JUDGEMENT Justice Sanjay Karol, J. For an offence, which is alleged to have been committed during the period from 1999 till 2002 and on 10.3.2002 accused were put to trial. In terms of judgment dated 26.2.2005, passed by the Presiding Officer, (Addl. Sessions Judge), Fast Track Court, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. in S.T. No. 39/04, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh versus Mehar Chand and others, accused stand acquitted of the charged offences. 2. It is the case of prosecution that Smt. Meera Devi daughter of Smt. Shakuntla Devi (PW-2) and Sh. Jagdish Chand (PW-4) was married to Mehar Chand (accused No. 1). Marriage was solemnized in the year 1999. Smt. Meera Devi was staying in the matrimonial house along with other co-accused namely Mohinder Singh (accused No. 2), Smt. Kanchna Devi (accused No. 3), Smt. Brahmi Devi (accused No. 4) and Kishori Lal (accused No. 5). On 10.3.2002 Sh. Amar Singh (PW-3) neighbour of PW-2 and PW-4 received a telephonic call from accused No. 1 Mehar Chand and was told that Smt. Meera Devi had left the matrimonial house and her parents be asked to take away her minor daughter along with dowry articles lying in the matrimonial house. Accordingly, PW­3 informed parents of Smt. Meera Devi about the same. They searched for their daughter but in vain, as such, a missing report was lodged with the Police Station Lamba Gaon on 12.3.2002 (Ext. PW 10/A). Police also searched for Smt. Meera Devi who could not be traced anywhere. On 22.4.2002 a telephonic message was received from Pradhan Gram Panchayat, Kosari that dead body of Smt. Meera Devi was found hanging from a tree in the jungle near Jamuni-Da-Nalla. Allegedly, accused No. 1 gave information about the same. Police reached on the spot and found the dead body in a state of skeleton which was lying hanging from a tree with a rope. Necessary proceedings were conducted on the spot and skeleton form of the body was sent for post mortem. Police recorded statement (Ext. PW 2/A) of Smt. Shakuntla Devi (PW-2) under Section 154 Cr. P.C. on the basis of which F.I.R. No. 21/2002, dated 23.4.2002 (Ext. PW 11/A) under Sections 498-A and 306 read with Section 34 IPC was registered with Police Station Lamba Gaon. Post mortem was got conducted through Dr. Nirdosh Gupta (PW-1) and post mortem report (Ext. PW 1/B) obtained by the police. P.C. on the basis of which F.I.R. No. 21/2002, dated 23.4.2002 (Ext. PW 11/A) under Sections 498-A and 306 read with Section 34 IPC was registered with Police Station Lamba Gaon. Post mortem was got conducted through Dr. Nirdosh Gupta (PW-1) and post mortem report (Ext. PW 1/B) obtained by the police. Investigation revealed that on 10.3.2002, accused gave beatings to deceased Smt. Meera Devi which forced her to leave her house and commit suicide. With the completion of investigation challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. The accused were charged for having committed offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 both read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 to which they did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to prove its case, prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses and statements of the accused under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 were also recorded. 5. Appreciating the material on record, Court below acquitted the accused of all the charged offences, hence the present appeal. 6. We have heard Sh. R. K. Sharma, learned Senior Addl. Advocate General duly assisted by Sh. J. S. Guleria, Assistant Advocate General on behalf of the appellant-State as also Sh. Abhishek Sood, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused. We have also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence placed on record by the prosecution. Having minutely examined the record, we are of the considered view that no case for interference is made out at all. We find that the judgment rendered by the trial Court is well reasoned and is based on complete and proper appreciation of evidence (documentary and ocular) placed on record. There is neither any illegality/infirmity nor any perversity in the same. 7. It is a settled position of law that there should be reasonable nexus between cruelty and suicide. It has to be substantiated, established and proved on record. Cruelty by itself would not amount to having committed an offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC. A reasonable nexus has to be established between cruelty and the suicide in order to make good the offence of cruelty under the penal laws. Cruelty has to be of such a gravity as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide. Cruelty by itself would not amount to having committed an offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC. A reasonable nexus has to be established between cruelty and the suicide in order to make good the offence of cruelty under the penal laws. Cruelty has to be of such a gravity as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide. Suicide alone would not establish that it was occasioned on account of cruelty which was of sufficient gravity so as to lead a reasonable person placed in similar circumstances to commit suicide. Mere assumption or demand of dowry by itself in given circumstances may not amount to cruelty. The harassment has to be with a definite object i.e. to meet any unlawful demand. Every act of cruelty is not punishable. There must be evidence to show that soon before the death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. Prosecution has to rule out the possibility of natural or accidental death so as to prove that the death had occurred otherwise than in normal circumstances. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If the incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. 8. In Girdhar Shankar Tawade vs. State of Maharashtra (2002) 5 SCC 177, the Apex Court has held that the basic purport of the statutory provision is to avoid ‘cruelty’ which stands defined by attributing “a specific statutory meaning attached thereto. 