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2012 DIGILAW 1899 (RAJ)

Puran Indoria v. Balashram Society

2012-09-06

VINEET KOTHARI

body2012
Hon'ble Dr. KOTHARI, J.—These two cross - appeals being (1) SB Civil Second Appeal No.15/2006 – Puran Indoria s/o Gauridutt Indoria, Proprietor, M/s. Indoria Fabricators and Engineering Works vs. Balashram Society and (2) SB Civil Second Appeal No.391/2007 – Balashram Society vs. Puran Indoria, have been filed by the tenant and landlord respectively being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 18.11.2005 of the appellate court below of learned Additional District Judge No.3, Udaipur deciding the cross-appeals of both the parties and while dismissing the defendant – tenant's appeal No.27/2000 – Puran Indoria s/o Gauridutt Indoria vs. Balashram Society, the learned appellate court below, also dismissed the plaintiff – landlord's appeal No.58/2000 – Balashram Society vs. Puran Indoria and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 15.12.1999 of the learned trial court of Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division) No.1, Udaipur in eviction Suit No.16/95 – Balashram Society vs. Puran Indoria in respect of suit shop let out on 13.01.1976 for a monthly rent of Rs.120/- to Shri Puran Indoria 2. The eviction suit No.16/95 – Balashram Society vs. Puran Indoria s/o Gauridutt Indoria, Proprietor of Indoria Fabricators and Engineering Works, Udia Pole, Udaipur, was filed on 19.07.1984, inter alia, on the grounds of default in payment of rent, sub-letting by tenant to sub-tenant M/s. Kusum Industries, bonafide need of the landlord of the suit premises and alternative accommodation becoming available to the defendant – tenant in the form of an industrial plot No.F-219 situated at Mewar Industrial Area, Road No.1, Madri, Udaipur, in which the defendant – tenant had started manufacturing activities of fabrication of machines, spare parts etc. The learned trial court decreed the suit of eviction in respect of the suit shop measuring 20 x 30 ft., in which tenant installed lathe machines and was doing miscellaneous engineering and fabrication activities, on the ground than an alternative accommodation became available to the defendant – tenant under Sec. 13(1)(i) of the Act and decided the issue No.5 in favour of the plaintiff - landlord. The other issues were, however, decided against the plaintiff – landlord, except the issue of default in payment of rent and the benefit of first default was given to the defendant - tenant under Sec. 13(6) of the 1950 Act. 3. The other issues were, however, decided against the plaintiff – landlord, except the issue of default in payment of rent and the benefit of first default was given to the defendant - tenant under Sec. 13(6) of the 1950 Act. 3. The cross – appeals were filed by both the parties before the learned Appellate Court, which as aforesaid, affirmed the decree of the learned trial court. Hence, the present two second appeals being (1) SBCSA No.15/2006 was filed on 19.12.2005 and (2) SBCSA No. 391/2006 was filed on 27.02.2006 by both the parties before this Court under Section 100 CPC. 4. On 13.01.2006, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court framed the following substantial question of law in the Second Appeal No.15/2006 filed by the defendant – tenant : “Whether the two courts below committed error of law in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff against the defendant on the defendant's acquiring commercial premises for his business particularly, when the tenancy in question is commercial tenancy?” 5. While admitting the second appeal of the appellant – defendant – tenant No.15/2006, co-ordinate Bench of this Court also stayed the execution of the impugned decree of the eviction, which is still continuing. 6. In the cross-appeal No.391/2007 -Balashram Society vs. Puran Indoria filed by the landlord, no substantial question of law was framed so far, however, the said appeal was directed to be heard along with the present appeal of the defendant – tenant on 11.12.2007. Hence final arguments on both these appeals were heard together and both these appeals are being decided by this common judgment. 7. Hence final arguments on both these appeals were heard together and both these appeals are being decided by this common judgment. 7. It is well settled that the eviction decree, even on one of the grounds specified in Section 13 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950 in various Clauses of Section 13(1) (a) to (l) can be maintained and presently the substantial question of law framed in the defendant – tenant's appeal only pertains to eviction granted by both the courts below on the ground specified under Section 13(1)(i) of the Act, which is reproduced as under: Section 13 Eviction of tenants – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree, or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied - (a) ........ to (h) ...... & (k) & (l) ....... (i) that the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence; 8. Learned counsel for the appellant - defendant – tenant, Mr. B.R. Mehta submitted that Section 13(1)(i) of the Rent Control Act, 1950 does not apply to the commercial premises or the suit premises used for commercial purposes and it applies only to the residential accommodation and since in the present case, the suit shop was admittedly given for commercial purposes for running a business in the name and style of M/s. Indoria Fabricators and Engineering Works, Udia Pole, Udaipur, the learned courts below could not have decreed the eviction merely on the ground of an industrial plot No.F-219, Mewar Industrial Area, Madri having been allotted to the said firm M/s. Indoria Fabricators and Engineering Works. 