JUDGMENT : Common question of law is involved in both these cases. 2. The petitioner in W.P(C) No. 2914 of 2009 is having a manufacturing unit outside the State of Kerala and is doing business by sale of the products so manufactured and brought into the State, by way of stock transfer. The point raised is, whether the concessional rate of tax confined to the products manufactured by the 'SSI units registered in the State of Kerala' alone, under Entry 6 of the Schedule II of S.R.O. No.1091 of 1999, is discriminatory and violative of Articles 301, 302 and 304(a) of the Constitution of India. 3. In W.P.(C) No.35617 of 2009, besides the above legal question, another issue has also been raised, contending that, in the absence of any specific entry in the first schedule to the KGST Act, to cover "Soda makers" for rate purpose, the rate of tax can only be 8%, under the 'Residuary Entry'. There is no dispute on the factual aspects. 4. The petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 2914 of 2005, a Company constituted under the relevant provisions of the Companies Act, is a registered dealer under the relevant taxation Statutes in the State of Kerala as well as the State of Tamil Nadu. The said petitioner is manufacturing various items; such as pickles, jams, squashes, artificial soft drink concentrates, vinegar etc. under the name and style "Mr. Butlers" and is a dealer of the said items. The products are manufactured in the factory situated at Coimbatore, in the State of Tamil Nadu and such products are brought over to Kerala, by way of 'branch transfer' and are sold in the State as well. The factory started commercial production of the concerned items from 18.09.2004 and the manufacturing unit is registered with General Manager, District Industries Centre, Coimbatore as an SSI unit, as per Ext. P1, though the name was subsequently changed as per Ext. P1(a). The normal rate of tax in respect of the items, as per the first schedule to the KGST Act, is given under Entries 141, 97 and 167, which are in respect of the first point of sale in the State (at the rate of 20 %, 25 % and 12 % respectively). P1(a). The normal rate of tax in respect of the items, as per the first schedule to the KGST Act, is given under Entries 141, 97 and 167, which are in respect of the first point of sale in the State (at the rate of 20 %, 25 % and 12 % respectively). The petitioner has been collecting the tax at the above stipulated rates from the customers, at the time of sale in the State and is effecting the payment to the Department accordingly. The grievance is that, by virtue of Entry No. 6 of the second schedule to S.R.O. No. 1091/1999 issued by the State, in exercise of the power under Section 10 of the KGST Act, a lesser rate of tax @ 8 % has been stipulated in respect of the products manufactured by the SSI units registered with the Director of Industries and Commerce, Kerala, as stipulated in Ext. P2 notification, which benefit is being virtually denied to the petitioner, referring to the manufacturing activity being pursued elsewhere outside the State. This is stated as discriminatory and violative of the relevant provisions of the Constitution of India and hence is under challenge. 5. The petitioner is W.P.(C) No. 35617 of 2009 is engaged in the manufacturing and sale of 'Soda makers'. The said petitioner's factory is also an SSI unit, registered with the Director of Industries, Government of Tamil Nadu and the unit is situated at Coimbatore. Besides the similar contentions as raised in the other writ petition, challenging Entry No. 6 of the second schedule of S.R.O. No.1091 of 1999, confining benefit of concessional rate of tax only to the SSI units situated and registered in the State of Kerala, the petitioner contends that, their product 'Soda maker' does not fall under 'Entry 116' of the first schedule to the KGST Act and hence, the same has to be treated as a Residuary Entry' under 'Entry No. 177' of the first schedule, attracting tax @ 8 %, whereas the tax sought to be realized is at 12%, with reference to entry No. 116. The steps taken by the concerned respondent proposing 'fast track assessment' under Section 17D of the KGST Act in respect of the assessment years 2002 - 03 and 2003 - 04 made the petitioner to approach this Court, challenging notices issued in this regard, seeking for necessary declaration. 6. The steps taken by the concerned respondent proposing 'fast track assessment' under Section 17D of the KGST Act in respect of the assessment years 2002 - 03 and 2003 - 04 made the petitioner to approach this Court, challenging notices issued in this regard, seeking for necessary declaration. 6. The respondent State has filed a counter affidavit in W.P.(C) No. 2914 of 2005, contending that, the claim put forward by the petitioner is totally wrong and misconceived and that the benefit provided as per Ext. P2 notification, in respect of the manufacturing units situated and registered in the State of Kerala, is based on reasonable classification. It is pointed out that, such concession is available only in respect of the small scale industries in the State, that too in respect of such turn over so manufactured within the State, making use of the infrastructure available here. It is stated that such a stipulation has been brought about, for promoting industrial activities in the State, providing a congenial atmosphere for the growth of industry. It is also stated that, there is absolutely no discrimination, nor is there any violation of the constitutional provisions, in any manner. 