Judgment L.N. Mittal, J. By this common judgment, I am disposing of two cases i.e. EFA No. 2 of 2009, titled K S D hillon versus Punjab Financial Corporation (PFC) and others and EFA No. 3 of 2009 titled A nju S harma and N eeraj Kumar versus PFC and others, as both these appeals have arisen out of single order dated 31.8.2009 passed by learned Additional District Judge, SAS Nagar, Mohali whereby separate objections preferred by appellants of the two appeals have been dismissed. PFC filed application under section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act (in short, the Act) against M/s Ved Sons Private Limited Company (respondent no. 2 herein) and against Ved Pal Anand (not party to the instant appeals). The said application was allowed by learned Additional District Judge, Ropar vide order dated 28.10.1982 and recovery of the amount claimed by PFC was ordered to be effected with interest since 15.3.1978 till recovery along with incidental charges and miscellaneous expenses by putting to sale moveable and immovable properties mentioned in Annexure A to the mortgage deed. Ad-interim injunction and attachment of the properties under mortgage was also confirmed. Respondents in the said case i.e. Ved Sons Private Limited Company and Ved Pal Anand were restrained from transferring or removing the mortgaged/hypothecated properties. PFC has filed execution petition for execution of aforesaid order dated 28.10.1982. In the execution petition, KS Dhillon appellant filed objections alleging that he has purchased 1 kanal 17 marlas land from Avtar Singh and Inder Mohan Singh who had purchased the same from original owners Maninder Kaur and Harinder Kaur through their attorney Ved Pal Anand vide sale deeds dated 22.10.1991 and 14.11.1991 and accordingly KS Dhillon objector claimed to be bonafide purchaser of the said land measuring 1 kanal 17 marlas. Similarly appellants Anju Sharma and Neeraj Kumar filed objections alleging that they have purchased one marla land from Darshan Singh vide sale deed dated 18.3.2005. They also claimed to be bonafide purchasers thereof. The objections were resisted by PFC by alleging that the entire land measuring 1 kanal 18 marlas stood mortgaged with PFC by deposit of title deed and also by registered mortgage deed and the said land also stood attached and the said mortgage was never redeemed. Objectors have no right, title or interest in the suit property. Various other pleas were also raised.
Objectors have no right, title or interest in the suit property. Various other pleas were also raised. Learned Additional District Judge, Mohali vide impugned order dated 31.8.2009 dismissed both the objection petitions. Feeling aggrieved, objectors have filed these two first appeals. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the case files. Counsel for the appellants/objectors vehemently contended that appellants are bonafide purchasers of the disputed land because they purchased it after verifying entries from the revenue record. It was emphatically argued that no mutation of alleged sales in favour of Ved Pal Anand or alleged mortgage in favour of PFC was sanctioned. It was thus contended that PFC is estopped from seeking recovery of the decretal amount by sale of the disputed land. It was also pointed out that wrong khewat and khatauni numbers have been mentioned in sale deeds in favour of Ved Pal Anand and in mortgage deed by Ved Pal Anand in favour of PFC. Reliance in support of these contentions has been placed by counsel for the appellants on various judgments namely Baidya Nath Dutt vs. Alef Jan Bibi and others, AIR 1923 Calcutta 240; Annada Mohan Roy Choudhury vs. Nilphamari Loan Office, Limited, 1972(65) Indian Cases 245; Amir Jahan Begam vs. Khadim Husain Khan and others, AIR 1931 Oudh 253; Annada Mohan Roy Choudhury vs. Nilphamari Loan Office Limited and another, AIR 1921 Calcutta 549; Mt. Ghulam Fatima vs. Mt. Gopal Devi and another, AIR 1940 Lahore 269; Mt. Gopal Devi vs. Mt. Ghulam Fatima, AIR (30) 1943 Lahore 113; T. Syed Fakruddin Saib and others vs. Katta Ramayya Setti and others, AIR (31) 1944 Madras 299; Arur Singh vs. Mt.
