JUDGMENT Mr. Vijender Singh Malik, J.: - Vivek Padam Singh, the petitioner, in the above mentioned six petitions, seeks quashing of six FIRs with the following particulars, alongwith all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom:- (1). FIR No. 287 dated 21.12.2007 registered at Police Station Sector 56, Gurgaon, District Gurgaon for an offence punishable under sections 420, 467, 468, 469 read with section 120-B of Indian Penal Code and section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. (2). FIR No. 413 dated 21.12.2007 registered at Police Station Sector 5, Gurgaon, District Gurgaon for an offence punishable under sections 420, 467, 468, 469 read with section 120-B of Indian Penal Code and section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. (3). FIR No. 187 dated 21.12.2007 registered at Police Station Badshahpur, Gurgaon, District Gurgaon for an offence punishable under sections 420, 467, 468, 469 read with section 120-B of Indian Penal Code and section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. (4). FIR No. 286 dated 21.12.2007 registered at Police Station Sector 56, Gurgaon, District Gurgaon for an offence punishable under sections 420, 467, 468, 469 read with section 120-B of Indian Penal Code and section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. (5). FIR No. 508 dated 21.12.2007 registered at Police Station Sector Sadar, Gurgaon, District Gurgaon for an offence punishable under sections 420, 467, 468, 469 read with section 120-B of Indian Penal Code and section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. (6). FIR No. 273 dated 19.4.2006 registered at Police Station Sadar, Gurgaon, District Gurgaon for an offence punishable under sections 420, 467, 468, 469 read with section 120-B of Indian Penal Code and section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 2. For facility of appreciation of the controversy, it is necessary to reproduce the contents of FIR No. 287 dated 21.12.2007, sought to be quashed in Criminal Misc. No. M-2392 of 2009, because the contents of the other FIRs are nearly same, but relating to cases pertaining to the land of different villages. 3. An application for investigation regarding the land of village Ghata was received by the Flying Squad of the Chief Minister, Haryana. It was found during investigation that jamabandis for the years 1966-67 and 2001-2002 show existence of Panchayat land in village Ghata. 3. An application for investigation regarding the land of village Ghata was received by the Flying Squad of the Chief Minister, Haryana. It was found during investigation that jamabandis for the years 1966-67 and 2001-2002 show existence of Panchayat land in village Ghata. Prem Singh, Sardar, Dharamvir, Raj Pal and Mahavir Singh of village Ghata, Tehsil Sohna, District Gurgaon filed case No. 5 in the court of Vivek Padam Singh, Sub Divisional Magistrate (Civil)-cum-Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Gurgaon claiming that they have been cultivating the land measuring 33 Kanals 17 Marlas in village Ghata. After describing the land by its revenue numbers, it is mentioned that they claimed themselves to be in cultivating possession of the land for the last 50 years, from the time of their ancestors. They further claimed that their ancestors made the land cultivable and they used to pay the rate fixed by the Government on the land. They also claimed that they were the original owners of the land and cultivating the same well before coming into force of Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1953 made effective from 26.3.1953 and Punjab Village Common Lands Act, 1952 made effective from 9.1.1954. They claimed proprietary rights to have come to vest in them qua the said land. Vivek Padam Singh, Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Gurgaon, passed orders on 10.2.2005 declaring the petitioners as owners of land measuring 33 Kanals 17 Marlas which otherwise was Panchayat land. The full area of shamlat deh fell into the category of Panchayat land. Vivek Padam Singh, the petitioner connived with the proprietors, violated the rules and taking bribe decided the cases against the interest of Gram Panchayat, Ghata and, therefore, committed an offence punishable under sections 420, 467, 468, 469 read with section 120-B IPC and section 13(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 4. The names of the villages and the names of the persons filing petitions before Vivek Padam Singh, the petitioner in other FIRs are different as per the different FIRs. 5. Some additional facts are, however, there in FIR No. 273 dated 19.4.2006 registered at Police Station Sadar, Gurgaon, District Gurgaon, sought to be quashed in Criminal Misc. No. M-15364 of 2009. In the said case, the sarpanch of the village and other persons are said to have been involved in the matter and the FIR seems to have been registered against them also. 6. No. M-15364 of 2009. In the said case, the sarpanch of the village and other persons are said to have been involved in the matter and the FIR seems to have been registered against them also. 6. I have heard Mr. Mansur Ali, Advocate assisted by Mr. Simrandeep Singh Sandhu, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Sagar Deswal, learned Assistant Advocate General, Haryana, for the State. I have gone through the records of the cases thoroughly. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner, while working as Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Gurgaon, exercising the powers of Collector, gave judgments in six cases. According to him, the said judgments had been challenged by the Gram Panchayats and the judgments of the petitioner have been reversed. According to him, though, it is held by the Appellate Authority in the judgments passed in the appeals that Vivek Padam Singh lacked jurisdiction in the matter, yet no comment came in those judgments regarding bonafides of the petitioner in passing the judgments. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the Flying Squad of Chief Minister, Haryana registered the FIRs on the allegations that the petitioner had no jurisdiction to try the cases. According to him, Gram Panchayat never made any complaint about taking of bribe by the petitioner in passing the aforesaid judgments. According to him, in last four lines of the FIR, there is a bald allegation that bribe has been taken in passing the orders. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that starting from Gram Panchayat right upto the Commissioner, Gurgaon, there has been hierarchy of officers concerned with this matter and none had ever made a complaint against the petitioner regarding bribe. According to him, there are six FIRs for six judgments. Referring me to the provisions of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 (for short, “the Act”), learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner had been acting in judicial or quasi judicial capacity and in a legal proceeding, he gave a definitive judgment and for the same, he cannot be proceeded on criminal side. He has cited before me a decision of this court in Smt. Gayatri Jain Vs. He has cited before me a decision of this court in Smt. Gayatri Jain Vs. State of Punjab, 2005(2) RCR (Criminal) 535 where the petitioner had passed a quasi judicial order in exercise of the powers vested in the authority under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 and the order passed was against law. It was held that the authority fell well within the definition of “Judge” under section 2 of the Act and lodging of the FIR against the authority was an abuse of the process of law and consequently, the FIR was quashed. