JUDGMENT C.R. Sarma, J. 1. The judgment and order, dated 30.08.2011, passed by the learned special Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, in Special Case No. 3/11, is in challenge in this appeal, filed by the appellant, who is the convict in the said special case. By the impugned judgment and order, the learned Sessions Judge convicted the appellant under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) (2)(sic) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the P.C. Act.") and thereby sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and pay fine of Rs. 50,000/- in default suffer simple imprisonment for another period of 3 (three) months for his said conviction. 2. Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, the convicted person, as appellant, has come up with this appeal. 3. I have heard Mr. M. Mukherjee, Mr. B. Mazumdar and Mr. S. Lodh, Learned Counsel, appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. R.C. Debnath, learned Special Public Prosecutor, appearing for the respondent' 4. The prosecution case, as revealed during the trial, may in brief, be staled as follows :-- The first informant, namely, Shri Sub-rata Pal (PW 1), an un-employed youth, in the year 1999, applied for a bank loan, under the scheme, namely, Prime Ministers Rozgar Yoyona", (hereinafter called as "the PMRY") from the Industry Department. Accordingly the said applicant appeared before the Interview Board and a loan for Rs. 42,000/- was sanctioned. As directed by the sanctioning authority, the said informant approached the Central Bank of India, Agartala Branch, seeking release of the said loan amount. Sri Shankar Biswas, (hereinafter, called the appellant')/ who was the Manager of the said Bank, at the relevant time, demanded an amount of Rs. 10,000/-as consideration towards the release of the said loan amount. On 23.12.1999, the informant gave an amount of Rs. 5,000/- of 50 rupee denomination, The numbers of the first note and the last note of the bundle were I.C.N.-848814 and 3AB866362, respectively, and on receipt of the said amount the appellant kept the same in the drawer of his table. Immediately after paying the amount, the informant lodged in FIR (Ext.1) with the Officer-in-Charge, Agartala Police Station, bringing the matter to his notice. After receiving the said FIR, police registered a case under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, (herein after referred to as "the IPC") and Sections 113 of the P.C. Act. Mr. Bimalangshu Das, Dy. Immediately after paying the amount, the informant lodged in FIR (Ext.1) with the Officer-in-Charge, Agartala Police Station, bringing the matter to his notice. After receiving the said FIR, police registered a case under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, (herein after referred to as "the IPC") and Sections 113 of the P.C. Act. Mr. Bimalangshu Das, Dy. S.P. (Central) of Tripura Police, Agartala (PW 8), at about 1-45 p.m., after making a G.D. Entry of the FIR, took up the investigation and proceeded to the place of occurrence i.e. the Central Bank of India, Agartala, accompanied by the informant, the Officer-in-Charge, Inspector, Shri Rupak Chakravorty, another S.I., Shri Sunil Ch. Das and other staff. The investigating officer also took with him two independent persons, namely, Shri Dulal Debnath (PW 2) and Sri Sribash Saha (PW 3) and recovered the bundle of the 100 notes of 50 rupee denomination from the appellant. Accordingly the Investigating Officer seized the said amount, vide Ext. No. 3, in presence of the witnesses, i.e. PW 2 and PW 3. PW 8, who had initiated the investigation and completed the major part of the investigation. Subsequently, four other investigating officers including PW 5, PW 6 and PW 9 also conducted the investigation. PW 9, who was also one of the investigating officers, after receipt of the sanction order for prosecution, submitted the charge-sheet against the appellant. 5. The learned Special Judge framed charge under Section 13(1)(a) of the PC Act. The charge was read over and explained to the accused person to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried- 6. In order to prove its case prosecution examined, as many as, 9 (nine) witnesses. PW 1 is the informant, PWs 2 and 3 are the seizure list witnesses, PW 4 is a Sub-Inspector of police, who made the GD Entry, PW 7 is the Dy. Manager of the Bank, at the relevant time, PWs 5, 6, 8 and 9 are the investigating police officers. 7. At the close of the evidence for the prosecution, the accused person was examined under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Cr PC"). He denied the allegations, brought against him and declined to adduce any defence evidence. His plea was that he neither took any money from the informant, nor such money was recovered from his chamber. He denied the allegations, brought against him and declined to adduce any defence evidence. His plea was that he neither took any money from the informant, nor such money was recovered from his chamber. He also stated, in his statement, made under Section 313, Cr PC, that the police took him from the Bank to the Police station and that no money was seized from him. 8. Considering the evidence, on record, the learned trial Judge came to the findings that though no case under Section 13(1)(a) of the PC Act could be established, the accused person was guilty of the offence under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) (2)(sic) of the P.C. Act. Accordingly, the learned Judge convicted him under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) (2)(sic) of the P.C. Act and sentenced him, as indicated above. 9. Being aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence the convicted person, as appellant, has come Lip with this appeal. 