Order (Per: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Navin Sinha) Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the State. 2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 4.6.1997 dismissing him from service as affirmed in Appeal on 5.3.1998 and the Memorial rejected on 29.9.1999. 3. The petitioner came to this Court in CWJC No. 7650 of 1997 within due time questioning the order of removal dated 4.6.1997. On 17.5.2011 the Court granted him conditional liberty to challenge the appellate order. Unfortunately, for him the writ petition was dismissed for non-prosecution on 12.7.2011, also observing that no proper amendment application had been filed. The petitioner filed MJC No. 3047 of 2011 for restoration of the writ application which was dismissed on 14.9.2011 dissatisfied with the ground urged for absence but granting liberty to file a fresh writ application. The present writ application has been instituted thereafter. 4. The petitioner, a constable was proceeded with departmentally on a memo of charge dated 6.9.1996. It alleged that while he was on deputation at the Maulanapur Village he established illicit relations with one Rita Devi and on promise of marriage kept her with him at Dhanbad and Patna City and later misbehaved with the woman and threw her out of his house. His conduct in establishing illicit relations with a woman was immoral reflective of his poor character affecting the image of the police force. In the departmental proceeding the alleged victim Rita Devi also deposed, apart from others returning a finding of guilt. Procedures for a second show cause notice and consideration of the reply was followed before the impugned order dated 4.6.1997 came to be passed. The appellate authority found no ground for interference as also the Director General of Police. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to persuade the court on any substantive infirmity in the decision making process warranting interference in exercise of judicial review (sic) Article 226 with the punishment passed in a departmental proceeding. The findings in the departmental proceeding being based on preponderance of probabilities and the best evidence available of the allegation maker, Rita Devi deposed her self. That shall suffice for the purpose of the departmental proceeding and the finding of guilt. 6. There are no allegations against the petitioner of having abused his uniform or having practiced undue influence or coercion because of his status as a constable upon the lady. That shall suffice for the purpose of the departmental proceeding and the finding of guilt. 6. There are no allegations against the petitioner of having abused his uniform or having practiced undue influence or coercion because of his status as a constable upon the lady. What he may have done may not have been very appropriate from a moral and social point of view. His conduct may not have been fully conducive to that of a Government servant. But it still leaves the question if the punishment was grossly disproportionate to the allegation warranting the extreme major penalty of dismissal from service. 7. The facts of the case noticed above also reflect that the petitioner has been diligent in pursuing matters claiming relief. He cannot be imposed the consequences for the dismissal of his writ application for non-prosecution, specially when he had engaged a counsel and entrusted him for defence. 8. In normal circumstances the quantum of punishment is the prerogative of the employee. The matter was required to be remanded to the authorities for passing appropriate orders of punishment as the Court is satisfied that dismissa1 from service in the nature of the charge is grossly disproportionate and leaves the conscience of the court fully dissatisfied. But the petitioner was removed from service on 4.6.1997 and has suffered sufficiently. To remand matters shall only be leaving a state of uncertainty serving no useful purpose. The Court, therefore, considers it proper to hold that the punishment order dated 4.6.1997 is grossly disproportionate to the charge having no co-relation to the imposition of discipline in the police force with no allegations against the petitioner for having abused the uniform or status as a police constable. The punishment under gone by deprivation of ranks status and pay since 4.6.1997 is considered sufficient punishment. Considering the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment and the limits of the same it was observed in (2006) 6 SCC 794 (Union of India Vs. K.G. Soni):- "14. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. K.G. Soni):- "14. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision. 15. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunals, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed." 9. The orders dated 4.6.1997, 5.3.1998 and 29.9.1999 are therefore set aside as being grossly disproportionate to the allegations. The petitioner shall stand reinstated in service. But he shall not be entitled to any salary for the period in between. The period shall however be counted for other purposes of continuity in service and pension. The payment of substantive allowance being statutory right, if the petitioner satisfies the respondents that he met the requirements, of the law, let the substantive allowance be paid to him within a maximum period of three months from the date of receipt of the production of a copy of this order. 10. Though counsel for the State had prayed for time to file counter affidavit but the court did not consider the same necessary as it did not find any infirmity in the departmental proceeding and issue remained confined to the question of the punishment only. 11. The writ application stands disposed.