JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal is the glaring example of misuse and abuse of process of law at the instance of the appellant-plaintiff, whereby the appellant has not only taken the High Court and the trial court for a ride but has also misled the courts by suppressing the material facts for obtaining the ex-parte ad-interim orders against the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, tent amounting to playing fraud on Court. 2. The present appeal filed under Or. XLIII Rule 1(r) of C.P.C. arises out of the order dated 11.4.2012, passed by the Additional District Judge No. 9, Jaipur Metropolitan City, Jaipur,(hereinafter referred to as the trial court) in Civil Misc. Application No. 1/2011, whereby the trial court has rejected the said application of the appellant-plaintiff seeking temporary injunction against the respondents-defendants with costs of Rs. 1100/-. This Court had called for the record of the case from the trial court and also the record of the writ petition being No. 11970/2011, filed by the appellant earlier, which have been perused by the Court. 3. At the out-set, it is necessary to mention the chronological dates and events of the case, which have constrained the Court to come to the conclusion that there was gross misuse and abuse of process of law at the instance of the appellant-plaintiff.3(i) In response to the proposal made by respondent No.3- Company to the appellant-company for appointment of Super Distributor for the supply of patented Fire Killers for the State of Rajasthan, the appellant had accepted the said proposal as per the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter dated 24.1.2011. Accordingly the respondent No.3, appointed the appellant company as the Distributor for the supply of patented Fire Killers for the State of Rajasthan. The appellant company also got issued an irrevocable letter of credit dated 6.5.2011, for Rs. 1,22,50,000/-, in favour of the respondent No.3- company through the respondent No. 1 Bank as desired by the respondent No. 3. The said letter of credit was valid for 90 days from invoice date, which was extended till 5.9.2011. The respondent No. 2 was the banker of the respondent No.3 and also the negotiating bank. It appears that the respondent No. 3 Company pursuant to the said agreement supplied the goods to the appellant and submitted the Bills/documents to the respondent No. 2 bank for payment. The respondent No. 2 was the banker of the respondent No.3 and also the negotiating bank. It appears that the respondent No. 3 Company pursuant to the said agreement supplied the goods to the appellant and submitted the Bills/documents to the respondent No. 2 bank for payment. The said Bills/documents were further sent to the respondent No. 1 Bank for confirmation. On 30.7.2011, the respondent No. 1 Bank issued confirmation/acceptance to the respondent No.2 Bank and also accepted the documents presented by the respondent No. 3. The respondent No. 1 Bank also undertook to make payment to the respondent No.2 under the letter of credit on the due date i.e. on 5.9.2011. Accordingly, the respondent No. 2 Bank negotiated the documents and made payment to the respondent No. 3 company.3(ii) The appellant company filed the writ petition being No. 11970/2011 against the respondents on 6.9.2011, seeking issuance of appropriate writ, order or direction against the respondent No.1 bank not to transfer the amount of Rs. 1,22,50,000/-, mentioned in the letter of credit dated 6.5.2011 to the respondent No. 2 bank, and against the respondent No. 2 bank to take immediate action regarding extension of time limit of the letter of credit dated 6.5.2011. In the said writ petition, the Court passed following order on 9.9.2011:- "It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that petitioner as well as respondent No. 3 Darvesh Fire @ Safety Industries Pvt. Ltd. Company have agreed for the extension of letter of credit for 90 days, which is clear from email message dated 5th September, 2011 (Annexure-6) and petitioner has already issued instructions to his Banker-Oriental Bank of Commerce-respondent No.1, vide letter dated 5th September, 2011(Annexure-9),but respondent No. 1 is not extending the letter of credit and is adamant to send amount in question to respondent No. 3. Issue Notice to respondents, returnable on 19th September, 2011 and the same may be given 'Dasti' to learned counsel for petitioner. Till then, parties shall maintain status-quo as it exists today in respect of letter of credit referred in writ petition. The stay order will come into effect only after service of notice upon respondents." 3(iii)The respondent No. 2 and 3, having been served with the notices in the writ petition, filed the applications under Article 226(3) of the Constitution seeking vacation of the ex-parte ad-interim order dated 9.9.2011 passed by the Court. The stay order will come into effect only after service of notice upon respondents." 