Judgment 1 Heard Ms. Raksha Gala, for the Petitioner. 2 On 17th January,2012, following order was passed: “1 Heard Ms. Gala, Advocate for Petitioner. 2 The impugned bill seeking difference of electricity charges levied on the basis of multiplying factor one instead of multiplying factor of 2 was issued in the month of December 2010 for the period of September, 2003 to December, 2010. Prima facie Sub-Section 2 of Section 56 of the Indian Electricity Act, 2003 will not empower the Petitioner to recover any amount for period of 2 years prior to the date of demand namely prior to December, 2008. The learned Advocate for the Petitioner has relied upon the Judgment of Division Bench (Ranjana Desai and A.A. Sayed, JJ) in the case of Rototex Polyester & anr. v/s. Administrator, Administration of Dadra and Nagar Havli (U.T.) Electricity Department, Silvassa & Ors. 2010 (4) BCR 456. The Electricity Ombudsman relied upon the following Judgments of the High Court. (a) Judgment of the Division Bench in W.P.(L) No.221 of 2006 Mr. Awadesh S. Pande (of M/s. Nand/A/15) v/s. Tata Power Co. Ltd. (b) M.S.E.D.C.L. v/s. Green World Magnum Enterprises (WP No.2894/2007 decided on 7/9/2007). (c) M.S.E.D.C.L v/s. Venco Research & Breeding Farm Pvt. Ltd. (W.P. No.6783/2009 decided on 5/3/2010). The learned Advocate for the Petitioner seeks time of one week to produce the aforesaid 3 Judgments referred at Serial Nos. (a) to(c) above. Stand over to 24th January, 2012. Parrheard. High on board.” 3 Advocate Ms. Gala has brought to my notice the relevant Judgments. She has also brought to my notice that the Judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Rototex Polyester & Another was brought to the notice of the authorities of the Electricity Ombudsmen. However, the same has not been referred in the impugned Judgment. 4 RULE. Since prima facie, in my opinion the impugned order of the Electricity Ombudsman is in accordance with the provisions of Sub-Section 2 of Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and since the Respondent is also a public sector undertaking namely B.S.N.L., I do not think that this is a fit case for granting interim relief as prayed for in the Petition. Hence, prayer for interim relief is refused. Hence, prayer for interim relief is refused. The Writ Petition is, however, admitted in view of the importance of the issue regarding correct interpretation of Sub-Section 2 of Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and the direct conflict of opinion between the Judgments of two Division Benches of this Court as elaborately stated by me herein after. 5 On a careful perusal of various Judgments brought before me, it is clear that there is a clear conflict between two Judgments of this Court. On the interpretation of Section 56 (2) of the Indian Electricity Act, 2003, in the present case, it is the case of the Petitioner that instead of applying correct multiplier factor 2, wrong multiplier factor 1 was applied. According to the Petitioner, therefore, a wrong bill for a lesser amount was issued. Hence, by the impugned bill seeking recovery of the difference, which bill is issued in the month of December, 2010, Petitioner sought recovery of the difference for the period from September, 2003 to December, 2010. In so far as period preceding two years of December, 2010 is concerned, in my opinion, there is no difficulty in the way of the Petitioner since even Sub-Section 2 of Section 56 does not bar such recovery. However, in my opinion, the problem and dispute arises when the Distribution Licensee like Petitioner seeks to recover Electricity charges and dues beyond a period of two years. In a case where such dues have not been continuously shown as recoverable as arrears of charges for electricity supplied, Section 56(2) bars the recovery. The Division Bench of this Court (Coram: Smt. R. P. Desai and A.A. Sayed JJ.) which has decided Rototex Polyester and another v/s. Administrator, Administration and others 2010(4) BCR 456, was considering the case where demand notice was issued on 3rd October, 2007 claiming difference in the charges from July 2003 to July 2007. In that Judgment of the Division Bench, this Court followed the earlier Judgment of the Division Bench, this Court in the case of Bharat Barrel & Drums Manufacturing Company Pvt. Ltd. v/s. The Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay AIR 1978Bombay 369. In that Judgment of the Division Bench, this Court followed the earlier Judgment of the Division Bench, this Court in the case of Bharat Barrel & Drums Manufacturing Company Pvt. Ltd. v/s. The Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay AIR 1978Bombay 369. 6 Section 56 (2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 reads thus: “(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no sum due from any consumer, under this section shall be recoverable after the period of two years from the date when such sum became first due unless such sum has been shown continuously as recoverable as arrear of charges for electricity supplied and the licensee shall not cut off the supply of the electricity.” 7 The Electricity Ombudsmen has relied upon the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mr. Awadhesh S. Pandey v/s. Tata Power Company Ltd. & Others (Coram: F. I. Rebello and Anoop V. Mohta, JJ.) AIR 2007 Bombay 52,. Para 7 of the said Judgment reads thus: “Para7: We then come to the next issue as to whether the demand made by respondent No.1 is contrary to the provision of Section 56 of the Electricity Act. We have, already narrated the facts. The Electricity Ombudsman by his order of 18th July, 2006, held that the respondent No.1 is entitled to recover past dues by correcting multiplying factor. The question posed by the Electricity Ombudsman to itself was whether the recovery could be made for the entire period of 26 months i.e. for a period from October, 2003 to November, 2005 and that too belatedly in January, 2006. After considering the various provisions including the regulations, the Ombudsman held, only those charges for a period of two years previous to the demand could be recovered and that the arrears for the consumption in January 2004 became first due in February, 2004 as supplementary bill was raised in 2006 and these dues having been within two years are recoverable under the provisions of Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act. Submission of counsel for the petitioner is that the provisions of Section 56 do not empower respondent