9. Learned counsel Mr. 9. Learned counsel Mr. B.R. Mehta further submitted that in the suit shop measuring 20 x 30 ft., the defendant – tenant had set up the Lathe machines on which the fabrication works was being done by the defendant – tenant, whereas different kinds of manufacturing and fabrication activities were undertaken at the said industrial plot No.F-219, Mewar Industrial Area, Madri, Udaipur and, therefore, it cannot be said to be a case of alternative accommodation becoming available to the defendant – tenant and consequently the courts below have erred in decreeing the eviction suit on the ground specified under Section 13(1)(i) of the Act. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent – plaintiff – landlord, Mr. Suresh Shrimali urged that provisions of Section 13(1)(i) of the Act applies equally to both kinds of suit premises either commercial or residential in nature and the user of the suit property for these two different purposes, does not restrict the applicability of Section 13(1)(i) of the Act to only residential accommodations. He, therefore, submitted that, as a matter of fact, both the courts below have given correct findings of fact based on evidence that since alternative accommodation viz. an industrial plot was allotted to the defendant tenant at F-219, Mewar Industrial Area, Madri, Udaipur, where the defendant – tenant could definitely shift his lathe machines also installed in the suit premises, therefore, the courts below were justified in decreeing the eviction suit on the said ground. 11. Drawing the attention of the Court towards the said Clause (i) of Section 13(1), learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff – landlord, Mr. Suresh Shrimali submitted that the two part of Clause (i) of Section 13(1) are separated by the words “or” whereas the first part relates to both types of suit premises, only the second part of the said Clause (i) pertains to residential accommodation, wherein the words “suitable residence” has been used. 12. Mr. Suresh Shrimali also urged that the purpose of Section 13(1)(i) of the Act is very clear, namely, that is to provide a ground for eviction to the landlord, if a suitable alternative accommodation has become available to the tenant and, therefore, no discrimination can be made on the basis of the nature of user of the suit property in question, be it commercial or residential. 13. 13. He also drew the attention of the Court towards Ex.3, 4 and 5 – the Calenders published for the years 1982, 1983 and 1984 by the defendant – tenant M/s. Indoria Fabricators and Engineering Works jointly with sub-letee firm M/s. Kusum Industries and he urged that though the defendant – tenant had denied any sub-letting and stated before the learned trial court that the said tenant firm M/s. Indoria Fabricators and Engineering Works had no connection with the sub-letee firm M/s. Kusum Industries, this evidence on record established that both these firms jointly published their Calenders in the years 1982 to 1984 for 3 years continuously and no such joint Calenders could have been published unless the two firms had a connection. Therefore, the eviction suit also deserved to be decreed on the ground of sub-letting. 14. On the ground of nuisance created by the lathe machines and the bonafide need for godown of the printing press which the plaintiff - Balashram Society is running and in the adjacent premises also a school from 1st Standard to 8th Standard is run by the plaintiff - Society, he submitted that the courts below have erred in refusing the eviction decree on these grounds of eviction and giving findings against the plaintiff on these issues and therefore, landlord's appeal No.391/2007 also deserves to be allowed by this Court. 15. Having heard learned counsels and upon perusal of the record and judgments of the courts below, this Court would concentrate only on the substantial question of law framed in the tenants appeal No.15/2006 and if the conclusions of this Court on that substantial question of law are against the defendant – tenant, this Court need not go into the other questions and the merits of the appeal filed by the plaintiff – appellant viz. appeal No.391/2007. Hence, this Court proceeds to decide the question framed for consideration by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the light of Section 13(1)(i) of the Act in tenant's appeal. 16. appeal No.391/2007. Hence, this Court proceeds to decide the question framed for consideration by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the light of Section 13(1)(i) of the Act in tenant's appeal. 16. Section 13(1) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950 is a non obstante clause and the provisions of said Section 13 operate notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract to the contrary and prohibits any court from passing any decree of eviction against a tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied on the specified grounds of eviction to be established by the plaintiff – landlord specified in various Clauses (a) to (l) of sub-Section (1) of Section 13 of the Act. The grounds like default in payment of rent - Clause (a); or tenant causing substantial damages to the premises -Clause (b); or the tenant has materially altered the premises - Clause (c); or that the tenant causing nuisance - Clause (d); or the tenant assigned sub-letting or parting with the possession of the suit premises without the permission of the landlord - Clause (e); or that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord and the latter has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant - Clause (f); or that the premises were let to