Arvind Kumar Tripathi (II), J.;— Heard the learned standing counsel for the appellant and Shri M.K.Gupta, learned counsel for the respondents. This is an application to condone the delay of 11 years 92 days in filing the appeal. 2. Before adverting to the facts as stated in the application for condonation of delay, it would be appropriate to notice in brief: the controversy which was involved in the suit giving rise to the appeal. 3. The suit no. 333 of 1993 (Radhey Lal Maheshwari versus State of U.P and others) was instituted for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from selling any part of the property i.e property no. 28/647-45 siutate in Loha Mandi District Agra, treating it as Nazul poperty. In the said suit, besides the State of U.P, Nagar Mahapalika were impleaded as defendants. The plaintiff came out with the case that the said property was earlier declared as evacuee property and was vested in the Central Government. The said property was sold under the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 in favour of M/s Qaulity Marked Footwear Manufacturer Association, Agra through President of India. It appears that the said purchaser was in arrears of public dues with the result the Collector, Agra auction sold the said property for recovery of arrears of land revenue by the order dated 15.11.1972 and was purchased by the present plaintiff. It was stated that the defendants are illegally treating the property in dispute as Nazul property. 4. The suit was contested by the defendants by filing separate written statements disputing the fact that the property in dispute was ever declared as evacuee property. They came out with the case that property in dispute is Nazul property and it is recorded as such in the record of Nazul Department. This could not be sold as an evacuee property. The parties led evidence. As many as 14 issues were framed. The Trial Court by its judgment & decree dated 29.5.1995 decreed the suit restraining the defendants permanently to auction sell the property in question on the findings that the plaintiff has proved his title by documentary evidence. He filed documents such as sale certificate etc. while on the other hand the defendants could not produce any satisfactory evidence. 5. The Trial Court by its judgment & decree dated 29.5.1995 decreed the suit restraining the defendants permanently to auction sell the property in question on the findings that the plaintiff has proved his title by documentary evidence. He filed documents such as sale certificate etc. while on the other hand the defendants could not produce any satisfactory evidence. 5. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree, a First Appeal was preferred being First Appeal No. 330 of 1996 (Nagar Maha Palika versus Shri Radhey Lal Maheshwari & others). The said appeal has been dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 9.3.1999 by the following order: "No one turns up on behalf of the appellants. One month's time is, however granted to the learned counsel for filing requisite number of paper book as per Rules of the Court failing which the appeal shall stand dismissed without any further reference to a Bench. " 6. After the dismissal of the aforesaid appeal filed by Nagar Maha Palika,Agra (now known as Nagar Nigam,Agra), the present appeal has been preferred on behalf of the State of U.P with delay. It may be noted that in the aforesaid First Appeal No.330 of 1996, the State of U.P through the Collector, Agra was impleaded as respondent No.2. 7. The present appeal has been presented before this Court on 26.11.2006. The office has reported that there is a delay of 11 years and 92 days in its filing. The condonation of delay has been sought for on the ground that all the relevant records relating to Nazul land were with the Nagar Palika (now known as Nagar Nigam). There was a long correspondence in between the Collector, Agra and Nagar Nigam to transfer the record but the Nagar Nigam failed to transfer the record, which occasioned the delay. Further averments is that by the Government Order No. 2657/9-Aa-4-96-16 N-96 dated 23.9.1997, the disposal and management of Nazul land was handed over to the District Magistrate, Agra but the relevant records relating the Nazul land were not received in the office of the District Magistrate, Agra due to various reasons. It has been further stated that the necessary permission for filing this appeal was given by the State Government on 16.10.2006, hence the delay in filing the appeal be condoned. It has been further stated that the necessary permission for filing this appeal was given by the State Government on 16.10.2006, hence the delay in filing the appeal be condoned. Plea that for some time the Collector, Agra remained busy in connection with the election duty has also been set out. 8. The learned standing counsel submits that on these facts the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned. He also placed reliance on certain decisions to show that the principle of merger will not apply and the judgment by this Court dismissing the First Appeal filed by the Nagar Nigam will not come in the way of the appellant. In reply, Shri M.K.Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 submits that on the own showing of the appellant, there is gross delay in filing the appeal. Elaborating the arguments he submits that the dismissal of the earlier First Appeal No. 330 of 1996 by the High Court will amount resjudicata as the points involved in the present appeal stands adjudicated upon against the appellant. 9. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. It was not disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant that they had the knowledge of the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. It is also not in dispute that against the judgment of the trial court, the First Appeal no. 330 of 1996 was filed before this Court which has been dismissed by the judgment dated 9.3.1999. The said judgment has attained finality. In paragraph 11 of the affidavit, it has been stated that by the Government Order 23.9.1997, the management and disposal of Nazul land was handed over to the District Magistrate, Agra. This being the position, the Collector, Agra should have filed the appeal shortly thereafter. But the present appeal was filed after about nine years. The explanation given by the Collector for not filing the appeal shortly thereafter, is not convincing. It was departmental correspondence if any, between the office of the Collector, Agra and Nagar Nigam and the Collector should have ensured that the necessary record is received in his office without any further delay. It appears that the appellant has acted in the matter leisurely. It was