3(iii)The respondent No. 2 and 3, having been served with the notices in the writ petition, filed the applications under Article 226(3) of the Constitution seeking vacation of the ex-parte ad-interim order dated 9.9.2011 passed by the Court. On 21.12.2011, the Court interalia passed following order on the said applications of the respondents under Article 226(3) of the Constitution. "The matter has come up on application filed by the respondent No. 2 u/Art. 226(3) of the Constitution for vacation of the Ex-parte interim order dated 09.09.2011. Counsel for respondent No. 2 submits that the last date of letter of credit was 05/09/2011 and the petitioner sought extension for three months(90days) which has been noticed by the Court while granting ex-parte order dated 09/09/2011 and that too expired on 06/12/2011. Counsel seeks permission to invoke the letter of credit and submits that if there is any inter-se dispute between the petitioner and respondent No. 3, they are always at liberty to resolve the same by the mechanism provided under the law but the respondent No. 2 cannot be held responsible for such inter-se disputes. Counsel for petitioner, on the other hand, submits that copy of the application was made available to him on 09/12/2011. He wants some time to file counter. At the same time, counsel for respondent No. 1 represented by Mr. MA Khan submits that since the period of letter of credit expired and at least the respondent No. 1 may be discharged and any order passed by this Court may not cause prejudice so far as the rights of the respondent No.1 are concerned. Although the request made by counsel for petitioner for granting time has been seriously opposed by all the counsel appearing for the respondents, however, in the interest of justice, this Court considers it appropriate to grant reasonable time to the petitioner for doing the needful but for the delay which has been caused after expiry of 90 days, the respondent No. 2 will be entitled to charge interest at the rate of 18% per annum. List the matter on 04/01/2012." 3(iv) On 4.1.2012, the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner sought permission to withdraw the said writ petition and the Court passed following order:- "Counsel for petitioner on instructions wants to withdraw the writ petition. List the matter on 04/01/2012." 3(iv) On 4.1.2012, the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner sought permission to withdraw the said writ petition and the Court passed following order:- "Counsel for petitioner on instructions wants to withdraw the writ petition. The writ petition stands dismissed as prayed for." 3(v) In the meantime, on 2.1.2012 the appellant filed the suit being No. 2/2012 against the respondents-defendants before the trial court seeking the same reliefs as prayed for in the writ petition, for permanent injunction restraining the respondent No.1 (defendant No.1),from making the payment to the respondent No. 2 Bank of Rs. 1,22,50,000/-, pursuant to the letter of credit dated 6.5.2011 and seeking direction against the respondent-defendant No. 2 for taking action with regard to the extension of time limit of the said letter of credit. The appellant-plaintiff also filed an application being T.I. Application No. 1/2001, seeking temporary injunction of the similar nature pending the suit. Neither in the plaint nor in the T.I. Application did the appellant-plaintiff mention that the writ petition was already filed by it and the same was pending before the High Court. On 3.1.2012, the trial Court issued notices to the respondents-defendants and kept the matter on 4.1.2012. 3(vi) On 4.1.2012, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1-defendant No. 1 Bank appeared and sought time for filing the Vakalatnama. On the same day the appellant- plaintiff by submitting a hand-written application sought amendment in the plaint under Or. VI R. 17 of C.P.C. for incorporating the fact that the writ petition being No. 11970/2011, filed by the appellant-plaintiff has been withdrawn on 4.1.2012. The trial court in the said order dated 4.1.2012, recording no-objection of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 (though there was no Vakalatnama on record), allowed the said amendment and ordered to keep the matter on the next day i.e. 5.1.2012 for producing the amended copy of the plaint and the T.I. Application. 