the tenant for use as a residence by reason of his being in the service or employment of the landlord and that the tenant has ceased to be in such service or employment - Clause (g); or that the premises are required reasonable and bonafide by the landlord -Clause (h); or that the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence - Clause (i); or that the premises have not been used without reasonable cause for the purpose for which they were let for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit - Clause (j); or that the landlord requires the premises in order to carry out any building work at the instance of the State Government, in pursuance of an improvement scheme or development scheme; or because the premises have become unsafe or unfit for human habitation, or upon the requisition of a local authority - Clause (k); or that the landlord has been required by any authority under any law to abate the overcrowding of the premises - Clause (l) and only on these specified grounds upon establishing the same with the help of evidence, an eviction decree can be passed by the Court against the tenant. We are presently concerned with Clause (i) of the Section 13(1) of the Act, which in specific terms stipulates that the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence. 17. It may be stated at the outset that the language of this Clause (i) of Section 13(1) of the Act of 1950 is not complete in itself or at least is not happily worded and caused some confusion. 17. It may be stated at the outset that the language of this Clause (i) of Section 13(1) of the Act of 1950 is not complete in itself or at least is not happily worded and caused some confusion. The purpose of enactment of this Clause (i) appears to be that if the tenant has acquired suitable alternative accommodation and, therefore, he can shift to his own premises and use the same, the landlord can seek eviction from the disputed suit premises on this ground so that the landlord can use his premises in his own manner. The purpose of providing protection to the tenants in the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950 and allow the eviction only on the grounds specified was at a point of time when the accommodation available was far less in supply than the demand for the same and in that context, the protection was given that the tenants may not be unnecessarily harassed at the whims and caprices of the landlords and they may be evicted only on the specified grounds. This was in the year 1950. 18. A new Act has since been enacted by the State of Rajasthan in the form of The Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 which has brought into force w.e.f. 11.03.2003 and by a further amendment, the said Act has now been extended to all the Municipal Areas of the State of Rajasthan, by the Rajasthan Rent Control (Second Amendment) Act, 2005 (Rajasthan Act No.1 of 2006). In the New Act also, almost similar provisions for eviction of the tenants have again been re-enacted and provisions of Section 13(1)(i) now stands substituted by Section 9(j) of the said Act, which reads as under: Section 9 : Eviction of Tenants: Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or contract but subject to other provisions of this Act, the Rent Tribunal shall not order eviction of tenant unless it is satisfied that, - (a) ....... (b) ...... (c) ...... (d) ...... (e) ..... (f) ....... (g) ...... (h) ..... (i) .... (j) the tenant has built or acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted suitable premises adequate for his requirement; 19. The difference of the words in New Clause 9(j) with Section 13(1)(i) are that the word “suitable residence” has now been substituted by the word “suitable premises adequate for his requirement”. (f) ....... (g) ...... (h) ..... (i) .... (j) the tenant has built or acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted suitable premises adequate for his requirement; 19. The difference of the words in New Clause 9(j) with Section 13(1)(i) are that the word “suitable residence” has now been substituted by the word “suitable premises adequate for his requirement”. The word “residence” has been omitted in the New Act and substituted by wider words “suitable premises” and “adequate for his requirement”, which has obviously done away with the distinction between residential and non-residential accommodation under this Clause. Otherwise the language of the said two provisions is in pari materia. 20. The reason for amendment in New Clause 9(j) obviously was to avoid disputes on the question of fact as to whether the alternative accommodation of residence is suitable for the tenant or not and, therefore, it was to be presumed that if the tenant has built or acquired vacant possession or has been allotted suitable premises adequate for his requirement, he would be liable to be evicted from the suit premises in question. The overall purpose of Clause (i) of Section 13(1) of Old Act and Clause (j) of New Act is to provide a ground of eviction to the landlord, in case the tenant gets a suitable alternative accommodation on his own; whether built, acquired or allotted. 21. This clarification by amendment in new law can be employed even to interpret the provisions of old law. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pappu Sweets and Biscuits and another reported in (1998) 7 SCC 223 in para 13 held as under : “13. The learned counsel for the appellant also drew our attention to a similar exemption notification for the subsequent period issued by the State of U.P. wherein the relevant item is worded thus: "Units making sweetmeats, namkin, reori, gazak (but excluding such confectionery manufacturing units as are registered under the Factories Act, 1948) and restaurants." The learned counsel submitted that subsequent legislation can be looked at in order to see what is the proper interpretation to be put upon the earlier legislation when the earlier legislation is found to be obscure or ambiguous or capable of more than one interpretation. In support of his contention, he relied upon the decisions of this Court in State of Bihar vs. S.K. Roy ( AIR 1966 SC 1995 ) and Yogender Nath Naskar vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta (1969) 1 SCC 555 . In Naskar's case (supra), this Court quoted with approval the following observations made in Cape Brandy Syndicate vs. I.R.C. (1921) 2 KB 403. "I think it is clearly established in Attorney General vs. Clarkson (1900) 1 QB 156 that subsequent legislation may be looked at in order to see the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous. I quite agree that subsequent legislation if it proceeded on an erroneous construction of previous legislation cannot alter that previous legislation; but if there be any ambiguity in the earlier legislation, then the subsequent legislation may fix the proper interpretation which is to be put upon the earlier Act." 22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs. vs. Union of India and another reported in 2008(5) SCC 287 , which has been followed in the later decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court also, the Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 12 that there has been a definite shift in the Court's approach while interpreting the rent control legislations and an analysis of judgments of 1950s to early 1990s would indicate that in majority of cases the courts heavily leaned in favour of an interpretation which would benefit the tenant. However, a different trend is clearly discernible in the later judgments. Relevant part of para 12 is quoted below for ready reference: “There has been a definite shift in the court's approach while interpreting the rent control legislations. An analysis of the judgments of 1950s to early 1990s would indicate that in majority of cases the courts heavily leaned in favour of an interpretation which would benefit the tenant. In these cases the Court consistently held that the paramount object of every rent control legislation is to provide safeguards for tenants against exploitation by landlords who seek to take undue advantage of the pressing need for accommodation of a large number of people looking for a house on rent for residence or business in the background of acute scarcity thereof. However, a different trend is clearly discernible in the later judgments.” 23. However, a different trend is clearly discernible in the later judgments.” 23. Further in para 32, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rational at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equality. Again to quote, the Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 32 as under: “It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rational at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equality and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become nonexistent. In State of M.P. vs. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. ( AIR 1964 SC 1179 ), this Court while dealing with a question whether geographical classification due to historical reasons could be sustained for all times observed: “6....Differential treatment arising out of the application of the laws so continued in different regions of the same reorganised State, did not, therefore immediately attract the clause of the Constitution prohibiting discrimination. But by the passage of time, considerations of necessity and expediency would be obliterated, and the grounds which justified classification of geographical regions for historical reasons may cease to be valid. A purely temporary provision which because of compelling forces justified differential treatment when the Reorganisation Act was enacted cannot obviously be permitted to assume permanency, so as to perpetuate that treatment without a rational basis to support it after the initial expediency and necessity have disappeared.” 24. Similarly Clause (i) of Section 13(1) of Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950 deserves to be interpreted harmoniously and with the changing societal developments, where availability of industrial plot to the tenant later on should definitely be construed as a good ground for eviction of the tenant from the previous business premises in which he was undertaking similar commercial/ industrial activities. 25. 25. The Apex Court decision in the case of Satyawati Sharma vs. Union of India (supra) was further followed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kashmir Singh vs. Union of India and others reported in 2008(7) SCC 259 , wherein the Apex Court in para 68 held as under: “For the purpose of giving an effective and meaningful construction to the provisions, the Court is bound to take into consideration the situational change. The statute is an ongoing one. The number of litigations in the year 1925 might have been small. Occasional formation of the Commission might be contemplated keeping in view the number of litigations at that point of time. The Act, however, must be interpreted differently as the Court cannot ignore the ground realities. If it is to be held that in terms of Section 83 of the Act, the State Government has the power to dissolve the Commission only in terms thereof, for all intent and purport, the Commission shall continue till a member dies or resigns.” 