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2012 DIGILAW 175 (KER)

Suni @ Sudheer, Thrissur v. State of Kerala

2012-02-09

K.VINOD CHANDRAN, R.BASANT

body2012
Judgment K. Vinod Chandran, J. 1. Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned. This is a classical case of such fire, fiercer than that of the purgatory, consuming the lover and also the avenger, but not even singeing the one from whom such fire emanated. 2. The appellant (A1) was charged along with three others with the offence of conniving with the other accused and murdering the deceased who had jilted his aunt (A3), on the eve of the betrothal of the deceased. The offence as charged by the prosecution occurred on 11.1.2003 at 8.15 p.m. The 1st accused along with three others being his cousin (A2) and aunts (A3 and A4) with the common intention of murdering one Suresh, detained the latter and committed his murder with a chopper, causing 23 ante-mortem injuries on the deceased, was the allegation. The 1st accused alone was charged with the overt act of inflicting the injuries on the deceased leading to his death. The other accused were arraigned for the common intention they nurtured to commit the said offence. The accused were thus committed for the offences punishable under Sections 341 and 302 read with Sections 114 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. On committal, the Sessions Court framed charges under the above mentioned sections and the accused pleaded not guilty to the same. 3. The trial Court recorded the evidence of PW-1 to PW-16 and marked Exhibits P1 to P31 as also material objects, M.O.1 to M.O.9. The accused took up a defence of total denial and stated in his 313 statement that the motive of avenging his jilted aunt is totally false since, she had no such relationship, that he was not present at the place where the said incident is said to have occurred. He also alleged animosity on P.W.1, the only eye witness, and described the deceased as a person having lot of enemies. The 1st accused also examined D.W.1 and D.W.2 purportedly in support of the defence set up by him and marked Exhibits D1, D2 and D2(a) respectively being a portion of 161 statement of P.W.1, Electricity Board Operation Register and page No.76 of Exhibit B2 register. 4. The 1st accused also examined D.W.1 and D.W.2 purportedly in support of the defence set up by him and marked Exhibits D1, D2 and D2(a) respectively being a portion of 161 statement of P.W.1, Electricity Board Operation Register and page No.76 of Exhibit B2 register. 4. The learned Sessions Judge after detailing the entire facts, considered the evidence recorded elaborately and exhaustively and found that the deceased died of the injuries sustained by him on 11.1.2003 and that the said injuries leading to the death of the deceased were inflicted by the 1st accused. However, the learned Sessions Judge refused to accept the case of the prosecution with respect to the wrongful restrain of the deceased by accused 2 to 4 and also disbelieved the pre-meditated common intention of the accused 2 to 4 to commit the offence as alleged. The first accused was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life under Section 302 IPC and was directed to pay compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/-to the legal heirs of the deceased. The amount was directed to be paid within a period of six months from the date of judgment, failing which the 1st accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of one year. Accused 2 to 4 were found not guilty of the offences alleged. The appeal before us is only with respect to the conviction and sentence imposed on the 1st accused. 5. We find that the recapitulation of the facts is unnecessary for the decision in this appeal, since we are dealing with the specific circumstances and evidence which persuaded the learned Sessions Judge to enter a conviction against the 1st accused. We were ably aided by the learned counsel for the appellant as also the learned Public Prosecutor, who meticulously took us through the evidence recorded. 6. The motive was spoken to by P.W.1, the eye witness in front of whose house, the incident occurred, as also PW-5, who was a friend of the deceased. The incident itself was spoken to by the eye witness, P.W.1, who deposed in consonance with his version recorded in the F.I. Statement, on the basis of which the F.I.R. was registered. P.W.4, an auto driver as also P.W.1 deposed on the same lines with respect to the deceased being taken to the hospital. P.W.15 was the Investigating Officer who conducted the investigation. P.W.4, an auto driver as also P.W.1 deposed on the same lines with respect to the deceased being taken to the hospital. P.W.15 was the Investigating Officer who conducted the investigation. The recovery of the dhoti (M.O.6) of the 1st accused and one of the chappals of the 1st accused [M.O.9(a)] from the scene of the crime and the other chappal of the 1st accused [M.O.9 (b)] from the house of the 3rd accused were spoken to by P.W.6, who was a witness to seizure mahazar Exhibit P4 and duly identified by P.W.1. The seizure of M.O.9(b), being the other chappal of the 1st accused recovered from the house of A3, was effected by seizure mahazar Exhibit P5 attested to by P.W.7 and again identified by P.W.1. The weapon, M.O.1, used by the 1st accused to commit the offence was recovered by