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2012 DIGILAW 1882 (BOM)

Pradeep v. Ajeet Seeds Ltd. , Aurangabad

2012-10-03

U.D.SALVI

body2012
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard. Perused. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of parties. 2. Order dated 17/3/2011 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class (Court No.3), Aurangabad rejecting the plea (application Exhibit 20) for dismissal of the complaint for want of territorial jurisdiction in S.C.C. No.2824/2005 is challenged in the present petition. 3. The respondent herein lodged a complaint S.C.C. No.2824/2005 against the present petitioner in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Aurangabad for penalising the petitioner/ accused for the commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The complaint disclosed that the respondent/ complainant, a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, has/ had registered office at Aurangabad and was engaged in seeds business. It is further disclosed that on the request of the petitioner/ accused, dealership of seeds business with the complainant was allotted to the petitioner/ accused upon the petitioner/ accused agreeing to abide by the terms and conditions disclosed in the application form dated 1/9/1997 and thereafter the complainant had supplied seeds to the accused from time to time, and thereby the petitioner/ accused had incurred a liability of Rs.4,87,047.76 ps.; and for liquidation of the said liability had issued a cheque bearing No. 2734893, dated 28/12/2004 drawn on Khamgaon Urban Co- operative Bank Ltd., Khamgaon in favour of the complainant; and the cheque was presented as per the instructions of the accused by the complainant to their bankers Canara Bank, Shahganj Branch, Aurangabad for realisation. According to the complainant the Cheque was dishonoured and returned to the complainant at Aurangabad by the bankers with a memorandum carrying a remark Funds insufficient on 7/2/2005. The complaint further proceeds to disclose that a legal notice dated 5/3/2005 was issued by the complainant by Registered Post A.D., which the petitioner/accused refused to accept. According to the respondent/ complainant, the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, therefore, had taken place within jurisdiction of Aurangabad Court. 4. The complaint further proceeds to disclose that a legal notice dated 5/3/2005 was issued by the complainant by Registered Post A.D., which the petitioner/accused refused to accept. According to the respondent/ complainant, the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, therefore, had taken place within jurisdiction of Aurangabad Court. 4. The petitioner/ accused moved an application (Exhibit 20) for dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction thereby raising contentions that the alleged transaction of purchase and sales took place at Khamgaon, the accused was permanently residing at Khamgaon, the cheque in question was presented for payment to the Khamgaon Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd., at Khamgaon and, therefore, mere presentation of the cheque at Aurangabad and giving notice as contemplated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act does not give jurisdiction to the Court. 5. The respondent/ complainant resisted the application with say (Exhibit 38). The respondent/ complainant contended:- (1) Goods were supplied at Aurangabad. (2) Cheque was presented at Aurangabad. (3) Knowledge about dishonour of cheque was received at Aurangabad. (4) Notice was sent to Advocate from Aurangabad. (5) Notice was received back on refusal at Aurangabad and, therefore, the application deserves to be rejected. 6. Learned Magistrate, after hearing the parties and upon taking into account the rival contentions observed that the place from where the notice was issued and the place from where the cheque was presented also got jurisdiction to try and entertain the said complaint. Learned Magistrate placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shamshad Begums case Shamshad Begum Vs. B. Mohammed : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri.) 264. Learned Magistrate took into consideration few more judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court namely K. Bhaskaran Vs. Shankaran AIR 1999 SC 3762 . , M/s Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. & anr. Vs. M/s National Panasonic India Ltd. 2009 AIR SCW 410. , and one delivered by this Court in M/s Jinraj Paper Udyog Vs. M/s Dinesh Associates & anr. 2009 ALL MR (Cri.) 89. 