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2012 DIGILAW 1894 (RAJ)

Ramesh Chand Bihari Lal Bajaj v. Ravindra Kumar

2012-09-05

PRASHANT KUMAR AGARWAL

body2012
Hon'ble AGARWAL, J.—The defendant-appellant has preferred this civil second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 19.02.2004 passed by the Additional District Judge, Gangapurcity (District Sawaimadhopur) in Civil Regular Appeal No.26/2001 whereby the learned appellate Court has upheld and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 2.5.2001 passed by the trial Court i.e. Civil Judge (Senior Division) Gangapurcity (District Sawaimadhopur) in Civil Suit No.51/99 whereby the learned trial Court decreed the suit for eviction filed by the plaintiff-respondent. 2. It is an admitted fact between the parties that the suit shop was let out to the appellant-tenant by one Shri Vishambhar Dayal on 19.1.1984 at the monthly rent of Rs.375/- and the respondent-landlord purchased the same from Shri Vishambhar Dayal on 16.12.1991 by registered sale deed in lieu of sale consideration of Rs.1,50,000/- during the subsistence of the tenancy and since the date of purchase the appellant became tenant of the respondent and relation of landlord and tenant established between them. It is also an admitted fact that before the suit shop was sold to the respondent its previous owner Shri Vishambhar Dayal filed Civil Suit No.10/1989 for eviction against the appellant on the ground of bonafide and reasonable necessity and the same was pending in the Court when the transaction of sale and purchase of the suit shop took place. It is also an admitted fact that the respondent was doing cloth business as a partner alongwith his elder brother-Shri Ram Gopal and mother Smt.Shanti Devi in the partnership firm M/s Ram Gopal Ravindra Kumar in a shop adjoining to the suit shop. 3. The respondent filed suit for eviction against the appellant on 24.2.92 with the averment that from 31.3.1991 he has retired from the partnership firm M/s Ram Gopal Ravindra Kumar and since then no shop was available to him for his independent and separate business and therefore, he purchased the suit shop so that he can start his own business in it and, therefore, the same is required by him bonafide and reasonably. It was further averred that appellant has been allotted a shop in 'Katla' which is suitable and adequate for his business whereas no alternative accommodation is available to the respondent for his use and occupation and in case decree for eviction is not passed in comparison to the appellant he will face more hardship. It was further averred that appellant has been allotted a shop in 'Katla' which is suitable and adequate for his business whereas no alternative accommodation is available to the respondent for his use and occupation and in case decree for eviction is not passed in comparison to the appellant he will face more hardship. In the written statement it was averred by the appellant that the respondent has not retired or separated from the partnership firm M/s Ram Gopal Ravindra Kumar and he is still doing business as a partner of the same firm in the adjoining shop and, therefore, the need shown by him is neither bonafide nor reasonable. It was also averred by the appellant that he does not have alternative shop for his use and occupation and in the event of decree for eviction being passed he will face more difficulty in comparison to the respondent. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, necessary issues were framed by the trial Court and both the parties produced oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their respective case. After hearing both the parties, the trial Court decreed the suit filed by the respondent. On the basis of evidence available on record the Court found that the respondent has retired from the partnership of the above said firm and he is no more partner in it and he is in need of his own independent and separate business and, therefore, the requirement shown by him is both bonafide and reasonable. It was also found that the respondent has no alternative accommodation for his use and occupation whereas the appellant has been allotted a piece of land to construct a shop by Municipality in 'Katla' and he also has a shop in his possession which can be used by him for his business. It was also found by the trial Court that appellant made no serious efforts to take some other shop on rent or otherwise for his use and occupation. As a consequence of these findings, the suit was decreed. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed appeal under Section 96 CPC and the same was dismissed by the appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 19.2.2004. Learned appellate Court re-appreciated and re-evaluated in detail the evidence available on record including the bills Ex.A-10 & Ex.A-11, photographs Ex.A-8, Ex.A-12 & Ex.A-13 and application for Ration Card Ex.A-15. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed appeal under Section 96 CPC and the same was dismissed by the appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 19.2.2004. Learned appellate Court re-appreciated and re-evaluated in detail the evidence available on record including the bills Ex.A-10 & Ex.A-11, photographs Ex.A-8, Ex.A-12 & Ex.A-13 and application for Ration Card Ex.A-15. It was also found by the appellate Court that the respondent has retired from partnership w.e.f. 1.4.1991 and he has no other alternative accommodation for his use and occupation whereas appellant has been allotted a plot of land to construct a shop. Still dissatisfied, the appellant-tenant is before this Court by way of this civil second appeal. 