ORDER By the Court.— Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the State. 2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 5.6.2012 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Gumla in S.T. No. 221 of 2011, whereby, the application med by the petitioner for discharge under Section 227 of the Cr PC, has been rejected by the Court below, fixing the case for framing of the charge. 3. The petitioner has been made accused in Bishunpur P.S. Case No.1 of 2010 corresponding to G.R. No. 49 of 2010 and it appears from the FIR that a police truck was exploded, followed by the encounter between the police party and the members of the extremists’ group in which, seven police officials were killed and several others were injured. The FIR was lodged on the basis of the fardbeyan of one of the injured police officials in the occurrence, wherein, it is stated that during the occurrence, one Nakul Yadav who was one of the extremists involved in the occurrence, informed about the occurrence on phone to Anmol Da, Subodhjee (i.e. the petitioner) and Deo Kumar Singh, informing that the work had been accomplished, the arms of the police had been looted and the police personnel were killed. On the basis of the fardbeyan of the informant, the police case was instituted and investigation was taken up. It appears that after investigation, charge-sheet has been filed against the accused persons, including the petitioner, and the cognizance was also taken and subsequently, the case was committed to the Court of Session. In the Court of Session, the petitioner filed application for discharge, which appears to have been filed mainly on the ground that there was nothing to show that it was actually the petitioner who was informed on phone by one of thee extremists that the work had been accomplished. It was submitted in the Court below that the petitioner was apprehended by Patrakar Nagar Police at Patna on 15.1.2010 itself, at about 4 p.m., in connection with Patrakar Nagar P.S. Case No. 10 of 2010. It was accordingly, submitted that when the petitioner was arrested on the date of occurrence itself, possibly no telephonic conversion could be made with the petitioner. It was accordingly, submitted that when the petitioner was arrested on the date of occurrence itself, possibly no telephonic conversion could be made with the petitioner. The Court below however, on the basis of the materials brought on record, found that there was nothing to show that in fact, the petitioner was apprehended by the Patna Police of 15.1.2010 and on the basis of the materials brought on record, the offence was made out against the petitioner and accordingly, the discharge application filed by the petitioner was rejected by the Court below. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order passed by the Court below is absolutely illegal. Learned counsel has submitted that in the FIR, it is only stated that the said Nakul Yadav only informed one Subodh Jee. It has been submitted that there is nothing on record to show that the said Subodh Jee is actually the petitioner and accordingly, it cannot be said that the petitioner was actually informed about the occurrence by one of the extremists. Learned counsel has taken certain other points also in this revision and has further submitted that since the charge-sheet has been submitted for offences under the Explosive Substance Act and the unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, but there was no sanction for the prosecution of the petitioner under the said Acts and accordingly, the impugned order passed by the Court below is illegal on this ground also. However, it may be stated that during the pendency of this application, the counter affidavit has been filed wherein the sanction order issued on 14.9.2012 against the petitioner for his prosecution under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act has been brought on record as Annexure B. 5. Assailing the order dated 14.9.2012 issued by the State Government, sanctioning the prosecution of the petitioner under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that Section 45(2) of the said Act prescribes that the sanction order is to be issued within the prescribed time limit by the appropriate Government and that too, upon independent review of the evidence gathered in course of the investigation. Learned counsel has also drawn an attention of this Court towards Rules 3 and 4 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation and Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008, to show that the Authority has to submit the report to the appropriate Government within seven working days of the receipt of the evidence gathered by the Investigating Officer and the appropriate Government has to take the decision regarding sanction for prosecution within seven working days after receipt of the recommendations of the Authority. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in this case, the occurrence had taken place on 15.1.2010 but the sanction has been accorded in this case on 14.9.2012 which itself is sufficient to show that the same is against the aforesaid Rules and the Act and the same cannot be taken into consideration. Learned counsel has submitted that till date, there is no sanction for prosecution of the petitioner for the offence under the Explosive Substance Act. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decision of thus Court in Ravi Sharma @ Arjun @ Mahesh @ Ashok v. State of Jharkhand and others, reported in 2012 (3) East Cr C 644 (Jhr), wherein, this Court had considered the sanctioning provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and the Rules made there under, to show that in the said case, when the sanction was accorded by the appropriate Government at the fag end of the trial, the same was quashed by this Court. Learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court towards the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Yogesh @ Sachin Jagdish Joshi v. State of Marashtra, reported in 2008 (2) Crimes 263 (SC), in support of this contention, that even the criminal conspiracy cannot be proved against the petitioner in view of the fact that there is nothing on record to show that it was actually the petitioner who was informed by one of the extremists about the occurrence. Placing reliance on these decisions, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impinged order passed by the Court below cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 8. Placing reliance on these decisions, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impinged order passed by the Court below cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 8. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, has submitted that the petitioner is named in the FIR itself, on the direct allegation made by the informant himself while he was injured, that he heard the extremist Nakul Yadav informing Anmol Da. Subodh Jee (i.e. the petitioner) and Deo Kumar Singh on phone about the occurrence, stating that the arms of police have been looted and the police personnel had been killed. Learned counsel accordingly, submitted that this clearly shows the meeting of minds between the persons actually committing the offence and the petitioner and the similarly situated other co-accused persons and accordingly, the offence is clearly made out against the petitioner as well, with the help of Section 120-B of the IPC. 9. Learned counsel for the State has also drawn the attention of this Court towards the fact that the sanction has since been accorded for persecution of the petitioner for the offence under the unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and the same has been brought on record as Annexure-B to the counter-affidavit. Learned counsel submitted that the Court below has taken into consideration the material available on record and has found that there was nothing on record to show that the petitioner was actually arrested by the Patna Police on 15.1.2010 and has rejected the discharge petition filed by the petitioner. Learned counsel further submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned order, worth interference in the revisional jurisdiction. 