7. Heard Mr. V.V. Asokan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. Sudhish Kumar the learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the respondents at length. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the decisions reported in AIR 1963 SC 928 (Firm A.T.B. Mehtab Majid and Co. v. State of Madras and another). ( (1988) 2 SCC 568 (Weston Electroniks and another v. State of Gujarat and others), (1997) 5 SCC 406 (Shri Digvijay Cement Co. & Others v. State of Rajasthan & Others), 1999 (7) KTR 403 (Ker.) (Real Food Products Pvt. Ltd and another v. Asst. Commissioner of Sales Tax (Assmt.) & others), 104 STC 148 (Shree Mahavir Oil Mills and another v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others), 107 STC 586 (Anand Commercial Agencies v. Commercial Tax Officer, Hyderabad and Others). (1988) 1 SCC 743 (Indian Cement and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others) and (2000) 117 STC 200 (Crane Betel Nut Powder Works v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another) in support of the contentions raised in the Writ Petitions. 9. The learned Senior Government Pleader, on the other hand, sought to distinguish the dictum contained in the above decisions. 9. The learned Senior Government Pleader, on the other hand, sought to distinguish the dictum contained in the above decisions. The learned Government Pleader also made a reference to Section 10(1)(ii) and Section 10(2)(a) of the KGST Act, as to the source of power for having issued the relevant notification, which is stated as more based on 'public interest'. It is stated that the Government is at liberty to exempt any class of persons or to exempt the entire State or any part thereof, to meet the requirements based on such public interest. It is also pointed out that, while challenging S.R.O. No.1090/1999 issued under Section 10 as aforesaid, the petitioners have not chosen to challenge the provisions of law i.e. Section 10(i)(ii) and 10(2)(a) as aforesaid, which confer the power. The learned Government Pleader further submits, that the relevant clause under the notification gives reduction of tax only to the industries registered with the Director of Industries and Commerce in Kerala and that the selection of the class is very much reasonable and not discriminatory. Reference is made to the decision reported in (1990) 77 STC 82 (SO = AIR 1990 SC 820 [Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab], pointing out that every difference is not a discrimination. The learned senior Government Pleader also submits that the scope of the notification i.e. S.R.O. No.1090/1999 has already been considered by a Division Bench of this Court as per the decision reported in 2002 (10) KTR 269 A (Baby v. Addl. Sales Tax Officer) in respect of rate of tax payable by the 'poultry farms' situated in the State of Tamil Nadu and pursuing the sale in the State of Kerala, holding that, the benefit of concessional rate of tax given to the poultry farms in Kerala is a reasonable restriction. It is also stated that the writ petitioner in W.P.(C) 2914 of 2005 has already satisfied the tax 1 availing the benefit under the 'Amnesty Scheme' and issue has become merely 'academic' in the said case. 10. It is also stated that the writ petitioner in W.P.(C) 2914 of 2005 has already satisfied the tax 1 availing the benefit under the 'Amnesty Scheme' and issue has become merely 'academic' in the said case. 10. With regard to the specific entries in the schedule of the KGST Act in respect of the product 'Soda maker' involved in W.P.(C) 35617 of 2009, the learned Government Pleader submits that, the said item clearly comes within the purview of entry 116 and is not liable to be treated as under the Residuary Entry No. 177, with lesser tax @ 8 %. It is also pointed out that, the petitioners themselves have described the product as "Home Soda maker". As such, there cannot be any user outside the home and hence, it forms a 'home appliances/such other item' coming under Entry 116 of the first schedule of the KGST Act, attracting tax liability @ 12%. It is also contended that the decision sought to be relied on by the petitioners in Chitra P. Prabhan v. State of Kerala (2000) 8 KTR 487), treating such item as 'Residuary Entry' is not applicable to the case in hand, as the said decision was in respect of the entry as it stood prior to amendment, which is not the position as on date. It is asserted by the learned Government Pleader that the product is to be classified as per the 'popular meaning' as made clear by this Court in M/s. Southern Gas Ltd. v. State of Kerala (ILR 2004 (2) Ker. 534). 11. As mentioned hereinbefore, apart from the question of proper entry and rate of tax in respect of the commodity involved in W.P.