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2012 DIGILAW 1858 (BOM)

Miss Sudha Shamrao Parab, (Since deceased) v. Anant Vishnu Dhargalkar

2012-10-01

F.M.REIS

body2012
Judgment Heard Shri Valmiki Menezes, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner and Shri S. Chopdekar, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent no.2. 2. The above Petition challenges an Order dated 01.04.2003 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, at Pernem, in Regular Civil Suit no. 16/2000 whereby an application filed by the Respondent no.2 to frame an issue of tenancy came to be allowed. 3. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the Petitioner filed a suit on the ground that they are owners in possession of a suit property surveyed under no. 205/1 of Dhargal Village, Pernem, and praying inter alia, for a permanent and mandatory injunction to restrain the Respondent no.1 from selling/alienating/transferring the suit property in favour of the Respondent nos. 2 and 3 and to direct the Respondent no.2 to demolish the illegal construction carried out by him in the suit property. 4. The Respondent no.2 filed the written statement, inter alia, claiming that an area of 400 square metres from the suit property is in their possession for the last over 30 years and further that he has a construction therein as he was occupying as a tenant therein. It is further stated in the written statement that he is an Agricultural tenant in the suit property. It is not disputed that initially when the issue came to be framed by the learned Judge, no issue of tenancy was framed. But, however, the Respondent no.2 thereafter filed an application dated 12.11.2002 to frame an issue which was opposed by the Petitioner herein. 5. By the impugned Order dated 01.04.2003, the learned Judge directed that an issue to that effect be framed in the suit. 6. Being aggrieved by the said Order, the Petitioner has preferred the present Petition. 7. Shri Valmiki Menezes, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, has taken me through the written statements filed by the Respondent no.2 and pointed out that all the essential ingredients and/or particulars of the alleged claim of tenancy have not been disclosed by the Respondent no.2 and until and unless such particulars are furnished, the question of framing an issue does not arise. Learned Counsel further pointed out that it is the specific case of the Petitioner that the Respondent no.2 has no right at all to the suit property and that illegally he was trying to put up a construction therein. Learned Counsel further pointed out that it is the specific case of the Petitioner that the Respondent no.2 has no right at all to the suit property and that illegally he was trying to put up a construction therein. Learned Counsel further pointed out that until and unless all the particulars of the alleged tenancy are furnished as to when such tenancy has been created and/or what were the terms and/or what was the nature of the said tenancy, etc., the question of framing any such issue would not arise. Learned Counsel further pointed out that the claim of tenancy of the Respondent no.2 is totally vague and as such it is well settled that no issue of tenancy can be framed on vague pleadings. 8. On the other hand, Shri Chopdekar, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent no.2, has supported the impugned Order. Learned Counsel further pointed out that there are specific allegation in the written statement at para 5 that the Respondent no.2 is an agricultural tenant of the suit property. Learned Counsel as such submits that once such pleadings are found in the written statement, the learned judge had no other alternative but to frame such issue. Learned Counsel as such submits that the Petition deserves to be rejected. 9. I have considered the rival contentions of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. I have also gone through the records. This Court in the Judgment reported in 2012(2) AIR Bom 94 in the case of Mahableshwar Pandurang Halankar vs. Damodar Pandurang Halankar & Ors. has held at para 5, 6, & 8 thus: “5. Having heard the learned Counsel and on perusal of the records, before I go into the merits of the rival contentions raised by the Counsel appearing for both the parties, it would be appropriate to consider the judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. The Apex Court in the judgment reported in Thomas Antony Vs. Varkey Varkey (supra) has held at para 16 thus: 16. -While making a reference to the Tribunal mandatory the legislature cannot be said to have intended that even a patently frivolous, mala fide and illegal plea of tenancy taken by a party merely to delay the proceeding and to remain in possession of the property is also to be referred to the Tribunal. -While making a reference to the Tribunal mandatory the legislature cannot be said to have intended that even a patently frivolous, mala fide and illegal plea of tenancy taken by a party merely to delay the proceeding and to remain in possession of the property is also to be referred to the Tribunal. The statutory provisions, in our considered view, envisage a case where a bona fide and legally sustainable plea of tenancy is taken by the party, that question shall be referred to the Tribunal. 6. The Division Bench of this Court in the judgment in the case of Pulmati Shyamlal Mishra & anr vs. Ramkrishna Gagaprasad Bajpai & Ors. (supra) has held at Para 34, 35 and 36 thus: -34. It is also not correct to assume that the Court is under any obligation to frame and remit the issue of tenancy mechanically, merely on of its necessity and justification. Cases can be conceived, when tenancy plea may appear to be patently frivolous, fraudulent and part of the dilatory strategy, and may not by itseif attract sections 85 and 85-A of the Tenancy Act. The remittance of any such tenancy issue and the trial thereof by the Mamlatdar and higher authorities in appeal and revision, is known to have become a long winding and time consuming process. This delay enures for the benefit of the person in possession of the land. This, not unnaturally, prompts and tempts him to claim to be the tenant out of sheer anxiety to perpetuate his unmerited possession, even