4. After hearing counsel for the respective parties, the appeal was admitted vide order dated 26.7.2004 on the following substantial questions of law:- “(i) Whether the Dissolution of firm will be treated from the date of information of Dissolution to the Registrar of firm or from the date mentioned in the information because in the present case the present Plaintiff/respondent has given the information of Dissolution of firm approx. after 10 years? (ii) Whether the suit of eviction can be consolidated or they may be proceeded for the same premises when the previous suit for eviction is pending on the ground of necessity and comparative hardship and the subsequent suit is filed on the same ground by the subsequent purchaser. In the instant case Vishamber Dayal; has sold the shop in question to the present respondent/Plaintiff? (iii) Whether the dissolution of firm can be presumed merely on the oral statement whereas no documentary evidence to that regard is put forward?” 5. The appellant filed an application for framing of additional substantial questions of law on 19.7.2012 during pendency of the appeal. Reply to the application was not filed by the respondent. Learned counsel for both the parties submitted their respective submissions not only on substantial question of law already framed at the time of admission of this appeal but also on the proposed additional substantial questions of law and, therefore, the appeal is being decided on the basis of all these substantial questions of law. 6. Learned counsel for both the parties submitted their respective submissions not only on substantial question of law already framed at the time of admission of this appeal but also on the proposed additional substantial questions of law and, therefore, the appeal is being decided on the basis of all these substantial questions of law. 6. I am of the view that following two more substantial questions of law are involved in this appeal:- “(iv) Whether the findings arrived at by the Courts below on Issue Nos.1 and 2 are perverse being based on non-consideration of material and relevant evidence available on record and misreading thereof? (v) Whether the Courts below have committed an error of law in not considering the question of partial eviction looking to the size of the shop as well as need shown by the respondent-plaintiff and the matter is required to be remanded back to the trial Court/first appellate Court to consider and decide the question?" 7. I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and also gone through the record made available for my perusal as well as the relevant legal provisions and the case law. 8. My finding with reasons on each of the substantial question of law is as below:- Question No. 1: Although, in the present case the respondent claims that he retired from the Partnership of Firm M/s Ramgopal Ravindra Kumar with effect from 31.3.1991 and whereas the intimation regarding his retirement was given to the Registrar of firms on 8.12.2000 during pendency of the suit when in the written statement the fact of retirement from the above-said firm was disputed by the appellant but no legal provision has been brought to my knowledge indicating that the retirement of a partner from the firm will be effective from the date on which such intimation/information is given to the Registrar of firms and not from the date on which such retirement actually took place. Section 32 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 provides for various modes in regard to retirement of a partner. It is as follows:- "32. Section 32 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 provides for various modes in regard to retirement of a partner. It is as follows:- "32. Retirement of a partner- (1) A partner may retire,_ (a) with the consent of all the other partners, (b) in accordance with an express agreement by the partners, or (c) where the partnership is at will, by giving notice in writing to all the other partners of his intention to retire. (2) A retiring partner may be discharged from any liability to any third party for acts of the firm done before his retirement by an agrement made by him with such third party and the partners of the reconstituted firm, and such agreement may be implied by a course of dealing between such third party and the reconstituted firm after he had knowledge of the retirement. (3) Notwithstanding the retirement of a partner from a firm, he and the partners continue to be liable as partners to third parties for any act done by any of them which would have been an act of the firm if done before the retirement, until public notice is given of the retirement. Provided that a retired partner is not liable to any third party who deals with the firm without knowing that he was a partner. (4) Notices under sub-section (3) may be given by the retired partner or by any partner of the reconstituted firm." According to clause (b), a partner can retire in accordance with an express agreement by the partners. In the present case, the respondent claims that Ex.1 dated 10.12.91 was executed between him and other partners of the firm which is a clear indication of the fact that he retired from the partnership with the express agreement of other partners. This provision although provides for the mode of retirement of a partner but it does not indicate from which date the retirement will take effect. It also provides for liability of the retired partner in case public notice of retirement is not given but it does not mean that in absence of such notice the retiring partner shall be treated as continuing partner for all purposes. 