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2012 DIGILAW 1898 (ALL)

COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT, DAV INTER COLLEGE v. STATE OF U. P.

2012-08-24

A.P.SAHI

body2012
Amreshwar Pratap Sahi, J. Heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Adarsh Bhushan for the petitioners and Sri Arun Kumar Singh who has filed a caveat on behalf of the respondent no. 4 and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 2. After the matter was heard at length, learned counsel for both the parties including the learned Standing Counsel state that the matter be disposed of finally at this stage itself without waiting for any counter affidavits. Accordingly, the matter is being disposed of finally at this stage with the consent of the parties. 3. The facts as on record are that the petitioner no. 1 Committee of Management contends that the previous elections that were recognized by the department were held on 14th August, 2008, and the tenure of the Committee of Management is four years in which one Sri Raghuvar Dayal was elected as the Manager. The Manager is stated to have died on 17.6.2011 whereafter the petitioner no. 2 is said to have been elected as the Manager for the rest of the term and his signatures were also attested on 28th June, 2011. The said Committee according to the petitioner was in effective control over the institution. 4. The dispute has arisen after the respondent no. 4 is alleged to have set up an election on 30th July, 2012 which has now been recognized by the District Inspector of Schools on 6.8.2012. 5. The challenge raised to the said order is on the ground that there was no authority available to the respondent no. 4 to initiate any election process or getting the elections held which is being disputed by Sri Arun Kumar Singh on the ground that the elections have been held under the scheme of administration by the General Body which is authorized to hold the elections. 6. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioners who are the outgoing Committee had initiated the election process and information was given to the District Inspector of Schools on 3rd August, 2012 to send an observer for the elections that were proposed to be held on 12.8.2012. 6. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioners who are the outgoing Committee had initiated the election process and information was given to the District Inspector of Schools on 3rd August, 2012 to send an observer for the elections that were proposed to be held on 12.8.2012. The submission is that the District Inspector of Schools inspite of having this information has surreptitiously after taking charge on 4th August, 2012 functioned for a single day and he immediately passed the order on 6.8.2012 recognizing the respondent no. 4 who happens to be the son of a member of a legislative assembly of the ruling party. According to the petitioner's counsel, this was done by the DIOS to oblige the legislator's son. 7. The contention is that if the District Inspector of Schools took charge on 4th August, 2012 he acted hastily and malafidely and recognized the respondent no. 4 as the Manager without putting the petitioners to notice or examining their claim. 8. The second contention of Sri Khare is that this matter ought to have been referred to the Regional Level Committee headed by the Joint Director of Education, and the District Inspector of Schools should not have entered into the issue relating to the dispute of the elections of the Committee of Management. 9. Sri Arun Kumar Singh for the respondent no. 4 submits that the entire elections of 30th July, 2012 has been held following the process as prescribed under the scheme of administration through the General Body and therefore the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is without any basis. The District Inspector of Schools, according to him, has therefore bonafidely and genuinely passed the impugned order in recognizing the respondent no. 4 which does not suffer from either want of jurisdiction or correct exercise of power. 10. Learned Standing Counsel also submits that the District Inspector of Schools has proved his worth by recognizing the respondent no. 4 in the given circumstances. 11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, in the opinion of the court the action taken in haste is also a mala fide action, inasmuch as, it is malice in law. 10. Learned Standing Counsel also submits that the District Inspector of Schools has proved his worth by recognizing the respondent no. 4 in the given circumstances. 11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, in the opinion of the court the action taken in haste is also a mala fide action, inasmuch as, it is malice in law. The District Inspector of Schools took charge on 4th August, 2012 and if the petitioners were the outgoing Committee then the minimum which was required was that the District Inspector of Schools ought to have put the petitioner Committee of Management to notice before having passed the order of recognition and attested the signatures of the respondent no. 4. In the circumstances, the order of the District Inspector of Schools cannot be said to be a bona-fide exercise of power. 12. Secondly, when there is such a dispute and the District Inspector of Schools comes to know of the existence of a previous Committee of Management he has to refer the matter to be decided by the Regional Level Committee headed by the Joint Director of Education. The District Inspector of Schools completely failed to follow this procedure in law, more so, when the petitioner Committee was the outgoing Committee and was in effective control. In the aforesaid circumstances on this ground as well the impugned order cannot be sustained. 13. Accordingly, the order dated 6th August, 2012 and the attestation of the signatures of the respondent no. 4 are quashed. The matter shall now stand referred to the Regional Level Committee headed by the Joint Director of Education - Respondent No. 2 who shall now proceed to pass an appropriate order after examining the claim of both the parties in accordance with law and after providing an opportunity of hearing within two months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order before him. 14. The writ petition is allowed.