3(vii) On 5.1.2012, the learned counsels for the appellant-plaintiff and for the respondent No. 1-defendant No.1 bank remained present before the trial court with the amended copy of the plaint and T.I. Application. The trial court taking into consideration the order dated 9.9.2011 and 4.1.2011, passed by the High Court in the writ petition observed that the order dated 9.9.2011 was continued till 4.1.2012. The trial court taking into consideration the order dated 9.9.2011 and 4.1.2011, passed by the High Court in the writ petition observed that the order dated 9.9.2011 was continued till 4.1.2012. The trial Court therefore, restrained the respondent No. 1-defendant No. 1 from making any payment to the respondent Nos. 2 and 3(defendant Nos. 2 and 3) in respect of the letter of credit dated 6.5.2011 and directed to maintain status-quo in that regard. The appellant-plaintiff neither mentioned in the amended plaint about the order dated 21.12.2011 passed by the High Court in the writ petition, nor produced the copy of the said order on record. The trial court thereafter directed to place the matter on 22.2.2012 for the service of notices to the respondent Nos. 2 and 3(defendants Nos. 2 and 3).3(viii) The respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (defendant Nos. 2 and 3) on having been served with the said notices and the ad-interim ex-parte order passed by the trial court, filed detailed replies and requested the trial court for prepping the hearing of T.I. Application. The trial court, therefore, fixed the hearing of T.I. Application on 11.2.2012 instead of 22.2.2012 vide order dated 7.2.2012 and directed the parties to file necessary reply/rejoinder during this period. It appears that thereafter the hearing was adjourned for one reason or the other and ultimately the trial court heard the T.I. Application on 29.3.2012, and passed the impugned order dated 11.4.2012 dismissing the said T.I. Application of the appellant-plaintiff with costs of Rs. 1100/-, holding that the plaintiff had not only failed to establish any prima facie case, but had suppressed material facts from the Court at the time of filing of the suit. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant plaintiff has filed the present appeal. 4. Before adverting to the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties on the merits of the case, it is required to be mentioned that from the aforesaid facts and events and from the record of the case, it clearly transpires that the appellant had suppressed material facts and misused and abused the process of law for obtaining the ex-parte ad-interim orders from the Courts. When the Writ Petition being No. 11970/2011 was sought to be withdraw on 4.1.2012, the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner did not inform the High Court that the appellant had already filed the suit on 2.1.2012 before the trial court seeking identical reliefs as prayed for in the Writ Petition. When the appellant filed the suit before the trial court on 2.1.2012, he did not mention either in the plaint or in the T.I. Application that the Writ Petition being No. 11970/2011 was already pending before the High Court and the orders dated 9.9.2011 and 21.12.2011 were passed in the writ petition. It was on 4.1.2011, that the appellant-plaintiff presented a hand written application seeking amendment in the plaint and T.I. Application under Or. VI R. 17 for simply incorporating the fact that such a writ petition was filed by him and has been with-drawn on 4.1.2012, without mentioning about the orders dated 9.9.2011 and 21.12.2011 passed by the High Court in the writ petition, nor producing the said orders, along with the amendment application. It also appears from the record that on 4.1.2012, one Advocate named Kailash Chand Tailor appeared for the respondent No. 1-defendant No. 1 bank before the trial court and sought time for filing his Vakalatnama. He also consented for granting the amendment in the plaint as prayed for by the appellant-plaintiff. It appears that when the T.I. Application was kept for hearing of ad-interim injunction on the next date i.e. 5.1.2012, again the learned counsels for the appellant-plaintiff and for the respondent No. 1(defendant No. 1) appeared before the trial court. From the order dated 5.1.2012 passed by the trial court, it appears that though the learned counsels for the appellant and the respondent No. 1 had referred to the order dated 9.9.2011 passed by the High court, they did not refer to the subsequent order dated 21.12.2011 passed by the High Court in the writ petition. Had the learned counsels for the appellant mentioned the correct facts and produced the said order dated 21.12.2011, it would have been noticed by the trial court that even the alleged extended time limit of 90 days from 5.9.2011 had also expired on 6.12.2011, and in that case, there was no question of granting ex-parte ad-interim injunction, restraining the respondent No.1 from making payment to the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 under the letter of credit dated 6.5.2011 and further directing the defendants to maintain status-quo with regard to the said letter of credit. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 bank also neither drew the attention of the court nor opposed passing of the said order on 5.1.2012. 