9. Section 63 of the Act provides for recording of changes in and dissolution of a firm. It also provides for liability of the retired partner in case public notice of retirement is not given but it does not mean that in absence of such notice the retiring partner shall be treated as continuing partner for all purposes. 9. Section 63 of the Act provides for recording of changes in and dissolution of a firm. According to this provision when a change occurs in the constitution of a registered firm any incoming, continuing or outgoing partner, and when a registered firm is dissolved any person who was a partner immediately before the dissolution, or the agent of any such partner or person specially authorised in this behalf, may give notice to the Registrar of such change or dissolution, specifying the date thereof; and the Registrar shall make a record of the notice in the entry relating to the firm in the Register of Firms, and shall file the notice along with the statement relating to the firm filed under Section 59. This provision merely provides that when a change occurs in the constitution of a registered firm any outgoing partner also may give notice to the Registrar of such change specifying the date thereof and it further provides that the Registrar shall make a record of the notice in the entry relating to the firm in the Register of Firms, but it does not say that the change so made shall be effective only from the date on which the notice is served on the Registrar. Thus, merely because the information regarding retirement of respondent was given to the Registrar of firms about ten years from the date of the alleged retirement, it cannot be held that it was effective from the date of information and in the intermittant period he continued to be partner of the firm. 10. Question No.2: It is an admitted fact that the suit shop originally belonged to one Shri Vishambhar Dayal and it was let out by him to the appellant on 19.1.1984 and he also filed Civil Suit No.10/1989 for eviction against the appellant on the ground of necessity and the same was pending in the Court when the suit shop was sold by him to the respondent on 16.12.1991 but that can not adversely effect the outcome of the present suit. Infact during hearing of the appeal no submissions were made by the learned counsel for the appellant on this substantial question of law and adverse effect of the previous suit on the present suit. From the record it is clear that with the consent of both the parties vide order dated 14.5.1987 the trial Court consolidated both the suits and thereafter on 28.2.1998 issues and on 21.4.1998 additional issue was framed only in respect of the present suit and this is clear indication of the fact that despite consolidation of both the suits the suit filed by Shri Vishambhar Dayal was not contested. The evidence was also adduced only in respect of the present suit and both the Courts below considered and decided the dispute between the present parties only. Learned counsel for the appellant failed to show how the consolidation of the two suits effects the maintainability and decision of the present suit. Non-contest of his suit by Shri Vishambhar Dayal is indication of the fact that after the sale of suit shop to the respondent, he lost interest in the suit shop as well as in the suit filed by him. 11. Question No.3: It appears that this question has been framed without properly looking the evidence available on record as to prove the fact of retirement of the respondent from the aforesaid firm, not only oral evidence but also documentary evidence Ex.1 dated 10.12.91, deed of retirement, has also been produced by the respondent and, therefore, there is no question of presumption of retirement of the respondent from the firm merely on the basis of oral statement. Otherwise also, there is no legal requirement that the dissolution of a firm or retirement of a partner from a firm can be effected only by a written document. As already referred, Section 32 of the Indian Partnership Act provides for the mode of retirement of a partner but according to this provision there is no further requirement that it can be effected only by a written document and in absence of such a requirement, even by oral consent partners of the firm can agree for the retirement of a partner. In the present case, there is concurrent finding of both the Courts below regarding retirement of the respondent from the aforesaid firm and I find no illegality and perversity in it requiring interference of this Court. 12. In the present case, there is concurrent finding of both the Courts below regarding retirement of the respondent from the aforesaid firm and I find no illegality and perversity in it requiring interference of this Court. 12. Question No.4: It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that it is an admitted fact that the respondent purchased the suit shop with a sitting tenant of long standing and this fact alone is indication of the fact that the requirement shown by him is neither bonafide nor reasonable as normally a person in requirement of a premises for his business will never purchase premises in occupation of a tenant as for such premises there is little possibility for the purchaser to fulfill his requirement in near future. It was also submitted that it is not the case of the respondent that before purchasing the suit shop he asked the appellant to vacate the same and assurance was given by him for vacation and, therefore, it was in the knowledge of the respondent that he will be required to file suit for eviction. It was submitted that this important and relevant fact