Manoj Misra, J. I have heard Sri A. N. Bhargava, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Rakesh Bahadur, learned counsel for the respondent and have perused the record. 2. This is a plaintiffs appeal against the judgment and decree dated 17.1.1979 passed by Civil Judge, Jalaun at Orai in Civil Appeal No. 96 of 1977 arising out of Civil Suit No. 227 of 1976. Suit No. 227 of 1976 was instituted by the plaintiff-appellant for compensation of Rs. 500 and for permanent prohibitory injunction thereby seeking to restrain the Municipal Board, Oral ( defendant-respondent herein) from establishing "Rasta" over the property/land of the plaintiff, as also for restraining the said defendant from interfering in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff. 3. Plaint case was that the plaintiff was the owner in possession of the suit property, where she has two "Kachcha" and two "Pucca" rooms whereas the remaining portion was foundation ( "Neev"). It was claimed that her building maps were sanctioned, once in 1961 and the other in 1972. The defendant, however, demolished two walls thereby causing loss of ? 500 and were further planning to take "Rasta" from three sides of the plaintiffs house, whereas never any such "Rasta" was in existence and there was no compliance of the provisions of sub section ( 3) of Section 212 and there was no proper issuance of notice under Section 221 of the U. P. Municipality Act, 1916 and that the plaintiffs land was never acquired nor any compensation was ever paid to her. It was claimed that a notice, under Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, was issued on 1.9.1975, which was served on the defendant on 4.9.1975 ; and that the cause of action first arose on 23.6.1975 when the defendant demolished the walls, and on 2.7.1975 when the defendant declared its intention to establish "Rosta". 4. The defendant contested the suit taking various pleas, one of them being that the suit was barred by Sections 326, 221 ( 6), 184 ( 2), 222 and 321 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916. 5. Both the courts below found that the suit was barred by subsection ( 3) of Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act as the suit was instituted on 1.6.1976 more than six months after the accrual of the cause of action, which admittedly arose on 23.6.1975, and on 2.7.1975. 5. Both the courts below found that the suit was barred by subsection ( 3) of Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act as the suit was instituted on 1.6.1976 more than six months after the accrual of the cause of action, which admittedly arose on 23.6.1975, and on 2.7.1975. The courts below further found that the defendant had taken steps under Sections 186 and 211 of the U. P. Municipalities Act for removal of encroachment, to which no challenge was made under Section 318 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, therefore, the order attained finality, under Section 321 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the courts below the instant second appeal has been filed. The substantial question of law formulated for adjudication in this appeal, at the time of admission, was as to whether the suit of the plaintiff was barred by Sections 326 and 221 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. 1916. A bare perusal of Section 221 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, does not indicate any bar with regard to institution of a suit, it only provides the methodology by which a street is to be adopted as a public street. Further, Section 221 also does not provide for any finality to any such declaration. Accordingly, I am of the view that the suit of the plaintiff cannot be said to be barred by Section 221 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. However, in the judgment of the courts below, it has come that the order of the Municipal Board declaring the street as a public street and directing for removal of encroachment attained finality under Section 321 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. Therefore, the substantial question of law involved for adjudication in this appeal is re-framed as follows : "whether the suit of the plaintiff is barred by the provisions of sub-section ( 3) of Section 326 as also Section 321 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916?". 7. Therefore, the substantial question of law involved for adjudication in this appeal is re-framed as follows : "whether the suit of the plaintiff is barred by the provisions of sub-section ( 3) of Section 326 as also Section 321 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916?". 7. Sri A. N. Bhargava, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the provisions of sub-section ( 3) of Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act were not attracted inasmuch as the plaintiff had instituted suit for an injunction on the ground that the land was never acquired by the Municipal Board, therefore, the taking of rasta from over the said land was a void act. which cannot be said to have been done in discharge of the official duties of the Municipality and, as such, no notice was required to be served under subsection ( 1) of Section 326, therefore, the provisions of sub-section ( 3) of Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act were not attracted so as to bar the suit by limitation.. It was further contended that Section 321 of the U. P. Municipalities Act does not bar the institution. of the suit, as would be clear from the provisions of Section 322 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. 