7. Mr. Lakhotiya, learned Advocate for the petitioner/ accused submitted that sending/ issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action, but actual communication of the notice i.e. the service of notice would. He further submitted that even presentation of the cheque by the complainant to its banker would not by itself give rise to a cause of action. He further submitted that even presentation of the cheque by the complainant to its banker would not by itself give rise to a cause of action. According to him, the principle that the debtor must seek the creditor cannot be applied in a criminal case as the jurisdiction of the Court to try a criminal case is governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and not on common law principle. In support of these submissions, he invited attention of the Court to the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Harman Electronics (P.) Ltd. & anr. Vs. M/s National Panasonic India Ltd. (supra) particularly to para Nos.14, 19, 20, 24 to 27. Inviting the attention of this Court to the judgment in case of Jambu Kumar Jain Mr. Jambu Kumar Jain & anr. Vs. TATA Capital Ltd. & ors. : 2011 All MR (Cri.) 2139. , he pointed out that there has been reiteration of the same ratio as expressed in M/s Harman Electronics P. Ltd. case (supra) by the Single Bench of this Court. This thought, he submitted, was also found expressed in the cases decided by the Single Bench of this Court namely Prabhu Modi case Prabhu Dayal Modi Vs. Euro Developers Pvt. Ltd. & anr. : 2010(3) BCR (Cri.) 801., Diptikumar Mohanty case Dipti Kumar Mohanty & anr. Vs. Videocon Industries Ltd. & anr. : 2009(1) BCR (Cri.) 766., Ahuja Dongre 2007 (1) BCR (Cri.) 1031. . According to him, the offence had taken place at Khamgaon i.e. the place where the cheque was issued/ drawn or presented by bankers of the complainant to the bankers of the petitioner/ accused for realisation, the cheque was returned unpaid by the drawee Bank for want of sufficient funds to the credit of the drawer, notice was refused, and the place where the petitioner/ accused was expected to make payment to the payee. It is for these reasons, he submitted that the Court at Aurangabad had no jurisdiction to entertain the said complaint. 8. Mr. It is for these reasons, he submitted that the Court at Aurangabad had no jurisdiction to entertain the said complaint. 8. Mr. Sapkal, learned Advocate for the respondent invited the attention of the Court to the note taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court while delivering the judgment in Smt. Shamshadbegum case of its previous observations in K. Bhaskaran case regarding concatenation of the five acts which went in the making of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and its implications on deciding the jurisdiction of the Courts to try the said offence. He further pointed out from para 16 of the judgment in K. Bhaskaran case referred to in Smt. Shamshad Begum case that the amplitude of the jurisdiction in the cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act stood so widened and expansive so as to render raising of question of jurisdiction regarding the said offence on idle exercise. 9. In Shamshad Begum case, he argued, the Hon’ble Apex Court had endorsed a view that the Court in whose jurisdiction notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount was given had the jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as one of the components of the said offence i.e. giving of the notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment had taken place by sending of such notice. According to him, the act of giving notice by payee is over once it is dispatched; and giving of notice can be distinguished from receipt of notice. In this context, he placed reliance on observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in paras 18 and 21 of the judgment delivered in K. Bhaskaran case K. Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan & anr. : AIR 1999 SC 3672(1) . 10. Learned Advocate for the respondent further submitted that in the instant case the notice demanding the payment of the cheque amount was issued from Aurangabad where the registered office of the complainant was situate and the accused was called upon to make the payment of the cheque amount to the complainant located at Aurangabad. 10. Learned Advocate for the respondent further submitted that in the instant case the notice demanding the payment of the cheque amount was issued from Aurangabad where the registered office of the complainant was situate and the accused was called upon to make the payment of the cheque amount to the complainant located at Aurangabad. In such circumstances, he submitted, the accused was under obligation to make the payment of the cheque amount at Aurangabad as demanded and his failure to do so resulted in commission of the offence and as such, the Aurangabad Court had jurisdiction to entertain and try the said complaint. In this context, he relied upon the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in Preetha S. Babu case Preetha S. Babu, Ernakulum Vs. Voltas Ltd., Chochin & anr. : 2010(3) Mh.L.J. 234 . He also placed reliance on the judgment in C.C. Alavi Haji case C.C. Alavi Haji Vs. Palapetty Muhammed & anr. : 2007 Cri.L.J. 3214. Referring to unreported judgment delivered by the Single Bench of this Court in Criminal Writ Petition No.692/2010 (Jyotiba Shripati Goykar Vs. Ramchandra s/o Aba Waghmare ), he submitted that, Preetha S. Babu case (supra) weighed with this Court to endorse the view canvassed by him. 11. Judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in K. Bhaskaran case breaks a pathway for understanding the parameters defining the jurisdiction of the Court in the case of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. At para 13 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court in clear terms laid down for the guidance of the Courts below that the provisions under Sections 177 to 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure need to be borne in mind when the question regarding territorial jurisdiction of the Courts to try the offence is sought to be determined. Under Section 177 of the Code, every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried in a Court within whose jurisdiction it was committed. 