was not considered by the Courts below in deciding the question of bonafide and reasonable requirement shown by the respondent and non-consideration of the same has resulted into perversity which can be corrected by Court in this appeal. It was further submitted that Bill (Ex.A/10) dated 12.12.1996, Bill (Ex.A/11) dated 4.12.1996, copy of application for Ration Card (Ex.A/15), Photographs (Ex.A/8, A/12 and A/13) clearly show that the respondent is still partner in the aforesaid firm and is carrying on his cloth business as usual but both the Courts below did not consider this documentary evidence in a right perspective rather they misread it. It was submitted that it is well settled that even a finding of fact can be interfered by the High Court in second appeal if it is result of non-consideration of material evidence or misreading thereof. In support of this submission learned counsel relied upon the case T. Sivasubramaniam & anr. vs. Kasinath Pujari & ors. Reported in (1997) 7 SCC 275 and Indrasen Jain vs. Rameshwardas reported in (2005) 9 SCC 225 . 13. In support of this submission learned counsel relied upon the case T. Sivasubramaniam & anr. vs. Kasinath Pujari & ors. Reported in (1997) 7 SCC 275 and Indrasen Jain vs. Rameshwardas reported in (2005) 9 SCC 225 . 13. On the other hand, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that it is well settled legal position that concurrent finding of fact cannot be interfered by the High Court in second appeal filed under Section 100 CPC. It was further submitted that each and every piece of evidence available on record including the documentary evidence referred by the appellant was duly considered by both the Courts below and issue of bonafide and personal necessity was decided in favour of the respondent. According to learned counsel for the respondent in the present case it cannot be said that the finding arrived at by the Courts below is result of non-consideration of material evidence available on record or misreading of the same. 14. It is well settled legal position that concurrent finding of fact cannot be interfered by High Court in second appeal filed under Section 100 CPC unless it is found that the finding is result of non-consideration of material evidence available on record or misreading thereof. Perusal of impugned judgments makes it clear that both the Courts below have considered each and every material piece of evidence available on record including the above-said documentary evidence referred by the learned counsel for the appellant. Bill (Ex.A/10) dated 12.12.1996 and Bill dated 4.12.1996 have been issued by the aforesaid partnership firm M/s Ram Gopal Ravindra Kumar after the alleged retirement of the respondent from this firm and during pendency of the suit and from these bills at the most it can be said that these were issued by the respondent but only by that reason it cannot be said that the respondent did n ot retire from the above-said firm and he continued to be partner of the same and, therefore, the need shown by him for the suit shop is not bonafide and reasonable. Similarly, the above-said photographs at the most show that even after the alleged retirement, the respondent continued to sit in the shop but it also not an indication of the fact that he was still partner in the firm and he did not require the suit shop for his separate and independent business. Similarly, the above-said photographs at the most show that even after the alleged retirement, the respondent continued to sit in the shop but it also not an indication of the fact that he was still partner in the firm and he did not require the suit shop for his separate and independent business. Ex.A/15 is copy of application for issuing of Ration Card submitted by the respondent some time in the year 1997 in which the respon-dent mentioned his business address as firm Ram Gopal Ravindra Kumar but mere mentioning of above-said business as his address for the purpose of issuing of Ration Card cannot be said to be indication of the fact that he was still partner in the same business and his claim of retirement is false. 15. So far as purchase of suit shop by the respondent with a sitting tenant is concerned, merely by that reason it cannot be said that the requirement shown by him is not bonafide and reasonable. If a landlord is presently jobless and he purchases a shop with a sitting tenant, he cannot be compelled to continue to be jobless only to accommodate the tenant and the tenanted premises purchased by him can be vacated if his requirement is otherwise found to be bonafide and reasonable. If the contention of learned counsel for the appellant is held to be correct, it would mean that such a landlord would never be able to evict his tenant even if his requirement/need is otherwise found bonafide and reasonable and he would have no option other than to purchase a new shop with vacant possession or to take a shop on rent. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Rajendra Kumar & others vs. Parasram reported in 2011(3) WLC (Raj.) 165 = 2011(3) RLW 2534 has held that "there is no provision of law laying down that if a person purchases any property which is under tenancy with a third party, it should be presumed that he does not need that property for his personal use." In the case of Dinesh Kumar & ors. vs. Nandlal Mehra & ors. S.B.Civil Second Appeal No.344/2009 decided vide judgment dated 13.4.2012 and in the case of Kistoori Devi through Lrs. vs. Nandlal Mehra & ors. S.B.Civil Second Appeal No.344/2009 decided vide judgment dated 13.4.2012 and in the case of Kistoori Devi through Lrs. vs. Ajay Pal Singh Chhabra S.B.Civil Second Appeal No.987/2011 decided vide judgment dated 21.8.2012 by this Court, a similar contention was raised on behalf of the tenant but the same was rejected. 