Judgment :- 1. The three petitioners have filed the present writ petition seeking to challenge the orders of recovery made in respect of three petitioners in letters dated 11.7.2006, 19.7.2006 as well as 7.1.2009 respectively and seeks to set aside the same. 2. By the impugned letter dated 11.7.2006, the State Government directed the Director General of Police to recover the amount towards compensation paid by the State to one Meena amounting to Rs.3,80,000/-proportionately. In that order, they had referred to the name of one S.Chandrasekaran, the Sub Inspector of Police and three petitioners, i.e., S.Ganesan, Police Constable, one M.Nagarajan, Police Constable and N.Chandran, Grade-I Police Constable. Pursuant to the order issued by the State Government, the Director General of Police had apportioned the entire compensation among all five police men involved in the crime and each one of them was directed to pay Rs.76,000/- towards the payment made in favour of Tmt.Meena 3. S.Chandrasekaran, the Sub Inspector of Police filed W.P.No.12599 of 2009 before this court as against the order of recovery and obtained an interim stay on 9.7.2009. That writ petition was dismissed by this court on 05.11.2009 and it was held that the petitioner was liable to pay the amount. The petitioners' writ petitions were admitted on 26.10.2009. But however no interim orders were granted and only notice was ordered. This court by an order dated 9.8.2011 directed the learned Special Government Pleader to produce the original records relating to the compensation ordered by the State. Accordingly, the files were produced and circulated for perusal by this court. 4. It is seen from the records that one Wilson, S/o Swaminathan, a resident of Royapettah was taken into custody by the E-2 Royapettah Police Station on 21.6.1993 on the complaint from the crew of Pallavan Transport Express Wing. He was beaten with lathi and iron pipe in the street and in the police station and was done to death on 22.06.1993 while in custody of the police. When the matter was brought to the notice on enquiry by the District Collector, Chennai, the State Government had accepted the report of the District Collector and granted an ex-gratia payment of Rs.50,000/-to the members of the family of the deceased Wilson and that Tmt.Meena, the mother of the deceased was paid compensation. When the matter was brought to the notice on enquiry by the District Collector, Chennai, the State Government had accepted the report of the District Collector and granted an ex-gratia payment of Rs.50,000/-to the members of the family of the deceased Wilson and that Tmt.Meena, the mother of the deceased was paid compensation. But, however the said Meena filed a writ petition before this court being W.P.No.14879 of 1994 claiming compensation of Rs.3 lakhs for the custodial assault on her son Wilson. In that writ petition, the three petitioners in this writ petition, i.e., S.Ganesan was shown as 11th respondent, the second petitioner M.Nagarajan was shown as 10th respondent and the third respondent N.Chandran was shown as 9th respondent. The said writ petition came to be allowed by an order dated 4.3.2004. In that order, the court took exception to the State filing an improper counter affidavit. In paragraph 75 it was observed as follows: "75.) Now coming to the quantum of compensation, it is true that the petitioner had been paid a sum of Rs.50,000/- vide G.O.Ms.No.759 Public Department, dated 19.8.1994. It is pertinent to note that subsequently even during the pendency of this writ petition, in G.O.Ms.No.15 3, Public Department, dated 31.1.1998, quantum of relief has been increased to Rs.1,00,000/- from Rs.50,000/-in the case of death due to police torture. In the writ petition, the petitioner has sought for a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- as compensation. Having regard to the age of the boy (24 years) and the uncontradicted claim that he was doing screen printing and earning about Rs.2,000/-per month, and the fact that the petitioner had lost her only son, fixing a sum of Rs.2,50,000/-as compensation will be reasonable. Even in Motor Accident Claims where the death is due only to the accident or at worst due to the rashness and negligence, such amounts or even more are fixed as compensation. Here is a case where the victim who is admittedly not a rowdy and had never been to the Police Station before, has been done to death by inhuman and sadistic action by the party/respondents. Calculated on the basis of the said amount as due in June, 1993, after 11 years at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, the total amount payable will be Rs.4,15,000/-. Calculated on the basis of the said amount as due in June, 1993, after 11 years at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, the total amount payable will be Rs.4,15,000/-. By adding a sum of Rs.15,000/-towards funeral and other incidental expenses, the total amount payable as on date inclusive of the interest amount can be reasonably fixed at Rs.4,30,000/-. Deducting a sum of Rs.50,000/-which was already paid, the respondents are directed to pay a total sum of Rs.3,80,000/- to the petitioner within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order failing which interest shall be payable at the rate of 18 per cent per annum, from this date. The writ petition is allowed accordingly. No costs. After the delivery of the Order, the learned Government Pleader seeks for directions to enable the Government to recover the amounts from the party-respondents. 2.) It is made clear that the initial responsibility to pay the amounts to the petitioner is on the first respondent and it is open to them to recover the same from the party-respondents in accordance with law."(Emphasis added) 5. Neither the petitioners herein nor the State went on appeal against the said order. Even the learned Government Pleader opined that the acquittal of the petitioners cannot be a ground to deny compensation because in the criminal court all witnesses have become hostile. Subsequent to the order passed by this court, the State had issued G.O.Ms.No.323, Public (L&O-E) Department, dated 5.4.2004 implementing the order passed by this court and granted compensation of Rs.3,80,000/-to Meena, the mother of the victim Wilson and there is no dispute about the same. Subsequent to the payment made to the victim's mother, the State Government had issued the impugned order dated 11.7.2006 directing the amount to be recovered from all five policemen who were responsible for the death of Wilson and consequential orders were passed. Challenging the same, the writ petition came to be filed as noted already. 6. The contention raised by the petitioners was that as against the departmental proceedings and penalty of imposition of reduction of pay by two stages for two years, original applications were filed before the Tribunal and the Tribunal had set aside the penalty and allowed the O.A. and remitted the matter for fresh disposal. 