Judgment :- 1. Inveighing the common order dated dated 18.3.2011 passed by the Subordinate Judge, Perambalur, in I.A.Nos.151 and 195 of 2010 in O.S.No.190 of 2001, these civil revision petitions are focussed. 2. Heard both sides. 3. A thumbnail sketch of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of these petitions would run thus: (i) The revision petitioners herein filed the suit O.S.No.197 of 2001 for recovery of the unpaid sale consideration to a tune of Rs.6,58,900/-. (ii) The defendants entered appearance and their advocate filed the vakalat. Thereafter, no written statement was filed and subsequently, the suit was decreed ex-parte on 16.10.2003. (iii) The defendants, after a long delay, filed the I.A.Nos.151 and 195 of 2010 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to get the delay of 1,180 days condoned in filing the applications under Order 9 Rule 13 of C.P.C., so as to get set aside the ex-parte decree. (iv) After hearing both sides, the lower Court allowed the applications on cost of Rs.1,500/- payable by each of the defendants in favour of the plaintiffs. 4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said common order, these two revisions have been focussed by the plaintiffs on various grounds. 5. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners/plaintiffs would put forth and set forth his arguements, which could succinctly and precisely be set out thus: (i) The defendants did not approach the trial Court with their application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act setting out the actual delay of 2173 days, however, they gave an impression as though the delay was only 1,180 days. (ii) Even though the lower Court held that the delay was 2,173 days, yet without any reasons available on record for getting condoned such delay and without any justification, it simply allowed both the applications. (iii) Even though each and every days' delay need not be explained by the party concerned, yet the law enjoins such defaulting parties to give sufficient reason for getting the delay condoned. (iv) In this case, neither the defendants nor the lower Court cited any reason for condoning such huge delay of 2,173 days. As such, the said order of the lower Court warrants interference in these revisions. 6. (iv) In this case, neither the defendants nor the lower Court cited any reason for condoning such huge delay of 2,173 days. As such, the said order of the lower Court warrants interference in these revisions. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the defendants would put forth and set forth his arguements, which could tersely and briefly be set out thus: (i) The sale consideration itself found specified in the sale deed was Rs.27,000/-, whereas, the suit was for recovery of the alleged sale consideration of Rs.6,00,000/-and odd, which even by phantasmagorical thoughts cannot be stated as appropriate. (ii) The trial Court passed the ex-parte decree, whereupon the respondents/defendants herein preferred the said applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to get the delay condoned in filing the applications to get set aside the ex-parte decree. (iii) The defendants came to know about the ex-parte decree only belatedly and accordingly, the defendants calculated the delay of 1,180 days, whereas the Court held that the delay was actually 2,173 days. (iv) The lower Court, considering the pro et contra appropriately allowed the applications, warranting no interference in revisions. 7. Heard both sides. 8. The point for consideration is as to whether there is any perversity or illegality in allowing the two applications for getting the delay condoned in filing the applications under Order 9 Rule 13 of C.P.C.to get aside the ex-parte decree. 9. A plain reading of the records available would exemplify and demonstrate that the defendants were not justified in projecting the case before the lower Court as though the delay was only 1,180 days. The question of computing the number of days delay from the date of knowledge would not arise in a case where vakalat was already filed in the suit on the defendants' side. 10. The question of computing the delay based on date of knowledge, would arise, if at all the plea of the defendants are to the effect that the suit summons were not served on them and that they came to know about the suit only belatedly. But that is not the case here. As such, I could find fault with the defendants for they having not approached the Court appropriately with true facts. 11. No doubt, the lower Court appropriately calculated the number of days delay, so to say, to an extent of 2,173 days. 12. But that is not the case here. As such, I could find fault with the defendants for they having not approached the Court appropriately with true facts. 11. No doubt, the lower Court appropriately calculated the number of days delay, so to say, to an extent of 2,173 days. 12. The core question arises as to whether the lower Court was justified in condoning such delay. 13. I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions of the Honourable Apex Court. (i) 2010(2) Supreme 115 (Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd., vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another) and an excerpt from it would run thus: "8.) ............The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and other similar statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate - Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst.Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 , N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil, (2001) 9 SCC 106 . ..........................." (ii) One other decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2002 SC 1201 (Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu and others v. Gobardhan Sao and others) also could fruitfully be cited; certain excerpts from it would run thus: "13.) It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses." (emphasis added) 14. A plain reading of those decisions would exemplify and connote that there should be valid reasons for condoning the delay and in a cavalier and casual fashion the delay should not be condoned and if it is done so, any vexatious litigation would get prolonged ad nauseam and ad infinitum. 