10. After having heard the learned counsels for both the sides and upon going through the record. In find that in the FIR there is direct allegation that one Subodh Jee, amongst others, was informed about the occurrence by one of the extremists in presence of the informant himself. The petitioner had been apprehended by the Patna police in connection with Patrakar Nagar P.S. Case No. 10 of 2010 dated 16.1.2010 and subsequently, the letter was issued by the DIG Police, Special Branch, Jharkhand Ranchi for remand of the petitioner in the cases relating to the extremists activities in the State of Jharkhand, in which, he was involved. The petitioner had been apprehended by the Patna police in connection with Patrakar Nagar P.S. Case No. 10 of 2010 dated 16.1.2010 and subsequently, the letter was issued by the DIG Police, Special Branch, Jharkhand Ranchi for remand of the petitioner in the cases relating to the extremists activities in the State of Jharkhand, in which, he was involved. The said letter is dated 21.1.20 10 and has been brought on record as Annexure A to the counter-affidavit, filed by the State Government. This letter clearly shows that the petitioner has been apprehended by the Patna Police in connection with the case which was instituted on 16.1.2010 and at this stage there is nothing to show that in fact, the petitioner was apprehended by the Patna Police on 15.1.2010, rather this is only an allegation at this stage that he was actually apprehended on 15.1.2010. The Court below has found no material on record to substantiate the contention of the petitioner that he, was actually apprehended on 15.1.2010 itself, i.e., the date of occurrence in the present case. 11. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no sanction has been accorded against the petitioner for his prosecution under the Explosive Substance Act, I am of the considered view that it is for the trial Court to see at the time of framing of charge whether the required consent of the District Magistrate for the prosecution of the petitioner for the offence under the Explosive Substance Act is there on record or not. Section 7 of the Explosive Substance Act only prescribes that no Court shall proceed to the trial of any person for an offence against this Act except with the consent of the District Magistrate. In the said section, there is no prohibition for taking the cognizance without such consent and in that view of the matter. I find no force in the submission of the learned counsel. 12. In the said section, there is no prohibition for taking the cognizance without such consent and in that view of the matter. I find no force in the submission of the learned counsel. 12. Further, so far as the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding sanction for the, offence under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act is concerned, I find that though it is apparent that the concurrence had taken place on 15.1.2010 and the sanction was accorded by the appropriate Government on 14.9.2012, but there is nothing on the record to show as to when the Authority received the evidence from the Investing Officer and when the recommendation was made by him and the time taken by the appropriate Government thereafter in granting the sanction. As such, it cannot be said at this stage that merely because of the delay, the entire sanction shall be vitiated. However, this point was not even taken in the Court below and this is being taken for the first time in this revision application. 13. I am of the considered view that the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Ravi Sharma's case (supra) is of no help to the petitioner, inasmuch as in the said case, the sanction was accorded at the fag end of the trial and it was also found that the investigation of the offence was not made by the competent police officer and taking into consideration these facts, the said sanction order was quashed. The facts of this case are quite different and it is not at all the case of the petitioner that in the present case also, the investigation was made by the police officer who was not competent to investigate the case, Similarly, I do not find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner and that there is nothing on record to show that it was actually the petitioner who was contacted by one of the extremists on phone, informing him about the occurrence and as such, it cannot be said that there was previous meeting of minds between the petitioner and the persons who had actually committed the offence. The document brought on record as Annexure-A to the counter-affidavit rued by the State, clearly shows that the petitioner has been apprehended by the Patna Police in connection with the case relating to the extremists activities only, and the FIR also shows that during the extremists operation, one of the extremist had contacted the petitioner on phone. Thus, at this stage, it cannot be said that it was not the petitioner who was contacted• by one of the extremists on phone. 14. In Yogesh's case (supra), cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Supreme Court of India has laid down the law for the offence under Section 120-B of the IPC as follows :- "23. Thus, it is manifest that the meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act by illegal means is sine qua non of the criminal conspiracy but it may not be possible to prove the agreement between them by direct proof Nevertheless. existence of the conspiracy and its objective can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the accused. But the incriminating circumstances must form a chain of events from which a conclusion about the guilt of the accused could be drawn. It is well settled that an offence of conspiracy is a substantive offence and renders the mere agreement to commit an offence punishable even if an offence does not take place pursuant to the illegal agreement." (Emphasis supplied.) 15. Thus, it is apparent from the law laid down by the Supreme Court of India that the criminal conspiracy may not be proved by direct proof; rather it can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the accused. There is direct allegation that the petitioner was informed about the occurrence by one of the culprits, informing that the arms of the police had been looted and the police personnel have been killed, and this circumstance against the petitioner and his conduct, prima facie shows the previous meeting of minds of the accused persons. 16. In the facts of this case, I am of the considered opinion that at this stage, it cannot be said that the petitioner was not informed by one of the extremists and there was no criminal conspiracy between the petitioner and the persons actually committing the offence. 16. In the facts of this case, I am of the considered opinion that at this stage, it cannot be said that the petitioner was not informed by one of the extremists and there was no criminal conspiracy between the petitioner and the persons actually committing the offence. As on the basis of the materials brought on record, the offences are made out against the petitioner as well, it is not a case for discharge of the petitioner at this stage. The Court below has discussed the materials on record and has passed a reasoned order in accordance with law. 17. I do not find any illegality and/or irregularity in the impugned order, worth interference in the revisional jurisdiction. There is no merit in this application and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. Application dismissed.