No.1 to recover any amount if the period of two years has elapsed no can electricity supply be cut off for nonpayment of those dues. Submission of counsel for the petitioner is that the provisions of Section 56 do not empower respondent No.1 to recover any amount if the period of two years has elapsed no can electricity supply be cut off for nonpayment of those dues. In other words, what is sought to be contended is that if the demand or part of the demand is time barred the provisions of Section 56 would not be attracted. We are afraid, we cannot subscribe to that proposition. Section 56(1) is a special provision, enabling the generating company or the licensee to cutoff supply of electricity until such charges or sum as demanded under Section 56(1) is paid. Relying on subsection (2), it was strongly urged that Section 56(1) cannot be resorted to after the period of two years from the date when such demand became first due. In our opinion, subsection (2) only provides a limitation, that the recourse to recovery by cutting of electricity supply is limited for a period of two years from the date when such sum became due. As long a sum is due, which is within two years of the demand and can be recovered, the licensee of the generating company can exercise its power of coercive process of recovery by cutting of electricity supply. The Electricity Act has provided that mechanism for improvement of supply of electricity and to enable the licensee or generating company to recover its dues. Apart from the above mechanism, independently it can make recovery by way of a suit. In our opinion, therefore, the impugned order passed by the Electricity Ombudsman does not suffer from any error apparent on the fact of the record and consequently there is no merit in this petition.” 8 On the other hand as stated above, Advocate for the Petitioner relied on the observation in the Judgment of Division Bench in the case of Rototex (supra). The relevant paragraphs 12 to 18 reads thus: “Para12: Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Company Private Limited v. The Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay AIR 1978 Bom.369, a Division Bench of this Court was concerned with a situation where additional amounts for eleven years period were claimed from the consumer on the basis of failure to multiply the reading by 2 (two) and not on the basis of faulty meter. The question was whether the licensee had to restrict its claim to six months. The Division Bench observed that under Section 26 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 restriction as to six months does not seem to apply to a claim made by the licensee on the ground that there was a failure to multiply the reading by the changed multiplication factor. Para13: In U.A. Thadanis case (supra), learned Single Judge of this Court was concerned with similar fact situation. Two bills were raised on the consumer demanding additional amounts because multiplying factor was wrongly charged. It was argued by the consumer on the basis of Subsection (6) of Section 26 that the Electrical Inspector could determine the quantum of electricity during the statutory period of six months and for the period anterior to it the reading registered in the disputed meter will have to be presumed to be correct. Relying on the judgment of this Court in Bharat Barrel, learned Single Judge held that the restriction as to six months period provided in Section 26 has no application to a demand made by the licensee or the Electricity Board for the unpaid amount for the electricity consumed if the consumer was underbilled due to clerical mistakes or human error or such like mistakes. Para14: The principle which can be deduced from the above judgments is that in case the consumer is underbilled on account of clerical mistake such as the present case, where the multiplication factor had changed from 500 to 1000, but due to oversight, the department issued bills with 500 as multiplication factor instead of 1000, the bar of limitation cannot be raised by the consumer. Though Section 26(6) of the Indian Electrical Act, 1910 is not in pari materia with Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003, in our opinion, the present case would be governed by the above principle and, hence, the challenge raised by the petitioners must fail. Para15: The question raised in this petition can be examined from yet another angle keeping Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 with which we are concerned here in the forefront. Para16: In Yatish Sharmas case tariff was changed from GP1 to GP2. Between 19/1/2000 and 27/5/2000, the readings of the electronic meter were not taken. A supplementary bill was raised by the petitioner Corporation therein on the basis of the average monthly consumption. Para16: In Yatish Sharmas case tariff was changed from GP1 to GP2. Between 19/1/2000 and 27/5/2000, the readings of the electronic meter were not taken. A supplementary bill was raised by the petitioner Corporation therein on the basis of the average monthly consumption. By the supplementary bill, a demand of Rs.78,187.17 was raised on the consumer and debited to the amount of the bill for the month of April, 2004. The consumer raised a grievance before the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum. The matter ultimately reached the Ombudsman. He held that the supplementary bill was raised after a period of four years from the date when it became first due and, hence, the amount was recoverable under Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003. The Ombudsman order was challenged in this Court. Para17: The issue which arose before learned Single Judge was what interpretation should be placed on the words when such sum becomes first due. The question was whether the Ombudsman view that since the arrears for consumption became due immediately upon the usage of energy, the supplementary bill raised in August, 2004 for the disputed period between January, 2000 to May, 2000 was barred under Section 56 (2). Para18: While dealing with this submission, learned Single Jude referred to Delhi High Courts judgment in H.D. Shourie v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi AIR 1987 Delhi 219, where the Delhi High Court was considering the expression due appearing in Section 24 of the Electricity Act, 2003. The Delhi High Court observed that if the word due is to mean consumption of electricity, it would mean that electricity charges would become due and payable