Ghulam Fatima vs. Mt. Gopal Devi and another, AIR 1940 Lahore 269; Mt. Gopal Devi vs. Mt. Ghulam Fatima, AIR (30) 1943 Lahore 113; T. Syed Fakruddin Saib and others vs. Katta Ramayya Setti and others, AIR (31) 1944 Madras 299; Arur Singh vs. Mt. Santi and others, AIR 1936 Lahore 405; K.V. Galliara vs U.Thet, AIR 1929 Rangoon 117; Smt. Niranjan Kaur and others vs. The Financial Commissioner, Revenue & Secretary to Government, Punjab and others, 2010(4) RCR (Civil) 610; D.A.V. College Registered Society, Lahore vs Umrao Singh and others, AIR 1935 Lahore 410; Ramrao Jankiram Kadam vs. State of Bombay and others, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 827; Gholam Sidhique Khan and others vs. Jogendra Nath Mitra and another, AIR 1926 Calcutta 916; Mazhar Hasan and others vs. Mukhtar Hasan and another, AIR 1938 Allahabad 64; Siddappa Nagappa Divate vs. Vishvanathsa Ramchandrasa Kabadi, AIR (30) 1943 Bombay 419; Sha Kuramshi Vershi vs. Sha Ratanshi Nenshi and anothers, AIR 1952 Kutch 55; Puran Chand and others vs. Deepak Gosain and others, PLR 2007 (1) 727; Fazal Husain vs. Muhammad Kazim and others, AIR 1934 Allahabad 193; Kartar Singh vs. Gurdial Singh, 2008(3) Punjab Law Reporter 395; Avtar Singh vs. Hazura Singh and others, AIR 1984 Punjab and Haryana 211; Abdul Gafur and others vs. Nawab Ali and others, AIR (36) 1949 Assam 17; Purnedu Nath Tagore vs. Hanut Mull Dogar and others, AIR 1940 Calcutta 565; Neelakanth and another vs. Siddalingayya and others, AIR 2004 Karnataka 258; Syed Abdul Khader vs. Rami Reddy and others, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 553(1); Nahar Lal Shah and another vs. Baij Nath Shah and others, AIR 1928 Calcutta 385; Ved Kumari vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1989 NOC 136 (Punj. & Har.); Munnalal Gupta vs. U.P. Financial Corporation and another, AIR 1975 Allahabad 416. On the other hand, counsel for PFC contended that Ved Pal Anand had purchased the disputed land vide two sale deeds dated 1/2.3.1976 Exihibits P/1 and P/2 from original owners Maninder Kaur and Harinder Kaur and thereafter Ved Pal Anand mortgaged the same with PFC vide registered mortgage deed dated 29.3.1976 and therefore, objectors/appellants cannot be said to be bonafide purchasers of the disputed land.
It was also contended that the disputed land already stood attached and the attachment was confirmed vide order dated 28.10.1982 passed under section 31 of the Act and in view of said attachment also, objectors/appellants cannot be said to be bonafide purchasers of the disputed land. I have carefully considered the rival contentions. Sale deeds Ex. P1 and Ex. P2 executed by Maninder Kaur and Harinder Kaur original owners of the disputed land depict that they sold disputed land to Ved Pal Anand on 1/2.3.1976 and thereafter Ved Pal Anand mortgaged the same in favour of PFC vide registered mortgage deed dated 29.3.1976. Application of PFC under section 31 of the Act was also allowed by Additional District Judge vide order dated 28.10.1982 whereby attachment of the disputed land was also confirmed. In view thereof, subsequent sale deeds by Ved Pal Anand as attorney of Harinder Kaur and Maninder Kaur in favour of Avtar Singh and Inder Mohan Singh in October/November, 1991 and thereafter subsequent sale deeds by Avtar Singh and Inder Mohan Singh in favour KS Dhillon objector in the year 1993 and also ultimate sale deeds in favour of objectors Anju Sharma and Neeraj Kumar in March, 2005 could not have conferred any valid and legal title in favour of vendees/objectors/appellants. It is also significant to notice that the objectors claimed to have derived title from Maninder Kaur and Harinder Kaur through their sale deeds of October/November, 1991 in favour of Avtar Singh and Inder Mohan Singh but at that time Maninder Kaur and Harinder Kaur themselves were not owners of the disputed land having already sold it to Ved Pal Anand in March, 1976. Consequently, Maninder Kaur and Harinder Kaur could not transfer any valid or legal title in favour of Avtar Singh and Inder Mohan Singh in October, 1991. Mere non sanctioning of mutation would not divest a lawful owner of his title over the land. Title is conferred by conveyance deed and not by mutation. Non entering of order of attachment in revenue record would also not frustrate the attachment order. In addition to the aforesaid, the disputed land stood mortgaged in favour of PFC vide mortgage deed dated 292.3.1976. In view of said mortgage also, any subsequent alienation of the mortgaged land would automatically be subject to the rights of the mortgagee in the mortgaged land. The matter does not rest here.
In addition to the aforesaid, the disputed land stood mortgaged in favour of PFC vide mortgage deed dated 292.3.1976. In view of said mortgage also, any subsequent alienation of the mortgaged land would automatically be subject to the rights of the mortgagee in the mortgaged land. The matter does not rest here. The disputed land was also under attachment and therefore, any alienation thereof after attachment is null and void. Transfers in favour of appellants are also hit by the doctrine of lis pendens having been made long after of the recovery order dated 28.10.1982 passed under section 31 of the Act whereby mortgage and attachment of the disputed land were also affirmed. If such transferees are taken to be bonafide purchasers of the property, then it would not be possible to execute any order or decree because the judgment debtor can frustrate the same by making alienation of his property. Transfers made in violation of attachment order are null and void in so far as execution of the decree or order in which the attachment has been made is concerned. Even otherwise, the transfers have to be subject to rights of mortgagee under the registered mortgage deed. Thus, examined from any angle, claim of objectors/appellants cannot be accepted at all. For the reasons aforesaid, the appellants/objectors cannot be said to be bonafide purchasers of the disputed property. The disputed land is certainly available to PFC for execution of order dated 28.10.1982 passed under section 31 of the Act in view of mortgage deed as well as in view of attachment order. Judgments cited by counsel for the appellants have no applicability to the facts of the instant case. Both the appeals are meritless and are accordingly dismissed.