26. Again the Hon'ble Supreme Court in three Judges Bench decision in the case of State of Maharashtra and another vs. Super Max International Private Limited and others reported in 2009(9) SCC 772 = 2010(2) RLW 1263 (SC) reaffirmed and followed the decision of Satyawati Sharma vs. Union of India (supra) in the following terms : “The need for a more balanced and objective approach to the relationship between the landlord and tenant needs to be emphasised. This is not to say that the Court should lean in favour of the landlord but merely that there is no longer any room for the assumption that all tenants, as a class, are in dire circumstances. (The case of the present appellant who is in occupation of an area of 9000 sq ft in a building situated at Fort, Mumbai on a rental of Rs.5236.58, plus water charges at the rate of Rs.515.35 per month more than amply highlights the point. (Satyawati Sharma vs. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 287 ; Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397 , reaffirmed and followed.)” 27. Learned counsel for the appellant – defendant – tenant, Mr. B.R. Mehta, drew the attention of the Court towards the decision of this Court in the case of Santlal vs. Harbans Singh reported in AIR 1972 Raj. Learned counsel for the appellant – defendant – tenant, Mr. B.R. Mehta, drew the attention of the Court towards the decision of this Court in the case of Santlal vs. Harbans Singh reported in AIR 1972 Raj. 228 = 1972 RLW 657, wherein while deciding a revision petition filed by the defendant – tenant Santlal challenging the issue No.1 framed by the trial court, which was filed to argue that in the said issue, the word “premises” has been used by learned Munsif Magistrate, whereas the word “shop” should have been used, since the suit premises was only a shop given to the tenant. 28. Upholding this contention of the defendant – tenant, the learned Single Judge of this Court (Hon'ble B.P. Beri, J, as His Lordship then was) held in para 5 of the said judgment that it is correct that word “premises” may include a shop, but when the dispute is in regard to a shop, the proper issue should be framed using the word “shop” only instead of “premises”. The learned Single Judge in first part of para 5 of the judgment held that the Code of Civil Procedure insists on the necessity of framing issues which arise from the material proposition of fact and law asserted by one party and denied by the other party for the obvious purpose of guiding the investigation within well-settled boundaries. Precision in the matter of issues is a guarantee against digression and discursiveness in the further course of trial and thus, modifying the issue framed by the learned trial court, the learned Single Judge substituted the word “shop” in place of “premises”. While doing so, the learned Single Judge also observed as an obiter referring to a survey of parallel statutes of other States in India done by Mr. R.C. Kochatta in his book “Fundamentals of Rent Control legislation in India”, the learned Single Judge noticed that the words employed in Clause (i) alone employs the words “suitable residence”. The Acts of Assam, Bombay, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan confine the ground of alternative accommodation only to residential building while the Acts of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Mysore are wider in this respect because they apply to all varieties of buildings, residential or otherwise. It would be relevant to quote the said portion of para 5 of the judgment in extensio: “Clause (i) alone employs the words 'suitable residence'. It would be relevant to quote the said portion of para 5 of the judgment in extensio: “Clause (i) alone employs the words 'suitable residence'. A survey of parallel statutes of others States in India done by by Mr. R.C. Kochatta in his book “Fundamentals of Rent Control legislation in India”, shows that the Acts of Assam, Bombay, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan confine the ground of alternative accommodation only to residential building while the Acts of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Mysore are wider in this respect because they apply to all varieties of buildings, residential or otherwise. Thus it would be clear that acquisition of alternative accommodation can be a ground for eviction if only the terms of Section 13(1)(i) are satisfied. The simple question, therefore, is whether the issue as framed by the learned Munisff, when he employs the word “premises” is precise enough to pinpoint the con-troversy. The answer must be in the negative. Law insists on precision. It is correct that the word “premises” may include a shop but when the dispute admittedly is in regard to a shop the proper issue should be in regard to the shop specified as such. The issue No.1 if properly drafted would be: “Has the defendant acquired another suitable shop and if so whether he is liable to be evicted on that account?” Mr. Guru Prakash does not dispute that this is a part of his case. Accordingly in the interest of exactitude the issue No.1 should read as indicated above in place of the issue No.1 as framed by the learned Munisff. 29. Significantly, the learned Judge was dealing with shop (commercial nature of tenancy) under Section 13(1)(i) of the Rent Control Act and not a residential accommodation and, therefore, the observation while quoting the survey of comparative statutes of different Acts about Section 13(1)(i) applying only to residential accommodation, cannot be said to be ratio decidendi of the said case, as there is no discussion further on this issue. 