8. In Girdhar Shankar Tawade vs. State of Maharashtra (2002) 5 SCC 177, the Apex Court has held that the basic purport of the statutory provision is to avoid ‘cruelty’ which stands defined by attributing “a specific statutory meaning attached thereto. In order to ascribe a meaning to the word ‘cruelty’ as is expressed by the Legislatures Whereas explanation (a) involves three specific situations viz , (i) to drive the woman to commit suicide or (ii) to cause grave injury or (iii) danger to life, limb or health, both mental and physical, and thus involving a physical torture or atrocity, in explanation (b) there is absence of physical injury but the Legislature thought it fit to include only coercive harassment which obviously as the legislative intent expressed is equally heinous to match the physical injury whereas one is patent, the other one is latent but equally serious in terms of the provisions of the statute since the same would also embrace the attributes of ‘cruelty’ in terms of section 498 (A).”“Section 498-A is attributed only in the event of proof of cruelty by the husband or the relatives of the husband of the woman Admittedly, the finding of the trial court as regards the death negated suicide with a positive finding of accidental death. If suicide is left out, then in that event question of applicability of explanation (a) would not arise - neither the second limb to cause injury and danger to life or limb or health would be attracted in any event the willful act or conduct ought to be the proximate cause in order to bring home the charge under section 498 (A) and not de-hors the same To have an event sometime back cannot be termed to be a factum taken note of in the matter of a charge under section 498-A. Explanation (b) of Section 498-A in no uncertain terms records harassment of the woman and the statute itself thereafter clarifies it to the effect that it is not every such harassment but only in the event of such a harassment being with a view to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand - there is total absence of any of the requirements of the statute in terms of section 498 (A).”“Charges under sections 306 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code are independent of each other and acquittal of one does not lead to acquittal on the other.” “To have an event sometime back cannot be termed to be a factum taken note of in the matter of a charge under section 498-A The legislative intent is clear enough to indicate in particular reference to explanation (b) that there shall have to be a series of acts in order to be a harassment within the meaning of explanation (b) The letters by itself though may depict a reprehensible conduct, would not however, bring home the charge of section 498-A against the accused Acquittal of a charge under section 306, as noticed hereinbefore, though not by itself a ground for acquittal under section 498-A, but some cogent evidence is required to bring home the charge of section 498-A as well, without which the charge cannot be said to be maintained.” 9. In Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618, the Apex Court has also held that “Sections 498-A and 306 IPC are independent and constitute different offences. In Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618, the Apex Court has also held that “Sections 498-A and 306 IPC are independent and constitute different offences. Though, depending on the facts and circumstances of an individual case, subjecting a woman to cruelty may amount to an offence under section 498- A and may also, if a course of conduct. amounting to cruelty is established leaving no other option for the woman except to commit suicide, amount to abetment to commit suicide. However, merely because an accused has been held liable to be punished under section 498-A IPC it does not follow that on the same evidence he must also and necessarily be held guilty of having abetted the commission of suicide by the woman concerned.” 10. In Sushil Kumar Sharma. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (2005) 6 SCC 281, the Apex Court has held as under: “10. The object for which Section 498-A IPC was introduced is amply reflected in the Statement of Objects and Reasons while enacting the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act 46 of 1983. As clearly stated therein the increase in the number of dowry deaths is a matter of serious concern. The extent of the evil has been commented upon by the Joint Committee of the Houses to examine the work of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In some cases, cruelty of the husband and the relatives of the husband which culminate in suicide by or murder of the helpless woman concerned, constitute only a small fraction involving such cruelty. Therefore, it was proposed to amend IPC, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “CrPC”) and the Evidence Act suitably to deal effectively not only with cases of dowry deaths but also cases of cruelty to married women by the husband, in-laws and relatives. The avowed object is to combat the menace of dowry death and cruelty. 11. One other provision which is relevant to be noted is Section 306 IPC. The basic difference between the two sections i.e. Section 306 and Section 498-A is that of intention. Under the latter, cruelty committed by the husband or his relations drag the woman concerned to commit suicide, while under the former provision suicide is abetted and intended. 19. The object of the provision is prevention of the dowry menace. The basic difference between the two sections i.e. Section 306 and Section 498-A is that of intention. Under the latter, cruelty committed by the husband or his relations drag the woman concerned to commit suicide, while under the former provision suicide is abetted and intended. 19. The object of the provision is prevention of the dowry menace. But as has been rightly contended by the petitioner many instances have come to light where the complaints are not bona fide and have been filed with oblique motive. In such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all cases wipe out the ignominy suffered during and prior to trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what remedial measures can be taken to prevent abuse of the well-intentioned provision. Merely because the provision is constitutional and intra vires, does not give a licence to unscrupulous persons to wreak personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It may, therefore, become necessary for the legislature to find out ways how the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be appropriately dealt with. Till then the courts have to take care of the situation within the existing framework. As noted above the object is to strike at the roots of dowry menace. But