Satish Kumar Mittal, J.— The Punjab State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as Rs.the Management') has filed the instant Letters Patent Appeal challenging the order dated 17.04.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby two separate writ petitions, one filed by the workman (CWP No. 17820 of 2005) was allowed and the other (CWP No. 8766 of 2006) filed by the Management was dismissed. After partly setting aside the award of the Industrial Tribunal, the learned Single Judge directed the Management to release the pensionary benefits to the respondent-workman by counting his service as daily wager from 9.1.1988 to 16.3.1993. Though this appeal is barred by limitation, and along with the appeal, the appellant has filed an application (CM No. 5245 of 2012) for condonation of 168 days' delay in filing the appeal, yet without taking the said delay into consideration, we have heard the learned counsel for the appellant on merits and gone through the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. In this case, the respondent-workman was appointed as a daily wage security guard with the Management on 8.1.1988. His services were regularized as a security guard w. e. f. 15.3.1993. He retired from service as a regular security guard on 31.10.2000 on attaining the age of superannuation. When the Management did not count his daily wage service for the period from 9.1.1988 to 16.3.1993 for the grant of pensionary benefits, the workman raised an industrial dispute through his Union and the same was referred by the appropriate Government to the Industrial Tribunal for its adjudication. The Industrial Tribunal after considering the issue on the basis of the evidence led by the parties, came to the conclusion that the daily wage service rendered by the workman for the period from 9.1.1988 to 16.3.1993 was to be counted in the eligible service of the workman for the grant of pensionary benefits. However, the Industrial Tribunal denied the relief to the workman on the ground that he was not a member of the labour Union on 5.2.2000, the date on which the Union passed the resolution to fight the case of the workman. Feeling aggrieved against the award of the Industrial Tribunal, the Management as well as the workman filed separate writ petitions challenging the award. Feeling aggrieved against the award of the Industrial Tribunal, the Management as well as the workman filed separate writ petitions challenging the award. The challenge of the workman was that the relief cannot be denied to him merely on the aforesaid ground, particularly when the industrial dispute was referred by the appropriate Government and the workman became the member of the Trade Union much before making reference by the appropriate Government. The Management challenged the finding of the Industrial Tribunal ordering for counting of the daily wage service towards qualifying regular service for the grant of pensionary benefits on the ground that as per the rules of the Management, such services were not liable to be counted even for the grant of pensionary benefits. The learned Single Judge by detailed order has accepted the claim of the workman and rejected the contention of the Management vide impugned order. On the point on which the workman was denied the relief by the Industrial Tribunal, i. e., on the date the Union passed the resolution to agitate the case of the workman, he was not a member of the Union, the learned Single Judge while interpreting Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Rs.the Act') and particularly while relying upon Clause (c) of Section 36(1), and the fact that when the industrial dispute was referred for adjudication by the appropriate Government on 2.8.2001 the workman became member of the said Union, and further relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Bombay Union of Journalists vs. The Hindu Bombay and another, AIR 1963 SC 318 , set aside the said part of the award of the Industrial Tribunal and held that the Industrial Tribunal has committed grave illegality while denying the relief to the workman on the aforesaid ground. The learned counsel could not point out any illegality in the said order. We are of the view that on such technical plea a just relief cannot be denied to the workman, particularly in view of the fact that the appropriate Government in exercise of its powers under Section 10 of the Act had referred the matter to the Industrial Tribunal for its adjudication at the instance of the workers' union. On this aspect now the amendment has been made in Section 2A by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 (24 of 2010). On this aspect now the amendment has been made in Section 2A by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 (24 of 2010). Sub-section (2) of Section 2A clearly lays down that any workman, who is having a dispute with his employer with regard to his dismissal, discharge or termination, may make an application directly to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute after the expiry of 45 days from the date he has made the application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the dispute. On such application the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal has been empowered to adjudicate such dispute as if it was referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of the Act. This right has been given to the workman notwithstanding anything contained in Section 10 of the Act. On the second issue, i. e., with regard to counting of daily wage service for the purpose of grant of pensionary benefits, it has been argued by the learned counsel that even as per Clause 7 of the Finance Circular No. 73/89 of the Management, the daily wage service rendered by the workman cannot be counted for the purpose of grant of pensionary benefits. The pensionary benefits have been denied to the workman because he had not rendered ten years of qualifying service on regular basis, which is the requirement for grant of pension. The Industrial Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge while relying upon the Division Bench decisions of this Court in Kashmir Chand vs. Punjab State Electricity Board, (P&H) 2005(4) SCT 298 and Hanumant Singh and others vs. State of Haryana and others, 2008(4) RSJ 756, has held that the daily wage or work charged services rendered by the workman immediately before his regularization are to be counted as qualifying service for the purpose of grant of pensionary benefits. It has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the Management that the respondent-workman was working as whole time employee and he continuously worked on daily wages for a long period and while taking into consideration the same, his services were regularized. There is no break in service from the date of his initial appointment as daily wage basis till the date of his regularization. There is no break in service from the date of his initial appointment as daily wage basis till the date of his regularization. In these facts, while relying upon the aforesaid two Division Bench decisions, the learned Single Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that the service rendered by the workman on daily wages from 9.1.1988 to 16.3.1993 is to be counted for the purpose of grant of pensionary benefits. Further Clause 7 of the Finance Circular No. 73/89 of the appellant-Corporation, as relied upon by the Management, also does not support the case of the Management because in the said Clause it has been clearly laid down that the entire service rendered by an employee as work charged as also the service paid from contingencies shall be reckoned towards retirement benefits, provided such service is followed by regular employment. The contention of the Management that the said Circular is applicable only to work charged employees and not daily wage employees, cannot be accepted, particularly when during his work charge service, the workman was paid from contingencies. An argument has been raised that the decision of this Court in Kashmir Chand's case (supra) is under consideration in SLP filed by the Punjab State Power Corporation Limited against the judgment of this Court in R. S. A. No. 1259 of 2011, therefore, the decision in this appeal be kept in abeyance. We do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel. As far as the matter in hand is concerned, the same is squarely covered by the aforesaid two Division Bench decisions of this Court. In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.