16. Question No.5: It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that it is well settled legal position that in a suit for eviction based on bonafide and reasonable necessity of the landlord, question of partial eviction from the tenanted premises is mandatorily required to be considered by the Court and a clear finding has to be given whether looking to the size of the premises and the requirement shown by the landlord as well as the use for which the tenant is occupying the same, eviction from a part of the tenanted premises is possible or not but in the present case both the Courts below failed to consider and decide the question. It was further submitted that in the present case both the parties even failed to take necessary pleadings, issue was not framed and no evidence was led and, therefore, it is essential that the case may be remanded back to the trial Court/first appellate Court to consider and decide the question. It was also submitted that the question of partial eviction effects the right of tenant as well as landlord and, therefore, in this regard evidence is required to be specifically led by the parties and the same cannot be decided merely on the basis of material which has been produced by the parties in regard to some other question. According to learned counsel for the appellant although in the application under Order 41 Rule 5 CPC filed by the respondent during pendency of this appeal for award of mesne profits and in the reply filed by the appellant and the documents filed by the parties in support thereof, size of the suit shop has been mentioned but only on that basis question of partial eviction cannot be decided either way. It was submitted that unless a specific issue is framed and proper opportunity to produce evidence is given to both the parties, the question of partial eviction cannot legally be decided. It was submitted that unless a specific issue is framed and proper opportunity to produce evidence is given to both the parties, the question of partial eviction cannot legally be decided. It was also contended that consideration and decision of this question by the High Court for the first time in this appeal, would deprive the appellant to challenge the same by means of further appeal and therefore, the only course is to remand the case back. 17. In support of his submissions learned counsel relied upon the case of Rehman Jeo Wangnoo vs. Ram Chand and others reported in AIR 1978 SC 413 and also on order dated 17.11.2006 passed by Coordinate Bench of this Court in S.B.Civil Second Appeal No.636/2005 Ramchandra vs. Jagdish Narayan. 18. On the other hand, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that although the question of partial eviction was not considered and decided by both the Courts below and neither pleadings were taken nor evidence was led by the parties but as during pendency of this appeal size of the suit shop and other relevant material has come on record in the form of application under Order 41 Rule 5 CPC and the reply filed by the appellant himself and the documents produced in support thereof, the question can easily be decided and there is no necessity to remand the case back to consider and decide the same. It was further submitted that when sufficient material is available on record, the question of partial eviction can be decided by the High Court in second appeal also despite the fact that the same was not considered and decided by the Courts below. It was further submitted that in the reply filed to the application the appellant admits that the size of the suit shop is 7'9" x 38' and it is not a corner shop. According to learned counsel there is no question of decree of partial eviction in respect of a single shop having width of only 7'8" as in the event of decree for partial eviction being passed the shop can be used neither by the respondent nor by the appellant for his business. It was also submitted that it is well settled legal position that decree for partial eviction cannot be passed in respect of a single shop. 19. It was also submitted that it is well settled legal position that decree for partial eviction cannot be passed in respect of a single shop. 19. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the case of Narsingh Dass vs. Jeth Mal reported in 1988(1) RLW 555 and Ram Lal & Ors. vs. Girraj & ors. Reported in 1992(2) WLC (Raj.) 683 = RLW 1992(2) Raj. 147. 20. I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and also gone through the record made available for my perusal as well as the relevant legal provisions and the case law. 21. The proviso appended to sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act provides that if the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. It is thus clear that decree for partial eviction from a tenanted premises can be passed only when from the material available on record Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord in the event of passing such a decree. It is thus clear that in each and every case decree for partial eviction cannot be passed and only on the fulfillment of the above said requirement such decree can be passed. The word "satisfied" is understood to mean free from anxiety, doubt, perplexity, suspense or un-certainty. It is synonymous with "convince beyond a reasonable doubt." Satisfication for the purpose of judicial determination depends on sufficiency of facts placed before the Court. No doubt the satisfactionis of the Court resting on