JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dilip Gupta, J.—Savvy Home Private Limited has filed this petition for quashing the order dated 8th June, 2012 by which the Principal Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Planning, Government of U.P., Lucknow, exercising revisional powers under Section 41(3) of the U.P. Urban and Planning Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), has set aside the order dated 30th March, 2012 passed by the Vice-Chairman of the Agra Development Authority, Agra (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Development Authority’) for cancelling the sanction earlier granted on 20th May, 2010 to the housing scheme map submitted by respondent No. 3-M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited. 2. It transpires from the records of the writ petition that the Development Authority sanctioned the map submitted by M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited for the Housing Scheme on 28th May, 2010 over an area of 57308.30 sq. mtr. land comprising two villages Kakretha and Babarpur in Agra. According to the petitioner, respondent No. 3-M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited had misrepresented before the Development Authority for getting the map sanctioned as various Khasra plots included in the map which were shown in a compact zone were actually situated at a distance from each other; a fabricated Sajra plan was furnished showing Khasra plots No. 1/11 and 1/12 in the map whereas in the original revenue village map such plots are not shown; M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited withheld information that it was merely a co-sharer of certain plots and not the absolute owner and that khasra plot Nos. 437 and 438 were included in the map whereas an area of 6680 sq. mtr. in khasra plot No. 437 and an area of 3340 sq. mtr. in khasra plot No. 438 belonged to the petitioner and Ishwar Sahkari Awas Samiti. 3. The petitioner, accordingly, filed an application on 6th/7th September, 2011 before the Development Authority for cancelling the sanctioned map and for stopping the development work and when no action was taken, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 2335 of 2012 which was disposed of by the Court on 13th January, 2012 with a direction to the Development Authority to expeditiously take an appropriate decision on the application submitted by the petitioner. Notice was issued to M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited by the Vice-Chairman of the Development Authority on the application submitted by the petitioner and ultimately by the order dated 30th March, 2012, the Vice-Chairman of the Development Authority cancelled the sanctioned map and directed the said respondent-M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited to stop the development with the liberty that they could apply for a revised map for an area of 50630.00 sq. mtr. 4. It is further stated in the writ petition that though the sanctioned map had been cancelled but respondent No. 3-M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited did not stop the construction work and so the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 27198 of 2012 in which a statement was made by the counsel appearing for the said respondent that the order dated 30th March, 2012 had been set aside by the State Government in the revision preferred by the said respondent. It is then that the petitioner made inquiries and came to know that by the order dated 8th June, 2012, the Principal Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Planning, Government of U.P., Lucknow, exercising revisional powers under Section 41(3) of the Act, had set aside the order dated 30th March, 2012 passed by the Vice-Chairman of the Development Authority. 5. Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner assisted by Sri P.C. Jain submitted that it was absolutely necessary for the State Government to have heard the petitioner in the revision filed by respondent No. 3-M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited as it was on the application filed by the petitioner that the sanctioned map in favour of M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited had been cancelled by the Vice-Chairman of the Development Authority. The submission of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that any order prejudicial to the petitioner could have been passed by the State Government only after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard in terms of the proviso to section 41(3) of the Act. It is also the submission of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that in any case, the revision filed by respondent No. 3-M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited before the State Government was not maintainable as the order against which the revision was filed was passed by the Vice-Chairman of the Development Authority and not by the Authority or the Chairman. It is also the submission of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that in any case, the revision filed by respondent No. 3-M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited before the State Government was not maintainable as the order against which the revision was filed was passed by the Vice-Chairman of the Development Authority and not by the Authority or the Chairman. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also raised submissions on the merit of the case and submitted that the Vice-Chairman of the Development Authority had not committed any illegality in cancelling the map which had earlier been sanctioned in favour of respondent No. 3-M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited and, therefore, the impugned order is manifestly illegal and deserves to be set aside. In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Rikhabsao Nathusao Jain v. Corporation of the City of Nagpur and others, (2009) 1 SCC 240 ; Shanti Sports Club and another v. Union of India and others, (2009) 15 SCC 705 and Priyanka Estates International Private Limited and others v. State of Assam and others, (2010) 2 SCC 27 . 6. Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Pramod Kumar Pathak, learned counsel for respondent No. 3-M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited, Sri M.C. Chaturvedi for respondent No. 2-Development Authority and the learned Standing Counsel for the State of U.P. have, however, submitted that there was no necessity for the State Government to issue notice to the petitioner in the revision filed by respondent No. 3-M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited under Section 41(3) of the Act inasmuch as the petitioner was merely a complainant. It is also their submission that the petitioner, as a complainant, does not have the locus to maintain the writ petition. Learned counsel for the respondents have also placed the order passed by the State Government and have submitted that it does not suffer from any illegality. In this connection, they have also placed the order passed by the High Court in First Appeal From Order No. 862 of 2011 which had been filed by the petitioner against the order refusing to grant temporary injunction in Original Suit No. 617 of 2010 filed by the petitioner. 7. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the parties. 8. 7. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the parties. 8. The main issue that arises for consideration in this petition is whether notice was required to be issued to the petitioner in the revision filed by respondent No. 3-M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited before the State Government under Section 41(3) of the Act for setting aside the order passed by the Vice-Chairman of the Development Authority by which the map earlier sanctioned in favour of M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited was cancelled. 9. To appreciate this issue, it will be appropriate to examine the relevant provisions of the Act. 10. Section 14 of the Act deals with development of land in development area. It provides that after the declaration of any area as development area under Section 3, no development of land shall be undertaken or carried out or continued in that area by any person or body unless permission for such development has been obtained in writing from the Vice-Chairman in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 11. Section 15 of the Act deals with the application for such permission. It provides that any person desiring to obtain the permission for development of land in the development area shall make an application in writing to the Vice-Chairman in such form and containing such particulars in respect of the development as may be prescribed by bye-laws. On receipt of the application, the Vice-Chairman shall make such inquiry as is considered necessary and shall, by order in writing, either grant the permission or refuse to grant such permission and any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Vice-Chairman refusing to grant permission may appeal to the Chairman within thirty days. However, if at any time after the permission has been granted, the Vice-Chairman is satisfied that such permission was granted in consequence of any material misrepresentation made or any fraudulent statement or information furnished, he may cancel such permission for reasons to be recorded in writing. 12. Section 15 of the Act is reproduced below : “15. However, if at any time after the permission has been granted, the Vice-Chairman is satisfied that such permission was granted in consequence of any material misrepresentation made or any fraudulent statement or information furnished, he may cancel such permission for reasons to be recorded in writing. 12. Section 15 of the Act is reproduced below : “15. Application for permission.—(1) Every person or body (other than any department of Government or any local authority) desiring to obtain the permission referred to in Section 14 shall make an application in writing to the Vice-Chairman in such form and containing such particulars in respect of the development to which the application relates as may be prescribed by bye-laws. (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed by rules. (2-A) The Authority shall be entitled to levy development fees, mutation charges, stacking fees and water fees in such manner and at such rates as may be prescribed: Provided that the amount of stacking fees levied in respect of an area which is not being developed or has not been developed, by the Authority, shall be transferred to the local authority within whose local limits such area is situated. (3) On the receipt of an application for permission under sub-section (1), the Vice-Chairman after making such inquiry as it considers necessary in relation to any matter specified in clause (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 9 or in relation to any other matter, shall by order in writing grant the permission, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order or refuse to grant such permission: Provided that before making an order refusing such permission, the applicant shall be given a reasonable opportunity to show-cause why permission should not be refused. Provided further that the Vice-Chairman may before passing any order of such application give an opportunity to the applicant to make any correction therein or to supply any further particulars of documents or to make good any deficiency in the requisite fee with a view to bringing it in conformity with the relevant rules or regulation. Provided also that before granting permission, referred to in Section 14, the Vice-Chairman may get the fees and the charges levied under sub-section (2-A) deposited; (4) Where permission is refused, the grounds of such refusal shall be recorded in writing and communicated to the applicant. Provided also that before granting permission, referred to in Section 14, the Vice-Chairman may get the fees and the charges levied under sub-section (2-A) deposited; (4) Where permission is refused, the grounds of such refusal shall be recorded in writing and communicated to the applicant. (5) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may appeal to the Chairman against