P.W.15, the Investigating Officer by Exhibit P3 mahazar and the recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act was proved by P.W.3 who attested the mahazar and the weapon was identified by P.W.1. P.W.8 was the doctor who conducted the post-mortem and he has deposed about the 23 ante-mortem wounds inflicted on the body of the deceased. In the opinion of P.W.8 except injury No.22 the other 22 wounds were chop wounds which led to the bleeding of the deceased and eventual death. The doctor further deposed that injury No.2 and 10 to 20 and 23 are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature, individually and collectively, necessarily, to cause the death of a human being. The recovered chopper (M.O.1) also, according to him, was capable of causing the injuries revealed in the corpse of the deceased. The bloodstains, in the dhoti (M.O.6) and chappals [M.O.9(a) and (b)] belonging to the 1st accused, all recovered from the scene of the crime, are evident from Exhibits P4 and P5 mahazars. The bloodstains found in M.O.1 chopper, recovered under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, was analysed to be human blood by Exhibit P31. These circumstances together, according to the learned Additional Sessions Judge, led to the unimpeachable conclusion that the deceased succumbed to the injuries inflicted on his person on 11.1.2003 and such injuries were caused by the 1st accused with M.O.1 chopper to avenge the aunt of the 1st accused who was spurned by the deceased. 7. These circumstances together, according to the learned Additional Sessions Judge, led to the unimpeachable conclusion that the deceased succumbed to the injuries inflicted on his person on 11.1.2003 and such injuries were caused by the 1st accused with M.O.1 chopper to avenge the aunt of the 1st accused who was spurned by the deceased. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant/1st accused would challenge the circumstances relied on by the learned Sessions Judge as not having conclusively proved the guilt of the 1st accused or having proved the commission of the alleged offence by the 1st accused. We have gone through the entire deposition of the 16 witnesses examined in the case as also the Exhibits marked. The contentions canvassed on behalf of the appellant/1st accused are that there is no motive established and the eye witness account of P.W.1 is vitiated by suppression of material facts and his very presence at the scene is highly suspect. The recovery of the weapon, M.O.1, is also seriously challenged on behalf of the appellant, for the reason that the same was effected from an open place. The delay in the receipt of the F.I.R., as also the absence of visibility on account of the street light having no bulb also was canvassed before us in aid of the defence set up by the appellant. 8. The very serious challenge made is against the credibility of P.W.1 who spoke about the motive and was eye witness to the incident. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that there is absolutely no probability of P.W.1 having seen the incident since there was a "power cut" in the area at the time of the incident and the version of the witness that he came out of the house hearing the sound of 'iron chopping the head (transliterate-of "LANGUAGE") is highly improbable. The appellant's counsel further relying on the testimony of D.W.1 tried to raise a suspicion regarding the very presence of P.W.1 at the time of occurrence, which we shall deal with later. P.W.1 has been sought to be discredited on account of the fact that he had suppressed relationship with the deceased by denying such relationship to a specific question put in cross examination. 9. P.W.1 has been sought to be discredited on account of the fact that he had suppressed relationship with the deceased by denying such relationship to a specific question put in cross examination. 9. The contention of the appellant is that P.W.5, who was the friend of the deceased, had clearly spoken about the relationship of P.W.1 with the deceased making P.W.1, an interested witness. On going through the evidence tendered before the Court below in general as also the deposition of P.W.1 in particular, we are unable to countenance the said argument advanced by the appellant. The incident happened in the public road in front of the house of P.W.1 and according to us, he is the most natural witness who could have seen the incident and proved the fatal attack on the deceased. P.W.1 has deposed that he had seen the deceased while he was returning home in his scooter at about 8.00 p.m. on the fatal day, about 300 meters before his house. After reaching home, he changed his dress and was sitting in the verandah of his house when he heard the noise and noticed the incident going on in front of his house, on the public road. Having ventured out on the road to see what was happening, he witnessed the attack on the deceased, by the 1st accused. The contention regarding the improbability of any sound being heard on 'iron chopping the head' is only to be rejected taking into account the rustic life circumstance of the witness and the local dialects used by such people. The account of P.W.1 is perfectly in consonance with his F.I. Statement given immediately after the incident and the same would definitely add credence to the version of the witness as also the truth of the incident he