(C) 35617 of 2009, the common issue in both the cases is, whether confinement of concessional rate of tax, only to SSI units registered in the State of Kerala (as provided under Entry No. 6 of Schedule II to SRO No. 1091 of 1999), is discriminatory and ultra vires to the Constitution of India. But, for the proper analysis of the above question, it is necessary to have a glance through the relevant provisions of the Constitution of India; virtually Articles 301, 302, 303 and 304 which are reproduced below for convenience of reference : 301. But, for the proper analysis of the above question, it is necessary to have a glance through the relevant provisions of the Constitution of India; virtually Articles 301, 302, 303 and 304 which are reproduced below for convenience of reference : 301. Freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse - Subject to the other provisions of this Part, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free. 302. Power of Parliament to impose restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse - Parliament may by law impose such restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse between one State and another or within any part of the territory of India as may be required in the public interest. 303. Restrictions on the legislative powers of the Union and of the States with regard to trade and commerce - (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 302, neither Parliament nor the Legislature of a State shall have power to make any law giving, or authorising the giving of, any preference to one State over another, or making, or authorising the making of, any discrimination between one State and another, by virtue of any entry relating to trade and commerce in any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule. (2) Nothing in Clause (1) shall prevent Parliament from making any law giving, or authorising the giving of, any preference or making, or authorising the making of, any discrimination if it is declared by such law that it is necessary to do so for the purpose of dealing with a situation arising from scarcity of goods in any part of the territory of India. 304. Restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse among States - Notwithstanding anything in article 301 or article 303, the Legislature of a State may by law - (a) impose on goods imported from other States (or the Union territories) any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subject, so, however, as not to discriminate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced; and (b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest; Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purpose of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of the President. While Article 301 stipulates that trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free, subject to other provisions of Part XIII, Article 302 is an 'exemption', whereby power is vested with the Parliament to impose such restrictions on the aforesaid right, to be brought about in the public interest by necessary enactment. Article 303 however alerts that, such power to provide restrictions under Article 302 shall not enable the Parliament or the Legislature of a State to discriminate between one State and another by virtue of any entry relating to trade and commerce in any of the lists in the 7th schedule, except otherwise as prescribed under Sub Article (2) thereunder, involving a situation arising from the scarcity of goods in any part of the territory of India. Article 304 confers the power on the State to have a different course with regard to the imposition of tax, notwithstanding anything contained in the Article 301 or 303, by law, however, satisfying the requirements as specified therein. The contention of the State is that, the relevant S.R.O. ie. 1091 of 1999 has been issued in exercise of the power vested on the State under Section 10 of the KGST Act and that the same does in no way contravene any of the provisions of the Constitution of India, particularly, Article 301 and is well within the mandate of Article 304, which however is sought to be rebutted by the other side/petitioners. 12. Coming to the case law, it is to be noted that the foremost decision touching Articles 301 and 3.04 (a) of the Constitution of India is the one rendered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court as reported in AIR 1963 SC 928 (Firm Mehtab Majid & Co. v. State of Madras and another). The validity of Rule 16 of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939 was under challenge in the said case. Sub Rule 1 of Rule 16 of the said Rules dealt with sale of raw hides and skins. Tax is levied from the dealer who is the last purchaser in the State. The validity of Rule 16 of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939 was under challenge in the said case. Sub Rule 1 of Rule 16 of the said Rules dealt with sale of raw hides and skins. Tax is levied from the dealer who is the last purchaser in the State. Clause (i) of Sub rule (2) provided for levying of tax on the sale of hides and skins which have been tanned outside the State and the tax is levied from the dealer, who, in the State, happens to be the first seller of such hides or skins. Going by the relevant provisions of the Act, Rules and the rate of tax fixed, the net result was that, if the dealer had purchased the raw hides or skins in the State, he need not pay on the sale price of the tanned hides or skins and he can pay on the purchase price alone. If the dealer purchases raw hides and skins and transfers within the State, he will be liable to pay sales tax on the sale price of the tanned hides or skins. He also will have to pay more for tax, eventhough the hides and skins are tanned within the State, merely on account of his having imported the hides and skins from outside, and having therefore not paid any tax under sub Rule (1). The Apex Court observed that the mere circumstance of a tax having been paid on the sale of such hides or skins in their raw