8. Per contra, Sri Rakesh Bahadur, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that under the provisions of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, a Municipality is enjoined upon to maintain a public street and to remove encroachment thereon ; and it has also powers to adopt a private street as a public street. Once the powers are exercised, rightly or wrongly, under the provisions of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, then any suit that challenges the exercise of that power has to be instituted within the period of limitation provided by sub-section ( 3) of Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916. Since admittedly, as per the plaint averments, the cause of action accrued beyond six months from the date of the institution of the suit, the view taken by the courts below that the suit was barred under sub-section ( 3) of Section 326 of the U., P, Municipalities Act, cannot be faulted. Whether the plaintiff's Suit was barred by Section 321 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 : 9. Whether the plaintiff's Suit was barred by Section 321 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 : 9. For arriving at an answer to the question as to whether the suit was barred by the provisions of Section 321 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, it would be useful to examine the provisions of Sections 318, 321 and 322 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916. Sections 318, 321 and 322 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 are being reproduced herein below : "318. Appeals from order of Municipality.( 1) Any person aggrieved by any order or direction made by Municipality under the powers conferred upon it by Sections 180 ( 1), 186. 204, 205 ( 1), 208, 211, 212, 222 ( 6), 241 ( 2), 245, 278 and 285 or under a bye-law made under Heading "G" of Section 298, may within thirty days from the date of such order, exclusive of the time requisite for obtaining a copy thereof, appeal to such officer as the State Government may appoint for the purpose of hearing such appeals or any of them, or failing such appointment, to the District Magistrate. ( 2) The appellate authority may, if it thinks fit, extend the period allowed by sub-section ( 1) for appeal. ( 3) No appeal shall be dismissed or allowed in part or whole unless reasonable opportunity of showing cause or being heard has been given to the parties." "321. Finality of order of appellate authority. ( 1) No order or direction referred to in Section 318 shall be questioned in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided therein. ( 2) The order of the appellate authority confirming, setting aside, or modifying any such order or direction shall be final : Provided that it shall be lawful for the appellate authority, upon application, and after giving notice to the other party, to review any order passed by him in appeal by a further order passed within three months from the date of his original order." "322. Suspension of orders passed under Section 318 pending decision of appeal or civil suit regarding the subject of appeal or civil suit.Where an order or direction referred to in Section 318 is subject to appeal and an appeal has been instituted against it, or a civil suit has been instituted in respect thereof, all proceedings to enforce such order and all prosecutions for a breach thereof, may, by order of the appellate authority or of the civil court, as the case may be, be suspended pending the decision of the appeal or the civil suit, and if such order is set aside on appeal or by the decision of the civil court, disobedience thereof shall not be deemed to be an offence." 10. The courts below were of the opinion that the plaintiff ought to have preferred an appeal under Section 318 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 against the order of demolition/removal of encroachment passed in exercise of power under Sections 186 and 211 of the Act and, in absence of any such appeal, the order attained finality under Section 321 of the Act, therefore, the suit was barred. 11. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that the civil court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting the suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. In Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay, AIR 1965 SC 1942 , the Apex Court, in para 32, observed as follows : "...Whenever it is urged before a civil court that its jurisdiction is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication to entertain claims of a civil nature, the court naturally feels inclined to consider whether the remedy afforded by an alternative provision prescribed by a special statute is sufficient or adequate. In cases where the exclusion of the civil courts' jurisdiction is expressly provided for, the consideration as to the scheme of the statute in question and the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided for by it may be relevant but cannot be decisive. But where exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication, such considerations would be very important, and in conceivable circumstances, might even become decisive. But where exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication, such considerations would be very important, and in conceivable circumstances, might even become decisive. If it appears that a statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right and liability to be dealt with by Tribunals specially constituted in that behalf, and it further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, it becomes pertinent to inquire whether the remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not." In Dhulabhai v. State of M. P.. AIR 1969 SC 78 , a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, in para 32, observed as under : ".... ( 1) where the Statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunals the civil court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where, the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. ( 2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by said statute or not." In Gcmga Bai v. Vi/ay Kumar, ( 1974) 2 SCC 393 , in para 15, the Apex Court, observed as follows : "There is an inherent right in every person to bring a suit of a civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute one may, at one's peril, bring a suit of one's choice. It is no answer to a suit, howsoever frivolous to claim, that the law confers no such right to sue. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit." Likewise, in Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai, ( 2002) 6 SCC 16 , in para 23, the Apex Court observed as under : "The plaintiff is dominus litis, that is, master of, or having dominion over, the case. He is the person who has carriage and control of an action. In case of conflict of jurisdiction the choice ought to lie with the plaintiff to choose, the forum best suited to him unless there be a rule of law excluding access to a forum of the plaintiffs choice or permitting recourse to a forum will be opposed to public policy or will be an abuse of the process of law." The Apex Court in the case of Abdul Gafar v. State of Uttarakhand. ( 2008) 10 SCC 97: 2008 ( 4) AWC 3699 ( SC), following the decision in the case of Church of North India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai, ( 2005) 10 SCC 760 , observed as follows : "..A plea of bar to jurisdiction of a civil court has to be considered having regard to the contentions raised in the plaint. ( 2008) 10 SCC 97: 2008 ( 4) AWC 3699 ( SC), following the decision in the case of Church of North India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai, ( 2005) 10 SCC 760 , observed as follows : "..A plea of bar to jurisdiction of a civil court has to be considered having regard to the contentions raised in the plaint. For the said purpose, averments disclosing cause of action and the reliefs sought for therein must be considered in their entirety and the court would not be justified in determining the question, one way or the other, only having regard to the reliefs claimed de hors the factual averments made in the plaint." 12. Applying the principles noticed above, in the instant case, from the averments made in the plaint, I find that the plaintiff has claimed relief of compensation and injunction by setting up title in himself and by claiming that the land was never a "Rasta" and that it was never acquired by the Municipal Board and, as such, the Municipal Board has no right to establish "Rasta" over the property. Thus, the basis of the suit is title to the suit property, even though no declaration has been sought in that regard. It is noteworthy that the provisions of Sections 318 and 321 do not expressly bar the institution of a suit. However, even though there is no express bar to the institution of a civil suit, but vide Section 321 finality has been attached to an order passed by an appellate authority confirming, setting aside or modifying any such order or direction that are referred to in sub-section ( 1) of Section 318 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916. Accordingly, applying the test laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Dhulabhai v. State of M. P. ( supra), which is to the effect that where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunals the civil court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit, it has to be seen whether the remedy provided under Section 318 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 is adequate, and whether the appellate authority constituted there has power to enter into and decide questions of title. The obvious answer to this would be No. There is nothing in the U. P. Municipalities Act from which it could be inferred that the appellate authority exercising its powers under Section 318 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 would partake the character of a civil court and enter into and adjudicate upon complicated questions of title. In fact. Section 322 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 itself permits institution of civil suit and makes the operation of the orders referred to in Section 318 subject to the orders or decision in the suit. Thus, I'm of the considered view that the instant suit of the plaintiff, which was based on title over an immovable property, was not barred by the provisions of Section 321 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, accordingly, the view to the contrary taken by the court below is not sustainable in law. Whether the plaintiff's suit was barred by Section 326 ( 3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 : 13. With regards to the question whether the plaintiffs suit was barred by limitation under the provisions of sub-section ( 3) of Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, it would be useful to examine the provisions of Section 326, which are being reproduced herein below : "326. Suits against Municipality or its officers.