narrates. P.W.4, the auto driver who took the deceased to the hospital, would state that while he was returning from a hire, P.W.1 stopped him and they together carried the deceased to the hospital in his autorickshaw. P.W.4 as also P.W.1 was unshaken in cross examination and stuck to their guns in corroboration of each others evidence. In addition to this, is the Out Patient ticket of the deceased (Exhibit P9), which records the deceased as having been brought at 8.45 p.m. by reason of alleged assault by two people. P.W.4 as also P.W.1 was unshaken in cross examination and stuck to their guns in corroboration of each others evidence. In addition to this, is the Out Patient ticket of the deceased (Exhibit P9), which records the deceased as having been brought at 8.45 p.m. by reason of alleged assault by two people. Exhibit P9 categorically records that the deceased was "brought by Thankappan - the eye witness" (sic). 10. The contention raised on the basis of the alleged relationship between the deceased and P.W.1 being established by P.W.5 cannot by itself lead to P.W.1 being discredited. The contention seems to be that P.W.1 having been shown to have been related to the deceased and himself having denied the said relationship, he is to be treated as an interested witness and his evidence cannot be accepted without corroboration. There is absolutely no rule that the conviction cannot be based on the evidence of an interested witness. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has in SarwanSingh Vs. State of Punjab, [(1976) 4 SCC 369] held that: "It is not the law that the evidence of an interested witness should be equated with that of a tainted witness or that of an approver so as to require corroboration as a matter of necessity. The evidence of an interested witness does not suffer from any infirmity as such, but the courts require as a rule of prudence, not as a rule of law, that the evidence of such witnesses should be scrutinised with a little care. Once that approach is made and the court is satisfied that the evidence of the interested witness has a ring of truth such evidence could be relied upon even without corroboration". The said proposition has been noted with approval and followed in Jaisy@ Jayaseelan Vs. State, [(2012) 1 SCC 529], in which case the evidence of the brother of the deceased, an eye witness, was solely relied upon to enter a conviction of guilt even when the other three eye witnesses turned hostile. 11. In the instant case, P.W.5 merely states that in the family lineage, twice removed, P.W.1 and the deceased were related. It is also pertinent that in cross-examination while P.W.5 confirms that he and P.W.1 were from one ‘Tharawad', the deceased does not belong to the same Tharawad'. 11. In the instant case, P.W.5 merely states that in the family lineage, twice removed, P.W.1 and the deceased were related. It is also pertinent that in cross-examination while P.W.5 confirms that he and P.W.1 were from one ‘Tharawad', the deceased does not belong to the same Tharawad'. The learned Sessions Judge has rightly declined to give any significance to the alleged relationship especially in the context of no direct relationship having been spoken to by P.W.5. The evidence of P.W.1, according to us, is consistent with the other circumstances, clear and cogent and can be safely relied upon. The denial of relationship, if any, cannot for a moment be considered as deliberate and wilful suppression by P.W.1 and the intention behind such suppression eludes us, as it did the learned Sessions Judge. 12. The motive has been spoken to by P.W.1 not as a mere hearsay. P.W.1 in chief examination as well as cross examination categorically speaks about the relationship between the accused and Sulochana, the aunt of the appellant. He specifically speaks about having seen the deceased talking to Sulochana in front of her house. The fact that he did not state it in his F.I. Statement is not at all relevant since the said omission cannot be said to be fatal to the prosecution case and cannot have any adverse impact. P.W.5, a close friend of the deceased also speaks about the illicit relationship of the deceased as divulged to him by the deceased himself. P.W.5 also narrates how the animosity developed when the deceased decided to marry another; by reason of which the accused 1 and 2 fell apart from the deceased. The animosity and resultant vengeance is clear from the statement made by A2 to P.W.5 that the deceased will not be permitted to marry another. The motive attributed by the prosecution to the accused, according to us, is convincing and the evidence is consistent. 