departmental correspondence if any, between the office of the Collector, Agra and Nagar Nigam and the Collector should have ensured that the necessary record is received in his office without any further delay. It appears that the appellant has acted in the matter leisurely. There is no explanation as to why the appeal was not filed by the State of U.P within the statutory period immediately after the delivery of the judgment by the trial Court. It is not the case of the appellant that they had no knowledge of the judgment and decree of the trial court. The appellant, it appears, was early satisfied as the appeal was preferred by the Nagar Nigam. After its dismissal, he woke up, to file the appeal, which too has not been filed within a reasonable time. 10. Along with the affidavit, filed in support of the delay condonation application, the appellant has annexed two letters, one dated 7.7.1995 and the other dated 25.7.1995. These letters were given by the District Magistrate, Agra to the Administrator, Nagar Nigam, Agra directing the Nagar Nigam Agra to take appropriate steps by filing appeal before the High Court. It appears that at that point of time, the Collector, Agra was satisfied that the matter is required to be looked into by the Nagar Nigam, Agra. This being so, he cannot take a U turn and file the present appeal after the dismissal of the appeal filed by the Nagar Nigam. 11. The learned standing counsel submits that in view of the judgments of the Apex Court in the State of Kerala & Anr.versus Kondottyparambanmoosa & others JT 2008(9) SC 289, M/s Tilokchand Motichand and others versus H.B.Munshi and another AIR 1970 SC 898 ; State (NCT of Delhi) versus Ahmed Jaan (2008) 14 SCC 582 , the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned and the earlier judgment passed in First Appeal No.330 of 1996 will not operate as resjudicata as the appeal was dismissed not on merits but on technical ground. 12. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon Sheodan Singh versus Daryao Kunwar (1966) 3 SCR 300 : AIR 1966 SC 1332 in support of his contentions that the dismissal of the earlier First Appeal will operate as resjudicata. 12. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon Sheodan Singh versus Daryao Kunwar (1966) 3 SCR 300 : AIR 1966 SC 1332 in support of his contentions that the dismissal of the earlier First Appeal will operate as resjudicata. We find that the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sheodan Singh versus Daryao Kunwar (Supra) has been rendered by a Bench consisting four Hon'ble Judges. The facts therein are almost identical to the facts of the present case. There, two suits were decided simultaneously. Four First Appeals were preferred before this Court and out of them one appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation and the another appeal was dismissed on the ground of non filing of the paper books. It was urged by the respondents in the remaining two appeals that the judgment dismissing the appeal on the aforesaid two grounds will amount resjudicata and will also amount merger of the judgment and decree of the trial court with that of the High Court. The said plea has found favour with the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sheodan Singh versus Daryao Kunwar (Supra). In the case on hand also, the earlier appeal was dismissed for non filing of the paper book. The controversy involved in the earlier appeal as well as also in the appeal filed by the State is identical - whether the property in dispute is Nazul land or not. We are bound by the judgment of the Larger Bench of the Apex Court. The relevant paragraph is para 14, which is reproduced below: "This brings us to the main point that has been urged in these appeals, namely, that the High Court had not heard and finally decided the appeals arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91. One of the appeals was dismissed on the ground that it was filed beyond the period of limitation while the other appeal was dismissed on the ground that the appellant therein had not taken steps to print the records. It is therefore urged that the two appeals arising out of suits Nos.77 and 91 had not been heard and finally decided by the High Court, and so the condition that the former suit must have been heard and finally decided was not satisfied in the present case. It is therefore urged that the two appeals arising out of suits Nos.77 and 91 had not been heard and finally decided by the High Court, and so the condition that the former suit must have been heard and finally decided was not satisfied in the present case. Reliance in this connection is placed on the well-settled principle that in order that a matter may be said to have been heard and finally decided, the decision in the former suit must have been on the merits. Where, for example, the former suit was dismissed by the trial court for want of jurisdiction, or for default of plaintiff 's appearance, or on the ground of non-joinder of parties or misjoinder of parties or multifariousness, or on the ground that the suit was badly framed, or on the ground of a technical mistake, or for failure on the part of the plaintiff to produce probate or letters of administration or succession certificate when the same is required by law to entitle the plaintiff to a decree, or for failure to furnish security for costs, or on the ground of improper valuation or for failure to pay additional court fee on a plaint which was undervalued or for want of cause of action or on the ground that it is premature and the dismissal is confirmed in appeal (if any), the decision not being on the merits would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit. But none of these considerations apply in the present case, for the Additional Civil Judge decided all the four suits on the merits and decided the issue as to title on merits against the appellant and his father. It is true that the High Court dismissed the appeals arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91 either on the ground that it was barred by limitation or on the ground that steps had not been taken for printing the records. Even so the fact remains that the result of the dismissal of the two appeals arising from suits Nos. 77 and 91 by the High Court on these grounds was that the decrees of the Additional Civil Judge who decided the issue as to title on merits stood confirmed by the order of the High Court. Even so the fact remains that the result of the dismissal of the two appeals arising from suits Nos. 77 and 91 by the High Court on these grounds was that the decrees of the Additional Civil Judge who decided the issue as to title on merits stood confirmed by the order of the High Court. In