10. Mr. M. Mukherjee, Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, taking this Court through the records of the Court of the learned Magistrate and the learned trial Judge (Order, dated 06.01.2010, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, 'West Tripura and orders, dated 15.12.2010, 24.01.2011 and 25.01.2011, passed by the learned Special Judge) has submitted that, though, under Section 5 of the P.C. Act, the cognizance is required to be taken by the Special Judge, the learned CJM committed error by taking cognizance and that the learned trial Judge also committed error by failing to take cognizance under Section 5 of the P.C. Act. The Learned Counsel, appearing for the appellant, has submitted that, the sanction, in this case was granted vide CO:GM: HRD:2009-10 dated September, 25, 2009 i.e. after about 10 years from the date of registration of the case and 7 years after seeking of sanction by the investigating officer, that the same was issued vide memo dated 25th September, 2009 and signed by the authority on 29.9.2009 and that the same was granted without examining the materials, collected by the investigating agency, inasmuch as, the Investigating Officer (PW 9), who received the sanction order, did not receive any document, along with the sanction order. Therefore, the Learned Counsel, appearing for the appellant, has submitted that, the sanction order suffers from non-application of mind and as such the same cannot be treated as a valid and proper sanction, in the eye of law. Therefore, the Learned Counsel, appearing for the appellant, has submitted that, the sanction order suffers from non-application of mind and as such the same cannot be treated as a valid and proper sanction, in the eye of law. It is also submitted, on behalf of the appellant, that none of the independent witnesses supported the prosecution version regarding seizure of the money from the possession of the appellant. The Learned Counsel, appearing for the appellant, submitted that the failure of the prosecution to prove the original loan sanction order, belied the prosecution version regarding the claim of bribe of Rs. 10,000/- for favouring the informant in connection with the release of the loan amount. 11. The Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that, except the uncorroborated evidence of the investigating Officer i.e. PW 8, there is no substantive evidence, on record, to show that an amount of Rs. 5,000/-, containing 100 notes of 50 rupee denomination was found and seized from the possession of the appellant. Therefore, it is submitted that the failure of the prosecution to prove the seizure itself, by adding sufficient reliable cogent evidence, negates the prosecution story that the appellant had demanded and received Rs. 5,000/- as bribe, gratification from the informant. The Learned Counsel has also submitted that the learned trial judge committed error by relying on the uncorroborated evidence of PW 8 and the statements made by the PW 2 and PW 3 under Section 161, Cr PC, before the Investigating Officer. The Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, referring to the charge, framed against the appellant and the conviction recorded by the learned trial Judge, has submitted that although there is no provision, under the P.C. Act, constituting offence under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) (sic), the learned trial Judge committed gross error, by recording conviction under the said section and as such, the impugned conviction and sentence cannot be allowed to stand. The Learned Counsel has also contended that, as per the statements, made by PW 1 i.e. the informant, he had undergone training before the sanction of the loan, therefore, the loan, if any, was sanctioned after the training, undergone by the informant, but the Ext. The Learned Counsel has also contended that, as per the statements, made by PW 1 i.e. the informant, he had undergone training before the sanction of the loan, therefore, the loan, if any, was sanctioned after the training, undergone by the informant, but the Ext. 2 i.e. the seizure list indicates that he was called for undergoing training w.e.f. 3.5.1999 and the zerox copy of the sanction order reveals that the loan was sanctioned vide order, dated 30.3.1998, i.e. prior to completion of the training. Therefore, it is submitted that the contention of the informant (PW 1), that the loan was sanctioned after he had undergone training, stood belied, thereby raising doubt about the story of sanctioning the loan and payment of money to the appellant. The Learned Counsel has also submitted that the basic foundation of the prosecution version is that the loan was sanctioned in favour of the informant (PW 1) and that the appellant had demanded gratification, bribe towards the release of the said loan. Therefore, it is submitted, the failure of the prosecution to prove the sanction of the loan itself, by producing the relevant documentary evidence i.e. the loan sanction order, negated the basic foundation of the prosecution case. In the light of the above, the learned defence counsel has submitted that the prosecution failed to establish the case against the appellant, beyond all reasonable doubt and as such the appellant is entitled to be acquitted. In support of his contention, the Learned Counsel had relied on the decisions held in the case of (1) Tankeswar Roy v. State of Assam, reported in (2010) 4 GLR 496, (2) Hazari Lal v. The State (Delhi Admn.) reported in 1980 SC 873 and (3) Japan Kr. Saba v. State of Tripura, reported in (2009) 6 GLR 818. 