5. Because of the clever drafting of the T.I. Application and the suppression of material facts at the instance of the appellant and its counsel, it appears that the trial court was misled and could not understand the ill-design of the appellant, and granted the ad-interim injunction against the respondents, restraining respondent No. 1 Bank from making payment of the amount of Rs. 1,22,50,000/-, pursuant to the letter of credit dated 6.5.2011, without taking into consideration the implication of such order that the respondent No.1 was the banker of the appellant only and by such order the payment to the respondent No. 2 negotiating bank was stopped, though the respondent No. 1 bank at the instance of the appellant plaintiff had agreed to make payment of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- to the respondent No. 2, Bank on or before 5.9.2011 as per the letter of credit issued by it. The trial court was also sought to be impressed by the learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff that the ad-interim order dated 9.9.2011 passed by the High Court in the writ petition was continued till 4.1.2012,without disclosing the order dated 21.12.2011 passed in the writ petition. Thus there was clear attempt on the part of the appellant and its counsel to obtain ex-parte ad-interim injunction against the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, by suppressing the material facts and by misleading the trial court, and the appellant succeeded in achieving its such ill-will. It also appears that the respondent No. 1 Bank(the defendant No. 1) also inadvertently or inadvertently supported the appellant-plaintiff in as much as the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 was aware about the proceedings of writ petition, and therefore, he should have brought to the notice of the trial court about the order dated 21.12.2011 passed by the High Court. By appearing on 4.1.2011 without Vakalatnama for respondent No. 1, giving consent for amendment in the plaint, again remaining present on 5.1.2012 and not objecting against granting of ad-interim inunction, constrains this Court to infer that the respondent No. 1 Bank had also supported the appellant in materialising its ill design. 6. Learned senior counsel Mr. K.K. Sharma, appearing for the appellant had sought to submit that withdrawal of writ petition without seeking liberty to file suit was permissible in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P. Gwalior, and others, (1987) 1 SCC 5 . Relying upon the decision in case of Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank v. Neelam (2005) 5 SCC 91 and in case of Sarva Shramik Sanghatana(KV) Mumbai v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2008) 1 SCC 494 , he submitted that filing of the suit after the withdrawal of writ petition was also permissible. Relying upon the decision in case of S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State Of Bihar And Others, 2004 (7) SCC 166 : 2004 (2) WLC (SC) Civil 289 Mr. Sharma submitted that the facts suppressed in the suit must be the material facts. However, the learned senior counsel Mr. Ashok Mehta for the respondent No. 2-Bank relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Tamilnadu Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association v. S.C. Sekar, (2009) 2 SCC 784 , submitted that the superior courts must discourage the practice of forum shopping and that the person seeking equity must do equity. He also submitted that the party can not be permitted to recourse to a mechanism which amounts to abuse of process of law, and in the instant case there being gross misuse and abuse of process of law, the appellant deserved to be non-suited. 7. The court does not find any justification much less satisfactory justification in the submissions made by learned senior counsel Mr. K.K. Sharma as to why the fact was not mentioned before the High Court on 4.1.2012, while withdrawing the writ petition that the suit was already filed by the appellant in the trial court on 2.1.2012 seeking identical reliefs,and why the fact was not mentioned in the suit on 2.1.2012 that the writ petition was pending before the High Court. Mr. Mr. Sharma also failed to explain as to why the orders passed by the High Court in the Writ Petition were not mentioned even in the amended plaint or produced therewith. 8. There can not be any disagreement with the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions relied upon by the learned senior counsel Mr. Sharma for the appellant, however, they have no application to the facts of the present case in as much as the question is not as to whether the appellant could have filed the suit after withdrawing the writ petition. The issue involved in the instant case is about the suppression of material facts from the Courts, misusing and abusing the process of law, tent- amounting to committing fraud on the court, by the appellant-plaintiff. As rightly submitted by learned senior counsel Mr. Mehta for the respondent No. 2, such a practice of forum shopping and abusing the process of law must be discouraged and seriously viewed by the High Court. 