus, I am convinced with the arguments advanced by learned defence counsel that there is complete divergence in the depositions of the witnesses regarding the beatings to the complainant by the accused persons. In these circumstances, when no injury was caused to the complainant and when no MLR is available on record, then no offence under Section 323 read with Section 149 IPC is made out against any of the accused. So far as the offence under Section 427 IPC is concerned, the ingredients of this Section are also not established beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt. The complainant himself has admitted in his crossexamination that Manbir is his brother and Manbir has sold 2½ bigha of land to Randhir accused on 6.9.2005. he also admitted that the possession of the sold land was also delivered. In these circumstances, when the land was in possession of accused Randhir, then the question of making the fencing by complainant also does not arise. he also admitted that the possession of the sold land was also delivered. In these circumstances, when the land was in possession of accused Randhir, then the question of making the fencing by complainant also does not arise. Moreover, complainant Raj Singh - PW1 has failed to disclose the name of the shop from where he purchased the barbed wire and the name of the labour from whom fencing was got fitted. He also stated that he does not have the bill relating to purchase of that wire. Thus, the statement of complainant that the fencing belonging to him was removed by the accused, does not inspire any confidence. Even the other prosecution witnesses have not uttered a single word regarding removal of fencing of complainant, by the accused. Therefore, the offence under Section 427 IPC is also not made out against any of the accused. Now coming to the charge framed against the accused under Section 148 and 506 of IPC, though complainant Raj Singh as well as other prosecution witnesses namely PW4 lshak Khan, PW6 Raj Kishore and PW7 Sunil have deposed about the alleged occurrence and regarding the presence of accused persons at the alleged place of occurrence and threatening given to complainant by accused persons to eliminate him but at the same time, defence witnesses DW2 to DW6 have deposed that no altercation had taken place between the parties on 23.9.2008. Moreover, DW1 ASI Ajeet Singh has proved the true copy of final report under Section 173 Cr. P. C. In case FIR No. 213 dated 4.10.2008 under Sections 323, 506, 427 IPC and Section 3 of SC/ST Act as Ex. DW1/A; otherwise the said original report is also available on record. A perusal of the report Ex. DW1/A reveals that a cancellation report of the aforesaid FIR, which was lodged on the basis of complaint filed by complainant regarding the occurrence in question before the Area Magistrate and which was sent under Section 156(3) Cr. PC, was submitted by the prosecution. The said cancellation report was based on two grounds; firstly, there was no evidence against accused that any such incident had taken place and secondly the presence of the witnesses of the complainant at the alleged place of occurrence was doubtful on the basis of location of their mobile phones which was found at some other places. Moreover, the affidavits Ex. P3, Ex. Moreover, the affidavits Ex. P3, Ex. P4 and PW5/A furnished by PW2 Dharampal, PW3 Dharamender and PW5 Ram also reveal that no such incident/quarrel had taken place in the village between the complainant and the accused. Though these witnesses, when appeared in the witness box, deposed that they did not go through the contents of their respective affidavits at the time of signing the same but it is not believable that one would sign an affidavit without reading/understanding the contents thereof. PW3 Dharmender is 8th pass and PW5 Ram is 9th standard pass as has been admitted by them in their cross-examination. Thus, it can also not be said that these witnesses were illiterate and signed the affidavits without reading the same and it appears that they are just trying to help the complainant in prosecution of the accused. It would not be out of context to mention here that though charge under Section 3 (1) (xi) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 has been framed against the accused whereas it should have been framed under section 3 (1) (x) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. However, as has been discussed earlier, since complainant/prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused under section 3 (1) (x) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, therefore, accused are neither liable to be sentenced under section 3 (1) (xi) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Learned counsel for the applicant has failed to point out any piece of cogent evidence which might have been altogether ignored by the learned trial court while rendering the impugned judgment, so as to convince this Court to take a different view than the one taken by the learned trial court. Further, it is the settled proposition of law that whenever two views are possible, the view which goes in favour of accused, is to be followed by the Court. The view taken by this Court also finds support, from the judgment of the Hon'ble Surpeme Court, in the case of Arulvelu & anr. vs. State represented by the Public Prosecutor and anr. 2009 (4) RCR (Crl. ) 638. The view taken by this Court also finds support, from the judgment of the Hon'ble Surpeme Court, in the case of Arulvelu & anr. vs. State represented by the Public Prosecutor and anr. 2009 (4) RCR (Crl. ) 638. The relevant observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para No. 39, 40 and 41 in the case of Arulvelu's case (Supra) read as under: In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 , a two Judge Bench of this Court of which one of us (Bhandari, J. ) was a member had an occasion to deal with most of the cases referred in this judgment. This Court provided guidelines for the Appellate Court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused. The following principles emerge from the cases above: 1. The accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 2. The power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law, but the Appellate Court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court. 