condition did not make the goods of different kind from the tanned hides or skins which had been imported from outside. At the time of sale of those hides or skins in the tanned state, there was no difference between them as goods and the hides or skins tanned outside the State as goods. According to the Apex Court, the similarity contemplated by Article 304 (a) is in the nature of the quality and kind of the goods, and not with respect to whether they were subject of a tax already paid or not. According to the Apex Court, the similarity contemplated by Article 304 (a) is in the nature of the quality and kind of the goods, and not with respect to whether they were subject of a tax already paid or not. Observing that, the provisions of Rule 16 (2) thus did discriminate against the imported hides or skins, which had been purchased or tanned outside the State and therefore, that they contravened the provisions of Article 304 (a) of the Constitution, the impugned rule i.e. Rule 16 (2) of the aforesaid Rules was accordingly declared as invalid and the tax illegally collected was directed to be refunded to the petitioner. 13. In Weston Electroniks and another v. State of Gujarat & others ( (1988) 2 SCC 568 ), the question considered by the Apex Court was, whether the State of Gujarat was justified in leaving the low rate of tax on the goods manufactured locally, while a higher rate was fixed on similar goods imported from out side the State. Placing reliance on the decision in AIR 1963 SC 928 (cited supra) and such other decisions, the course pursued by the State of Gujarat was held as discriminatory and the notification prescribing a lower rate of tax for local manufactures in respect of Television and such other electronic goods was quashed. Somewhat similar circumstance was considered by the Apex Court in Indian Cement and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others [ (1988) 1 SCC 743 ]. There, the notification issued by the State Government by way of concession giving preference to local manufactures in respect of the rate of tax applicable was held as ultra vires to Part XIII of the Constitution and the same was set aside. Later, the scope of Articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution was examined and explained by the Apex Court in M/s Video Electronics Private Limited and another v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1990 SC 820 ). After referring to the various decisions rendered so far, including the one rendered by the Constitution Bench in AIR 1963 SC 928 (cited supra), the Apex Court observed that Part XIII of the Constitution can not be read in isolation and that free flow of trade between two States does not necessarily or generally depend upon the rate of tax alone. Many factors including the cost of goods play an important role in the movement of goods from one State to another and hence the mere fact that there is a difference in the rate of tax on goods manufactured locally and those imported, would not amount to hampering of trade between two States within the meaning of Article 301 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court observed that, as it manifests, Article 304 of the Constitution is an exemption to Article 301 of the Constitution and a need of taking resort to exception will arise only if the tax impugned is hit by Article 301 and 303 of the Constitution and otherwise not. There may be differentiations based on consideration of natural or business factors, which are more or less in force in different localities. The Apex Court observed that prevalence of differential rate of tax on sales of the same commodity cannot be regarded in isolation as determinative of the object to discriminate between one State and another. Where the general rate applicable to goods locally made and all those imported from other States is the same, nothing more normally and generally is to be shown by the State to dispel the argument of discrimination under Article 304(a), eventhough the resultant tax amount on imported goods may be different. 14. In Shree Mahavir Oil Mills and another v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others, reported in [ (1997) 104 STC 148 , it was held that, though the States are free to encourage and promote the establishment and growth of industries within their State by all such means as they think proper, they cannot, in the process, subject goods imported from other States to a discriminatory rate of taxation. The Apex Court relying on the decision in Video Electronics case (cited supra), held that the State action in granting exemption from tax on edible oil manufactured by small scale units within the State was not correct and that the limited exemption granted in Video Electronics Case (cited supra) was intercepted holding that the limited exemption cannot be widened. The Apex Court relying on the decision in Video Electronics case (cited supra), held that the State action in granting exemption from tax on edible oil manufactured by small scale units within the State was not correct and that the limited exemption granted in Video Electronics Case (cited supra) was intercepted holding that the limited exemption cannot be widened. Similarly, in Anand Commercial Agencies v. Commercial Tax Officer (1997) 107 STC 586 , the low rate of tax fixed for oil extracted from the groundnut already taxed in the State while prescribing a higher rate in all other cases was held as discriminatory and violative of Articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution of India. 