12. Refuting the said arguments, advanced by the Learned Counsel, appearing for the appellant, Mr. R.C. Debnath, learned Special Public Prosecutor has submitted that, in view of sections 460, 461 and 464 of the Cr PC, taking of cognizance by the learned CJM, and failure of the learned trial Judge to the cognizance by a speaking order, immediately after receipt of the case from the Court of the learned CJM, were mere irregularities without vitiating the proceeding. The learned State counsel has also submitted that the learned trial Judge, though committed a mistake by wrongly recording the sections of offence as Section 13(1)(d)(ii)(2) instead of Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act, such wrong mentioning of the section did not cause any prejudice to the appellant and as such the same was not fatal for the prosecution. Regarding the "sanction order", the learned special P.P. has submitted that though there was delay in granting the sanction by the authority concerned, the authority had passed a detailed order after applying its mind and as such no prejudice has been caused to the appellant. It is also submitted that as the independent seizure list witnesses, i.e. PW 2 and PW 3, declined to support the prosecution version, during the trial, the learned trial Judge committed no error by relying on their statements (Exts. 4 and 6), made before the Investigating Officer, under Section 161, Cr PC. It is submitted that sufficient corroboration could be drawn from the said statements in favour of the evidence, given by the PW 8, who seized the money from the possession of the appellant. Therefore, it is submitted that the prosecution has been able to prove, by adducing substantive evidence, that the money, given by the informant to the appellant, has been seized by the Investigating Officer and that the appellant has been rightly held guilty of taking illegal gratification, which is an offence under Section 13(1) (d)(ii) of the P.C. Act, and the punishment for which has been provided by Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act. In support of his contention the learned Special Public Prosecutor has relied upon the following decisions :-- (1) Main Pal v. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 2010 SC 3292 ; (2) Anna Reddy Sambasiva Reddy & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in AIR 2009 SC 2661 ; (3) Koli Lakhmanbh Chanabhai v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 2000 SC 210 ; (4) Salim Abdul Razak Baig v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2011 Cri LJ (NOC) 445 (BOM) and (5) State of Andhra Pradesh v. Vasudeva Rao, reported in AIR 2004 SC 960 . 13. 13. Having heard the Learned Counsel, appearing for both the parties and carefully perusing the materials on record, it is found that the learned CJM, West Tripura, by his order, dated 05.11.2009, passed in G.R. Case No. 935 of 1999 took cognizance of the offence under Section 420, IPC and sections 113 of the P.C. Act and thereafter transferred the case to the file of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class for disposal. The learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class by her order, dated 12.11.2010 committed the case to the Court of the learned Special Judge, Agartala, West Tripura for disposal. On being so committed and after receipt of the case record, the learned Special judge, West Tripura, Agartala, by his order, dated 15.12.2010, passed in ST No. 160/2010 got the case registered in his file as Special Court Case and by order, dated 25.1.2011, framed charge under Section 13(1)(a) of the P.C. Act and proceeded with the trial. Section 5 of the Act provides that a Special Judge may take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to him for trial and, in trying the accused persons, shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal/Special Judge, trying a case under the P.C. Act, is required to take cognizance under Section 193, Cr PC. Therefore, it is found that taking of cognizance by the learned Magistrate and failure of the learned Trial Judge for taking cognizance were irregularities as prescribed by Section 460, 461 and 464, Cr PC. In view of the provisions laid down under Sections 460, 461 and 464, Cr PC the said irregularities do not vitiate the proceeding. 14. With regard to sanction for prosecution, as provided by Section 19 the P.C. Act, Law is clear that no cognizance of offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant can be taken except with the previous sanction of the authority concerned. The Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that in the present case the sanction order cannot be accepted as valid sanction due to the discrepancy regarding date of sanction order and non-application of mind. The sanction order was issued vide memo No. CO:GM:HRD:2009-10, dated 25.09.2009, but the same was signed by the sanctioning authority on 29.09.2009. The Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that in the present case the sanction order cannot be accepted as valid sanction due to the discrepancy regarding date of sanction order and non-application of mind. The sanction order was issued vide memo No. CO:GM:HRD:2009-10, dated 25.09.2009, but the same was signed by the sanctioning authority on 29.09.2009. In view of the above, it is contended that the sanction appears to be issued before the same was signed by the authority concerned. It is also submitted that in the said sanction order it was mentioned that the appellant was caught red handed by West Agartala Police, which is not correct. The informant had lodged the FIR after giving the money to the appellant. Admittedly, as claimed by PW1, the money was first given by the informant at about 1-00 p.m. and thereafter he lodged the FIR around 1-45 p.m. It is the prosecution case that after receipt of the FIR, police visited the office of the appellant and recovered the money from the drawer of his table. Therefore, the statement made in the sanction order, that the appellant was caught red handed is not correct. Referring to the evidence of PW 9, who was one of the investigating officers, the Learned Counsel submitted that the said investigating officer produced and exhibited the sanction order as Ext. No. 9. PW 9 stated that he did not receive any document along with the sanction order for the prosecution. In view of the above, the Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that as no document was returned along with the sanction order, it can well be understood that no documents were examined and perused by the sanctioning authority. In view of the above, it has been strongly contended that the sanction order suffers from non-application of mind. 15. The Learned Counsel referring to the order, dated 13.6.2011, passed by the learned trial Judge, has submitted that, during the cross-examination of the Investigating Officer (PW 9), who exhibited the sanction order, the defence raised objection with regard to its production, but the same