15. I hark back to the trite proposition of law that the Court at this stage is not expected to go into the merits of the matter. There were exchange of arguements at the bar, relating to the merits of the matter. On the one side, the learned counsel for the defendants would state that the sale deed itself was for Rs.27,000/-, but the claim of the plaintiffs/vendors in the suit was for recovering a sum of Rs.6,00,000/- and odd, which cannot be countenanced by any standard. 16. Whereas, the learned counsel for the petitioners/plaintiffs would, by way of refuting such arguement, pilot his argument to the effect that the real happenings should be seen and accordingly if viewed it is crystal clear, even as per the documents available, that the defendants agreed to pay a total sale consideration of more than Rs.6,00,000/-. 17. Be that as it may, ess pasant, I just referred to the arguements of both sides. 18. I incidentally wanted to peruse the ex-parte judgement, and a copy of which was shown to me by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs and it is niggard and bereft of reasons. To say the least, such an ex-parte judgement is not contemplated under law. 19. 18. I incidentally wanted to peruse the ex-parte judgement, and a copy of which was shown to me by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs and it is niggard and bereft of reasons. To say the least, such an ex-parte judgement is not contemplated under law. 19. The lower Court, perhaps, at the back of his mind had the idea that an opportunity had to be given to the defendants to put forth their case on merits, in view of certain transactions, which emerged between the plaintiffs and the defendants anterior to the suit, as revealed by Exs.P1 to P4. 20. I would like to point out that those are all not germane for deciding the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 21. The learned counsel or the defendants would try to explain and expound by pointing out that the defendants were under the impression that as promised by the plaintiffs, the matter would have been withdrawn from the Court, because some talk of settlement was going on. However, when they received E.P. notice they got startled and approached their advocate for doing the needful. Litigants like the defendants were not expected to simply take things for granted. 22. I would like to be very specific in highlighting that if this matter is viewed in stricto sensu, certainly the Court has to hold that there was no reason for condoning the delay. However, I do not view this matter on that line, in view of the cryptic ex-parte judgement passed by the lower Court. The lower Court should have necessarily furnished reasons for passing the ex-parte decree. 23. At this juncture, I hark back to the following decision of the Honourable Apex Court. "AIR 2003 SUPREME COURT 2508 -RAMESH CHAND ARDAWATIYA V. ANIL PANJWANI, certain excerpts from it would run thus: "33.) . . . . . . . . . . Even if the suit proceeds ex-parte and in the absence of a written statement, unless the applicability of Order VIII, Rule 10 of the CPC is attracted and the Courts acts thereunder, the necessity of proof by the plaintiff of his case to the satisfaction of the Court cannot be dispensed with. In the absence of denial of plaint averments the burden of proof on the plaintiff is not very heavy. In the absence of denial of plaint averments the burden of proof on the plaintiff is not very heavy. A prima facie proof of the relevant facts constituting the cause of action would suffice and the Court would grant the plaintiff such relief as to which he may in law be found entitled. In a case which has proceeded ex-parte the Court is not bound to frame issues under Order XIV and deliver the judgment on every issue as required by Order XX, Rule 5. Yet the trial Court would scrutinize the available pleadings and documents, consider the evidence adduced, and would do well to frame the 'points for determination' and proceed to construct the ex-parte judgement dealing with the points at issue one by one. Merely because the defendant is absent the Court shall not admit evidence the admissibility whereof is excluded by law nor permit its decision being influenced by irrelevant or inadmissible evidence." 24. Hence, I am of the view that an opportunity must be given to the defendants. Having that in mind, I do not interfere with the discretion exercised by the lower Court in condoning the delay. However, each of the defendants should be directed to pay a sum of Rs.3,500/-(three thousand five hundred) in favour of the plaintiffs. As such, totally, the petitioners/plaintiffs are entitled to receive Rs.7,000/-(rupees seven thousand) from the respondents/defendants. Within 15 days, this order has to be complied with. 25. On complying with this order, the applications under Order 9 Rule 13 shall be numbered and dealt with as per law. In the event of setting aside the ex-parte decree, the suit itself should be disposed of within a period three months thereafter. 26. In view of the long lapse of time and also the laches on the part of the defendants, I would like to mandate that the defendants, as part and parcel of the condition imposed in this order, should refrain from encumbering or selling or in any manner modifying the immovable property, which happens to be the subject matter of the said sale deed till pending disposal of the suit itself. 27. In the result, the civil revision petitions are disposed of accordingly. However, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.