6. The contention raised by the petitioners was that as against the departmental proceedings and penalty of imposition of reduction of pay by two stages for two years, original applications were filed before the Tribunal and the Tribunal had set aside the penalty and allowed the O.A. and remitted the matter for fresh disposal. Thereafter, the aggrieved persons filed R.A.No.32 of 2001 to review the order passed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal had allowed the review and cancelled the remittal order. The order of the Tribunal was implemented by the consequential proceedings dated 28.6.2002 by the Commissioner of Police. Therefore, the petitioners contended that both in the criminal court as well as in the departmental proceedings, they were acquitted. Therefore, there is no case for recovering the amount. No notice was given for recovering the amount separately. Before this court the State defended the petitioners by stating that no such incident had taken place and now they cannot turn back and held the petitioners guilty so as to enable them to recover the amount. 7. The contentions raised by the petitioners are without substance. It is not as if this court while ordering enhanced compensation did not give notice to the petitioners. On the other hand, the petitioners were very much before this court when the writ petition was filed by Meena and the court also directed the State to recover the amount from the petitioners. While the State on getting the opinion given by the learned Government Pleader, did not prefer any appeal, nothing prevented the petitioners from filing an appeal to challenge the findings recorded by this court and as well as the direction to recover the amount from the individual policemen. Having allowed the order to become final, it is not open to them to turn back and question the consequential order passed by the State pursuant to the direction issued by this court. In this context, it is relevant to note that apart from the findings given by the court, the fact that they were let off in the disciplinary action or that they were acquitted by the criminal court is not a ground to deny compensation. Because the aim and purpose of these two proceedings are entirely different. In this context, it is relevant to note that apart from the findings given by the court, the fact that they were let off in the disciplinary action or that they were acquitted by the criminal court is not a ground to deny compensation. Because the aim and purpose of these two proceedings are entirely different. This court clearly found that the petitioners were responsible for inflicting injuries against the deceased Wilson and therefore, in the light of the legal precedents referred to therein, it is open to this court to direct the State to pay compensation and the consequential recovery of amount. 8. As to whether amounts can be recovered from the guilty policemen came to be considered by the Supreme Court in D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., reported in (1997) 1 SCC 416 wherein the Supreme Court in paragraphs 44, 45 and 54 had held as follows: “44.) The claim in public law for compensation for unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to life and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed under the Constitution, is a claim based on strict liability and is in addition to the claim available in private law for damages for tortious acts of the public servants. Public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. Award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the established violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21, is an exercise of the courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. 45.) The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits the role of the courts too much, as the protector and custodian of the indefeasible rights of the citizens. 45.) The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits the role of the courts too much, as the protector and custodian of the indefeasible rights of the citizens. The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. A court of law cannot close its consciousness and aliveness to stark realities. Mere punishment of the offender cannot give much solace to the family of the victim -civil action for damages is a long drawn and a cumbersome judicial process. Monetary compensation for redressal by the court finding the infringement of the indefeasible right to life of the citizen is, therefore, useful and at time perhaps the only effective remedy to apply balm to the wounds of the family members of the deceased victim, who may have been the breadwinner of the family. 54.) Thus, to sum up, it is now a well-accepted proposition in most of the jurisdictions, that monetary or pecuniary compensation is an appropriate and indeed an effective and sometimes perhaps the only suitable remedy for redressal of the established infringement of the fundamental right to life of a citizen by the public servants and the State is vicariously liable for their acts. The claim of the citizen is based on the principle of strict liability to which the defence of sovereign immunity is not available and the citizen must receive the amount of compensation from the State, which shall have the right to be indemnified by the wrongdoer. In the assessment of compensation, the emphasis has to be on the compensatory and not on punitive element. The objective is to apply balm to the wounds and not to punish the transgressor or the offender, as awarding appropriate punishment for the offence (irrespective of compensation) must be left to the criminal courts in which the offender is prosecuted, which the State, in law, is duty bound to do. The award of compensation in the public law jurisdiction is also without prejudice to any other action like civil suit for damages which is lawfully available to the victim or the heirs of the deceased victim with respect to the same matter for the tortious act committed by the functionaries of the State. The award of compensation in the public law jurisdiction is also without prejudice to any other action like civil suit for damages which is lawfully available to the victim or the heirs of the deceased victim with respect to the same matter for the tortious act committed by the functionaries of the State. The quantum of compensation will, of course, depend upon the peculiar facts of each case and no straitjacket formula can be evolved in that behalf. The relief to redress the wrong for the established invasion of the fundamental rights of the citizen, under the public law jurisdiction is, thus, in addition to the traditional remedies and not in derogation of them. The amount of compensation as awarded by the Court and paid by the State to redress the wrong done, may in a given case, be adjusted against any amount which