9. At this juncture a very pertinent observations made by the Apex Court in case of Vijay Syal & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors., (2003) 9 SCC 401 are required to be reproduced as under:- "24. In order to sustain and maintain sanctity and solemnity of the proceedings in law courts it is necessary that parties should not make false or knowingly, inaccurate statements or misrepresentation and/or should not conceal material facts with a design to gain some advantage or benefit at the hands of the court, when a court is considered as a place where truth and justice are the solemn pursuits. If any party attempts to pollute such a place by adopting recourse to make misrepresentation and is concealing material facts it does so at its risk and cost. Such party must be ready to take consequences that follow on account of its own making. At times lenient or liberal or generous treatment by courts in dealing with such matters are either mistaken or lightly taken instead of learning proper lesson. Hence there is a compelling need to take serious view in such matters to ensure expected purity and grace in the administration of justice." 10. At times lenient or liberal or generous treatment by courts in dealing with such matters are either mistaken or lightly taken instead of learning proper lesson. Hence there is a compelling need to take serious view in such matters to ensure expected purity and grace in the administration of justice." 10. Since it is clearly established from the record that the appellant-plaintiff had by abusing and misusing the process of law, taken the courts for a ride, suppressing material facts from the courts and had tried to obtain the orders behind the back of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 against whom in fact the orders were sought. Such a misconduct on the part of the appellant-plaintiff not only deserves to be strongly deprecated but also deserves to be seriously viewed, which has been seriously viewed by this court, for which necessary orders shall be passed hereinafter. 11. Further, it cannot be gainsaid that the remedy of temporary injunction is an equitable remedy. One who seeks equity must do equity and also must come with clean hands. In the instant case, as stated hereinabove, the appellant-plaintiff having not come with clean hands and suppressed the material facts before the trial court for obtaining the ex-parte ad-interim injunction, the application for temporary injunction filed by the appellant deserved to be dismissed and has been rightly dismissed by the trial court. 12. The law relating to the granting or refusing to grant injunction against invocation of bank guarantee and against discounting the letter of credit is also well settled by the Apex Court in number of cases. It is trite law that the courts ought not to grant injunction to restrain the encashment of bank guarantees or letters of credit, except where the fraud is alleged to have been committed while executing the bank guarantee or letter of credit by the beneficiary or where irretrievable damage would be caused to the party concerned, if the injunction against the invocation was not granted. It is also well settled legal proposition that the bank issuing bank guarantee or letter of credit is bound to honour it as per its terms, irrespective of any dispute raised by its customer, as the bank guarantee or letter of credit is an independent and separate contract, and the existence of any dispute between the parties to the contract would not be a ground for the Bank to deny the payment under such bank guarantee or letter of credit. 13. To cite a few judgments in this regard are decisions in case of U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd. v. Singh Consultants & Engineers Pvt. Ltd., (1988) 1 SCC 174 , in case of Ansal Engineering Projects Ltd. v. Tehri Hydro Development Corporation Ltd. & Anr., (1996) 5 SCC 450 , in case of National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. v. Flowmore Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (1995) 4 SCC, 515, in case of Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (1999) 8 SCC 436 , in case of Federal Bank Ltd. v. V.M. Jog Engineering Ltd. & Ors. (2001) 1 SCC 663 and in case of Mahatma Gandhi Sahakra Sakkare Karkhane v. National Heavy Engineering Coop. Ltd. & Anr. (2007) 6 SCC 470 : 2007 (2) WLC (SC) Civil 553 The Apex Court considering the earlier judgments has carved out few principles in case of Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. v. Coal Tar Refining Co., (2007) 8 SCC 110 : 2007 (2) WLC (SC) Civil 513 which read as under:- 14. From the discussions made hereinabove relating to the principles for grant or refusal to grant of injunction to restrain enforcement of a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit, we find that the following principles should be noted in the matter of injunction to restrain the encashment of a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit:- (i) While dealing with an application for injunction in the course of commercial dealings, and when an unconditional Bank Guarantee or Letter of Credit is given or accepted, the Beneficiary is entitled to realise such a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit in terms thereof irrespective of any pending disputes relating to the