JUDGMENT : 1. The defendant - tenant has preferred this second appeal under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code aggrieved by the eviction decree passed by the first appellate court of learned Additional District Judge, Sumerpur in Appeal No. 8/2010 - Prakashmal v. LRs of Late Smt. Rehmat wife of Shri Kasam Ji, who is now represented after her death by Mohd. Salim s/o Shri Kasam Ji - her son. 2. The learned trial court had decreed the suit No. 42/1997 filed by the plaintiff - landlord Smt. Rehmat in respect of the suit premises, a shop situated at Sumerpur, which was initially given on rent to the defendant - tenant Prakashmal @ Rs. 115/- per month and the eviction suit was filed, inter alia, on the ground of bonafide need of landlady's grand son Mohd. Raffique for opening an electronic equipment repair shop. 3. The first appeal filed by the defendant - tenant Prakashmal also came to be dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 20.12.2011 and thus the concurrent decrees of eviction on the ground of bonafide necessity of landlady's grand son is sought to be challenged in the present appeal of defendant - tenant. 4. By consent of both the learned counsels, the appeal is being disposed of finally at admission stage.The following substantial question of law is framed for consideration by this Court : "Whether an eviction decree can be granted to the landlord/landlady, who is governed by Muslim Law, for the bonafide need of her grand-son and whether such grand-son is a member of "family" as stipulated in Section 13(1)(h) of the Rent Control Act, 1950 ?" 5. Learned counsel for the appellant - defendant (tenant), Mr. J.R. Patel urged that both the courts below have wrongly held that grand-son Mohd. Raffique was the member of the "family" of Mst. Rehmat - the landlady, as in the presence of his father Lal Mohd., the grand-son could not succeed to the property of the plaintiff - Mst. Rehmat under Muslim Law and after her death, during the pendency of the present appeal, since another son Mohd. Salim uncle of Mohd. Raffique for whose need, the suit shop is sought to be vacated, was brought on record on the basis of a Will purportedly executed by Mst. Rehmat in his favour, certainly the said Mohd. Rehmat under Muslim Law and after her death, during the pendency of the present appeal, since another son Mohd. Salim uncle of Mohd. Raffique for whose need, the suit shop is sought to be vacated, was brought on record on the basis of a Will purportedly executed by Mst. Rehmat in his favour, certainly the said Mohd. Raffique, could not fall within the ambit and scope of the term "family" of said Mohd. Salim, his uncle, since own real father Lal Mohd. Was alive under Section 13(1)(h) of the Act of 1950 and, therefore, no decree of eviction could be passed at the instance of landlord Mohd. Salim for the purported bonafide need of his nephew Mohd. Raffique. While submitting that the word "family", which is not defined in the Rent Control Act, 1950, need not be construed narrowly and it is not necessary that the grand-son has to be dependent on the landlady to become a member of her "family", learned counsel for the appellant - tenant, Mr. J.R. Patel urged that the landlady in the present case, never pleaded and proved that the said grand-son was the member of her "family" and for his bonafide need, she needed the suit shop in question. He relied upon various case laws in support of his contentions with regard to the term "family", which will be discussed hereinafter. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Rajesh Parihar, learned counsel for the respondent - plaintiff - landlady, strongly refuted the contentions of the learned counsel for the defendant - tenant and urged that the word "family" has been construed to be a term of wide import and irrespective of right to succeed to the property of the grant-mother or not, the grand-son Mohd. Raffique being a blood relation, could not be denied the status of being a family member of Mst. Rehmat and even though he was living separately from his father namely Lal Mohd. and his grand mother Mst. Raffique being a blood relation, could not be denied the status of being a family member of Mst. Rehmat and even though he was living separately from his father namely Lal Mohd. and his grand mother Mst. Rehmat was living with him, it does not mean that the grand-mother could not claim the eviction on the ground of bonafide need for grand-son to set up his own business in the suit shop and he urged that both the courts below have rightly decreed the eviction suit in favour of the respondent - plaintiff and no substantial question of law in fact arises in the present second appeal and any such question, if at all if arises, the same deserves to be answered in favour of the respondent - plaintiff and the concurrent eviction decrees deserve to be upheld. He also relied upon various case laws in support of his contentions, which will be discussed hereinafter. 