15. The meaning and scope of the expression 'public interest' under the relevant taxation Statutes was considered and explained by the Apex Court in Shri Digvijay Cement Co. & Others v. State of Rajasthan & Others ( 1997 (5) SCC 406 ) whereby the State notification reducing the rate of tax, as against the rate applicable to the manufactures of cement of another State was intercepted, referring to the mandate under Articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution of India. In ((1999) 7 KTR 403 (Ker.)) Real Food Products Pvt. Ltd and another v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and others, a Single Bench of this Court observed that, the notifications issued by the Government of Kerala as they existed then, providing concessional rate of tax to SSI Units, manufacturing biscuits within the State, against the rate applicable to the manufactures of similar product situated outside the State, was held as discriminatory and violative of Articles 14, 301 and 304(a) of the Constitution of India. It was declared that, invalidity of the impugned notification, as declared by the Court, was to take effect only from the date of the judgment. 16. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope of Article 301 to 304 (a) and the entire case law till date, in State of Madras v. N.K Nataraia Mudaliar [ (1968) 22 STC 376 = AIR 1969 SC 147 ). 16. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope of Article 301 to 304 (a) and the entire case law till date, in State of Madras v. N.K Nataraia Mudaliar [ (1968) 22 STC 376 = AIR 1969 SC 147 ). The Bench, (Per Shah, Mitter and Vaidialingam, JJ), held as follows:- (i) It must be taken as settled law that restrictions of impediments which directly and immediately impede or hamper the free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse fall within the prohibition imposed by Article 301 and subject to the other provisions of the Constitution they may be regarded as void. (ii) It must be regarded as settled law that a tax may in certain cases directly and immediately restrict or hamper the flow of trade, but every imposition of tax does not do so. (iii) Article 301 does not merely protect inter-State trade or operate against inter-State barriers: all trade is protected whether it is intra-State or inter-State by the prohibition imposed by Article 301, and there is nothing in the language or the context for restricting the power of Parliament which it otherwise possesses in the public interest to impose restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse, operative only as between one State and another as two entitles. (iv) Exercise of power to tax may normally be presumed to be in the public interest. (v) An Act which is merely enacted for the purpose of imposing tax which is to be collected and to be retained by the State does not amount to a law giving, or authorising the giving of, any preference to one State over another, or making, or authorising the making of, any discrimination between one State and another, merely because varying rates of tax prevail in different States. (vi) The flow of trade does not necessarily depend upon the rates of sales tax: it depends upon a variety of factors; such as the source of supply, place of consumption, existence of trade channels, the rates of freight, trading facilities, availability of efficient transport and other facilities for carrying on trade. It is where differentiation is based on considerations not dependent upon natural or business factors which operate with more or less force in different localities that Parliament is prohibited from making a discrimination. It is where differentiation is based on considerations not dependent upon natural or business factors which operate with more or less force in different localities that Parliament is prohibited from making a discrimination. Prevalence of differential rates of tax on sales of the same commodity cannot be regarded in isolation as determinative of the object to discriminate between one State and another. (vii) By leaving it to the State to levy sales tax in respect of a commodity on intra-State transactions no discrimination is practised; and by authorising the State from which the movement of goods commences to levy on transactions of sale Central Sales tax, at rate prevailing in the State, subject to the limitation set out above, no discrimination can be deemed to be practised. (viii) Imposition of differential rates of tax by the same State on goods manufactured or produced in the State and similar goods imported in the State is prohibited by Article 304(a). But where the taxing State is not imposing rates of tax on imported goods different from rates of tax on goods manufactured or produced, Article 304(a) has no application. (ix) Article 303 prohibits the making of law which gives, or authorises the giving of, any preference to one State over another, or makes, or authorises the making of, any discrimination between one State and another. Prevalence of different rates of sales tax in the States which have been adopted by the Central 5ales Tax Act for the purpose of levy of tax under that Act is not determinative of the giving of preference or making a discrimination. (x) In the matter of determining the taxable turnover the same rules will apply by virtue of section 9 (1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, whether the tax is to be levied under the Central Sates Tax Act or General Sales Act. If under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, in computing the turnover, excise duty is not liable to be included and by virtue of section 9 (1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, Central Sales tax has to be levied in the same manner as under the Madras Act, the excise duty will not be liable to be included in the turnover for the purposes of Central sales tax. Per Bachawat, J., it was observed that, "Neither intra-Sales tax nor inter-State sales tax operates directly or immediately on the free flow of trade or the movement or the transport of goods from one part of the country to another. None of the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 directly impede the movement of goods or the free flow of trade. Even assuming that the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 is within the mischief of Article 301, it is a law made by Parliament in the public interest and is saved by Article 302." Per Hegde, J., it was observed that "(i) Mere difference in rates is neither showing preference nor making discrimination, but other things being equal, the difference in rates would result in showing preference to some States and making discrimination against others. Hence difference in rates is a prima facie proof of preference or discrimination. It is for the State to justify this difference. (ii) The difference in the rates under section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 are in the public interest, and these differences do not materially affect the free flow of trade in the country. (iii) None of the sub-sections (viz. sub-sections (2), (2A) and (5) of Section (8) has direct or immediate impact on inter-State trade or commerce. 17. In 2002 (10) KTR 269 (Ker.) (Baby v. Additional Sales Tax Officer), a Division Bench of this Court considered the constitutional validity of the notification bearing Nos. SRO 1090 of 1999 and 291 of 2000, whereby exemption was provided to poultry farmers within the State. After considering the case of the petitioner, who was a registered dealer under the CST Act, having poultry farms in the State of Tamil Nadu, dealing in chicken, cattle feed etc., the Bench observed that it was never discriminatory or violative of Article 14, nor was there any infringement of Article 301, but was subject to reasonable restrictions in view of Articles 302, 303 (2) and 304 of the Constitution of India. 18. On going through the judicial precedents as above, it is very much evident that, the stipulation under Article 301 of the Constitution of India is not an absolute one, but is subject to the other provisions of Part XIII i.e. 302, 303 and 304 as well. 18. On going through the judicial precedents as above, it is very much evident that, the stipulation under Article 301 of the Constitution of India is not an absolute one, but is subject to the other provisions of Part XIII i.e. 302, 303 and 304 as well. Obviously, Article 304 starts with a 'non-obstante clause', carving out the exemption thereunder, enabling the State to have a different approach and course to meet the situation by necessary enactments. Section 10 of the KGST Act enables the State to exempt, a class of persons/category in the following manner: 10. Power of Government to grant exemption and reduction in rate of tax : (1) The Government may, if they consider it necessary in the public interest, by notification in the Gazette, make an exemption or reduction in rate, [either prospectively or retrospectively] in respect of any tax payable under this Act, - (i) on the sale or purchase of any specified goods, or class of goods, at all points or at a specified point or points in the series of sales or purchases by successive dealers, or (ii) by any specified class of persons in regard to the whole or any part of their turnover. (2) Any exemption from tax, or reduction in the rate of tax, notified under sub-section (1) - (a) may extend to the whole State or to any specified area or areas therein. (b) may be subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be specified in the notification. (3) The Government may by notification in the Gazette, cancel or vary any notification issued under sub-s.(1). Obviously, such power takes its origin from the constitutional provisions under Part XIII and it is in exercise of the said power, that the notification bearing SRO No.1091/1999 has been issued by the State, which incorporates 'Entry No.6' to Schedule II, whereby it is provided that, the rate of tax applicable to the small scale industries registered with the Director of Industries and Commerce in the State of Kerala will be confined to 8%. The general rate of tax, as applicable to any other manufacturer, whether situated outside the State or within the State, is of course at a higher rate, as provided under the first schedule of the KGST Act. The general rate of tax, as applicable to any other manufacturer, whether situated outside the State or within the State, is of course at a higher rate, as provided under the first schedule of the KGST Act. The exemption stands confined only to such industries, who are registered with the Director of Industries and Commerce in the State as aforesaid, and it is with the intent to achieve a definite purpose to promote the social and economic scene and procure more employment opportunities within