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that even departmental proceedings could not be initiated against the petitioner. In this regard, he has cited a decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court of India in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1999 Supreme Court 2881 where interpreting articles 309 and 311 of the Constitution of India and rule14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, it has been held that mere mistake of law or wrong interpretation of law cannot be made basis for initiation of disciplinary proceedings against a quasi judicial authority. A decision of Hon‘ble Madras High Court in Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chennai and anr. Vs. N. Sivasamy, Commercial Tax Officier (Under suspension), Chennai and anr., 2006 (3) SCT 246 has also been cited in this regard. 11. Learned State counsel, on the other hand, has made reference to consolidated status report of the State and has submitted that enquiry was conducted and the petitioner was found to have lacked in the following matters:- “a). He has wrongly entertained the suit under the Punjab Occupancy Tenant (Vesting of Proprietary) Act, 1952. b). He has wrongly entertained the suit for occupancy rights under the Occupancy Tenancy Act on the Panchayat land. c). As per section 4 of The Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 this Act prevails over other Act. d). Section 13-D of The Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act has over riding effects on other Acts. e). The Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation) Act, 1961, is special Act for Shamlat lands and special Act over rides the general Acts. f). As per section 4 of The Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 this Act prevails over other Act. d). Section 13-D of The Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act has over riding effects on other Acts. e). The Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation) Act, 1961, is special Act for Shamlat lands and special Act over rides the general Acts. f). Under Section 13-A of The Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation) Act,1961 only Collector is empowered to adjudicate the title suit against the Panchayat land and not the Assistant Collector 1st Grade. g). He (Vivek Padam Singh) has declared the plaintiffs not only the occupancy tenants as per main issue but also declared them owners alongwith occupancy rights against the issue framed by him. h). As per The Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation) Act,1961 the possession of the plaintiffs was to be seen on 26 January, 1950 and 12 years before the commencement of Shamlat Law as per Section 2 (G) (5) (VIII) and Section 4 (3) (II) of The Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation) Act,1961 but plaintiffs have not proved. i). The plaintiffs have not proved their case in any of the exception clauses given in Section 2 (G) (5) (i to ix) of The Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation) Act,1961. j). That the plaintiffs do not fulfil the definition of tenants rather they were recorded as “Chakota Bill Muqta Saal Tamam” in column No. 09 of the jamabandi. As per rule 19 of the The Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation) Act,1961 their possession was unauthorized and they can not be declared as occupancy tenants.” 12. According to him, he had decided the suits within a period of four months while other cases were pending in his court for longer periods. According to him, under the Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952 only civil court had the jurisdiction to declare a person to have become owner on account of acquiring occupancy rights in a given piece of land. According to him, the petitioner had been an Executive Magistrate and he does not fall within the definition of “Judge” under section 2 of the Judges Act. 13. According to him, the petitioner had been an Executive Magistrate and he does not fall within the definition of “Judge” under section 2 of the Judges Act. 13. As per section 2 of the Act, “Judge” not only means a person officially designated as a Judge, but is also a person who is empowered by law to give in any legal proceeding a definitive judgment or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definitive or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive. There is nothing on the record to suggest that the petitioner invited the suits. The suits were pending before him. Though, he is claimed to have decided those suits within four months, yet he was acting in a quasi judicial capacity and he gave a definitive judgment. 14. In the appeals filed against those judgments by the Gram Panchayat, there is no whisper to the effect that the petitioner acted in a malafide manner or that he connived with the plaintiffs. There is not even a bald suggestion that he took bribe from the plaintiffs. The Gram Panchayat or anyone from the hierarchy of the officers upto Commissioner had ever made a complaint that the petitioner had taken bribe for deciding the cases in this manner. The appellate authority had also not offered any comment regarding the bona fides of the petitioner in deciding those cases. 15. In the decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court of India in Union of India Vs. A.N.Saxena, (1992) 3 SCC 124 noticed in Union of India Vs. K.K.Dhawan, AIR 1993 (SC) 1478 it has been laid down that unless the actions of an officer indicate culpability, namely a desire to oblige himself or unduly favour one of the parties or an improper motive, there is no reason why disciplinary action should be taken. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court of India, unless culpability is shown, even disciplinary proceedings cannot be initiated. Here, the FIRs have been registered for an offence punishable under sections 420, 467, 468, 469 read with section 120-B of Indian Penal Code and section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 without there being any thing in the FIRs satisfying the ingredients of those sections. 16. Here, the FIRs have been registered for an offence punishable under sections 420, 467, 468, 469 read with section 120-B of Indian Penal Code and section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 without there being any thing in the FIRs satisfying the ingredients of those sections. 16. Nothing has been placed on record to show that any enquiry was ever made to find out if, in fact, the petitioner has taken any bribe or any other kind of illegal gratification for making the judgments in question. The allegations in this regard are just bald which do not make out any sense. 17. The points referred to by learned State counsel, reproduced above, only indicate the mistakes on the part of the petitioner and do not indicate any culpability on his part. In these circumstances, I find the petitioner to be covered by the provisions of the Act and, therefore, the petitions are allowed and the above detailed six FIRs alongwith all the subsequent proceedings arising out of the same are quashed, qua the petitioner. ---------0.B.S.0------------