13. What remains is the allegation of "power cut" and the deposition of D.W.2. The allegation of "power cut" has been effectively and completely dispelled by the evidence of D.W.1, the Assistant Engineer of Kerala State Electricity Board. The said official produced the "register of load shedding" (Exhibit D2), which definitely proved that the power supply to the area where the incident occurred was resumed at 8.00 p.m., i.e. before the time of occurrence. The allegation of "power cut" has been effectively and completely dispelled by the evidence of D.W.1, the Assistant Engineer of Kerala State Electricity Board. The said official produced the "register of load shedding" (Exhibit D2), which definitely proved that the power supply to the area where the incident occurred was resumed at 8.00 p.m., i.e. before the time of occurrence. The further dispute regarding the street light having no bulb is a mere afterthought since none of the witnesses who were at the scene at or after the incident, viz., P.W.1, P.W.4 or P.W.5, were questioned about the same. A feeble attempt was made when P.W.5 was cross-examined about the bulbs having been put after the area fell within the Corporation limits; but never pursued for obvious reasons. The eye witness convincingly and consistently says that he saw the incident in the light of the street lights as also the light from his house. Exhibit P4 scene mahazar and Exhibit P8 scene plan would demarcate the place of occurrence as 12.65 metres south-east from P.W.1's house and about 5.6 metres south-east from the street lamp on the northern edge of the road and 19.10 metres north-west of the mercury bulb mounted on the post on the southern edge of the road. There can be no doubt that there was sufficient light to witness the incident. Much has been made about the specific mention of a bulb on the northern post indicating the absence of the bulb in the other post, nearer to the spot where the incident occurred. The specific mentioning of a bulb on one post, as we see it, is only in the nature of a distinction of the 'mercury bulb' as against an ordinary one. Above all, the witnesses having not been confronted with the same, the contention is only to be rejected. 14. Similar is the evidence of D.W.2, which clearly smacks of incredulity. Not only was his presence not put to any of the witnesses, his entire account is incoherent and does not on any single point connect with the incident as spoken to by others. To cite one single instance; P.W.4, auto driver, specifically speaks of the deceased being carried into the autorickshaw by himself and P.W.1 while certain others stood around, afraid to approach. D.W.2 on the contrary speaks of the deceased being boarded into the auto by all of the bystanders. To cite one single instance; P.W.4, auto driver, specifically speaks of the deceased being carried into the autorickshaw by himself and P.W.1 while certain others stood around, afraid to approach. D.W.2 on the contrary speaks of the deceased being boarded into the auto by all of the bystanders. The evidence of D.W.2 also is to be discarded as a feeble and futile afterthought. P.W.1 had just reached home after work. The road leading to his house was deserted; a church procession having just passed by, as is the normal case. The brutal attack on the deceased causing nearly 23 wounds occurred just in front of the house of P.W.1 and it is evidently natural that he witnessed the incident. The presence of the accused is amply established by P.W.5, who deposes as having seen both A1 and A2 talking to each other before the incident occurred and that too, wearing the dress recovered from the site of occurrence. The incident spoken to by the eye witness and the motive leading to the same, according to us, clearly establishes the crime and the motive behind it and points a definite, unwavering finger at the 1st accused. 15. One other serious challenge made by the counsel for the appellant is against the recovery of the weapon (M.O.1) which, according to him, is from an open space. A plain reading of Exhibit P3 recovery mahazar would clearly show that M.O.1 chopper was seen in the backyard of one Vesu between the irregularly arranged stones of a bund and amongst waste materials. The said recovery cannot be said to be from an open space from which the article could have been easily detected. The authorship of concealment is also evidently on the 1st accused, who led the police to the said spot and facilitated the recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The bloodstains in the chopper (M.O.1) were analysed and found to be human blood and the M.O. was identified by the eye witness (P.W.1) as also the attestor to the seizure mahazar (P.W.3). The bloodstains in the chopper (M.O.1) were analysed and found to be human blood and the M.O. was identified by the eye witness (P.W.1) as also the attestor to the seizure mahazar (P.W.3). The place from which the chopper was recovered was in the direction in which the 1st accused fled, the weapon was identified as the one used in the incident capable of causing the injuries which led to the death of the victim and in addition the recovery effected at the instance of the 1st accused clearly establishes his knowledge regarding the place and object of concealment. 16. On a plain reading of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, it can be discerned that it is an exception to the normal rule of inadmissibility of self-incriminating statements, made by an accused in custody, as evidence. Any fact discovered as a consequence of disclosure of information by an accused while in custody renders the information relating distinctly to the fact discovered admissible in evidence. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The scheme of Section 27 is evident. Sections 24 to 26 make clear the attitude of law towards confessions, confessions to police officers and confessions while in police custody, made by an indictee. Section 27 which starts with the words "provided that" is an exception to that attitude of law. Any information furnished by a person accused of any offence while in police custody whether amounting to a confession or not, is made admissible under Section 27 of the Act, provided such information leads to the discovery of any fact and provided the information distinctly refers to the fact discovered. The guarantee afforded by the discovery - the confirmation of the information by the subsequent distinct fact discovered, is what persuades the law to carve out the exception. In the instant case, the relevance of the discovery of the weapon used in the crime cannot, for a moment, be doubted and is in consonance with the other evidence unearthed. It cannot also be disputed that the discovery was as a result of the information supplied by the accused in the crime and that such information was given while in custody and that it led to the discovery of the material object. It cannot also be disputed that the discovery was as a result of the information supplied by the accused in the crime and that such information was given while in custody and that it led to the discovery of the material object. The discovery of the fact was also deposed by the investigating officer and only the factum of concealment of the weapon is sought to be admitted in evidence by the prosecution. The discovery was of the fact that M.O.1 lies concealed at a particular place and the appellant was aware of the fact that it was available at the particular spot/area where it was found available to be recovered by the police official. 17. A contention is raised that the recovery of the weapon was from an open place and the information cannot hence be admitted under Section 27 of the Evidence At. We hear such arguments often. There is a common assumption that if the place of discovery is an open place, the discovery under Section 27 would be inadmissible. This common incorrect impression deserves to be disabused. It will be appropriate to refer to paragraph 26 of State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Jeet Singh, [AIR 1999 SC 1293]. Hon'ble Justice K.T.Thomas speaking for the 2 Judge Bench observed: "There is nothing in Section 27 of the Evidence Act which renders the statement of the accused inadmissible if recovery of the articles was made from any place which is "open or accessible to others". It is a fallacious notion that when recovery of any incriminating article was made from a place which is open or accessible to others it would vitiate the evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Any object can be concealed in places which are open or accessible to others. For example, if the article is buried on the main roadside or if it is concealed beneath dry leaves lying on public places or kept hidden in a public office, the article would remain out of the visibility of others in normal circumstances. Until such article is disintered its hidden state would remain unhampered. The person who hid it alone knows where it is until he discloses that fact to any other person. Hence the crucial question is not whether the place was accessible to others or not but whether it was ordinarily visible to others. Until such article is disintered its hidden state would remain unhampered. The person who hid it alone knows where it is until he discloses that fact to any other person. Hence the crucial question is not whether the place was accessible to others or not but whether it was ordinarily visible to others. If it is not then it is immaterial that the concealed place is accessible to others". (emphasis supplied) 18. It is not the openness of the situs of the concealment that matters. The question is whether the discovery relates distinctly to the information furnished. In the instant case it matters little that the place where the weapon was concealed was an open place. The crucial fact is that the weapon was lying concealed; the information that it was available there was conveyed by the accused to the investigating officer and the discovery of the weapon was effected by the investigating officer exclusively on the basis of information furnished by the appellant. If the fact is discovered or must have been discovered, even without the information received from the accused, Section 27 may not apply. 19. That on a closer search, any one could have recovered the weapon from an open place does not militate against the discovery being effected exclusively on the basis of information furnished by the accused to the investigating police officer. The contention that the recovery was from an open place is irrelevant when the recovery was effected from its place of concealment exclusively on the basis of information furnished by the accused and the object discovered could not be and was not perceived by the others who passed by. Undoubtedly in the instant case the weapon was not recovered from a place where it was open for all the world to see. The intention to conceal is evident from the place where it was recovered and the manner in which it was concealed. The concealment was also a connecting link in the crime and was made in the direction of flight of the accused. The concealment of the weapon involved in the crime, being the fact deposed to by the Investigating Officer, stands proved and inter alia connects the accused to the crime committed. 20. The non-explanation of an injury on the accused has also been highlighted by the learned counsel for the accused as a relevant circumstance. The concealment of the weapon involved in the crime, being the fact deposed to by the Investigating Officer, stands proved and inter alia connects the accused to the crime committed. 