if no basis exists for the claim. Nothing can thus prevent a defendant from claiming to be tenant (1) even if his plea to that effect is overruled specifically or constructively by the Tenancy Court in some earlier proceedings in between himself and the landlord or their predecessor-in-title or (2) even if the plea so set up happens to be irreconcilably inconsistent with his defence of being mortgagee, purchaser or owner of the land by inheritance or adoption, in the earlier stage of the same proceedings or in the earlier round of another litigation. A plea to that effect as an integral part of any other fraudulent defences is yet another specie of the same category. A plea to that effect as an integral part of any other fraudulent defences is yet another specie of the same category. Unwarranted remittance of such issue for trial in literal and mechanical compliance with the above provisions, enables the litigants to abuse the process of the Court and cause grave miscarriage of justice. This indeed makes mockery of the judicial process causing damage to the confidence of the litigating public in its efficacy and utility. 35. This only highlights the danger of any literal or mechanical construction of these provisions in disregard of their content and context and any casual approach in the matter. Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates framing of issues by the Court on application of mind, not only to the pleading but also to the documents produced, while Rule 4 thereof empowers it to examine any person and enforce production of additional -documents for that purpose. These provisions thus enable the courts to (1) seek clarification of the bald pleadings, (2) insist on production of documents in doubtful cases, and (3) get explanation for the adverse factors even where the litigant is driven to rely on oral evidence, with a view to frame correct issues and restrict the trial of the case only to the same. There is nothing in section 85 or 85-A or in any other provisions of the Tenancy Act, robbing the Courts of these powers so indispensable for the effective adjudication and, relieving it or its duty imposed thereunder. These sections provide for remittance of issues only if and when the same are framed on being found to arise on such scrutiny and it is after that stage that the Civil Court ceases to have jurisdiction with regard to the same till the finding is certified by the Tenancy authorities. The process contemplated under Order 14 does not contemplate any trial of such issue but it does involve nipping of any such plea in the bud, if the Court, subject to any' contrary decision in appeal and revision, judicially concludes against its framing and raising. This is implicit in the separate provision for framing issues and the trial thereof. This process does not thus involve any conflict between Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure or section 85 and 85-A of the Tenancy Act nor any question of any lack or excess of jurisdiction. This is implicit in the separate provision for framing issues and the trial thereof. This process does not thus involve any conflict between Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure or section 85 and 85-A of the Tenancy Act nor any question of any lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such scrupulous compliance with these provisions alone can prevent such possible abuse of its process. 36. The Court has thus a duty to examine the substance and refuse to frame and remit any such issue if the same appears to be demonstrably frivolous and mala fide. It is obviously not easy to draw a dividing line between such frivolous and mala fide pleas on the one hand and the ones turning out to be false at the end of the trial on the other. Facts of a given case, however, would rarely fail to furnish the required indication to the judicially trained mind. Facts of the present case, in our opinion, leave no manner of doubt that tenancy plea is a part of the fraudulent defence strategy and does not call for any remittance for trial. The approach could not have been different even if the defendant No. 5 had pleaded the tenancy specifically. The same picture would have emerged in the careful scrutiny at the preliminary stage contemplated under Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure.- 8. The learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Uttam Sambha Deshmuch & ors. Vs. Yamunabai & ors. (supra) has held at Para 3 thus: “...However, a bald statement that Sambha was tenant of the suit land previous to sale deed dated 20-4-1959, has been made. However, material facts constituting the plea of tenancy, have not been pleaded, viz. as to when the tenancy commenced; who was the landlord; what were the terms and conditions of the tenancy; what was the rent fixed etc. are absent in the pleading. Apart from this, it will be evident that no documentary evidence viz. revenue record and/or rent receipts have been produced on record to show the relationship of the deceased Sambha as the tenant of the said land.-” 10. On perusal of the written statement, no particulars are found therein as to when such tenancy was created, who created the tenancy, terms of the tenancy, etc. revenue record and/or rent receipts have been produced on record to show the relationship of the deceased Sambha as the tenant of the said land.-” 10. On perusal of the written statement, no particulars are found therein as to when such tenancy was created, who created the tenancy, terms of the tenancy, etc. Considering the ratio laid down in the aforesaid Judgment I find that no issue of tenancy can be framed on such a vague plea. 11. Considering that such pleadings are lacking in the written statement, the learned Judge was not justified to pass the impugned Order and frame the issue. For the aforesaid reasons, I find that the impugned Order cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside. The learned Judge has acted with material irregularity whilst passing the impugned order in excess of it's jurisdiction, which calls for interference by this Court in the impugned order. 12. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause 10(a). The Petition stands disposed of accordingly with no orders as to costs.