that order within thirty days from the communication thereof and may after giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant, and if necessary, also to the representative of the Vice-Chairman either dismiss the appeal or direct the Vice-Chairman to grant the permission application applied for with such modifications, or subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified. (6) The Vice-Chairman shall keep in such form as may be prescribed by regulations a register of applications for permission under this section. (7) The said register shall contain such particulars, including information as to the manner in which applications for permission have been dealt with, as may be prescribed by regulations, and shall be available for inspection by any member of the public at all reasonable hours on payment of such fee not exceeding rupees five as may be prescribed by regulations. (8) Where permission is refused under this section, the applicant or any person claiming through him shall not be entitled to get refund of the fee paid on the application for permission but the Vice-Chairman may, on an application for refund being made within three months of the communication of the grounds of the refusal under sub-section (4) direct refund of such portion of the fee as it may deem proper in the circumstances of the case. (9) If at any time after the permission has been granted under sub-section (3), the Vice-Chairman is satisfied that such permission was granted in consequence of any material misrepresentation made or any fraudulent statement or information furnished, he may cancel such permission, for reasons to be recorded in writing and any work done thereunder shall be deemed to have been done without such permission. Provided that a permission shall not be cancelled without affording to the person or body concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard.” 13. Section 41 of the Act deals with the Control by the State Government. Provided that a permission shall not be cancelled without affording to the person or body concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard.” 13. Section 41 of the Act deals with the Control by the State Government. Sub-section (3) of Section 41 of the Act provides that the State Government may, at any time, either on its own motion or on application made to it in this behalf, call for the records of any case disposed of or order passed by the Authority or the Chairman for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed or direction issued and may pass such order or issue such direction in relation thereto as it may think fit. The proviso stipulates that the State Government shall not pass an order prejudicial to any person without affording such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 14. Section 41 of the Act is quoted below : “41. Control by State Government.—(1) The Authority, the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman shall carry out such directions as may be issued to it from time to time by the State Government for the efficient administration of this Act. (2) If in, or in connection with, the exercise of its powers and discharge of its functions by the Authority, the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman under this Act any dispute arises between the Authority, the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman and the State Government the decision of the State Government on such dispute shall be final. (3) The State Government may, at any time, either on its own motion or on application made to it in this behalf, call for the records of any case disposed of or order passed by the Authority or the Chairman for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed or direction issued and may pass such order or issue such direction in relation thereto as it may think fit : Provided that the State Government shall not pass an order prejudicial to any person without affording such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (4) Every order of the State Government made in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court.” 15. (4) Every order of the State Government made in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court.” 15. A Division Bench of this Court in Vinod Kumar Bhalotia v. State of U. P. and others, 2000 (1) AWC 564 , examined whether a revision under Section 41(3) of the Act is maintainable by a third party against an order of the Vice-Chairman granting permission under Section 15(3) of the Act and after analysing the provisions of Section 41(3) of the Act and Section 15(3) of the Act, held that a revision at the instance of a third party would be maintainable. The petitioner-therein was the owner of the commercial building and the respondent was the owner of a plot of land immediate adjoining the said building. The respondent wanted to make a commercial building over the said plot and submitted a plan to the Gorakhpur Development Authority for granting the permission. The Vice-Chairman of the Gorakhpur Development Authority sanctioned the plan and granted permission under Section 15(3) of the Act to make the constructions. The petitioner preferred a revision against the said order before the State Government under Section 41(3) of the Act which was dismissed by the State Government on the ground that no revision lay against an order passed by the Vice-Chairman of a Development Authority or against an order granting permission to make constructions. The Division Bench, after examining the provisions of Section 41(3) of the Act, observed that if by an order a case has been disposed of, a revision would lie against such an order irrespective of the fact by whom the said case was disposed of. However, if a revision is filed against an order which does not dispose of a case, then the same would be maintainable only if the order is passed by the Authority or the Chairman. It clarified that no revision would lie against an order simpliciter of the Vice-Chairman if it does not dispose of a case. The relevant portion of the judgment is quoted below : “In our opinion, the interpretation suggested