may be awarded to the claimant by way of damages in a civil suit.” 9. The fact that the State defended the petitioners in the writ proceedings is not a ground to contend that the petitioners are innocent. It is not the pleadings of the parties which determines the issue in question. But it is the findings rendered by the competent court that alone can govern the lis between the parties. In the present case, though the State had defended them in the writ proceedings, but subsequent to the loss of the case, after getting an opinion from the Government Pleader, they had decided not to go on appeal thereby allowed the order to become final. In view of the direction issued by this court, the State is bound to implement the order. Therefore, the contentions raised by the petitioners to the contrary are hereby rejected. The further submission that the departmental proceedings and the outcome of the criminal court will not finally decide the matter. In the writ proceedings, public tort remedy is available in the light of the guidelines issued in D.K.Basu's case (cited supra). The court can always order compensation. For this purpose the findings recorded in the other proceedings are not relevant. 10. The other contention that there has been violation of principles of natural justice is concerned, it must be noted that the said concept is not an inelastic concept and it applies to facts and circumstances of each case. The court can always order compensation. For this purpose the findings recorded in the other proceedings are not relevant. 10. The other contention that there has been violation of principles of natural justice is concerned, it must be noted that the said concept is not an inelastic concept and it applies to facts and circumstances of each case. In this case, the petitioners were heard by the constitutional court before rendering a finding and while granting appropriate direction. Therefore, there is no further formality for the State to once again attempt to fix the liability by issuing a show cause notice. It is necessary to refer to the useless formality theory. 11. In this context it is necessary to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India reported in (1999) 6 SCC 237 . The following passages found in paragraph 17 may be usefully reproduced below: “17...... The above case is a clear authority for the proposition that it is not always necessary for the Court to strike down an order merely because the order has been passed against the petitioner in breach of natural justice. The Court can under Article 32 or Article 226 refuse to exercise its discretion of striking down the order if such striking down will result in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite party, in violation of the principles of natural justice or is otherwise not in accordance with law.” 12. Further, the Supreme Court in Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan reported in (2000) 7 SCC 529 in paragraphs 21 to 24 referred M.C.Mehta's case and quoted it with approval which reads as follows: “21.) As pointed recently in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India1 there can be certain situations in which an order passed in violation of natural justice need not be set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For example where no prejudice is caused to the person concerned, interference under Article 226 is not necessary. Similarly, if the quashing of the order which is in breach of natural justice is likely to result in revival of another order which is in itself illegal as in Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of A.P.2 it is not necessary to quash the order merely because of violation of principles of natural justice. Similarly, if the quashing of the order which is in breach of natural justice is likely to result in revival of another order which is in itself illegal as in Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of A.P.2 it is not necessary to quash the order merely because of violation of principles of natural justice. 22.) In M.C. Mehta1 it was pointed out that at one time, it was held in Ridge v. Baldwin3 that breach of principles of natural justice was in itself treated as prejudice and that no other ‘de facto’ prejudice needed to be proved. But, since then the rigour of the rule has been relaxed not only in England but also in our country. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan4 Chinnappa Reddy, J. followed Ridge v. Baldwin3 and set aside the order of supersession of the New Delhi Metropolitan Committee rejecting the argument that there was no prejudice though notice was not given. The proceedings were quashed on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. But even in that case certain exceptions were laid down to which we shall presently refer. 23.) Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L. Kapoor case4 laid down two exceptions (at SCC p. 395) namely, if upon admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible, then in such a case, the principle that breach of natural justice was in itself prejudice, would not apply. In other words if no other conclusion was possible on admitted or indisputable facts, it is not necessary to quash the order which was passed in violation of natural justice. Of course, this being an exception, great care must be taken in applying this exception. 24.) The principle that in addition to breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has been developed in several cases. In K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India5 Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) also laid down the principle that not mere violation of natural justice but de facto prejudice (other than non-issue of notice) had to be proved. It was observed, quoting Wade's Administrative Law (5th Edn., pp. 472-75), as follows: (SCC p. 58, para 31) “It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope and extent. ... It was observed, quoting Wade's Administrative Law (5th Edn., pp. 472-75), as follows: (SCC p. 58, para 31) “It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope and extent. ... There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with, and so forth.” Since then, this Court has consistently applied the principle of prejudice in several cases. The above ruling and various other rulings taking the same view have been exhaustively referred to in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma6. In that case, the principle of ‘prejudice’ has been further elaborated. The same principle has been reiterated again in Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P.7” 13. Even if any notice is given, the petitioners cannot improve their case as the earlier order passed by this court had become final. Under these circumstances, there is no case made out. Accordingly, the writ petition will stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petition stands closed.