7. In Smt. Rajinder Dhada v. Jagdish Singh reported in 2002(8) Supreme Bound Reports 422 , dealing with a case arising under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that expression "family" would mean such relations of landlord as ordinarily live with him and are dependent upon him. In that case, the need was claimed by the appellant - landlady for two children left behind by her sister-in-law after her death and the father of the children was as ASI in Police. The High Court reversed the eviction order passed by the courts below and found that the two children to be neither dependent on nor were ordinarily living with landlady and in such circumstances, no fault could be found with the decision of the High Court. 8. The High Court reversed the eviction order passed by the courts below and found that the two children to be neither dependent on nor were ordinarily living with landlady and in such circumstances, no fault could be found with the decision of the High Court. 8. In another case, under the same Act, the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ravinder Kumar Pujara v. Gian Chand reported in AIR 1987 (P&H) 31 , held that the moment an independent business is set up by the son, who till then may have been the member of the family of the landlord, it would not be possible to say that the use of their rented land by the son would be deemed to be by the landlord himself and in such a case in the absence of any averment and evidence that such son was member of the family or dependent upon his father, the requirement of landlord to settle the former in business, would not be covered by the said clause nor can it be reasonably argued that the landlord requires the rented land for his own use. 9. Besides aforesaid two judgments, another judgment relied upon by Mr. J.R. Patel, learned counsel for the appellant - defendant, is that of a learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Sewa Ram Sethi and others v. Des Raj reported in , in which the landlord sought ejectment of tenant for requirement of his married son living separately for 12/13 years and in such circumstances, the Court did not find the need to be bonafide enough for ordering eviction of the tenant. 10. In Sheshambal (Dead) through LRs. v. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building reported in 2010 (3) SCC 470 , the Apex Court held that normally the right to relief must be judged by reference to date suit or legal proceedings are instituted, however, subsequent developments having a bearing on right to relief claimed by a party cannot be shut out from consideration. In Sheshambal (Dead) through LRs. v. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building reported in 2010 (3) SCC 470 , the Apex Court held that normally the right to relief must be judged by reference to date suit or legal proceedings are instituted, however, subsequent developments having a bearing on right to relief claimed by a party cannot be shut out from consideration. In the peculiar facts, the demised premises after the death of landlord devolved in three married daughters and, therefore, the Court held that if in the original petition, the said three daughters had pleaded their own requirements and the requirements of any member of their family depending upon them, the matter would have to be otherwise, but in these circumstances the decree of eviction could not be granted. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant - defendant, Mr. J.R. Patel also relied upon a decision of the learned Single Judge of Jharkhand High Court in Mukhtar Ahmad and another v. Mahmudi Khatoon and another reported in AIR 2011 Jharkhand 28 , in which the learned Single Judge held that the properties in the name of a female covered by Muslim Law belongs to her exclusively and there is no concept of jointness of nucleus or any concept that property is purchased from joint nucleus of head of joint family, hence all the properties which are exclusively purchased by sale deed by female in her name can be divided only between her children. 12. Thus, learned counsel for the appellant - defendant contended that in Muslim Law so long as a person is alive he/she is the absolute owner of his/her property; nobody else including a son has any right, whatsoever, in it much less the grand-son, as in the case here. It is only when the owner dies and never before that the legal rights of the heirs accrue. Therefore, he contended that the suit property in question - the suit shop could not have devolved upon the grand-son and consequently his need could not furnish a ground for eviction. 13. On the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiff - landlord, Mr. Rajesh Parihar relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Ladu Lal & anr. v. Smt. Jasoda Devi & ors. 13. On the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiff - landlord, Mr. Rajesh Parihar relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Ladu Lal & anr. v. Smt. Jasoda Devi & ors. reported in 2008(1) WLN 319 (Raj.) , wherein the learned Single Judge of this Court held that the word "family" used in Section 3(vii) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950 has wide definition and cannot be restricted to 'heir', 'successor' and 'descendant' only. Relying upon a earlier decision in the case of Radhavallabh v. Damodardas reported in 1964 RLW 587 , the Court held that the word "family" used in the Rent Control Act, 1950 has been used in a sense of common parlance and not in technical sense and, therefore, the bonafide need of nephew of landlord Banshilal was held to be established as the member of the family and the eviction decree was upheld. 14. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in a old case under Muslim law in the case of Mohammad Azam Khan v. Hamid Shah and another reported in AIR 1947 Allahabad 137 , held that the word "family" in Section 3(a) is not restricted to only those persons residing in the house of settler for whose maintenance he was mainly responsible, but the word is intended to be used in its broad popular sense; persons descended from one common progenitor and having a common lineage, e.g. nephews of the settler and their descendants, are included in the term irrespective of whether they live in the settler's house, or whether the settler is responsible for their maintenance. 15. In a case arising under Muslim Wakf Validating Act, 1913, another Division Bench of Madras High Court in Asha Bibi and others v. Nabissa Sahib and others reported in 1957 AIR Madras 583 , held that technically the word 'family' may be taken to mean the collective body of persons who live in the house and under one head or manager; and includes within its fold a household consisting of parents, children and servants and as the case may be, lodgers or boarders. Under the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, it is intended to be used in a broad and popular sense. Popularly, however, the term indicates persons descended from one common progenitor and having a common lineage. Under the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, it is intended to be used in a broad and popular sense. Popularly, however, the term indicates persons descended from one common progenitor and having a common lineage. It will take in both agnates and cognates and relations by blood or marriage and, therefore, it was held that the nephews of the settlor are in this sense the members of his family and similarly are daughter-in-law, the son of a half brother or the son of a half-sister. 16. On a careful analysis of the aforesaid case laws and the provisions of the Rent Control Act, 1950, the special law for eviction of tenants, who are entitled to protection given under the said Act and the eviction can be sought only on the specific grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the Act, this Court is of the considered opinion that the word "family" employed in Section 13(1)(h) of the Act need not be construed narrowly or in a pedantic manner. The grand-son Mohd. Raffique in the present case is admittedly a blood relation of the plaintiff - landlady Mst. Rehmat. The right to sue as landlady upon her death devolved upon Mohd. Salim, who was another son and uncle of Mohd. Raffique. Neither the strict law of succession, nor right to sue has to dispel or dislodge the ground of eviction, if bonafide need of landlord or member of his family is otherwise established and proved with evidence by the plaintiff. The word "family" is used in the context of bonafide need of the landlord/landlady, who can claim the eviction either for his/her own bonafide need or for any bonafide need of his/her family member has to be liberally and bonafidely construed. The landlady being grand-mother, in the present case, even though living with the grand-son, who was of mature age in his early twenties, could certainly claim the eviction of the suit shop for grandson as member of her "family", irrespective of his entitlement to succeed to her property or not. The question of title is neither relevant nor it can be decided in rent control and eviction matters under the Act of 1950. That is why, the definition of landlord is widely given in the Act to include any person who being owner or otherwise is entitled to recover the rent in respect of the premises let out. The question of title is neither relevant nor it can be decided in rent control and eviction matters under the Act of 1950. That is why, the definition of landlord is widely given in the Act to include any person who being owner or otherwise is entitled to recover the rent in respect of the premises let out. Therefore, effort of learned counsel for the defendant - appellant to project that the grand-son could not be a member of the family, as not being entitled to succeed to the property in his own right in the presence of his own father Lal Mohd. and his uncle Salim Mohd., does not detract or disloge the ground of eviction set up and established under Section 13(1)(h) of the Act. The findings of courts below in this regard are findings of fact. 17. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant - defendant that Mst. Rehmat could have given the property by Will to the grand-son Mohd. Raffique himself, is not at all an issue. It was her choice to whom the property is to be given by way of Will. Even though the said Mohd. Raffique being nephew of present landlord Mohd. Salim may not be his direct descendant, but he would continue to be a member of the "family" qua the deceased grand-mother Mst. Rehmat and also qua the uncle Mohd. Salim, who got the right to sue and pursue the eviction suit to the logical end, even in the present second appeal filed by the defendant - tenant by virtue of Will executed by Mst. Rehmat in his favour. 18. The Rent Control Act, 1950 does not make any distinction between Muslim Law or Hindu Law, nor the application of Personal Law for succession can adversely affect the operation of this special law namely Rent Control Act, 1950. This Court does not find anything in Muslim Law either to hold that a grand-son cannot be held to be a member of "family" of the grand-mother. While deciding rent control and eviction matters, the Court is neither deciding question of succession or inheritance under the personal law of the parties concerned, nor such questions are of great relevance in eviction matters. While deciding rent control and eviction matters, the Court is neither deciding question of succession or inheritance under the personal law of the parties concerned, nor such questions are of great relevance in eviction matters. In the absence of word "family" defined in Rent Control Act, 1950 itself and as per legal precedents, the word "family" is required to be construed liberally and broadly and depending upon facts of each case, relatives like nephew, daughter-in-law etc. also having been held to be members of "family", this Court finds no reason to hold in the present case that grand-son Mohd. Raffique would not be covered by the term "family" under Section 13(1)(h) of the Act of 1950 qua her grand-mother Mst. Rehmat and even his uncle Mohd. Salim, as his nephew. The eviction decree of both the courts below, therefore, is not liable to be upset on any of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant - defendant - tenant. 19. As already stated, the law is that such bonafide need on the date of institution of the suit has to be seen and if established, the eviction can be ordered on this ground. It is also well settled by a catena of judgments that the findings of bonafide need of landlady or her family members are findings of fact and unless held to be perverse, do not give rise to any substantial question of law requiring consideration under Section 100 of CPC. 20. Therefore, The substantial question of law framed above is required to be answered in favour of the plaintiff - landlord - landlady and the findings of bonafide need of grand-son Mohd. Raffique deserve to be upheld. Thus, the substantial question of law framed above is answered like this that the plaintiff - landlady Mst. Rehmat could claim the eviction of the suit shop for the bonafide need of her grand-son Mohd. Raffique as her "family" member, even under Muslim Law and that need having been established, the eviction decree deserves to be upheld. 21. The present second appeal is, therefore, liable to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost. 22. The appellant-defendant-tenant shall hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit property viz. Raffique as her "family" member, even under Muslim Law and that need having been established, the eviction decree deserves to be upheld. 21. The present second appeal is, therefore, liable to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost. 22. The appellant-defendant-tenant shall hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit property viz. shop in question to the respondent-plaintiff within a period of six months from today i.e. on or before 31st January, 2013 and shall pay mesne profit @ Rs. 1,500/- per month commencing from August, 2012 and will further continue to pay the mesne profit each month by 15th day of the next succeeding month or in advance to the respondent also and in case there is any default in payment of mesne profit, the period of six months for eviction shall stand reduced and the decree of eviction would become executable forthwith. The defendant shall also clear all the arrears of rent and mesne profit and pay the same to the plaintiff within three months from today, otherwise the same will bear interest @ 9% per annum. The tenant shall also not sub-let, assign or part with the possession of the suit premises or any part thereof in favour of any one else and would not create any third party interest in the same during the aforesaid period and the same would be treated as void. The appellant-defendant shall furnish a written undertaking incorporating the aforesaid conditions in the trial court within one month and one copy thereof along with affidavit, in this Court. It is made clear that if the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit shop is not handed over to the respondent-landlord within a period of six months from today or mesne profits are not paid as directed above, besides the expeditious execution of the decree in normal course, the respondent-plaintiff shall also be entitled to invoke the contempt jurisdiction of this Court. A copy of this judgment be sent to both the learned courts below and both the parties forthwith. *******