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2012 DIGILAW 181 (PNJ)

Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab

2012-02-01

MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR

body2012
JUDGMENT Mr. Mehinder Singh Sullar, J. (Oral):- The epitome of the facts, culminating in the commencement, relevant for the limited purpose of deciding the core controversy, involved in the instant petition and emanating from the record, is that, 1st marriage of Bachittar Singh (coaccused) was solemnized with Paramjit Kaur. Two daughters, namely, Jagminder Kaur and Manpreet Kaur were born out of their wedlock. She started visiting the Deras with the hope to have a son, but in vain. When she did not bear a son, then, she became reluctant to her matrimonial relations, renounced the world and started residing in the Deras/Gurudwaras. They were stated to have suffered a customary divorce in the Panchayat on 7.10.1999. Thereafter, Bachittar Singh solemnized the 2nd marriage with Surinder Kaur (sister of complainant Bahadur Singh respondent No.2) (for brevity “the complainant”) in the year 2001, who is claimed to be beautiful but deaf and dumb. They started residing as husband and wife and cohabited as such. As luck would have been, a son, namely, Amanpreet Singh was born out of their 2nd wedlock on 11.9.2003 in village Mewa Singh Wala. Consequently, the birth certificate dated 19.9.2007 of Amanpreet Singh was duly issued by the District Registrar, Births & Deaths, Kapurthala, wherein the name of his mother was rightly entered as Surinder Kaur. 2. According to the complainant that Bachittar Singh with the connivance of petitioner Kuldip Singh (Sarpanch) fabricated the birth certificate of Amanpreet Singh and illegally entered the name of mother as Paramjit Kaur, his 1st wife, instead of Surinder Kaur, the real/natural mother of Amanpreet Singh. 3. Levelling a variety of allegations and narrating the sequence of events, in all, the prosecution claimed that the petitioner with the connivance of his main accused Bachittar Singh and Paramjit Kaur, prepared and forged the birth certificate and wrongly entered the name of his mother as Paramjit Kaur, instead of Surinder Kaur. The petitioner attested the forged birth certificate of Amanpreet Singh as genuine in order to defraud and deprive Surinder Kaur from her legitimate claim. The petitioner attested the forged birth certificate of Amanpreet Singh as genuine in order to defraud and deprive Surinder Kaur from her legitimate claim. In the background of these allegations and in the wake of complaint of the complainant Bahadur Singh, brother of Surinder Kaur (natural mother of Amanpreet Singh), the present case was registered against the accused, vide FIR No.156 dated 29.8.2008 (Annexure P5), on accusation of having committed the offences punishable under Sections 342, 344, 420, 465 and 120-B IPC by the police of Police Station Sultanpur Lodhi, District Kapurthala in the manner indicated hereinbefore. 4. Aggrieved by the registration of the case, the petitioner has earlier filed CRM No.M-31110 of 2009 for quashing the FIR (Annexure P5), which was dismissed as withdrawn by this Court on 12.11.2009, to enable him to take all the points at the time of framing of charge. Consequently, the trial Court has framed the charges against all the accused under Sections 466, 468, 471, 417, 344 and 120-B IPC, by means of impugned charge sheet dated 20.1.2010 (Annexure P6). 5. The petitioner still did not feel satisfied and preferred the instant petition for quashing the FIR (Annexure P5), impugned charge sheet (Annexure P6) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, invoking the provisions of Section 482 Cr.PC. 6. The case set up by the petitioner, in brief in so far as relevant, was that the FIR (Annexure P5) and charge sheet (Annexure P6) are liable to be quashed on the basis of compromise deed (Annexure P1) (which was stoutly denied by the complainant). The complainant was stated to have taken his sister Surinder Kaur to his house in order to grab the property of Bachittar Singh. The certificate was manipulated by the complainant, in order to lodge the FIR against the accused. It was pleaded that the petitioner, being Sarpanch of the village, attested the birth certificate and no other role is attributed to him. According to the petitioner that if he has attested the certificate, even then, penalty can be imposed under sections 23 to 25 of the Registration of Births & Deaths Act, 1969 (hereinafter to be referred as “the Act”) and no offences punishable under sections 342, 344, 420, 465 and 120-B IPC are made out against him. According to the petitioner that if he has attested the certificate, even then, penalty can be imposed under sections 23 to 25 of the Registration of Births & Deaths Act, 1969 (hereinafter to be referred as “the Act”) and no offences punishable under sections 342, 344, 420, 465 and 120-B IPC are made out against him. On the strength of aforesaid grounds, the petitioner-accused sought to quash the FIR (Annexure P5), charge sheet (Annexure P6) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom in the manner described hereinabove. 7. The respondents refuted the prayer of the petitioner and filed their respective replies, inter-alia pleading certain preliminary objections of, maintainability of the petition, cause of action and locus standi of the petitioner. They claimed that petitioner and his co-accused Bachittar Singh and Paramjit Kaur hatched a criminal conspiracy against Surinder Kaur and changed the name of mother of Amanpreet Singh as Paramjit Kaur instead of Surinder Kaur, in order to defraud her (Surinder Kaur). As a matter of fact, Bachittar Singh deserted Surinder Kaur, he is still living with his co-accused Paramjit Kaur and illegally snatched her (Surinder Kaur) son. They have concocted a false story in this respect. Instead of reproducing the entire contents of the replies and in order to avoid the repetition of facts, suffice it to say that the respondents have reiterated the allegations contained in the FIR (Annexure P5). However, it will not be out of place to mention here that they have stoutly denied all other allegations contained in the main petition and prayed for its dismissal. 8. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, going through the record with their valuable assistance and after considering the entire matter deeply, to my mind, there is no merit in the instant petition in this regard. 