20. The non-explanation of an injury on the accused has also been highlighted by the learned counsel for the accused as a relevant circumstance. The injury itself is a minor one and the explanation was that it may have been caused by M.O.1 itself in the course of the attack on the deceased. It has come out in evidence that the body of the victim was indiscriminately chopped causing as much as 23 wounds, which led to profuse bleeding and it is quite possible that the sweat generated in the effort as also the blood of the deceased resulted in the palm holding the weapon to be slippery, thus causing the injury. Again the said contention is for the first time urged before us. One other factor is that quite voluntarily, the 1st accused in his 313 statement has contended that he is a lumber-jack by profession and the injury was caused in the course of such work. The injury, going by the minor nature of the same, as also the cause spoken of by the accused in his 313 statement is not a circumstance which can upset the probabilities evident from the other circumstances. 21. The contention regarding the delay in the receipt of F.I.R. based on facts is that the incident occurred on 11.1.2003 and the F.I.R. is seen to have been received by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-III, Thrissur on 13.1.2003 at 10.30 a.m. The 11th and 12th of January 2003 though holidays, the delay is fatal to the prosecution, argues the appellant. No doubt, Section 157 speaks of sending of a report of information regarding commission of an offence forthwith to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence. The Supreme Court has deprecated the practice of not sending F.I.R. to the residence of a Magistrate on Sundays and holidays in ArjunMarik Vs. State of Bihar, [1994 SCC (Cri) 1551]. However, it cannot be gainsaid that, such delay alone would vitiate the prosecution case. The Supreme Court has deprecated the practice of not sending F.I.R. to the residence of a Magistrate on Sundays and holidays in ArjunMarik Vs. State of Bihar, [1994 SCC (Cri) 1551]. However, it cannot be gainsaid that, such delay alone would vitiate the prosecution case. ArjunMarik case, cited supra, itself laid down that: "It is true that quite often there are valid reasons for the delay in the despatch of the first information report and it is not always a circumstance on the basis of which the entire prosecution case may be said to be fabricated, but it all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case where the circumstance of delay may lead to serious consequences". The circumstances revealed in evidence and established by the prosecution in the case before us does not persuade us to harbour any doubts. The delay is irrelevant and insignificant. It is also to be stated that the accused has not suggested during trial that the delay led to any embellishments in the prosecution case or introduction of any distorted version. 22. The instant case is not one which rests on circumstantial evidence, but is one in which there is a single eye witness, whose account of the incident is devoid of even a veneer of suspicion. The presence of the accused and the deceased at the scene of the crime before the incident as also at the time of occurrence of the incident as such has been clearly established by the prosecution. The motive for the crime has been sufficiently proved and the chain of circumstances leading to the commission of the offence is clearly and firmly decipherable and the links, at no point, are broken or even feeble. The medical evidence as also the chemical analysis report supports ably the version of the prosecution and so does the investigation conducted and the recoveries effected during the investigation. The medical evidence as also the chemical analysis report supports ably the version of the prosecution and so does the investigation conducted and the recoveries effected during the investigation. The cumulative evidence discussed above regarding the motive which led to the crime, the undoubted presence of the deceased and the accused in the close vicinity and the incident itself spoken to by the eye witness as also the recovery, the medical evidence and chemical analyst's report proves beyond all and any reasonable doubt that the 1st accused in order to avenge his spurned aunt attacked the deceased with a lethal weapon and brutally inflicted chop wounds on him with full knowledge of the consequences, eventually leading to his death. The judgment of the learned Sessions Judge does not warrant any interference and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant/1st accused is hereby confirmed. 23. Before leaving the appeal, we notice that the learned Sessions Judge has imposed compensation with default sentence evidently under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. while Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code speaks specifically of liability to fine. No fine is seen imposed. However, since the Court is competent to direct compensation from the amount of fine imposed, we do not think it calls for any interference. Necessarily, the technical error has to be taken note of, more so for future guidance in such matters. 24. The appeal hence fails and is accordingly dismissed.