terms of the contract. (ii) The Bank giving such guarantee is bound to honour it as per its terms irrespective of any dispute raised by its customer. (ii) The Bank giving such guarantee is bound to honour it as per its terms irrespective of any dispute raised by its customer. (iii) The Courts should be slow in granting an order of injunction to restrain the realisation of a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit. (iv) Since a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit is an independent and a separate contract and is absolute in nature, the existence of any dispute between the parties to the contract is not a ground for issuing an order of injunction to restrain enforcement of Bank Guarantees or Letters of Credit. (v) Fraud of an egregious nature which would vitiate the very foundation of such a Bank Guarantee or Letter of Credit and the beneficiary seeks to take advantage of the situation. (vi) Allowing encashment of an unconditional Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit would result in irretrievable harm or injustice to one of the parties concerned." 14. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles, if the facts of the present case and submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties are appreciated, it appears that the appellant-plaintiff had sought the temporary injunction against the respondent No.1-defendant No.1 from making payment of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- to the respondent No.2-negotiating bank, under the letter of credit dated 6.5.11 issued by the respondent No.1 in favour of respondent No.3-company pursuant to the agreement between the appellant and the respondent No.3, on the ground that the respondent No.3-company had not fulfilled its promises. The learned counsel Mr. K.K. Sharma for the appellant pressing into service Section 17 of the Contract Act had submitted that respondent No.3 had committed fraud by deliberately not complying with the assurances given by it in its proposal dated 24.1.11 and, therefore, the appellant could not sell the product namely the fire killers in the market. Thus, the respondent No. 3 had committed fraud with the appellant. He also submitted that respondent No.3 had agreed to extend the time limit of letter of credit for a further period of 90 days from the date 5.9.11, however the respondent No.2-Bank which was negotiating bank was insisting the respondent No.1-bank to make payment pursuant to the said letter of credit, and, therefore, the appellant had filed the petition, and after withdrawing the same had filed the suit. 15. The learned counsel Mr. 15. The learned counsel Mr. M.A. Khan appearing for the respondent No.1-bank, which had issued the letter of credit at the instance of the appellant in favour of respondent No.3, also relying upon one undated and unsigned letter allegedly written by the respondent No.2-bank (Annex.R-1/3) supported the plea of the appellant, by submitting that the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 had agreed to extend the time limit of letter of credit for a further period of 90 days from 5.9.11. 16. As against that the learned counsel Mr. Ashok Mehta for the respondent No.2 vehemently submitted that the respondent No.1-bank having assured the respondent No.2-bank to make payment under the letter of credit in question on or before 5.9.11, the respondent No.2-bank which was the negotiating bank had already made payment of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- to the respondent No.3-company and, therefore by the ex-parte ad-interim injunction purportedly granted against the respondent No.1 had in fact caused the loss to the respondent No.2-bank. Relying upon the observations made by the High Court in the order dated 21.12.11, he submitted that even High Court had noted that the alleged extended period of 90 days had also expired on 6.12.11. Hence, there was no genuine reason for the respondent No.1 to withhold the payment thereafter. He also submitted that the respondent No.1-bank was not concerned with the breach of terms of agreement if any committed by the parties to the agreement, and it was obliged to discount irrevocable letter of credit on or before 5.9.11. Mr. Mehta also submitted that the respondent No.1-bank being the banker of the appellant-company had wrongly supported the appellant as the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1-Bank did not draw the attention of the trial court of the order dated 21.12.11 passed by the High Court nor did he object against passing of the ad-interim injunction apparently against the respondent No.1 adversely affecting the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 17. The learned counsel Mr. 2 and 3. 