the moment electricity is consumed and if charges in respect thereof are not paid then even without a bill being issued, a notice of disconnection would be liable to be issued under Section 24, which could not have been the intention of the legislature. The Delhi High Court observed that the word due in this context would mean due and payable after a valid bill has been sent to the consumer. Learned Single Judge followed this view and set aside the Ombudsmans order which had taken a contrary view. We are in respectful agreement with learned Single Judge. In this case, the demand notice with revised bill dated 3/10/2007 was, according to the petitioners, served on them on 9/11/2007. Learned Single Judge followed this view and set aside the Ombudsmans order which had taken a contrary view. We are in respectful agreement with learned Single Judge. In this case, the demand notice with revised bill dated 3/10/2007 was, according to the petitioners, served on them on 9/11/2007. Therefore, the revised bill amount first became due on 9/11/2007. Hence, Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act 2003 would not come in the way of the respondents from recovering the said amount under the revised bills. The impugned order dated 12/9/2008 warrants no interference.” It is clear that the earlier Judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Mr. Awadesh Pandey (supra) was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench which subsequently decided the case of Rototex (supra). 9 According to me there is a direct conflict between the observation made in paragraph 7 of the Judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Mr. Awadesh Pandey (supra) and paragraphs 14 and 17 of the Judgment in Rototex (supra). This conflict will have to be resolved by a Larger Bench, since the similar issue regarding interpretation of Section 56 (2) is arising in several matters coming before this Court. 10 Before making order of reference, I deem it necessary to indicate reasons for making reference, I am unable to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of Rototex (supra) as also the Judgment of the Learned Single Judge in the case of Yatish Sharma. Even if the argument of the Petitioner is accepted, then even in the case where the Petitioner has committed an error in applying multiplier factor, the Petitioner can wake up after several years, without there being any limitation on the period within which said error can be noticed as is contended by the Petitioner. For example, a consumer may be charged only by applying multiplier factor 1', instead of 2'. On this basis, bills will be raised by the Distribution Licensee and consumer in good faith and being unaware of the mistake made by the Licensee, will go on paying amount of the Electricity charges and on that basis, the consumer may fix the sale price of its goods in case it is a manufacturing activity or commercial activity and accordingly, charge its normal customer for the goods or the services provided to the said consumer. If the Distribution Licensee is allowed to wake up after several years and serve bill for a differential amount and thereafter, argues that the amount became due only after service of such bill for a differential amount, in my opinion, then this will not only be contrary to the legislative intent under Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 but it will also result in the situation where an innocent consumer may be suddenly faced with a huge demand in respect of the bill even beyond two years of service of bills and will be forced to pay the same without any corresponding mechanism for recovery of charges of difference of the said amount from his customer or consumer to whom said consumer of electricity may have provided goods or service. This will be clearly unjust and arbitrary. In my opinion, interpretation of Section 56(2) done by the Division Bench in the case of Rototex Polyester (supra) results in a situation where the Distribution License can wake up and issue a supplementary bill after any number of years without there being any limitation on the numbers of years after which said supplementary bill is issued and can thereafter, claim that the amount becomes dues from the date on which it is sought to have been levied and demanded by presenting a bill by claiming that the amount becomes due only when the supplementary bill is issued. Such interpretation will lead to absurd results. 11 Therefore, both on account of the fact that I am unable to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of Rototex Polyester (supra) and particularly, the observations made in paragraphs 14 and 18 of the said Judgment and also on account of the fact that according to me, there is a direct conflict of opinion between the earlier Judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Awadesh S. Pandey (supra) and the subsequent Judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Rototex Polyester (supra), I deem it fit that the issue will have to be referred to the Larger Bench of this Court, consisting of at least 3 Judges. 12 Hence, I deem it necessary to request the Hon'ble the Chief Justice to refer the following issues to the Larger Bench consisting of atleast 3 Judges. 12 Hence, I deem it necessary to request the Hon'ble the Chief Justice to refer the following issues to the Larger Bench consisting of atleast 3 Judges. The issues to be referred is as under: (i) Whether irrespective of the provisions of Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003, Distribution Licensee can demand charges for consumption of electricity for a period of more than two years preceding the date of the first demand of such charges; (ii) Whether the charges for electricity consumed become due only after a demand bill issued by the Distribution Licensee and whether the Distribution Licensee can issue a demand bill even for the period proceeding more than two years from the date of issuance of demand bill notwithstanding the provision of Sub-Section 2 of Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003; (iii) Which of the Judgments of the Division Bench namely Awadesh S. Pandey v/s. Tata Power Co. Ltd., reported in AIR 2007 Bombay 52 or the Judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Rototex Polyester & Another, reported in 2010(4) have correctly interpreted the provisions of Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act. 3 The Registrar (Judicial) is directed to take further follow up action.