( 1) No suit shall be instituted against a Municipality, or against a member, officer or servant of a Municipality, in respect of an act done or purporting to have been done in its or his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been, in the case of a Municipality, left at its office, and, in case a member, officer or servant, delivered to him or left at his office or place of abode, explicitly stating the cause of action, the nature of the relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed, and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff, and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. ( 2) If the Municipality, member, officer or servant shall, before action is commenced, have tendered sufficient amounts to the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall not recover any sum in excess of the amount so tendered, shall also pay all costs incurred by the defendant after such tender. ( 2) If the Municipality, member, officer or servant shall, before action is commenced, have tendered sufficient amounts to the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall not recover any sum in excess of the amount so tendered, shall also pay all costs incurred by the defendant after such tender. ( 3) No action such as is described in sub-section ( 1) shall, unless it is an action for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be commenced otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action. ( 4) Provided that nothing in sub-section ( 1) shall be construed to apply to a suit wherein the only relief claimed is an injunction of which the object would be defeated by the giving of the notice or the postponement of the commencement of the suit or proceeding." 14. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the special period of limitation provided under Section 326 ( 3) would apply only to a suit, for whose institution, notice would be necessary under subsection ( 1) of Section 326 and it would not apply to an injunction suit by virtue of sub-section ( 4) of Section 326 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that since the claim of the plaintiff, as against the Municipal Board, was to the effect that the Municipal Board was carving out Rasta from over the land of the plaintiff without acquisition of the land, therefore, it was a void act, which could not be said to be done in exercise of official capacity and, as such, no notice was required under sub-section ( 1) of Section 326, accordingly, the special period of limitation, provided under sub-section ( 3) of Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, would not be attracted. 15. Per contra, Sri Rakesh Bahadur submitted that under the provisions of the U. P. Municipalities Act, a Municipal Board is required to maintain a public street and is also required to remove encroachments. Adoption of a private street as a public street is also a function enjoined upon the Municipal Board by the provisions of Section 221 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. Adoption of a private street as a public street is also a function enjoined upon the Municipal Board by the provisions of Section 221 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. Accordingly, in case of exercise of any such power, if any person is aggrieved, that person has to institute a suit within the statutory period fixed by sub-section ( 3) of Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. He further contends that admittedly, the suit was not instituted within the period provided under sub-section ( 3) of Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, therefore, the courts below were justified in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff, as barred by limitation. 16. Sri A. N. Bhargava, learned counsel for the appellant relied on the following authorities : ( 1) Padmaswar Mahadav v. Municipal Board and others, 1981 ALJ 960 ; ( 2) Abdul Majid v. Nagar Palika, Bhadohi, 1980 ( 6) ALR 485 . 17. Relying on the decision of this Court in the case of Padmaswar Mahadav ( supra), Sri A. N. Bhargava submitted that where the Municipal Board forcibly seeks to take possession from a plaintiff, without having any title over the land, then the act of the Municipal Board would be an act not contemplated by the provisions of the U. P. Municipalities Act and, as such, no notice under sub-section ( 1) of Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act would be required. Relying on the case of Abdul Majid ( supra), Sri A. N. Bhargava submitted that for a suit of an injunction, no notice is required, as contemplated by sub-section ( 1) of Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. 18. Having considered the authorities relied on by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, there is no difficulty in accepting the submission that the special period of limitation provided under sub-section ( 3) of Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act would apply only in a case where a notice is necessary under subsection ( 1) of Section 326 of the said Act. This view also draws support from a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of P. L. Kakkar v. Municipal Board. Agra. 1965 ALJ 983. This view also draws support from a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of P. L. Kakkar v. Municipal Board. Agra. 1965 ALJ 983. where the Court observed as under : "Sub-section ( 3) only refers to kind of cases mentioned in subsection ( 1) and if sub-section ( 3) does not apply it means that this kind of a case to which subsection ( 1) of Section 326 does not apply and if Section 326 does not apply, the question of giving notices does not arise." Now, the question that requires consideration is as to when notice under sub-section ( 1), Section 326 is required. A bare perusal of subsection ( 1) of Section 326 goes to show that a notice would be required for the purpose of enabling institution of a suit against a Municipality where the suit is in respect of its act done or purporting to have been done in its official capacity. 19. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Dargahi Lal Nigam v. Cawnpore Municipal Board through Chairman Municipal Board, Cawnpore, 1952 ALJ 122 ( at page 129-left column), dealt with this question and interpreted the provision by holding that the section does not require that the act must in fact be done under the Act. Even if it purports to be done under the Act, the section covers it." 20. Relying on the aforesaid decision of the Full Bench, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hafiz Mohammad Ali v. Municipal Board. Bareilly. 