JUDGMENT Mr. L.N. Mittal, J. (Oral):- C. M. No. 14449-C of 2012 : Allowed as prayed for. C. M. No. 14450-C of 2012 : Counsel for applicant-appellant states that deficiency in court fee has since been made good. The application is, therefore, allowed, subject to all just exceptions. Main Appeal : Plaintiff Raj Dulari Dhall has filed this second appeal. Plaintiff filed suit against Jai Shree Aggarwal – defendant (since deceased and represented by her sons Gautam Aggarwal and Kartik Aggarwal – respondents as her legal representatives) for possession of House No.391, Sector 16-A, Faridabad, by specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 30.06.2004. The plaintiff alleged that defendant agreed to sell the suit property to the plaintiff for Rs.28 lacs and received the entire sale price and executed impugned agreement dated 30.06.2004, which was also witnessed by defendant’s son Kartik Aggarwal. The plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, but defendant committed breach thereof. 2. The defendant broadly denied the plaint averments. It was denied that the defendant agreed to sell the suit property to the plaintiff or received consideration of Rs.28 lacs or executed the impugned agreement. It was pleaded that defendant’s son was introduced to Jai Bakshi – Property Dealer by one Pankaj Malhotra and they induced the defendant to purchase a property in New Delhi. The defendant made payment of several lacs rupees to them. In September 2004, they demanded further amount of Rs.7 lacs. Defendant’s son could not arrange the said money. Then they took him to plaintiff’s son Anil Dhall for advancing Rs.6 lacs. In that process, signatures of defendant and her son were obtained on blank papers. Defendant’s son even returned the amount of Rs.6 lacs to plaintiff’s son, but the blank signed papers were not returned. Various other pleas were also raised. 3. Both the courts below, instead of decreeing the plaintiff’s suit for specific performance of the impugned agreement, decreed the suit for recovery of Rs.28 lacs with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of payment till recovery. The plaintiff has also been directed to return all original documents of the suit property to the defendant on receipt of the aforesaid amount. Feeling aggrieved, plaintiff has filed this second appeal. 4. I have heard counsel for the appellant and perused the case file. 5. The plaintiff has also been directed to return all original documents of the suit property to the defendant on receipt of the aforesaid amount. Feeling aggrieved, plaintiff has filed this second appeal. 4. I have heard counsel for the appellant and perused the case file. 5. Both the courts below have found that the defendant was owner of only half share in the suit property, whereas the other half share was owned by defendant’s son Gautam Aggarwal, and therefore, the impugned agreement could not be specifically enforced. In view thereof, return of money paid by the plaintiff to the defendant has been decreed. 6. Counsel for the appellant, relying on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kammana Sambamurthy (deceased by L.Rs) v. Kalipatnapu Atchutamma (deceased b y L.R.) and Ors., [2010(6) Law Herald (SC) 4074] : reported as AIR 2011 Supreme Court 103, contended that specific performance of the agreement to the extent of defendant’s half share in the suit property could be ordered. It is canvassed that the defendant entered into the agreement to sell the suit property representing herself to be absolute owner thereof. 7. The aforesaid contention is apparently very attractive, but is in fact, devoid of substance. Judgment in the case of Kammana Sambamurthy (supra) is also completely distinguishable on facts. In the instant case, the plaintiff, at the time of agreement, had taken all original documents of the suit property from the defendant. Conveyance deed of the suit property Ex.PW-2/A, produced by the plaintiff in her evidence, revealed that the defendant was owner of only half share in the suit property, whereas the other half share is owned by defendant’s son Gautam Aggarwal. The said conveyance deed was in the possession of plaintiff since the time of impugned agreement. Consequently, the plaintiff could not plead ignorance of the fact that defendant had only half share in the suit property and was not absolute owner thereof. In these circumstances, the plea of the plaintiff regarding oral assertion of the defendant that she was absolute owner of the suit property, without being supported by any document, is patently absurd and untenable. The plaintiff could not have believed such oral assertion in the face of conveyance deed depicting that the defendant had only half share in the suit property. The plaintiff could not have believed such oral assertion in the face of conveyance deed depicting that the defendant had only half share in the suit property. In spite thereof, the plaintiff entered into the impugned agreement with the defendant for sale of the entire suit property. It would depict that the agreement was not entered into in all fairness and there was something foul in the transaction. The defendant has alleged that sale price recited in the impugned agreement is much less than the market value of the suit property. Even Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the market value of the property recited in the impugned agreement is far below the market price prevailing at the time of the impugned agreement. In these circumstances, specific performance of the agreement has been rightly declined. Discretion exercised by both the courts below in this regard cannot be said to be perverse or illegal so as to call for interference in second appellate jurisdiction. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument only that two reasonable views were possible, the view taken concurrently by the courts below cannot be interfered with in second appeal. 8. It is also worth mentioning that the plaintiff, either in the trial court or in the lower appellate court or even in instant second appeal, has not even taken up the plea that specific performance of the agreement be ordered to the extent of half share only. 9. Judgment in the case of Kammana Sambamurthy (supra) is distinguishable because in that case, the prospective vendee could not have knowledge that the vendor was owner of half share and the other half share was owned by vendor’s wife. In these circumstances, specific performance of the agreement to the extent of half share of the vendor-husband was ordered in that case. In the instant case, however, the plaintiff as prospective vendee had definite knowledge even at the time of impugned agreement that the defendant had only half share in the suit property because conveyance deed of the suit property was handed over to the plaintiff at the time of agreement. In spite thereof, the plaintiff entered into the impugned agreement with defendant for sale of entire suit property. In spite thereof, the plaintiff entered into the impugned agreement with defendant for sale of entire suit property. This circumstance disentitles the plaintiff to seek specific performance of the agreement even to the extent of half share of the defendant in the suit property. 10. For the reasons aforesaid, I find no merit in this second appeal. Concurrent finding recorded by the courts below to decline the relief of specific performance of the agreement to the plaintiff and instead thereof to decree the suit of the plaintiff for refund of amount paid by her to the defendant is fully justified by the evidence and circumstances of the case and is not shown to be perverse or illegal or based on misreading or misappreciation of evidence on record. There is, therefore, no ground to interfere with the said finding. No question of law, much less substantial question of law, arises for adjudication in this second appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed in limine. ---------0.B.S.0------------