was overruled without assigning any reason. Order dated 13.6.2011, aforesaid indicates that the defence had raised objection regarding production of the said sanction order, but the learned trial Judge overruled the same. Order dated 13.6.2011, aforesaid indicates that the defence had raised objection regarding production of the said sanction order, but the learned trial Judge overruled the same. Referring to the provision of Section 67 of the Evidence Act, the Learned Counsel has submitted that failure to examine the signatory of the said document or any other person acquainted with the signature of the sanctioning authority indicates that the sanction order has not been lawfully proved. It is contended that non-examination of the sanctioning authority deprived the accused from cross-examining the sanctioning authority for the purpose of eliciting discrepancy, in granting the sanction and that this withholding of the sanctioning authority has caused much prejudice to the accused/appellant. In reply to the said argument, the learned Special Public Prosecutor, referring to the provision of Section 294, Cr PC has submitted that non-examination of the sanctioning authority and failure to prove his signature caused no prejudice to the appellant, in as much as, the accused did not deny the genuineness of the sanction order (Ext. 9). Section 294 of the Cr PC reads as follows :-- 294: No formal proof of certain documents. (1) Where any document is filed before any Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of every such document shall be included in a List and the prosecution or the accused, as the case may be, or the pleader for the prosecution or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such document. (2) The list of documents shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government. (3) Where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the persons to whom it purports to be signed : Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require such signature to be proved. The provision of Section 294, Cr PC has dispensed with the requirement of proof of the signature of the person, to whom it purports to be signed, subject to the condition prescribed therein. The provision of Section 294, Cr PC has dispensed with the requirement of proof of the signature of the person, to whom it purports to be signed, subject to the condition prescribed therein. As provided by Section 294(1) immediately after submission of the document, along with a list, the prosecution or the accused as the case may, or the pleaders for the prosecution or the accused are required to be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such documents, which are mentioned in a list of document, as prescribed by the State Government. On being so called upon, if the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code, without proof of the signature of the person, to whom it purports to be signed. It has also been provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require such signature to be proved. Section 67 of the Evidence Act provides that if a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting is required to be proved. Therefore, in order to use a document without proving the signature of the maker of the document, to concerned party, against whom the same is proposed to be used, is required to be called upon either to admit or deny the genuineness of each of such document. This is a condition precedent. So, without complying with the said requirement, the document cannot be used unless the maker's signature is proved. 16. In the case of Tapan Kr. Salta (supra) this Court referred to decision held in the case of Madhya Bharat v. Fool Chand, reported in AIR 1956 MB 50, wherein it has been held that mere production of document was not sufficient, but it was necessary to prove the sanction by examining the sanctioning authority. In Tapan Salta (supra) it has been observed that, irregularity in granting sanction will be a deciding factor if failure is justice is occasioned. 17. The object of introducing Section 19 of the Evidence Act is to protect the interest of innocent public servant from, unnecessary harassment. In Tapan Salta (supra) it has been observed that, irregularity in granting sanction will be a deciding factor if failure is justice is occasioned. 17. The object of introducing Section 19 of the Evidence Act is to protect the interest of innocent public servant from, unnecessary harassment. From the record of the present case it does not appear that the documents were submitted in a list, prescribed by the State government. There is nothing to show that the accused person or his pleader was called upon to either admit or deny the said document. PW 9, who was one of the investigating officers, has simply produced the sanction order as Ext. 9. He has not proved the signature of the sanctioning authority. Therefore, as the statutory requirement, prescribed by Section 294(1) of the Cr PC, has not been complied with, the said document i.e. the sanction order could not have been read in the trial, without complying with the statutory requirement of Section 67 of the Evidence Act. There can be no dispute that failure, to prove the sanction order as per law and examine the sanctioning authority united to depriving the public servant from exercising his right to elicit the discrepancy, if any, in the said document or regarding the process of preparation of the same, thereby resulting failure of justice. 18. In the case of Tapan Kr. Saha (supra) this Court referred to decision held in the case of Madhya Bharat v. Fool Chand, reported in AIR 1956 MB 50, wherein it has been held that mere production of document was not sufficient but it was necessary to prove the sanction by examining the sanctioning authority. In Tapan Saha (supra) it has been observed that, irregularity in granting sanction will be a deciding factor its failure is justice is occasioned. In view of what has been discussed above, it is found that the sanctioning authority wrongly mentioned that the appellant was caught red handed. Non-receipt of any documents, papers with the sanction order (Ext. 9) implies that no document/ paper was examined by the said authority. Apart from the discrepancy regarding date of issue of sanction order and date of signature the failure to examine the sanctioning authority adversely affected the interest of the accused. Therefore, the same cannot be treated as a valid sanction. 