9. As is evident from the record, that Bachittar Singh, co-accused of petitioner, had solemnized 1st marriage with Paramjit Kaur. They have stated to have suffered a customary divorce in the presence of Panchayat on 7.10.1999 to enable him (Bachittar Singh) to remarry. Consequently, he performed the 2nd marriage with Surinder Kaur, sister of the complainant. A son namely Amanpreet Singh was born out of their 2nd wedlock. The Sub Registrar, Births & Deaths issued a birth certificate (Annexure R2/T), wherein the names of male child, Amanpreet Singh, his father Bachittar Singh and mother Surinder Kaur, were incorporated. Consequently, he performed the 2nd marriage with Surinder Kaur, sister of the complainant. A son namely Amanpreet Singh was born out of their 2nd wedlock. The Sub Registrar, Births & Deaths issued a birth certificate (Annexure R2/T), wherein the names of male child, Amanpreet Singh, his father Bachittar Singh and mother Surinder Kaur, were incorporated. The prosecution claimed that the accused hatched a criminal conspiracy, in order to defraud Surinder Kaur, manipulated and forged another birth certificate (Annexure R1/T), wherein, they have changed the name of mother of child as Paramjit Kaur, instead of Surinder Kaur. This certificate was wrongly attested and signed by the petitioner as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat of village Mewa Singh Wala. Meaning thereby, there are direct allegations against the petitioner that he committed a criminal conspiracy with his other co-accused and attested the fake & forged birth certificate as genuine as a Sarpanch of the village. 10. Ex facie, the celebrated arguments of learned counsel for petitioner that the complainant has manipulated the birth certificate in order to lodged a complaint against the accused and if the petitioner has wrongly attested the forged certificate, even then, penalty is provided under sections 23 to 25 of the Act, are not only devoid of merit but misplaced as well at this stage. 11. Whether the birth certificate (Annexure R1/T) of Amanpreet Singh, wherein Paramjit Kaur has been entered as his mother and as to whether the parties have entered into a compromise (Annexure P1) (stoutly denied by the complainant) and what is its effect etc., would be the moot points to be decided during the course of trial after receiving the evidence brought on record by the parties. If such points, which require the determination by the trial Court, are decided by this Court in the garb of petition under Section 482 Cr.PC, then, the sanctity of the trial, would pale into insignificance and amount to nullify the statutory provisions of trial, as envisaged under the Cr.PC, which is not legally permissible. As per allegations of the prosecution, the petitioner has attested the forged certificate as genuine and committed the criminal offences and since the provisions of sections 23 to 25 of the Act are not applicable, so, the question of imposing penalty did not arise at all in the present set of circumstances. The police has rightly registered the criminal case against him. The police has rightly registered the criminal case against him. In this manner, to me, the FIR (Annexure P5), charge sheet (Annexure P6) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom cannot possibly be quashed at this initial stage. 12. Sequelly, the questions, scope and jurisdiction of this Court for quashing an FIR at the initial stage of the trial under section 482 Cr.PC are not res integra. It is well settled proposition of law that in case, on the bare reading, the offences are made therefrom, no order can be made for quashment of criminal prosecution. Such criminal prosecution at the initial stage can be quashed in the rarest of the rare cases, only if it is proved that the same was lodged maliciously or vexatiously in order to wreak vengeance and not otherwise, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a celebrated judgment in case State of Haryana and others v. Ch.Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 Supreme Court 604, which was again reiterated in case Som Mittal v. Government of Karnataka, [2008(2) Law Herald (SC) 1119] : 2008(2) R.C.R.(Criminal) 92. 13. An identical question came to be decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in case Jeffery J. Diermeier & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr., [2010(5) Law Herald (SC) 2972] : 2010(3) R.C.R.(Criminal) 183. Having interpreted the scope of section 482 Cr.PC, it was ruled (para 16) as under:- “16. Before addressing the contentions advanced on behalf of the parties, it will be useful to notice the scope and ambit of inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. The Section itself envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of process of Court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. Nevertheless, it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Undoubtedly, the power possessed by the High Court under the said provision is very wide but is not unlimited. It has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and cautiously, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for which alone the court exists. Undoubtedly, the power possessed by the High Court under the said provision is very wide but is not unlimited. It has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and cautiously, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for which alone the court exists. It needs little emphasis that the inherent jurisdiction does not confer an arbitrary power on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. The power exists to prevent abuse of authority and not to produce injustice.” The indicated Bench mark and requisite ingredients for quashing the criminal prosecution emerging out from the aforesaid judgments are totally lacking in the instant case. 14. Not only that, the trial Court, having repelled the same contentions, has rightly charge sheeted the accused including the petitioner for the commission of offences punishable under sections 466, 468, 471, 417, 344 and 120-B IPC, through the medium of charge sheet (Annexure P6). Therefore, the contrary arguments of counsel for the petitioner “stricto sensu” deserve to be and are hereby repelled under the present set of circumstances, as the ratio of law laid down in the aforesaid judgments “mutatis mutandis” is applicable to the facts of the present case and is the complete answer to the problem in hand. 15. No other legal point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the learned counsel for the parties. 16. In the light of aforesaid reasons and without commenting further anything on merits, lest it may prejudice the case of either side during the course of trial of the main case, as there is no merit, therefore, the present petition is hereby dismissed in the obtaining circumstances of the case. 17. Needless to mention that nothing observed, here-in-above, would reflect, in any manner, on merits during the trial of the main case, as the same has been so recorded for a limited purpose of deciding the instant petition in this relevant direction. ------------