JUDGMENT : Justice Rajiv Sharma, J. Petitioner was promoted to the post of Private Secretary on 3.4.1999. The post of Private Secretary is in the feeder category for promotion to the post of Senior Private Secretary. The appointment/promotion to the post of Senior Private Secretary is governed under the Recruitment and Promotion Rules notified on 19.11.2001. According to rule 11, the post is to be filled up by way of promotion from amongst the Private Secretaries who possess five years regular service or regular combined with continuous ad hoc rendered upto 31.3.1998. Petitioner was fully eligible and qualified for being considered for the post of Senior Private Secretary. The Departmental Promotion Committee was convened on 23.12.2010. However, the name of the petitioner was not recommended by the Departmental Promotion Committee though her overall grading was ‘very good’. Petitioner has been assigned two ‘outstanding’ grading and three ‘very good’ and her overall grading as per recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee was ‘very good’. Respondent No.3, who is junior to the petitioner, was also ranked ‘very good’. However, he has only earned one ‘outstanding’ grading. The Departmental Promotion Committee was also convened on 29.9.2011 for making promotion to the post of Senior Private Secretary. The Departmental Promotion Committee was chaired by the Chief Secretary. However, surprisingly, the petitioner’s overall grading though remained ‘very good’ but respondent No.3 was assessed ‘outstanding’ on the basis of which his name was recommended for promotion to the post of Senior Private Secretary. Petitioner made representation on 16.11.2011 the manner in which the overall grading of the petitioner has been lowered. The representation made by the petitioner has been rejected on 30.11.2011. 2. Mr. Dilip Sharma has strenuously argued that the action of Departmental Promotion Committee to downgrade the overall grading of the petitioner and upgrading of respondent No.3 is illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory, unjustifiable, thus violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. He then argued that both the Departmental Promotion Committees convened on 23.12.2010 and 29.9.2011 were presided over by the Chief Secretary. 3. Mr. Rajinder Dogra, learned Additional Advocate General has supported the recommendations made by the Departmental Promotion Committee. According to him, the Departmental Promotion Committee has considered the case of the petitioner vis-à-vis other candidates strictly as per Chapter 16.25 (g) (iii) of the Hand Book on Personnel Matters, Volume-I. 4. 3. Mr. Rajinder Dogra, learned Additional Advocate General has supported the recommendations made by the Departmental Promotion Committee. According to him, the Departmental Promotion Committee has considered the case of the petitioner vis-à-vis other candidates strictly as per Chapter 16.25 (g) (iii) of the Hand Book on Personnel Matters, Volume-I. 4. Respondent No.3 though has been served but there is no representation on his behalf. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the pleadings carefully. 6. The post of Senior Private Secretary is a selection post. The Departmental Promotion Committee has met on 23.12.2010 whereby the petitioner’s overall grading was assessed as ‘very good’. However, her name was not recommended by the Departmental Promotion Committee. The Departmental Promotion Committee was presided over by the same person, i.e Chief Secretary and again the Departmental Promotion Committee met on 29.9.2011 whereby the grading of the petitioner has been downgraded from “very good” to “good” as far as 2009-2010 is concerned and the overall grading of respondent No.3 from ‘very good’ has been upgraded to ‘outstanding’. Respondent No.3 has only earned one ‘outstanding’ entry when the Departmental Promotion Committee met on 23.12.2010 but the Departmental Promotion Committee convened on 29.9.2011 has upgraded his three ‘very good’ entries for the years 2006-2007, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 to ‘outstanding’ entries and overall grading has been upgraded to ‘outstanding from ‘very good’. 7. The Court had called for the record of the Departmental Promotion Committee to see how the case of the petitioner vis-à-vis respondent No.3 has been gone into. There is no discussion the manner in which the overall grading of respondent No.3 has been upgraded to ‘outstanding’. No reason has been assigned why the entry for 2009-2010 has been lowered to ‘good’ from ‘very good’ qua the petitioner and why three ‘very good’ entries of respondent No.3 has been upgraded to ‘outstanding’. The scope of judicial review to assess the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee is very limited; however, it is equally true that if there is non-application of mind, unreasonableness or arbitrariness in the proceedings, the Courts can interfere. 8. In the instant case all the parameters have remained the same but despite that petitioner has been over looked for promotion and respondent No.3, who is junior, has been promoted by upgrading his grading to ‘outstanding’. 8. In the instant case all the parameters have remained the same but despite that petitioner has been over looked for promotion and respondent No.3, who is junior, has been promoted by upgrading his grading to ‘outstanding’. The representation of the petitioner has been rejected without a speaking order on 30.11.2011. The ground taken in the reply is that the Departmental Promotion Committee has to take into consideration the length of service in the feeder grade, arduous nature of duties and high job responsibility. In the case in hand, petitioner has been promoted to the post of Personal Assistant on 3.4.1999 before respondent No.3. The duties being discharged by the petitioner vis-à-vis respondent No.3 in the feeder category are the same. The duties and responsibilities of the post of Private Secretary are the same. In this case, the Departmental Promotion Committee was presided over by the Chief Secretary on 23.12.2010 and 29.9.2011. There has to be fairness in the action of Departmental Promotion Committee/Selection Committee. Petitioner though has no fundamental right to be promoted but she has right to be considered for promotion under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India in accordance with law. 9. Mr. Rajinder Dogra, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that it is the prerogative/discretion of the Selection Committee to go into the entire gamut and make recommendations. 10. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Centre for Public Interest Litigation and others versus Union of India and others, (2012) 3 SCC 117 have held that under our constitutional and statutory framework, there is nothing known as prerogative. Our Constitution recognizes no prerogative whatsoever; it recognizes merely rights, duties and discretions. Their Lordships have held as under: “14. We are of the view that the expression “prerogative” cannot be used in the context of a statutory provision. Under our constitutional and statutory framework, there is nothing known as prerogative. In this connection, we may usefully recall what was said by the eminent jurist N.A. Palkhivala in his treatise Our Constitution: Defaced and Defiled (Macmillan: December 1974). The relevant portion reads as follows: “Our Constitution recognizes no prerogative whatsoever; it recognizes merely rights, duties and discretions. The difference between ‘prerogative’ and ‘discretion’ is clear. A person who has a prerogative can act arbitrarily or irrationally and yet his decision must be treated as legal and valid. The relevant portion reads as follows: “Our Constitution recognizes no prerogative whatsoever; it recognizes merely rights, duties and discretions. The difference between ‘prerogative’ and ‘discretion’ is clear. A person who has a prerogative can act arbitrarily or irrationally and yet his decision must be treated as legal and valid. On the other hand, if a person has the discretion, and not the prerogative, to make a decision, the discretion can only be exercised fairly and reasonably; otherwise his act is void on the ground that there was no valid exercise of discretion in the eye of law.” (P.103) We are in respectful agreement with this view. In this case, the Court is not changing any Public Prosecutor who has already been appointed. The question in the present case was never an issue in Rajiv Ranjan Singh [(2006) 6 SCC 613]. Therefore, the decision in Rajiv Ranjan Singh is not of much relevance here.” 11. There is no requirement of assigning lengthy reasons by the Departmental Promotion Committee, but it must assign brief reasons to enable the Courts to see whether there has been due application of mind or the parameters prescribed under the Recruitment and Promotion Rules have been complied with scrupulously. There should not be any arbitrariness in the decision making process by the Departmental Promotion Committee. 12. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have summarized the entire case law on the principle of recording reasons in Kranti Associates Private Limited and another versus Masood Ahmed Khan and others, (2010) 9 SCC 496. Their Lordships have held as under: 47. Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts. h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or `rubber-stamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737). (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions". See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions". (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due Process". 13. The suitability of the candidates though is to be made by the Departmental Promotion Committee in its own judgment after making independent assessment, but the same has to be done objectively and not subjectively. 14. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Badrinath versus Government of Tamil Nadu, (2000) 8 SCC 395 have held that in rare cases, if the assessment is either proved to be mala fides or is found based on inadmissible or irrelevant or insignificant and trivial material and if an attitude of ignoring or not giving weight to the positive aspects of one’s career is strongly displayed or if the inferences drawn are such that no reasonable person can reach such conclusions, or if there is illegality attached to the decision, then the powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution are not foreclosed. Their Lordships have held as under: “38. Normally, this Court does not enter into question of the correctness of assessment made by Departmental Promotion Committees (or Joint Screening Committees). 39. But the case before us appears to be a very exceptional one as it has serious overtones of legal bias (to which we shall refer in detail when we come to Points 4 and 5). 40. Unless there is a strong case for applying the Wednesbury doctrine or there are mala fides, Courts and Tribunal cannot interfere with assessments made by Departmental Promotion Committees in regard to merit or fitness for promotion. 40. Unless there is a strong case for applying the Wednesbury doctrine or there are mala fides, Courts and Tribunal cannot interfere with assessments made by Departmental Promotion Committees in regard to merit or fitness for promotion. But in rare cases, if the assessment is either proved to be mala fide or is found based on inadmissible or irrelevant or insignificant and trivial material and if an attitude of ignoring or not giving weight to the positive aspects of one's career is strongly displayed, or if the inferences drawn are such that no reasonable person can reach such conclusions, or if there is illegality attached to the decision, - then the powers of Judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution are not foreclosed. 41. While the Courts are to be extremely careful in exercising the power of judicial review in dealing with assessment made by Departmental Promotion Committees, the executive is also to bear in mind that, in exceptional cases, the assessment of merit made by them is liable to the scrutinised by Courts, within the narrow Wednesbury principles or on the ground of mala fides. The judicial power remains but its use is restricted to rare and exceptional situations. We are making these remarks so that Courts or tribunals may not by quoting this case as an easy precedent - interfere with assessment of merit in every case. Courts and Tribunals cannot sit as appellate authorities nor substitute their own views to the views of Departmental Promotion Committees. Undue interference by the Courts or Tribunals will result in paralysing recommendations of Departmental Committees and promotions. The case on hand can be a precendent only in rare cases.” 15. Accordingly, in view of the observations and discussions made hereinabove, the writ petition is allowed. Recommendations made by the Departmental Promotion Committee vide Annexure P-4 dated 29.9.2011 and the promotion of respondent No.3 to the post of Senior Private Secretary are quashed and set aside. Respondents No.1 and 2 are directed to reconvene the Departmental Promotion Committee and to assess the suitability of the petitioner for the post of Senior Private Secretary afresh within a period of eight weeks from today. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.