1955 ALJ 566 ( at page 569-left column), observed as under : "The Municipal Board under the Municipalities Act has certain duties to perform which are mentioned in Section 7 of the Act and also to perform certain discretionary acts, vide Section 8 of the Municipalities Act. Further, in order to carry out these duties it has also the power to do certain other acts, for instance, appointment of certain officers or servants to carry out the duties and functions entrusted to the Board. Further, in order to carry out these duties it has also the power to do certain other acts, for instance, appointment of certain officers or servants to carry out the duties and functions entrusted to the Board. Where the Board performs the duties or purports to perform any of the duties mentioned in Section 7 or resolves to exercise any of the discretionary functions it is empowered to do under Section 8 or to carry into effect incidental powers to enable it to perform its duties or to exercise its discretionary functions it cannot but be said that it is acting in its official capacity. Thus, in D. L. Nigam v. Kanpur Municipal Board, a Full Bench of this Court held that the omission to pay the salary to a servant whom the Board had resolved to point was an official act and, therefore, notice was necessary." After observing as above, the Division Bench held that a suit for declaration that the plaintiffs were not liable to be ejected from the property in dispute against the Municipal Board could not have been instituted without service of notice under subsection ( 1) of Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. The conclusion of the Division Bench in the case of Hqfiz Mohammad ( supra) reads thus : "In the present case, the act of the Board complained of is the action taken by it to have the plaintiffs ejected from the property claimed by the Board as its own on the ground that the plaintiffs were trespassers. To maintain and develop the property vested in or entrusted to the management of the Board is one of the duties of the Board as mentioned in Clause ( q) of Section 7 of the Act. In performance of this duty the Board must take steps to eject trespassers from its land. And in so acting the Board cannot but be said to be acting in Its official capacity. We, therefore, hold that Section 326 applied to the facts of the present case and as no proper notice under that section was given prior to the institution of the suit, the suit was not maintainable." 21. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bibi Asfia Begum v. Municipal Board, Aligarh. We, therefore, hold that Section 326 applied to the facts of the present case and as no proper notice under that section was given prior to the institution of the suit, the suit was not maintainable." 21. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bibi Asfia Begum v. Municipal Board, Aligarh. 1983 UPLBEC 129, held, that "if an act is squarely covered by a provision of the U. P. Municipalities Act, it will be an act done by the Municipal Board under that provision. But if that act is not in accordance with the provisions of the Act or in defiance of relevant provisions, such an act of the Municipal Board would be purporting to have been done under the provisions of the Act, though illegally". Having observed as above, the Court held that the suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant, the Municipal Board, Aligarh from realizing arrears of House Tax on properties, was not maintainable as it was filed without issuing any notice ' under Section 326 ( 1) of the U. P. Municipalities Act. The Court further held that the requirement of notice under sub-section ( 1), in such a case, could be dispensed with only if the purpose of the suit would have been defeated by giving of the notice. 22. A conspectus of the authorities would go to show that even if the acts done by the Municipal Board are purported to be in exercise of its powers under the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 then a suit in respect of those acts could only be instituted in accordance with the provisions of sub-section ( 1) of Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act and the limitation for challenging the action would be as provided in sub-section ( 3) of Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. 23. 23. Coming to the facts of the instant case, a perusal of the plaint reveals that the plaintiffs suit was with respect to an act of the Municipal Board purported to have been done in exercise of Its power under the U. P. Municipalities Act, inasmuch as removal of encroachment, declaration of private street as public street, maintenance and establishment of roads are duties enjoined upon the Municipal Board by the provisions of U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, accordingly, the notice was mandatory under sub-section ( 1) of Section 326 and, as such, the provisions of subsection ( 3) of Section 326 were attracted. In fact, it is admitted to the plaintiff that he served a notice under Section 326 ( 1) of the U. P. Municipalities Act on 4.9.1975, whereas the suit was instituted on 1.6.1976. Thus, the suit was instituted beyond a period of six months from the date of accrual of cause of action, which, in any case, would be two months after the date of service of notice, even though in the plaint it is stated to be on 23.6.1975 and 2.7.1975, accordingly, viewed from any angle, the suit was beyond the period of limitation provided by sub-section ( 3) of Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. Accordingly, the courts below were justified in holding the suit as barred by limitation, provided under sub-section ( 3) of Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. 24. For the reasons stated above, the appeal lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.