the State. The scope of such notification as involved in (2002) 10 KTR 269) (Ker.)) (cited supra) having already been considered and explained by a Division Bench of this Court, placing reliance on the decisions rendered by the Apex Court in Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd & Another v. State of Punjab ( (1990) 77 STC 82 ) and State of Madras v. Nataraia Mudaliyar (AIR (1969) SC 147 = (1968) 22 STC 376 1), this Court finds that, the attempt made by the petitioners, seeking to have Article 304 (a) to be read in isolation, is not liable to be accepted. As such, the challenge raised by the petitioners, in respect of 'Entry No. 6' of Schedule II to SRO No. 1091/1999, to the extent the same confines the concession in the rate of tax only for the products manufactured by the small scale industrial units within the State and having registration with the Directorate of Industries and Commerce of Kerala, stands repelled. 19. With regard to the remaining issue in W.P.(C) No.35617 of 2009, the question to be considered is, whether the product "Soda maker" manufactured and marketed by the petitioners comes within the 'Entry 116' attracting a tax liability @ 12% (as now proposed to be made vide Exts.P4 and P4(a) notices) or whether it comes under the residuary clause under 'Entry 177', with a lesser tax of 8%. 20. The case of the petitioner is that, there is no specific entry to cover 'Soda maker' for the purpose of computation of its rate of tax and that the same can be grouped only under the 'Residuary Entry'. Reliance is also sought to be placed on (2000) 8 KTR 487) (Chitra P. Prabhan v. State of Kerala), whereby it was held that 'Soda maker' was liable to be taxed as an unclassified item at all points. Reliance is also sought to be placed on (2000) 8 KTR 487) (Chitra P. Prabhan v. State of Kerala), whereby it was held that 'Soda maker' was liable to be taxed as an unclassified item at all points. The case of the Revenue is that, the position has undergone substantial change after the decision rendered by this Court in (2000) 8 KTR 487). At that point of time, when the decision was rendered as above, 'Soda maker' was leviable to tax as an unclassified item at all points. The department, during the period 1985 - 86 to 1988 - 89, had been levying tax on 'Soda makers' at multi points, in view of the fact that there was no specific entry to cover the same. The dealers contended that the 'Soda makers' were leviable to tax only at single point by classifying the same within 'Entry 145' (plastics and articles made of plastic including plastic pipes). The said contention of the dealers was rejected by this Court and referring to the actual facts and figures, it was held that 'Soda maker' was not an item, which could be classified under 'Entry 145' and that the same could be reckoned only under the 'Residuary Entry', attracting tax at all points. From the year 1992 onwards, new entries were introduced in the first schedule and under 'Entry No. 104', pressure cooker, cook and serve ware to keep food warm, casserole, water filters and similar home appliances not coming under any other entry in the first schedule or in the fifth schedule, were included attracting the tax liability @ 12 1/2 %, at the point of first sale in the State, by a dealer who is liable to pay tax under Section 5. All other goods not coming under any entry in any other schedule were grouped together at the 'Residuary Entry 156' (as then existed) attracting tax liability @ 8%. The position almost remained the same during and after 1994 till the year 2000, except that the rate of tax payable in respect of the 'Residuary Entry No. 156' came to be reduced as 6 % in the year 1994. The rates were subsequently varied in respect of the above two entries, which happened to be included under Entries 116 and 177 respectively from the year 2000 onwards, where the rate of tax was 12 % and 8 % respectively. The rates were subsequently varied in respect of the above two entries, which happened to be included under Entries 116 and 177 respectively from the year 2000 onwards, where the rate of tax was 12 % and 8 % respectively. The items given under 'Entry 116' were, pressure cooker, non-stick cookware and utensils, cook and serve ware to keep food warms, casseroles, water filters and similar home appliances not coming under any other entry in this schedule or in the fifth schedule, while 'Entry No. 177' dealt with all other goods, not coming under any entry in any of the schedules. 21. It is true that the assessment in respect of the assessment years 2000 - 01, 2001 - 02 in the case of the petitioner was completed treating 'Soda maker' under 'Residuary Entry 177', with the rate of tax payable at 8%. But later, it came to the notice of the Department that the actual rate of tax payable by the petitioner was 12 % as the item 'soda maker' very much constituted an item scheduled under 'Entry 116' of the first schedule, leading to Exts. P4/P4(a) notices issued by the Fast Track Team, proposing assessment under Section 17D of the KGST Act, which made the petitioner to approach this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 35617 of 2009. 