Judgment Heard Shri V. Menezes, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners and Shri Sudin M.S. Usgaonkar, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. Rule. Heard forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent waives service. 3. The above petition challenges an order passed by the Administrative Tribunal dated 16/12/2011 passed in Eviction Revision Application no.8/2011 whereby the revision preferred by the petitioners came to be rejected and the learned Tribunal has allowed the application under Section 32(4) of the Goa, Daman & Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, and directed the petitioner to deposit the arrears of rent within a period of 30 days and on failure to do so the Rent Controller was directed to stop all proceedings and hand over the possession to the respondent herein. 4. Shri V. Menezes, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners has challenged the impugned judgment on the ground that the respondent is not a landlord as according to him though the original agreement of lease was executed by him in favour of the petitioners nevertheless it has now transpired that the said respondent did not have title to the suit premises on the relevant date. The learned Counsel has pointed out that even the respondent had filed an application to bring the legal representatives of the original owner on record before the learned Rent Controller. The learned Counsel has taken me through the impugned judgment and pointed out that the learned Tribunal has erroneously appreciated the material on record and dismissed the revision preferred by the petitioners. The next grievance raised by Shri Menezes, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners is that the Tribunal was not justified to pass an order under Section 32 (4) of the Rent Controller Act to direct the Rent Controller to hand over possession of the suit premises to the respondent in case there is default in payment of rent within a period of 30 days. The learned Counsel further pointed out that such directions are in excess of jurisdiction as once the revision preferred by the petitioners was dismissed the question of passing any such directions would not arise. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the second part of the impugned judgment to that effect in any event deserves to be quashed and set aside. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the second part of the impugned judgment to that effect in any event deserves to be quashed and set aside. The learned Counsel has thereafter taken me through the material on record and pointed out that the Tribunal has erroneously passed the impugned judgment. 5. On the other hand, Shri Sudin Usgaonkar, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has supported the impugned judgment. The learned Counsel has pointed out that the agreement pursuant to which the lease has been created in favour of the petitioners is the one executed by the respondent. The learned Counsel further points out that after the execution of the said lease the rent was being given by the petitioner to the respondent. The learned Counsel has taken me through the impugned judgment and pointed out that the learned Tribunal has rightly considered the material on record and taking note of the definition of a “Landlord” under the provisions of the Rent Control Act has passed the impugned judgment. As far as the second part of the impugned judgment as assailed by the petitioners is concerned the learned Counsel has pointed out that the said part is passed in view of the application filed under Section 32(4) filed by the respondent before the Tribunal. The learned Counsel, as such, submits that the petition deserves to be rejected. 6. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. I have also gone through the records as well as the impugned judgment. On perusal of the judgment dated 16/12/2011, the Tribunal has found that the original agreement of lease was executed by the respondent. The Tribunal has also taken note of the definition of the “Landlord” under the Act and found that the respondent comes within the meaning of landlord under the said Act. The Tribunal has also noted the fact that the rent was otherwise being paid by the petitioners to the respondent after the execution of the lease agreement. During the course of the hearing of the above petition Shri Sudin Usgaonkar, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has produced a copy of the said lease agreement which on perusal thereof suggests that the respondent and his wife had executed such lease agreement in favour of the petitioners. During the course of the hearing of the above petition Shri Sudin Usgaonkar, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has produced a copy of the said lease agreement which on perusal thereof suggests that the respondent and his wife had executed such lease agreement in favour of the petitioners. Shri Menezes, learned Counsel does not dispute that he entered into the suit premises pursuant to the said agreement dated 19/06/1991. Considering the factual position as stated herein above and noted by the learned Tribunal, I find that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Tribunal that there is tenant/landlord relationship between the petitioners and the respondent cannot be faulted. Hence, the impugned judgment to that extent cannot be faulted. 7. With regard to the contention of Shri Menezes, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the learned Tribunal had no jurisdiction to pass the second part of the order, I find that as the revision preferred by the petitioners came to be disposed of by the impugned judgment the question of passing any order under Section 32(4) would not arise. Such applications are to be disposed of during the pendency of the proceedings. Considering that the revision came to be disposed of, if at all any such right was available to the respondent such application is to be filed before the competent Court where such proceedings for eviction were pending. Shri Usgaonkar, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent in fact does not dispute that the second part of the order may not be available to the respondent at this stage, but however, pointed out that it does not preclude the respondent to file such application if they are so entitled before the Rent Controller. Shri Menezes, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners at this stage points out that the application under Section 32(4) earlier filed by the respondent came to be rejected. Be that as it may, it does not preclude the respondent to file such application in case there is any default in depositing the rent by the petitioner. In case any such application is filed no doubt the authority will have to decide such application after hearing the petitioners in accordance with law. All contentions with regard to any such application are left open. 8. In case any such application is filed no doubt the authority will have to decide such application after hearing the petitioners in accordance with law. All contentions with regard to any such application are left open. 8. Before hearing the above petition the petitioners were directed to deposit all the arrears of rent in respect of the suit premises before this Court. It is pointed out by Shri Menezes that such rent has been deposited accordingly. In view of the disposal of the Writ Petition, the Registry is directed to transfer the amount of Rs.93,720/-deposited in this Court to the concerned Rent Controller. Liberty to the respondent if so advised to file an appropriate application to withdraw the said amount which the Rent Controller will decide in accordance with law. 9. In view of the above, I pass the following order: ORDER (i) The impugned judgment dated 16/12/2011 to the extent it directs the petitioners to deposit the rent within 30 days and in default thereof the Rent Controller directed to pass order stopping the proceedings and handing over possession of the suit premises to the respondent and disposing of the application under Section 32(4) filed by the respondent is quashed and set aside. (ii) The remaining part of the impugned judgment dismissing the revision application preferred by the petitioners stands confirmed. (iii) Rule is made absolute in the above terms. (iv) The petition stands disposed of accordingly.