30. In the said judgment, the learned Single Judge was not concerned with the finding of eviction decree as such on the ground specified in Section 13(1)(i) of the Act and was, therefore, neither called upon, nor his Lordship did, interpret the Section 13(1)(i) of the Act. The observations made by the learned Author Mr. 30. In the said judgment, the learned Single Judge was not concerned with the finding of eviction decree as such on the ground specified in Section 13(1)(i) of the Act and was, therefore, neither called upon, nor his Lordship did, interpret the Section 13(1)(i) of the Act. The observations made by the learned Author Mr. R.C. Kochatta in his commentary was only noticed by the learned Single Judge as an obiter, but the real controversy before the learned Single Judge was only as to whether the issue framed by the court using the word “premises” was required to be made more precise by using the word “shop” in place of “premises” or not. Therefore, this judgment with great respect, gives little help to the defendant – tenant before this Court in present case to support his argument that Section 13(1)(i) of the Act applies only to the residential accommodation and not to the commercial accommodation. 31. In the present case, this Court is called upon to decide controversy in the context of the facts, whether the suit premises – a shop measuring 20 x 30 ft. was used for commercial purposes by installation of the lathe machines and the tenant, comes into the possession of an industrial plot at F-291 in Madri Industrial Area of Udaipur upon allotment and whether in such circumstance, the landlord can seek eviction on the ground specified in Section 13(1) (i), which eviction has been decreed in his favour by the two courts below and whether such eviction on the ground of availability of alternative accommodation to the tenant can be refused by holding that Section 13(1)(i) of the Act simply does not apply to commercial premises, specially when both suit premises and alternative accommodation, both are commercial premises and there is no cross – purpose shifting required like suit premises was residential and alternative accommodation was commercial and vice versa. 32. Another judgment cited at Bar is in the case of Hari Shankar Gupta vs. Musaddi Lal reported in 1970 RCR 783, in which learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court dealing with a tenant's appeal against eviction was seized with a case, where the let out premises was admittedly a residential house No.7295 constructed on plot Nos. 32. Another judgment cited at Bar is in the case of Hari Shankar Gupta vs. Musaddi Lal reported in 1970 RCR 783, in which learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court dealing with a tenant's appeal against eviction was seized with a case, where the let out premises was admittedly a residential house No.7295 constructed on plot Nos. 107, 108 and 109, Prem Nagar, Subzi Mandi, Delhi and he was sought to be evicted, inter alia, on the ground that the tenant had acquired vacant possession of another residential house in new premises in the house No.7289, Prem Nagar, Subzi Mandi, Delhi in the same locality, but the eviction decree was refused by the Controller on the ground that since the defendant had never shifted to the new premises alleged to have been acquired by the tenant, the eviction on this ground could not be ordered. 33. The learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court in para 4 of the judgment reproducing the Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, which is said to be in pari materia with the provisions of Section 13(1)(i) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950 observed as under: “4. In my opinion, the appeal has to be allowed and the case remanded to the learned Tribunal for re-decision according to law. Clause (h) of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act reads as follows:- “that the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of the Act, built, acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted a residence.” However, ultimately the Hon'ble Delhi High Court remanded the case back to the Tribunal for decision afresh according to the law after arriving at a finding with regard to the nature of the letting purpose of the tenanted premises. Thus, in the said judgment also, the finality of the eviction was not determined by the Hon'ble Delhi Court on the said statutory ground and the matter was thus remanded back to the Tribunal. Thus, in the said judgment also, the finality of the eviction was not determined by the Hon'ble Delhi Court on the said statutory ground and the matter was thus remanded back to the Tribunal. In relevant part of para 4 quoted above, the learned Single Judge also observed that “I am of the view that any other construction would lead to absurd results, for example a tenant has taken on rent commercial premises and after having done that he takes another residential accommodation for his residence, can it be urged that on account of his acquiring residence, he must vacate the tenanted commercial premises also. I have no doubt in my mind that this is an essential requirement of Clause (h) that the premises from which the tenant is to be evicted, must be residential and not residential – cum – commercial and the premises, which he acquires later on must also be residential and not residential – cum – commercial premises. Thus, this judgment also does not finally lay down that Clause 14(1)(h) applies only to the residential accommodation and not to the commercial premises. 