17. The learned counsel Mr. Veyanktesh Garg for the respondent No.3 taking the court to the record of the trial court submitted that the respondent No.3 had already supplied the goods namely the fire killers to the appellant, and the bills/documents in that regard having been accepted by the respondent No. 1-bank sent through the respondent No.2-the negotiating bank, the respondent No.1 was bound to honour the letter of credit issued by it and make the payment to the respondent No. 2-bank. According to him, there was no question of committing any fraud at the instance of respondent No.3, as the appellant had already sold the fire killers worth Rs. 35 lacs to one third party M/s. Om Enterprises, which had also made an application before the trial court for being impleaded as party-defendant under Order I Rule 10 of CPC. He also submitted that the said application having been dismissed by the trial court, the learned counsel who was appearing for the appellant in the suit had filed the appeal on behalf of the said third party before the appellate court, which established that there was collusion between the appellant, the respondent No.1 and the third party and they wanted to prolong the matter after obtaining ex-parte ad-interim injunction against the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, suppressing the material facts and making misrepresentation before the trial court. 18. As transpiring from the record, the appellant had alleged against the respondent No.3 of not complying with the terms and conditions of the proposal dated 24.1.11, and sought temporary injunction against discounting the letter of credit dated 6.5.11 issued by the respondent No.1-bank at the instance of the appellant in favour of the respondent No.3 for Rs. 1,22,50,000/-. The respondent No.2 being the negotiating bank for the respondent No.3, had already made the payment to the respondent No.3, on the respondent No.1-bank having accepted the bills and documents presented by the respondent No.3-company as per the communication dated 30.7.11 and 3.8.11. It also appears that the respondent No.1-bank had also assured the respondent No.2-bank to make the payment under the letter of credit on the due date i.e. 5.9.11. It also appears that the respondent No.1-bank had also assured the respondent No.2-bank to make the payment under the letter of credit on the due date i.e. 5.9.11. When the respondent No.1-bank had already accepted the documents presented by the respondent No.3, and when it was accepted by the appellant that the goods were received by it, the respondent No.1-bank was bound to honour the letter of credit and make payment to the respondent No.2-negotiating bank as per its assurance. As rightly submitted by the learned senior counsel for the respondent No.2, the respondent No.1 was not concerned with the breach of contract if any committed by the respondent No.3. There was no whisper of fraud alleged in the writ petition. It was only to justify the filing of the suit, such allegations of fraud were alleged. In the opinion of the court, the respondent No.1-bank should not have supported the appellant by not honouring its letter of credit on the ground of alleged non-compliance of the terms of contract by the respondent No.3. Though it has been alleged by the learned counsels for respondent No.2 and 3 that there was collusion between the appellant and the respondent No.1-bank while obtaining the ad-interim injunction from the trial court on 5.1.12, and though this court finds prima facie substance in the same, suffice is to say that it was highly improper on the part of the respondent No.1-bank in not making payment to the respondent No.2-bank under the letter of credit in question. In that view of the matter the impugned order passed by the trial court being just and proper, and the appeal being devoid of merits deserves to be dismissed. 19. From the entire conduct of the appellant, there remains no shadow of doubt that it was the appellant who had taken the High Court and the trial court for a ride and had attempted to commit fraud on court by abusing and misusing the process of law and by suppressing the material facts from the trial court, while obtaining the ex-parte ad-interim injunction against the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. The court therefore taking serious view in the matter, as expected by the Apex Court in case of Vijay Syal v. State of Punjab (supra), dismisses the appeal with exemplary cost of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid by the appellant to the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 2 and 3. The court therefore taking serious view in the matter, as expected by the Apex Court in case of Vijay Syal v. State of Punjab (supra), dismisses the appeal with exemplary cost of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid by the appellant to the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. The cost shall be deposited by the appellant in this court within one weeks from today. On such deposit being made, the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 shall be at liberty to withdraw the same without any further order from the court. The office shall bring to the notice of this court, if there is non-compliance of this order at the instance of the appellant.Appeal Dismissed. *******