19. 9) implies that no document/ paper was examined by the said authority. Apart from the discrepancy regarding date of issue of sanction order and date of signature the failure to examine the sanctioning authority adversely affected the interest of the accused. Therefore, the same cannot be treated as a valid sanction. 19. Regarding failure to frame charge under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) the learned Special Public Prosecutor, referring to the decision held in the case of Anna Reddy Sambasiva Reddy (supra), has submitted that omission to frame proper charge cannot be a ground to set aside the conviction, in the absence of prejudice to the accused. In the above referred case the Supreme Court, referring to Section 464, Cr PC, has observed that omission to frame proper charge cannot be a ground to set aside the conviction unless there is some occasion to cause prejudice to the accused person. The Supreme Court observed that if the ingredients of the section are obvious or implicit, conviction in regard thereto can be sustained irrespective of the fact that the proper section has not been mentioned. As observed by the Supreme Court, a fair trial to the accused is sine qua non in our criminal justice system, but at the same time procedural law contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure is designed to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by introduction of hyper technicalities. In the case of Main Pal (supra) the Supreme Court laying down the object of framing charge observed as follows : 9.(i). The object of framing a charge is to enable an accused to have a clear idea of what he is being tried for and of the essential facts that he has to meet. The charge must also contain the particulars of date, time, place and person against whom the offence was committed, as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged. (ii) The accused is entitled to know with certainty and accuracy, and the exact nature of the charge against him, and unless he has such knowledge, his defence will be prejudiced. (ii) The accused is entitled to know with certainty and accuracy, and the exact nature of the charge against him, and unless he has such knowledge, his defence will be prejudiced. Where an accused is charged with having committed offence against one person but on the evidence led, he is convicted for committing offence against another person, without a charge being framed respect of it, the accused will be prejudiced, resulting in a failure of justice. But there will be no prejudice or failure of justice where there was an error in the charge and the accused was aware of the error. Such knowledge can be inferred from the defence, that is, if the defence of the accused showed that he was defending himself against the real and actual charge and not the erroneous charge. (iii) In judging a question of prejudice, as of guilt, the Courts must act with a broad vision and look to the sub-stance and not to the technicalities, and their main concern should be to see whether the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what he was being tried for, whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him fairly and clearly, and whether he was given a full and fair chance to defend himself. In the light of the above, carefully perusing the charge framed by the learned trial Judge it is found that the ingredients of Section 13(1)(d)(ii) are obvious and implicit. The narration, made in the charge, clearly reveals that it was made clear to the appellant for what he was being tried. The defence plea raised and the statements made by the accused under Section 313, Cr PC, indicate that he understood that was being tried for demanding and taking illegal gratification, bribe of Rs. 5,000/- from the informant for favouring him with the release of loan. There was no difficulty for the appellant, accused person to understand the ingredients of the offence, for the commission of which, he was tried. Therefore, failure to mention proper section, no way misled appellant and, thus, caused no prejudice to him. The learned trial Judge instead of mentioning the Section 13(1)(a) of the P.C. Act, should have mentioned Section 13(1)(d)(ii) but the narration of charge was quite clear to indicate that the accused was tried for committing the offence under Section 13(I)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act. The learned trial Judge instead of mentioning the Section 13(1)(a) of the P.C. Act, should have mentioned Section 13(1)(d)(ii) but the narration of charge was quite clear to indicate that the accused was tried for committing the offence under Section 13(I)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act. In view of the above, considering the entire aspect of the matter, it is found that failure to put correct section of law caused no rejudice to the appellant. Hence, I find force in the contention of the learned special Public Prosecutor and hold that wrong mentioning of the section cannot be ground to set aside the conviction. 20. Now the question involved in the present case is whether a loan was sanctioned in favour of the informant (PW 1) and if so, whether, on being approached, the appellant, who was the manager of the Bank, having the power to release the loan amount, demanded an amount of Rs. 10,000/- as bribe for to favouring the informant with the release of the loan amount and whether the informant had given an amount of Rs. 5,000/- to the appellant as bribe and if so, whether the said amount was seized by the Investigating Officer, i.e. PW 8 from the possession of the appellant? 