by the learned counsel cannot be accepted as the expression ‘call for the records of any case disposed of is a wholly independent expression and it has no co-relation with the expression “Authority or the Chairman”. The relevant portion of the judgment is quoted below : “In our opinion, the interpretation suggested by the learned counsel cannot be accepted as the expression ‘call for the records of any case disposed of is a wholly independent expression and it has no co-relation with the expression “Authority or the Chairman”. If by an order a case has been disposed of, a revision would lie against such an order irrespective of the fact by whom the said case has been disposed of. If, however, a revision is filed against an order which does not dispose of a case, then the same would be maintainable only if the order is passed by the Authority or the Chairman. No revision would lie against an oder simpliciter of the Vice-Chairman if it does not dispose of a case.” (emphasis supplied) The Division Bench then proceeded to examine whether sanctioning a building plan or a map of a proposed construction amounts to a case disposed of and concluded that the said order does dispose of the case. The relevant observations are : “10. When a person gives a plan for construction of a building or for carrying out development, the Vice-Chairman is required to make inquiry in relation to matters specified in clause (d) of Section 9 which relates to Zonal Development Plans. Clause (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 9 provides for various matters which have to be taken into consideration. It is only after the Vice-chairman is satisfied that the map or building plan conforms to the matters enumerated in this provision that he grants permission to carry out development work. He has also power to impose conditions while granting such permission. The manner and mode of exercise of power while granting permission under sub-section (3) of Section 15 clearly shows that an order granting permission to carry out development or making construction would amount to a ‘case disposed of within the meaning of sub-section (3) of Section 41 of the Act and consequently, a revision would be maintainable against such an order. (emphasis supplied) The Division Bench further observed that development work made contrary to the bye-laws of the Development Authority may sometimes cause injury to others and a third party may suffer injury on account of wrong permission being granted under Section 15(3) of the Act. The observations are as follows : 11. (emphasis supplied) The Division Bench further observed that development work made contrary to the bye-laws of the Development Authority may sometimes cause injury to others and a third party may suffer injury on account of wrong permission being granted under Section 15(3) of the Act. The observations are as follows : 11. It may be noticed that construction or development work as defined in Section 2 (e) of the Act made contrary to the bye-laws of the Authority or the provision of the Act may sometimes cause serious injury to others. Construction of basement in certain situations may damage the foundation of an adjoining building. If a building is made without leaving the set-back area, it may obstruct light and air to adjoining buildings. Similarly, construction beyond the height permissible under the bye-laws may again affect the availability of sun-shine or light to the buildings in the neighbourhood. Construction of commercial building contrary to bye-laws in a residential area may cause injury to the inhabitants of the area. The Development Authorities have framed bye-laws providing for green belts and parks, etc. in order to maintain ecological balance and a construction made contrary to such bye-laws may affect the entire residents of that area. It is, therefore, obvious that a third party may suffer injury on account of a wrong permission being granted under sub-section (3) of Section 15 of the Act. The possibility of a wrong permission being granted either on account of a mistake or on extraneous considerations cannot be ruled out. (emphasis supplied) The Division Bench also examined whether the Act provides a remedy to a third party who is aggrieved by a wrong order passed by the Vice-Chairman under Section 15(3) of the Act and held that such a person can file a revision before the State Government under Section 41(3) of the Act. The relevant portion is quoted below : 12. It may now be examined whether U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act. 1973, which is a self-contained Code, provides any remedy to a third party who is aggrieved by a wrong permission granted to another person under Section 15 (3) of the Act. Before refusing permission opportunity of hearing is to be afforded to the applicant under Proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 15. 1973, which is a self-contained Code, provides any remedy to a third party who is aggrieved by a wrong permission granted to another person under Section 15 (3) of the Act. Before refusing permission opportunity of hearing is to be afforded to the applicant under Proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 15. If permission is refused, the person applying for permission has been given a right of appeal to the Chairman under sub-section (5) of the same section. Sub-section (1) of Section 27 provides that where any development has been carried on or completed in contravention of the master plan or Zonal Development Plan or without permission or approval or sanction referred to in Section 14 or in contravention of any conditions subject to which such permission was granted, the Vice-chairman or any officer of the Authority empowered by him in that behalf may make an order directing that such development shall be removed by demolition. Proviso to this sub-section lays down that no such order shall be made unless the owner or the person concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity to show-cause why the order should not be made. Sub-section (2) of Section 27 of the Act gives a right of appeal to the Chairman against the