12. At para 14 of the judgment in K. Bhaskaran case, the Hon’ble Apex Court analysed Section 138 of the Act and pointed out as to how and when the offence under Section 138 of the Act is completed. 12. At para 14 of the judgment in K. Bhaskaran case, the Hon’ble Apex Court analysed Section 138 of the Act and pointed out as to how and when the offence under Section 138 of the Act is completed. Only with concatenation of the following five acts, which are components of the said offence, the Hon’ble Apex Court ruled, the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be completed :- (i) drawing of the cheque, (ii) presentation of the cheque to the Bank, (iii) returning the cheque unpaid by drawee Bank, (iv) Giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, (v) Failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. 13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Harman Electronics Pvt. Ltd. case reiterated the role of Section 177 of the Code in determining the jurisdiction of the Court trying the offence. At para 20 of the judgment in M/s Harmon Electronics case, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the place where an offence has been committed plays an important role . 14. Considering a possibility that each of the five acts, which are the components of the said offence, would be done at five different locations, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment delivered in K. Bhaskaran case made following observations at para 16 of the judgment in context with the provisions under Section 178(d) of the Code : 16. Thus it is clear, if the five different acts were done in five different localities any one of the Courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In other words, the complainant can choose any one of those Courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which any one of those five acts was done. As the amplitude stands so widened and so expansive it is an idle exercise to raise jurisdictional question regarding the offence under Section 138 of the Act. 15. In the instant case, the cheque in question as can be seen from the tenor of the cheque was drawn by the accused on the Khamgaon Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd., Khamgaon Branch at Khamgaon. 15. In the instant case, the cheque in question as can be seen from the tenor of the cheque was drawn by the accused on the Khamgaon Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd., Khamgaon Branch at Khamgaon. The cheque in question, though presented by the complainant to their bankers at Canara Bank, Shahgunj Branch, Aurangabad, was presented for realization of the payment thereunder to the drawee Bank i.e. Khamgaon Urban Co-operative Bnak Ltd., Khamgaon and was returned unpaid by the drawee Bank at Khamgaon, and Canara Bank merely acted as an agent of the complainant for presentation of the said cheque to drawee Bank at Khamgaon and sought handling charges therefor vide Advice dated 7.2.2005. Thus, first three acts constituting the said offence occurred at Khamgaon. 16. Learned trial Court placed reliance on Shamshad Begum case (supra) in coming to the conclusion that the place from where the notice demanding the payment under the cheque was given is a place where the fourth component of the offence had occurred and as such, it (the Court at Aurangabad) had jurisdiction to try and entertain the complaint. Shamshad Begum case was delivered on 3.11.2008 wherein the place from where the notice contemplated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was issued by the complainant was the place where he had shifted his residence and had received reply to it and as such was viewed as the place where one of the acts (the fourth act) constituting the said offence had occurred. However, in M/s Harmon Electronics case, the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court later on (judgment delivered on 12.12.2008), made the following observations : Undisputedly all statutes deserve their strict application, but while doing so the cardinal principles therefor cannot be lost sight of. A Court derives a jurisdiction only when the cause of action arose within his jurisdiction. The same cannot be conferred by any act of omission or commission on the part of the accused. A distinction must also be borne in mind between the ingredient of an offence and commission of a part of the offence. While issuance of a notice by the holder of a negotiable instrument is necessary, service thereof is also imperative. Only on a service of such notice and failure on the part of the accused to pay the demanded amount within a period of 15 days thereafter, commission of an offence completes. While issuance of a notice by the holder of a negotiable instrument is necessary, service thereof is also imperative. Only on a service of such notice and failure on the part of the accused to pay the demanded amount within a period of 15 days thereafter, commission of an offence completes. Giving a notice, therefore, cannot have any precedent over the service. It is only from that view of the matter in Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. V. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd. (2001) 6 SCC 463 . emphasis has been laid on service of notice. 25. We cannot, as things stand today, be oblivious of the fact that a banking institution holding several cheques signed by the same borrower cannot only present the cheque for its encashment at four different places but also may serve notices from four different places so as to enable it to file four complaint cases at four different places. This only causes grave harassment to the accused. It is, therefore, necessary in a case of this nature to strike a balance between the right of the complainant and the right of an accused vis-a-vis the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 17. In Harmon Electronics case, the appellant/ accused was a resident of Chandigarh and he carried on business in Chandigarh. Admittedly, the cheque in question was issued at Chandigarh. The respondent/ complainant had a branch office at Chandigarh, although its Head Office was said to be at Delhi. The cheque in question was dishonoured at Chandigarh. The complainant/ respondent had issued a notice asking the appellant/ accused to pay the amount, however, from New Delhi. Admittedly, the said notice was served upon the respondent at Chandigarh. Failure on the part of the appellant to pay the amount within a period of 15 days from the date of service of the said notice completed the offence. It is in these circumstances, the Hon’ble Apex Court saw need to strike the balance between the right of the complainant and the right of an accused vis-Ã -vis the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure by allowing the appeal and transferring the case to the Court at Chandigarh; and the need to strike such balance was felt to avoid grave harassment to the appellant/ accused. 18. 18. In Preetha S. Babu case (supra), the Division Bench of this Court distinguished the case before it from Harman Electronic case (supra) on facts as under : In our opinion, in the facts of this case, it is difficult to hold that the Mumbai Court has no jurisdiction. Admittedly, respondent 1 registered office is situated at Mumbai. According to respondent 1, purchase order was placed in Mumbai. We have noted that statutory notice was issued from Mumbai and the accused were called upon to pay the amount in Mumbai. Cheque was deposited in Citibank, Mumbai, which is respondent 1 banker. It was dishonoured in Mumbai. If all these facts are taken into consideration, it is difficult to hold that no part of the cause of action has arisen in Mumbai. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18. Harman is, therefore, only an authority on the question whether Court will have jurisdiction because only notice is issued from the place which falls within its jurisdiction and it does not deviate from the other principles laid down by the Supreme Court in K. Bhaskaran. The Supreme Court accepted that the place where the cheque was presented and dishonoured has jurisdiction to try the complaint. The Supreme Court concluded that issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action but communication of the notice would. Only on a service of such notice and failure on the part of the accused to pay the demanded amount within a period of 15 days thereafter, commission of an offence completes. The Supreme Court in effect affirmed what it had said in K. Bhaskaran that Court within whose jurisdiction the cheque is presented and in whose jurisdiction there is failure to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice can have jurisdiction to try the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 19. It is pertinent to note that the Supreme Court has while holding that the Chandigarh Court has jurisdiction, observed in Harman that in the case before it, the complaint was silent as to whether the said cheque was presented at Delhi. In the present case it is categorically stated that the cheque was presented at the Citibank in Mumbai. 