21. With regard to the sanction of loan and demand of bribe, the informant, deposing as PW 1, stated that, after he had undergone the necessary training, an amount of Rs. 42,000/- was sanctioned as loan in his favour by the Industry Department and the loan amount was required to be released by the Central Bank, Agartala Branch. He also stated that he approached the appellant repeatedly with a request to release the loan amount, but the appellant refused to do so unless he was paid an amount of Rs. 10,000/- as bribe. According to PW 1, on 23.12.1999, at about 1.00 p.m. he gave a bundle of Rs. 5,000/- of 50 rupee denomination, of which, the number of the first note was I.C.N. 848814 and the number of the last note was 3AB866362. He also stated that, after making the said payment, he had lodged the FIR (Ext. 1) with the police. According to this witness, police, on receipt of the FIR, visited the office of the appellant and recovered and seized the said amount from the possession of the appellant. He also stated that, after making the said payment, he had lodged the FIR (Ext. 1) with the police. According to this witness, police, on receipt of the FIR, visited the office of the appellant and recovered and seized the said amount from the possession of the appellant. He has also exhibited the bundle of the notes, as M.O. No. 1 and stated that the Investigating Officer had seized some papers from him vide Ext. No. 2. In his cross-examination this witness stated that, after his completion of training, the loan was sanctioned in his favour. He denied the suggestion, put to him, on behalf of the defence, that he used to disturb and annoy the appellant by saying that the loan was sanctioned in his favour, without any valid sanction paper. He also denied the suggestion that, due to refusal of the appellant to release the money for want of valid sponsorship from the DIC, he in collusion with the police lodged a false complaint against the appellant. The said informant (PW 1) was not a witness to the seizure of the money from the possession of the appellant, inasmuch as, he was not a signatory to the seizure list (Ext. 3). From his evidence it appears that the loan was sanctioned, after he had undergone the training. Therefore, the sanction of the loan followed the training claimed to be completed by the informant. Exhibit 2 is the seizure list, by which the PW 6, one of the investigating officers, on 28.12.2001, had seized certain documents, on being produced by the informant. The item Nos. 1 and 2 of the Ext. No. 2 are the interview letter and the call letter for training, issued to the informant. The call letter for training was issued on 3.5.1999. Item No. 3 is the zerox copy of the sanction order of the loan. The said loan appears to be sanctioned on 13.3.98. Of course, the original sanction order has neither been seized, nor proved in this case. Be that as it may, from serial Nos. 2 and 3 of Ext. No. 2, it appears that the loan was sanctioned prior to the training, undergone by the informant. Therefore, the version of the informant that the loan was sanctioned after he had undergone the training falls flat. Be that as it may, from serial Nos. 2 and 3 of Ext. No. 2, it appears that the loan was sanctioned prior to the training, undergone by the informant. Therefore, the version of the informant that the loan was sanctioned after he had undergone the training falls flat. In view of above, his evidence, that the loan was sanctioned after completion of the training, is not correct. This conduct, of the part of PW 1 adversely affects his credibility, raising doubt about his reliability. Therefore, evidence of PW 1 in this regard is not believable. 22. The prosecution made no attempt either to produce of prove the loan sanction order, in its original. This failure of the prosecution to prove the original sanction order also raises doubt regarding the plea that the loan was sanctioned in favour of the appellant. Therefore, it is found that the prosecution failed to establish that the loan was sanctioned in favour of the appropriate authority. This being the position, the claim of the informant, that he had approached the appellant, after sanction of the loan has no legs to stand. 23. Now, the basic question is, whether money was taken form the informant as bribe, and if the same was seized by the Investigating Officer (PW 8) from the appellant's possession. PW 8, in his evidence stated that he seized the money in presence of Shri Dulal Debnath and Shri Sribash Saha i.e. PW 2 and PW 3 respectively, vide Ext. No. 3 i.e., the or official witnesses, have been cited as witness to the seizure. Therefore, as revealed from the seizure list, the seizure was made only in presence of PW 2 and PW 3. Both PW 2 and PW 3, in their evidence, given before the Court, declined to support the prosecution version aforesaid. Exhibiting his signature on the seizure list, PW 2 stated that, on 23.12.1999, when the police officer had visited the Central Bank, he was working in the ground floor and the police officer had requested him to put his signature on a paper and that he could not remember whether the same was a written document or not. This witness was deceased hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution. From his cross-examination no incriminating evidence could be elicited against the appellant. In his cross-examination he denied to have made any statement, as indicated in Ext. 4. Ext. This witness was deceased hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution. From his cross-examination no incriminating evidence could be elicited against the appellant. In his cross-examination he denied to have made any statement, as indicated in Ext. 4. Ext. 4 is the statement alleged to be made by PW 2, during his examination by police, under Section 161, Cr PC He denied the suggestion that the money was seized in his presence. In tune with the evidence of the PW 2, PW 3, another seizure list witness, while exhibiting his signature in the seizure list i.e. Ext. 3(1), stated that the police officer had gone to his shop, situated below the Central Bank and took his signature thereon. He failed to recollect as to whether the said paper was a written one or not. This witness was also declared hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution. He denied to have made any statement, as indicated in Ext. 6, i.e. the statement rendered under Section 161, Cr PC He further denied the suggestion that money was seized in his presence. Though this witness was cross-examined, on behalf of the prosecution, nothing could be elicited against the appellant. From the above, it is found that both PW 2 PW 3 stated that their signatures were taken by investigating officer, on the seizure list, in their shops, thereby implying that the signatures were not taken in the lace of seizure or in the place of occurrence. This makes it clear that they did not accompany the investigating officer to the place of seizure and they were not witnesses to the seizure. Therefore, there is no corroboration in the evidence of the Investigating Officer (PW 8) that the money, given by the informant, was seized from the possession of the appellant. The appellant in his statement, made under Section 313, Cr PC clearly stated that he was taken to the police station and that no money was seized from his possession. In view of the evidence given by PW 2 and PW 3, the said plea, taken by the appellant, cannot be discarded, without raising doubt about the seizure of the money from his possession. 24. In the case of Tankeszvar Roy (supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that reliance of the statements, recorded under Section 161, Cr PC, is not lawful. 24. In the case of Tankeszvar Roy (supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that reliance of the statements, recorded under Section 161, Cr PC, is not lawful. The Supreme Court, though, repeatedly said that a Court would be justified in relying upon the unimpeachable testimony of a hostile witnesses, the Supreme Court nowhere said that if the witness, declared hostile, does not accept the statements, recorded under Section 161, Cr PC, then the Court can rely upon the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161, Cr PC. In the case of Hazari Lal (supra), the Supreme Court observed that statements made by witnesses, in the course of investigation, cannot be used as substantive evidence. Law is well settled that the statements recorded under Section 161 of the Cr PC cannot be used as a substantive evidence against its maker, except using the same for the purpose of contradicting the witness in the manner as provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. The only exception is the permissibility to use the statement made, in the course of investigation, relates to the statement, falling within the provision of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act or Section 27 of the Evidence Act. In the present case the learned trial Judge has relied on the statements of PW 2 and PW 3 made under Section 161 of the Cr PC for drawing corroboration in favour of the evidence, given by PW 1 and PW 8. PW 8 is one of the investigating officers, he claimed to have seized the money from the drawer of the table of the appellant, but the seizure witnesses, i.e. PW 2 and PW 3 declined to support his contention. Their version is that their signatures, on the seizure list, were taken subsequently and not in the place, from where the money has been claimed to be seized. Both PW 2 and PW 3 were declared hostile by the prosecution and they were cross-examined. As discussed above, from their cross-examination no incriminating evidence could be elicited. The statements made by PW 2 and PW 3, before the investigating officer, during the course of investigation, were marked as Exts. 4 and 6. The said witnesses have categorically denied to have made the statements aforesaid. 25. As discussed above, from their cross-examination no incriminating evidence could be elicited. The statements made by PW 2 and PW 3, before the investigating officer, during the course of investigation, were marked as Exts. 4 and 6. The said witnesses have categorically denied to have made the statements aforesaid. 25. The learned trial Judge, heavily relying on the statements, made under Section 161, Cr PC, observed :-- PWs 2 and 3 signed the seizure list and proved their signatures. They have also proved their signatures in the label of the bundle of the notes with date put by them. PWs 2 and 3 went back to what was done in their presence and also went back to their statements recorded by the Investigating Officer. Their statements have been proved as Exts. 4 and 6. They have materially corroborated PWs 1 and 8. Their evidence, though declared hostile, should not be thrown overboard as there was other direct and circumstantial evidence on record and the evidence of the hostile witness may be used as corroborating evidence with other evidence on record. There was nothing in their deposition to support any defence version. Whatever they have stated, it was in support of the prosecution case and not otherwise. They admitted that they signed the seizure list and also signed on the bundle of notes which means they signed it at the time of seizure as stated in Exts. 4 and 6 and not otherwise. 26. As the investigating officer appears to be accompanied by the informant and other police officials, and in view of the claim that the money was seized from the office of the appellant, i.e. the Bank, there was no difficulty for the investigating officer to seize the money, in presence of the said police officials, the informant as well as some of the employees of the Bank. Failure of the investigating officer not to cite any other witnesses in the seizure list, except PW Nos. 2 and 3, who also refused to support prosecution version, raises serious doubt about the prosecution story regarding seizure of money, from the possession of the appellant, in his office. 27. Failure of the investigating officer not to cite any other witnesses in the seizure list, except PW Nos. 2 and 3, who also refused to support prosecution version, raises serious doubt about the prosecution story regarding seizure of money, from the possession of the appellant, in his office. 