order passed under sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) of Section 36 gives power to the Vice-Chairman to levy betterment charges and this can be done after giving an opportunity of hearing to the person concerned as provided in sub-section (2). A remedy against such an order is provided under sub-section (4) which empowers the Chairman to determine the amount of betterment charges. These provisions show that the scheme of the Act is that no adverse order should be passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to the person affected by the order and a right of appeal against such an order has also been provided. Section 37 of the Act lays down that except as provided in Section 41, every decision of the Chairman on appeal, and subject only to any decision on appeal, (if it lies and is preferred), the order of the Vice-Chairman or other officer under Section 15, or Section 27 shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court. Section 37 of the Act lays down that except as provided in Section 41, every decision of the Chairman on appeal, and subject only to any decision on appeal, (if it lies and is preferred), the order of the Vice-Chairman or other officer under Section 15, or Section 27 shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court. The Act does not make any provision for appeal against an order passed by the Vice-Chairman granting permission under sub-section (3) of Section 15 and the order is final except as provided in Section 41. If it is held that no revision lies against an order of Vice-Chairman granting permission under Section 15 (3) then a person who is suffering injury on account of grant of such permission will be remediless. The intention of the Legislature is, therefore, clear that though there is no right of appeal against the order of granting permission but an aggrieved person can approach the State Government for exercise of its revisional power. 13. As shown earlier, there can be a person who is aggrieved by an order sanctioning map or granting permission to carry on development under sub-section (3) of Section 15 of the Act. In normal course of events, such a person will not be a party before the Vice-Chairman at the stage when an application has been given to him under sub-section (1) of Section 15 by a person desirous of making construction or carrying on development work. The general law is that if an order is subject to appeal and it causes injury to a person who was not party to the proceedings, he may prefer an appeal with the leave of the Appellate Authority. In Smt. Jatan Kanwar v. Golcha Properties, AIR 1971 SC 374 , it was held as follows : “.....It is well-settled that a person who is not party to the suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the Appellate Court and such leave should be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the judgment.” 14. There being no provision of appeal against an order granting permission, there is no reason why a person aggrieved by such an order should be deprived of his right to invoke the revisional Jurisdiction of the State Government, which has been conferred upon it by Section 41 of the Act. 15. There being no provision of appeal against an order granting permission, there is no reason why a person aggrieved by such an order should be deprived of his right to invoke the revisional Jurisdiction of the State Government, which has been conferred upon it by Section 41 of the Act. 15. We would like to clarify here that the right of revision against an order granting permission under sub-section (3) of Section 15 of the Act would not be available to all and sundry. The revision would be maintained only at the instance of a “person aggrieved”. The expression “person aggrieved” is a well-known concept in legal jurisprudence and it is not possible to lay down exhaustibly who will be a person aggrieved. He must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongly deprived him of something or wrongly refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something. It would also mean a person who has been prejudicially affected by any act or omission of an authority although he may have no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject-matter thereof. A person who feels disappointed with the result of a case is not a person aggrieved. The order must cause him a legal grievance by wrongfully depriving him of something. (See Adi Pheroz Shah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, AIR 1971 SC 385 ).” (emphasis supplied) 16. The aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench holds that the possibility of wrong permission being granted by the Vice-Chairman of the Development Authority either on account of mistake or extraneous consideration cannot be ruled out and, therefore, a third party, who is aggrieved by the wrong permission granted under Section 15(3) of the Act, can approach the State Government for exercise of the revisional powers as the Act does not make any provision for an appeal against an order passed by the Vice-Chairman granting permission under Section 15(3) of the Act. The Court, however, clarified that the right of revision against an order granting permission under Section 15(3) of the Act will not be available to all and sundry and the revision would be maintainable at the instance of a third party by a ‘person aggrieved’. The Court, however, clarified that the right of revision against an order granting permission under Section 15(3) of the Act will not be available to all and sundry and the revision would be maintainable at the instance of a third party by a ‘person aggrieved’. The Division Bench also pointed out that a ‘person aggrieved’ is one who has been prejudicially affected by any act or omission of an Authority although he may have no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject-matter thereof. 