the judicial discretion vested in it. It is essentially objective in its character i.e. depending on the facts and material before the Court rather than subjective and resting upon caprice or predilection. The question of partial eviction is not a pure question of law. It is a question of fact. Its adjudication requires necessary pleadings and evidence. It is essentially objective in its character i.e. depending on the facts and material before the Court rather than subjective and resting upon caprice or predilection. The question of partial eviction is not a pure question of law. It is a question of fact. Its adjudication requires necessary pleadings and evidence. In the present case, although necessary facts have not been pleaded and proved by both the parties and no specific issue was also framed and, therefore, both the Courts also failed to consider and decide the question of partial eviction but it is well settled legal position that if sufficient material is available on record even High Court can consider and decide the question despite the fact that the same was not considered and decided by the Courts below and in such situation it is not necessary to remand the case back to the trial Court/first appellate Court. In the case of Anandi Lal vs. Smt.Sarju Devi & ors. Reported in 2000(4) WLC (Raj.) 547 = RLW 2000(4) Raj. 324, it was held that if the issue of partial eviction could be decided by the High Court on the basis of material available on record, the same is not required to be remitted to the Court below for fresh evidence. 22. Now, it is to be seen whether sufficient material is available on record so that this Court can consider and decide the question of partial eviction. During the pendency of appeal an application under Order 41 Rule 5 CPC was filed by the respondent claiming mesne profits @ Rs.11,006/- per month. Alongwith the application copy of the report prepared by the Executive Engineer, PWD, Gangapurcity was also filed in which the size of the suit shop has been mentioned as 38' x 7'8". According to this report the total area comes to be 291.46 sq.feet. Reply to the application was filed by the appellant and claim for awarding of mesne profits was disputed mainly on the ground that the suit shop is very small and it is not a corner shop and the appellant also stated that its size is 38' x 7'8". It is thus an admitted fact that the size of the suit shop is 38' x 7'8" and it is not a corner shop. It is thus an admitted fact that the size of the suit shop is 38' x 7'8" and it is not a corner shop. It cannot be disputed that for determination of question of partial eviction measurement and location of the tenanted premises is very much relevant. In the present case, when the measurement and location of the suit shop is undisputed and it is before the Court, I am of the view that no further material and evidence is required to be collected for the decision of the aforesaid question and the Court is in a position to decide the same. Therefore, this contention of learned counsel for the appellant is legally not tenable that the material available on record produced for deciding some other question is not relevant and cannot be considered by the Court to decide the question of partial eviction and the matter is required to be remanded back after framing a specific issue by affording opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence regarding it. Learned counsel for the appellant failed to explain what more material and evidence is required to be produced in the present case apart from the dimension and location of the shop relevant to decide the question raised. I am of the considered view that looking to the width of the suit shop, it is not possible to pass decree for partial eviction as such decree cannot satisfy the requirement of either of the parties. Although, the depth of the suit shop is comperatively sufficient but looking to the fact that it is not a corner shop and on both the sides it is surrounded by other shops, no new door can be opened in it towards other side so that it can be used by one party after dividing the suit shop in two parts. Apart from that, it is well settled legal position that in a case of single shop decree for partial eviction cannot be passed. In the case of Ram Lal & ors. vs. Girraj & ors. (supra), the learned Single Bench of this Court relied upon the case of Hanuman Das vs. Sanwal Ram reported in 1982 RLR 916 in which it was held that when the rented premises consists of a single shop the question of partial eviction cannot arise. 23. In the case of Ram Lal & ors. vs. Girraj & ors. (supra), the learned Single Bench of this Court relied upon the case of Hanuman Das vs. Sanwal Ram reported in 1982 RLR 916 in which it was held that when the rented premises consists of a single shop the question of partial eviction cannot arise. 23. Consequently, it is held that in the facts and circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the Courts below have committed an error of law in not considering the question of partial eviction and, therefore, the case is required to be remanded back to the trial Court/first appellate Court to consider and decide the question. 24. The net result of all this discussion is that no illegality and perversity has been committed by the Courts below in decreeing the suit filed by the respondent. 25. Consequently, the appeal being meritless is, hereby, dismissed with costs throughout. Stay application also stands dismissed. Two months period is granted to the tenant-appellant to vacate the suit premises and to hand-over the peaceful possession of the same to the landlord-respondent.