27. Referring to the decision held in the case of Koli Lakhanbhai Chanabhai (supra), learned Special Public Prosecutor has submitted that the statement made by the hostile witnesses in favour of the prosecution was relevant and that the learned trial Judge committed no error by relying on the statements made by PWs 2 and 3 before the investigating officer. In the above referred case the Supreme Court has observed that it is settled law that evidence of hostile witnesses can be relied upon to the extent to which it supports prosecution case. As observed by the Supreme Court evidence of such witnesses can not be treated as washed off the record. In view of the above, the evidence given by such hostile witnesses, supporting the prosecution version, can be relied upon. But, in the present case, none of the hostile witnesses (i.e. PWs 2 and 3) supported the prosecution version. They have denied to have made the statements before the investigating officer, as indicated in Ext. os. 4 and 6. The statements, made under Section 161, Cr PC, cannot be treated as substantive evidence, except using the same for contradicting their evidence. Therefore, I find no force in the submission, advanced by the learned Special Public Prosecutor, that the learned trial Judge committed no error by relying on the said statements made under Section 161, Cr PC, by the hostile witnesses i.e. PW Nos. 2 and 3, who refused to admit their said statements, to be correct. It is settled law that in the event of existence of two views i.e. one going in favour of the prosecution and other going in favour of the accused, the benefit should go in favour of the accused person. The said witness admitted that they signed the seizure list and also signed the bundle of notes. This admission does not mean they signed at the time of seizure as mentioned in Ext. Nos. 4 and 6. The said witness admitted that they signed the seizure list and also signed the bundle of notes. This admission does not mean they signed at the time of seizure as mentioned in Ext. Nos. 4 and 6. The said findings of the learned trial Judge are not based on sound principle of law, inasmuch as, the statements recorded by the police officer under Section 161, Cr PC can not be used as substantive evidence. The said witnesses, nowhere stated that the money was seized in their presence/ that they had seen the seizure and that the signature was prepared at the place of seizure itself. They categorically stated that their signatures were taken by the police officer in some other place and not at the place of seizure. Hence, there' is nothing to show that they were present at the time of seizure as indicated by the learned trial Judge. Therefore, the learned trial Judge was wrong in using their said statements in the course of investigation as substantive evidence. This being the position, there is no evidence to lend corroboration in favour of the PW1 and PW 8. Admittedly except the said Ext Nos. 4 and 6, there is nothing in support of the evidence of PW 8 that he had seized the money from the possession of the appellant. 28. Relying on the decision held in the case of V. Vasudeva Rao (supra), the learned Special Public Prosecutor has submitted that under the provision of Section 4(1) of the Evidence Act and Section 20 of the PC Act presumption can be drawn that the appellant had taken gratification from the informant. In the above referred case the Supreme Court has held that in order to draw presumption regarding acceptance of gratification (other than legal remuneration) from any person it is to be proved that the person accepted or obtained, or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or that valuable thing as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in the said Section 161 of the Penal Code, 1860. 29. The expressions "may presume" and "self presume" as defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, 1872, relates to factual presumption or discretionary presumption and legal presumption or compulsory presumption. 30. Section 20 of the P.C. Act relates to the legal presumption, i.e. compulsory presumption. 29. The expressions "may presume" and "self presume" as defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, 1872, relates to factual presumption or discretionary presumption and legal presumption or compulsory presumption. 30. Section 20 of the P.C. Act relates to the legal presumption, i.e. compulsory presumption. The said presumption under Section 20 of the P.C. Act can be drawn only when it is proved that the accused person has accepted or obtained or has. agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself or for any other person any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person. Unless the said fact is proved the presumption as envisaged by Section 20 of the P.C. Act can not be drawn. 31. That apart, the conviction in the present case will fall under Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act. The presumption, prescribed by Section 20, can be drawn in respect of offences punishable under Section 11 or clauses (a) or (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13. 32. As discussed above, prosecution had failed to prove the fact that the appellant has accepted gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any illegal gratification or bribe. Therefore, in the case at hand, no presumption can be drawn against the appellant. 33. In the light of the above discussion, I find no difficulty in holding that the prosecution failed to prove the basic requirement i.e. the seizure or recovery of money, from the possession of the appellant, alleged to be given by PW 1 as bribe, beyond all reasonable doubt and also that the money alleged to be seized vide Ext, No. 3 was received by appellant as illegal gratification for favouring the appellant with the release of the loan amount. Therefore, I find sufficient merit in this appeal requiring interference with the impugned conviction and sentence. In the result, the appeal is allowed. Accordingly the conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant are set aside. The accused appellant is acquitted and set at liberty forthwith. His bail bond shall stand discharged. Return the LCR. Appeal allowed