17. In the present case, the Vice-Chairman of the Development Authority, on the application filed by the petitioner for revocation of the map earlier sanctioned in favour of respondent No. 3-M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited, cancelled the permission. The said order mentions in detail the objections and the documents submitted by the petitioner to the Development Authority. Respondent No. 3-M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited could have filed an appeal as provided for under Section 15(5) of the Act, but it filed a revision under Section 41(3) of the Act. 18. The submission of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that the revision was not maintainable as the order had not been passed by the Development Authority or the Chairman. It is not possible to accept this contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. As pointed out by the Division Bench of this Court in Vinod Kumar Bhalotia (supra), a revision under Section 41(3) of the Act can also be filed against an order which disposes of a case and an order passed by the Vice-Chairman of the Development Authority for cancelling the permission earlier granted would fall in the category of “a case disposed of”. 19. The issue, however, that arises for consideration is whether the State Government should have afforded opportunity to the petitioner before deciding the revision. 20. The Division Bench of this Court in Vinod Kumar Bhalotia (supra) holds that a revision would be maintainable at the instance of a third party who is aggrieved by a wrong permission granted under Section 15(3) of the Act but such person should be prejudicially affected by any act or omission of an Authority although he may have no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject-matter thereof. 21. 21. It was at the instance of the petitioner that the Vice-Chairman of the Development Authority had proceeded to cancel the sanctioned map submitted by respondent No. 3-M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited. The petitioner was clearly a person who was likely to be prejudicially affected by the order and Section 41(3) of the Act also provides that the State Government shall not pass any order prejudicial to any other person without affording reasonable opportunity of being heard. If a revision could have been filed by the petitioner under Section 41(3) of the Act against an order passed by the Vice-Chairman of the Development Authority for sanctioning the map submitted by M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited as pointed out by the Division Bench in Vinod Kumar Bhalotia (supra), then certainly notice should also have been issued to the petitioner by the State Government in the revision filed by M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited against the order cancelling the sanction of the map. 22. It is the admitted case of the parties that the State Government did not issue any notice to the petitioner in the revision filed by the respondent under Section 41(3) of the Act. 23. It also needs to be remembered that the underlying principles of natural justice is to check arbitrary exercise of power by the State or its functionaries and, therefore, the principle implies a duty to act fairly i.e. fair play in action. 24. In Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association v. Designated Authority and others, (2011) 2 SCC 258 , in the context of principles of natural justice, the Supreme Court observed : “It is thus, well-settled that unless a statutory provision, either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of principles of natural justice, because in that event the Court would not ignore the legislative mandate, the requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard before an order is made, is generally read into the provisions of a statute, particularly when the order has adverse civil consequences which obviously cover infraction of property, personal rights and material deprivations for the party affected. The principle holds good irrespective of whether the power conferred on a statutory body or Tribunal is administrative or quasi-judicial. It is equally trite that the concept of natural justice can neither be put in a strait-jacket nor is it a general rule of universal application.” 25. The principle holds good irrespective of whether the power conferred on a statutory body or Tribunal is administrative or quasi-judicial. It is equally trite that the concept of natural justice can neither be put in a strait-jacket nor is it a general rule of universal application.” 25. The submission of learned Senior Counsel for the respondents also is that the petition is not maintainable at the behest of a third party. It has been found that notice was required to be issued to the petitioner in the revision filed by M/s. Nikhil Indus Infrastructure Limited but notice was not issued. It cannot, therefore, be urged that the petitioner could not have filed this petition. 26. It is, therefore, not possible to sustain the order dated 8th June, 2012 passed by the State Government and the matter needs to be remitted for deciding the revision afresh after affording opportunity to the petitioner. 27. The decisions relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner emphasise that no compromise should be made with the town planning scheme and no relief should be given to the violator of the town planning scheme and that the Rules, Regulations and Bye-laws are made by the Development Authority taking in view the larger public interest of the Society and it is the burden duty of the citizens to obey and follow such Rules. These are matters which may be examined by the State Government when it proceeds to decide the revision afresh. 28. In view of the aforesaid, as the matter is being sent to the State Government to decide it afresh on the ground that opportunity was not provided to the petitioner, it is not necessary to examine the submissions on merit made by learned Senior Counsel for the parties. 29. The order dated 8th June, 2012 passed by the State Government is, accordingly, set aside. It shall, however, be open to the State Government to pass a fresh order in accordance with law after affording opportunity to the parties concerned, including the petitioner. 30. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. ——————