19. It is pertinent to note that the Supreme Court has while holding that the Chandigarh Court has jurisdiction, observed in Harman that in the case before it, the complaint was silent as to whether the said cheque was presented at Delhi. In the present case it is categorically stated that the cheque was presented at the Citibank in Mumbai. Whereas in Harman, the dishonour had taken place at Chandigarh and this fact was taken into account while holding that Chandigarh Court has jurisdiction, in the present complaint it is categorically stated that the dishonour took place in Mumbai. Therefore, the present case would be covered by Harman where K. Bhaskaran is followed. The cheque was presented to the Bank in Mumbai, cheque was dishonoured in Mumbai and, therefore, the Mumbai Court has jurisdiction. Nothing said in Harman has adverse impact on the complainant case in the present petition. In fact he can draw support from it. In the instant case, the supply of seeds was made to the petitioner/ accused at Khamgaon. Apart from that, the notice dated 5.3.2005 demanding the payment of the cheque amount does not specify the place of payment of the said amount. A note sounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court at para Nos.26 and 27 of the Harman Electronic case, the words of which are reproduced hereinbelow, needs to be borne in mind: Leanred counsel for the respondent contends that the principle that the debtor must seek the creditor should be applied in a case of this nature. 27. We regret that such a principle cannot be applied in a criminal case. Jurisdiction of the Court to try a criminal case is governed by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and not on common law principle.� 20. These words leave no room for any exception. Facts in the present case, therefore, will have to be viewed to find out what act constituting the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 had occurred where. With respects, this Court feels that Preetha S. Babu case affords little guidance in relation to the facts in the present case. 21. In the instant case, there was refusal to accept the said notice at Khamgaon meaning thereby the service of notice was complete at Khamgaon. With respects, this Court feels that Preetha S. Babu case affords little guidance in relation to the facts in the present case. 21. In the instant case, there was refusal to accept the said notice at Khamgaon meaning thereby the service of notice was complete at Khamgaon. Considering the imperative role the service of notice played in constituting the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Harman Electronic case (supra), the fourth act constituting the offence was complete at Khamgaon. This gave rise to an obligation on the part of the petitioner/ accused to make the payment of the amount demanded and due under the said cheque within 15 days therefrom to avoid being stamped with the culpability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 22. Essentially, Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 makes drawing of a cheque by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability and its return by the Bank unpaid , either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that Bank, a penal offence subject to the conditions specified in the proviso thereunder. Failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice is one of those conditions necessary to fasten the culpability. 23. Word failure� as ordinarily understood means not doing somethin� i.e. inaction or apathy. Obviously, therefore, inaction in making payment demanded and due under the said cheque occurred at Khamgaon “the place where the applicant/ accused carried on business when the notice demanding the payment was served. 24. Next thing that remains to be seen is the impact of Section 179 of the Code in determining the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts to try the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 179 of the Code reads as under : 179. 24. Next thing that remains to be seen is the impact of Section 179 of the Code in determining the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts to try the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 179 of the Code reads as under : 179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues :- When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence, which is ensued, the offence may be enquired into or tried by Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. 25. Pertinently, the act� referred to in Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is an act of the offender/ accused and consequence referred to therein is a consequence which has ensued therefrom. Even if the facts in the present case are viewed in context of the provisions of Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it can very well be seen that the act of issuing the cheque on an account with insufficient funds occurred at Khamgaon, and the consequence ensuing therefrom i.e. its dishonour also occurred at Khamgaon. Judging from any angle of law, therefore, it has to be held that the Court exercising jurisdiction at Khamgaon and not the Court at Aurangabad, is a Court competent to enquire into and try the offence spelt out by such acts. 26. In the result, this petition must succeed. Order passed by the 3rd Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Aurangabad in S.C.C. No.2824/2005 below application Exh. 20 on 17.3.2011 is quashed and set aside with the directions to the respondent/ complainant to present the complaint in the Criminal Court of competent jurisdiction. Rule is made absolute in terms of the above with no orders as to costs.