such a case, even though the order of the High Court may itself not be on the merit the result of the High Court's decision is to confirm the decision on the issue of title which had been given on the merits by the Additional Civil Judge and thus in effect the High Court confirmed the decree of the trial court on the merits, whatever may be the reason for the dismissal of the appeals arising from suits Nos. 77 and 91. In these circumstances though the order of the High Court itself may not be on the merits, the decision of the High Court dismissing the appeals arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91 was to uphold the decision on the merits as to issue of title and therefore it must be held that by dismissing the appeals arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91 the High Court heard and finally decided the matter for it confirmed the judgment of the trial court on the issue of title arising between the parties and the decision of the trial court being on the merits the High Court's decision confirming that decision must also be deemed to be on the merits. To hold otherwise would make res judicata impossible in cases where the trial court decides the matter on merits but the appeal court dismisses the appeal on some preliminary ground thus confirming the decision of the trial court on the merits. It is well-settled that where a decree on the merits is appealed from, the decision of the trial court loses its character of finality and what was once res judicata again becomes res subjudice and it is the decree of the appeal court which will then be res judicata. It is well-settled that where a decree on the merits is appealed from, the decision of the trial court loses its character of finality and what was once res judicata again becomes res subjudice and it is the decree of the appeal court which will then be res judicata. But if the contention of the appellant were to be accepted and it is held that if the appeal court dismisses the appeal on any preliminary ground, like limitation or default in printing, thus confirming into the trial court's decision given on merits, the appeal court's decree cannot be res judicata, the result would be that even though the decision of the trial court given on the merits is confirmed by the dismissal of the appeal on a preliminary ground there can never be res judicata. We cannot therefore accept the contention that even though the trial court may have decided the matter on the merits there can be no res judicata if the appeal court dismisses the appeal on a preliminary ground without going into the merits, even though the result of the dismissal of the appeal by the appeal court is confirmation of the decision of the trial court given on the merits. Acceptance of such a proposition will mean that all that the losing party has to do to destroy the effect of a decision given by the trial court on the merits is to file an appeal and let that appeal be dismissed on some preliminary ground, with the result that the decision given on the merits also becomes useless as between the parties. We are therefore of opinion that where a decision is given on the merits by the trial court and the matter is taken in appeal and the appeal is dismissed on some preliminary ground, like limitation or default in printing, it must be held that such dismissal when it confirms the decision of the trial court on the merits itself amounts to the appeal being heard and finally decided on the merits whatever may be the ground for dismissal of the appeal." 13. In the case of M/s Tilokchand Motichand and others versus H.B.Munshi and another M/s AIR 1970 SC 898 ; relied upon by the learned standing counsel, it is mentioned that a short period of limitation might well frustrate the Fundamental Right. In the case of M/s Tilokchand Motichand and others versus H.B.Munshi and another M/s AIR 1970 SC 898 ; relied upon by the learned standing counsel, it is mentioned that a short period of limitation might well frustrate the Fundamental Right. Too long a period might enable stale claims to be made to the detriment of other rights which might emerge. We could lay our hand to a recent decision of the Apex Court in Maniben Devraj Shah versus Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai JT 2012(4) SCC 55 where the Supreme Court has reversed the order of the High Court condoning the delay of 7 years and 108 days. It has been held that the State and its instrumentalities do take more time in decision making as compare to others but that does not mean that despite negligence and lethargic attitude of its officers, delay should be condoned. More or less, a similar view has been taken in another recent judgment of the Apex Court in the Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors.v.Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. JT 2012(2) SC 483 JT 2012 (2) SC 483 wherein the Apex Court has refused to condone the delay of 427 days in the absence of any acceptable and plausible reason. In these two decisions, the Apex Court has considered their earlier judgments and has laid down that merely because appeal is at the instance of Government Central or State, the delay should not be condoned unless there is sufficient cause. The expression 'sufficient cause' gets its colour from the facts of each case. Though a liberal and justice oriented approach is to be adopted, it also to be kept in mind that successful litigant has acquired rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and has spent time pursuing the litigation. 14. By applying the ratio of the above judgments, we are satisfied that the delay in the case on hand has not been satisfactorily explained. Taking an overall picture of the case, we are satisfied that no case for condonation of delay has been made out. We may also place on record that the judgment of the trial court was scrutinized by us to find out as to whether the decree obtained by the plaintiff is erroneous. Taking an overall picture of the case, we are satisfied that no case for condonation of delay has been made out. We may also place on record that the judgment of the trial court was scrutinized by us to find out as to whether the decree obtained by the plaintiff is erroneous. We find that the trial court has given apparently good and valid reasons in its judgment and there is a document of title in favour of the plaintiff-respondent executed by the Collector. The only defence is that building and not the land was sold which has not been accepted. 15. In view of above discussions, we do not find any good ground to condone the delay in filing the appeal. The application for condonation of delay is therefore, rejected. The appeal is dismissed as barred by time. _____________