22. The main contention of the petitioner is that, all the items grouped under 'Entry 116' are home appliances, which are primarily used for the day to day affairs of kitchen for cooking and as such, the term 'similar home appliances' should be interpreted applying the principle of 'ejusdem generis'; on which event, 'Soda maker' not fall within Entry 116 and should be continued to be governed under Residuary Entry 177, with lesser rate of tax at 8%. It is also stated that the petitioner has effected the sale, passing on the liability to the customers by collecting tax only @ 8 % and as such, no added liability can be mulcted on the petitioner under any circumstances. 23. Going by the items listed under Entry No. 116 of the first schedule to the KGST Act, it is to be noted that the scope of the entry has been much widened by virtue of the relevant amendments, at different points of time. 23. Going by the items listed under Entry No. 116 of the first schedule to the KGST Act, it is to be noted that the scope of the entry has been much widened by virtue of the relevant amendments, at different points of time. So also, it is to be noted that the idea and understanding of the petitioner, that the items grouped under Entry No. 116 are those, which are primarily connected with 'cooking in the kitchen' and hence the term 'similar home appliances' cannot take in 'Soda maker' is only wrong and misconceived. Under the Entry No. 104 as it existed in 1992 - 94 and thereafter till 2000, 'water filter' was also one of the home appliances as included therein, attracting the tax liability at the prescribed rate, which in fact is in no way connected with cooking in kitchen, nor solely allocable for user in kitchen. In the year 200G and afterwards, some other additional items were also included under the said entry. The petitioner Company themselves have described their product as "Home Soda maker" and hence it cannot but be a home appliance. This is more so, when, the 'Home Soda maker' cannot have any application/utility other than the home use, as it is an alien product, so far as any commercial use is concerned. Applying the rule of harmonious interpretation and the principle of 'ejusdem generis', the term "similar home appliances" in entry No. 116 of the first schedule to the KGST Act very much takes in a 'Home Soda maker' as welt and it is liable to be treated as a classified item, attracting the tax at the rate as prescribed. 24. It is relevant to note that, classification has to be made as per the 'popular meaning' of the term/item. The law has been made clear by this Court as per the decision reported in M/s Southern Gas Ltd. v. State of Kerala (ILR 2004 (2) Ker. 534). Considering the facts of the present case in the light of the law declared by this Court as above, it is beyond any shadow of doubt that "Home Soda maker" manufactured and marketed by the petitioner can be nothing but a home appliance coming within the "Entry 116" to the first schedule to the KGST Act. 25. 534). Considering the facts of the present case in the light of the law declared by this Court as above, it is beyond any shadow of doubt that "Home Soda maker" manufactured and marketed by the petitioner can be nothing but a home appliance coming within the "Entry 116" to the first schedule to the KGST Act. 25. 'The product 'Home Soda maker' being liable to be classified under Entry 116, cannot be pushed back to the Residuary Entry No. 177. Even if, for any reason whatsoever, the said item happened to be treated as a Residuary Entry earlier, it cannot give any positive or vested right to the assessee to claim that it shall be continued to be treated under the Residuary Entry. This is primarily for the reason that, there cannot be any estoppel with regard to the provisions of law, nor could it be successfully contended that the mistake, if any committed, has to be perpetuated in the same manner. This Court finds that the challenge raised by the petitioner against Exts.P4/P4(a) notices, proposing to have the assessment reckoning 'Home Soda maker' manufactured and marketed by the petitioner as a home appliance, coming under Entry No. 116 of the first schedule to the KGST Act, is quite wrong and unfounded. 26. During the course of hearing, it was brought to the notice of this Court that the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 2914 of 2005 (concerned with the assessment year) has already cleared the entire liability, availing the benefit under the 'Amnesty Scheme' notified by the Government in the meanwhile. As it stands so, the issue raised in the said writ petition has become rather academic; which in any view of the matter is not much relevant, for the reason that the challenge raised against Entry No. 6 of schedule II to SRO No.1091/1999 (raised in both the cases) has been found against the petitioners. The remaining issue, as to the actual rate of tax applicable in respect of the 'Soda maker'/'Home Soda maker' manufactured and marketed by the petitioner in W.P(C) No. 35617 of 2009 having been found against the said petitioner, nothing remains in the said writ petition as well, to be considered or adjudicated. 27. In the above facts and circumstances, validity of the notification SRO No. 1091/99 with reference to Entry 6 of the Schedule II is upheld. 27. In the above facts and circumstances, validity of the notification SRO No. 1091/99 with reference to Entry 6 of the Schedule II is upheld. The product 'Soda maker'/'Home Soda maker' manufactured/marketed/sold by the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 35617 of 1999 is declared as an item grouped under 'Entry 116' of the I Schedule to the KGST Act. Interference is declined and both the writ petitions are dismissed accordingly.