3. The appellate court should always keep in mind that the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses. The trial court is in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 4. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. 5. If two reasonable or possible views can be reached - one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction - the High Courts/appellate courts must rule in favour of the accused. 40. This Court in a recently delivered judgment State of Rajasthan v. Naresh @ Ram Naresh 2009 (11) SCALE 699 again examined judgments of this Court and laid down that "An order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused. This Court has dealt with the scope of interference with an order of acquittal in a number of cases. " 41. This Court has dealt with the scope of interference with an order of acquittal in a number of cases. " 41. Careful scrutiny of all these judgments lead to the definite conclusion that the appellate court should be very slow in setting aside a judgment of acquittal particularly in a case where two views are possible. The trial court judgment can not be set aside because the appellate court's view is more probable. The appellate court would not be justified in setting aside the trial court judgment unless it arrives at a clear finding on marshalling the entire evidence on record that the judgment of the trial court is either perverse or wholly unsustainable in law. In Rs.Mrinal Das & others, V. The State of Tripura', 2011(9) SCC 479 , decided on September 5, 2011, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after referring to many earlier judgements, has laid down parameters, for interference against a judgement of acquittal, by observing as under :- An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons”, for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed. ” Similarly, in the case of 'State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram alias Vishnu Dutta, (2012) 1 SCC 602 ', the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “7. A judgment of acquittal has the obvious consequence of granting freedom to the accused. This Court has taken a consistent view that unless the judgment in appeal is contrary to evidence, palpably erroneous or a view which could not have been taken by the court of competent jurisdiction keeping in view the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, this Court shall be reluctant to interfere with such judgment of acquittal. 8. The penal laws in India are primarily based upon certain fundamental procedural values, which are right to fair trial and presumption of innocence. A person is presumed to be innocent till proven guilty and once held to be not guilty of a criminal charge, he enjoys the benefit of such presumption which could be interfered with only for valid and proper reasons. A person is presumed to be innocent till proven guilty and once held to be not guilty of a criminal charge, he enjoys the benefit of such presumption which could be interfered with only for valid and proper reasons. An appeal against acquittal has always been differentiated from a normal appeal against conviction. Wherever there is perversity of facts and/or law appearing in the judgment, the appellate court would be within its jurisdiction to interfere with the judgment of acquittal, but otherwise such interference is not called for. ” Thereafter, in the above case a large number of judgments were discussed and then it was opined as under:- “10. There is a very thin but a fine distinction between an appeal against conviction on the one hand and acquittal on the other. The preponderance of judicial opinion of this Court is that there is no substantial difference between an appeal against conviction and an appeal against acquittal except that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal the Court keeps in view the position that the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused has been fortified by his acquittal and if the view adopted by the High Court is a reasonable one and the conclusion reached by it had its grounds well set out on the materials on record, the acquittal may not be interfered with. Thus, this fine distinction has to be kept in mind by the Court while exercising its appellate jurisdiction. The golden rule is that the Court is obliged and it will not abjure its duty to prevent miscarriage of justice, where interference is imperative and the ends of justice so require and it is essential to appease the judicial conscience. ” No other argument was raised. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered view that there is no illegality or perversity in the impugned judgment, which is sine qua non for interference by this Court, in the judgment of acquittal. In view of the above, the present application is bereft of any merit and without any substance. No case for interference has been made out. Resultantly, the instant application under Section 378 (4) Cr. P. C., seeking leave to file appeal, is ordered to be dismissed.