34. A closer scrutiny of the said judgments, particularly, the Clause (h) reproduced in para 4 quoted above, there is a significant departure from the language employed in Clause (i) of Section 13(1) of the Rajasthan Act, which is noticeable. In the said Clause (h), there is the “comma” (“,”) before the phrase “or been allotted a residence”, whereas there is no such “comma” in Clause 13(1)(i) of the Rajasthan Act. The only “comma” which in case in Clause (i) is after the words “built” and there is no comma before or after the words “acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence”, which word “or” as per the well settled rules of interpretation makes the two clauses of Section 13(1)(i) of the Act independent of each other. There is no rational nexus behind restricting the operation of Clause (i) of Section 13(1) of Rajasthan Act only to residential accommodation and not to apply the same to the commercial premises. The use of word “suitable residence” after the words or have to be read with the phrase after the said word “or” namely “been allotted a suitable residence”. There is no rational nexus behind restricting the operation of Clause (i) of Section 13(1) of Rajasthan Act only to residential accommodation and not to apply the same to the commercial premises. The use of word “suitable residence” after the words or have to be read with the phrase after the said word “or” namely “been allotted a suitable residence”. As already said above, since Hon'ble Delhi High Court also did not finally hold that the eviction decree could be granted on the grounds specified under Section 14(1)(h) of the Act only for the residential accommodation, but the matter was remanded back to the Tribunal, in view of aforesaid significant difference in the phrases of the two provisions of Delhi Act and Rajasthan Act, since in Delhi Rent Control Act, “comma” has been put in the Statute before the words “or being allotted residence” that became an independent phrase for construction before the Delhi High Court and since it obviously referred to the word “residence”, the learned Single Judge held that the said Clause would not apply for commercial or for non-commercial premises. 35. In Section 13(1)(i) of the Rajasthan Act, no such distinction is to be found for making categorisation between the residential accommodations and non-residential accommodation or commercial accommodations for applying various grounds specified in Section 13(1) of the Rajasthan Act. No such distinction is made in the entire scheme of the Act and, therefore, such a distinction could not be read with the Clause (i) to read it in a restrictive manner, particularly when this Court finds that said Clause (i) is less than happily worded. Prior to the enactment of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001, the words “suitable residence” in Section 13(1)(i) of the Old Act of 1950 has also been deleted in the New Act of 2001 and the words “suitable premises adequate for his requirement” has been substituted in the New Act, but the ground for seeking eviction of tenant on the specified grounds of eviction to be established by the landlord continue to be same throughout since 1950 even after the enactment of 2001 Act and that is that the landlord can seek eviction of the tenant, if the tenant gets another suitable alternative accommodation; be it by building himself or acquired or be allotted through other agencies or persons. These three words “built, acquired or allotted are merely different modes of making available the alternative accommodation to the tenants and all the three words are not restricted by or pertain only to the end words of Clause (i) “suitable residence”. 36. This Court is, therefore, of the clear and firm opinion that Section 13(1)(i) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act applies to all kinds of suit premises; be it residential or non-residential or commercial premises and the word “suitable residence” has to be read with the phrase after the word “or” employed in the said Clause (i) namely “been alloted a suitable residence”. The Clause in its entirety read with phrase that “the tenant has able to build, acquire vacant possession of or has been allotted a suitable residence” does not create any invidious classification for two types of suit premises. If the phrase in the said clause 13(1)(i) after the “comma” is to be read as one phrase that would read like this “acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence”. As already observed, the language of Section 13(1)(i) is not happily worded and, which ambiguity has been sought to be remedied by provisions of Section 9(j) in the new Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 by deleting the words “residence” from Clause 9 (j) and also deleting the “comma” which came after the word “built” in the old Section 13(1)(i) of the Act and substituting much wider terms like, “suitable premises adequate for his requirement” that makes the legislative intention clear that the Legislature did not want to create any difference or classification depending upon the user of the suit premises whether it is residential or commercial. Therefore, this amendment in law can also be used to uphold the interpretation of old provisions of Section 13(1)(i) of the Act, which has been taken in the present case by this Court. 37. In Precision Steel and Engineering Works and another vs. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal reported in 2003(2) SCC 236 , interpreting the words “premises let for residential purposes” and discussing the difference between the two categories of premises, namely, residential and non-residential, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the expression as used in Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Control Act, 1958 should be interpreted liberally and not technically or narrowly. The maximum “Ex abundanti cautela” was discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with the Explanation to Section 14(1)(e) has nothing to do with determining the main, principal or dominant purpose of letting and it is wrong to contend that the enactment of the Explanation is suggestive of the legislative intent that even incidental user for commercial or other purposes, if accompanied by the consent of the landlord would, take the premises out of the expression “premises let for residential purposes”. The relevant portion of the judgment is quoted below for ready reference : “The expression “the premises let for residential purposes” should be construed liberally and not technically or narrowly; meaning thereby, where the premises are solely let for residential purposes they are undoubtedly covered by Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 but even when the premises are let out for composite or mixed purposes, if the predominant or main purpose of letting is for residential purposes, the same would be included within the expression “the premises let for residential purposes”. An incidental, secondary or unauthorized user of the premises for purposes other than residence would not take the premises out of the meaning of the expression “the premises let for residential purposes”. 38. Likewise, while interpreting Sec. 13(1)(i) of the Rent Control Act, this Court is of the opinion that the objective of providing this as a ground of eviction of the legislature was not to restrict it only to the cases of residential accommodation but for both types of accommodation; residential and non-residential and the emphasis is on the availability of alternative accommoda-tion and not on the word “residence” employed at the end of Sec.13(1)(i) of the Act. As already aforesaid, this Clause is not happily worded and the word “premises” should be read in place of word “residence” as it existed in Sec. 13 (1)(i) of the Act prior to the substitution of words “suitable premises adequate for his requirement” in the new Clause 9(j) in New Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001, which amendment was brought by the Legislation being conscious of this lacunae that the word “residence” could cause in the old law. 39. Since in the present case, from the facts above, it is clear that the tenant, who had the suit shop in question measuring 20 x 30 ft. 39. Since in the present case, from the facts above, it is clear that the tenant, who had the suit shop in question measuring 20 x 30 ft. situated at Udia Pole, Udaipur was using the same for commercial purposes only, by installing the lathe machines therein and was later on alloted a new plot at F-291, Madri Industrial Area, Udaipur, where he could easily shift his lathe machines also, since he was admittedly doing the fabrication works only at the industrial plot, in the considered opinion of this Court, the ground of eviction that an alternative accommodation became available to the tenant, stood established by the plaintiff landlord and the courts below were perfectly justified in decreeing the eviction suit on this ground in favour of the plaintiff – landlord and the substantial question of law framed above, therefore, deserves to be answered accordingly in favour of the plaintiff - landlord and against the defendant – tenant. The decree of eviction on this ground is, therefore, upheld and the defendant – tenant's appeal No.15/2006 Puran Indoria vs. Balashram Society is dismissed, while the landlord – plaintiff's appeal No.391/3007 – Balashram Society vs. Puran Indoria is being disposed of in the light of decision in tenant's appeal. No order as to costs. 40. The appellant-defendant-tenant, Mr. Puran Indoria or his assignee, sub-lettee, servants and agents, whoever is in the present occupation of the suit premises shall hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit property viz. shop situated at Udia Pole, Udaipur in question to the respondent-plaintiff within a period of six months from today and shall further pay mesne profits @ Rs.1,500/- per month, commencing from September, 2012 and will further continue to pay the mesne profits each month by 15th day of the next succeeding month or in advance to the respondent also and in case there is any default in payment of mesne profits, the period of six months for eviction shall stand reduced and the decree of eviction would become executable forthwith. The defendant - tenant shall also clear all the arrears of rent and mesne profits and pay the same to the plaintiff within three months from today, otherwise the same will bear interest @ 9% per annum and the same may be executed as a money decree against the defendant - tenant. 41. The defendant - tenant shall also clear all the arrears of rent and mesne profits and pay the same to the plaintiff within three months from today, otherwise the same will bear interest @ 9% per annum and the same may be executed as a money decree against the defendant - tenant. 41. The tenant shall also not sub-let, assign or part with the possession of the suit premises or any part thereof in favour of any one else and would not create any third party interest in the same during the aforesaid period and the same, if so created, would be treated as void. The appellant-defendant shall furnish a written undertaking incorporating the aforesaid conditions in the trial court within one month and one copy thereof along with affidavit, in this Court. It is made clear that if the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit shop is not handed over to the respondent-landlord within a period of six months from today or mesne profits are not paid as directed above, besides the expeditious execution of the decree in normal course, the respondent-plaintiff shall also be entitled to invoke the contempt jurisdiction of this Court. A copy of this judgment be sent to both the learned courts below and both the parties forthwith.