by misuse of the provision a new legal terrorism can be unleashed. The provision is intended to be used as a shield and not as an assassin’s weapon. If the cry of “wolf is made too often as a prank, assistance and protection may not be available when the actual “wolf appears. There is no question of the investigating agency and courts casually dealing with the allegations. They cannot follow any straitjacket formula in the matters relating to dowry tortures, deaths and cruelty. It cannot be lost sight of that the ultimate objective of every legal system is to arrive at the truth, punish the guilty and protect the innocent. There is no scope for any preconceived notion or view. It is strenuously argued by the petitioner that the investigating agencies and the courts start with the presumptions that the accused persons are guilty and that the complainant is speaking the truth. This is too wide and generalised a statement. Certain statutory presumptions are drawn which again are rebuttable. There is no scope for any preconceived notion or view. It is strenuously argued by the petitioner that the investigating agencies and the courts start with the presumptions that the accused persons are guilty and that the complainant is speaking the truth. This is too wide and generalised a statement. Certain statutory presumptions are drawn which again are rebuttable. It is to be noted that the role of the investigating agencies and the courts is that of a watchdog and not of a bloodhound. It should be their effort to see that an innocent person is not made to suffer on account of unfounded, baseless and malicious allegations. It is equally undisputable that in many cases no direct evidence is available and the courts have to act on circumstantial evidence. While dealing with such cases, the law laid down relating to circumstantial evidence has to be kept in view.” 11.In State of West Bengal Vs. Orilal Jaiswal (1994) 1 SCC 73, the Apex Court has held as under: “In a criminal trial the degree of proof is stricter than what is required in a civil proceedings. In a criminal trial however intriguing may be facts and circumstances of the case, the charges made against the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts and the requirement of proof cannot lie in the realm of surmises and conjectures. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after the introduction of S. 498A, I.P.C and S. 113A of Indian Evidence Act. Although, the court’s conscience must be satisfied that the accused is not held guilty when there are reasonable doubts about the complicity of the accused in respect of the offences alleged, it should be borne in mind that there is no absolute standard for proof in a criminal trial and the question whether the charges made against the accused have been proved beyond all reasonable doubts must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the quality of the evidences adduced in the case and the materials placed on record. The doubt must be of a reasonable man and the standard adopted must be a standard adopted by a reasonable and just man for coming to a conclusion considering the particular subject matter. The doubt must be of a reasonable man and the standard adopted must be a standard adopted by a reasonable and just man for coming to a conclusion considering the particular subject matter. The conscience of the court can never be bound by any rule but that is coming itself dictates the consciousness and prudent exercise of the judgment. Reasonable doubt is simply that degree of doubt which would permit a reasonable and just man to come to a conclusion. Reasonableness of the doubt must be commensurate with the nature of the offence to be investigated. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice, according to law.” 12. The Apex Court further cautioned that the court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty. 13. In Arun Vyas & anr. Vs . Anita Vyas (1999) 4 SCC 690, the Apex Court has held that the essence of offence in Section 498- A is cruelty. It is a continuing offence and on each occasion on which the wife is subjected to cruelty, she would have a new starting point of limitation. 14. In Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam and Anr. Vs. Vs . Anita Vyas (1999) 4 SCC 690, the Apex Court has held that the essence of offence in Section 498- A is cruelty. It is a continuing offence and on each occasion on which the wife is subjected to cruelty, she would have a new starting point of limitation. 14. In Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam and Anr. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 2 SCC 684, the Apex Court has held as under:- “The role of courts, under the circumstances assumes greater importance and it is expected that the courts would deal with such cases in a more realistic manner and not allow the criminals to escape on account of procedural technicalities or insignificant lacune in the evidence as otherwise the criminals would receive encouragement and the victims of crime would be totally discouraged by the crime going unpunished. The courts are expected to be sensitive in cases involving crime against women.” 15. Whether one spouse has been guilty of cruelty to the other is essentially a question of fact. The impact of complaints, accusations or taunts on a person amounting to cruelty depends on various factors like the sensitivity of the individual victim concerned, the social background, the environment, education etc. Further, mental cruelty varies from person to person depending on the intensity of sensitivity and the degree of courage or endurance to withstand such mental cruelty. In other words, each case has to be decided on its own facts to decide whether the mental cruelty was established or not. [Mohd. Hoshan A.P. & Anrs. Vs. State of A.P. (2002) 7 SCC 414]. 16. In State of A.P. Vs. M. Madhusudhan Rao (2008) 15 SCC 582, the Apex Court has held as under: “It is plain that as per clause (b) of the Explanation, which, according to learned counsel for the State, is attracted in the instant case, every harassment does not amount to “cruelty” within the meaning of Section 498-A I.P.C. The definition stipulates that the harassment has to be with a definite object of coercing the woman or any person related to her to meet an unlawful demand. In other words, for the purpose of Section 498-A I.P.C. harassment simpliciter is not “cruelty” and it is only when harassment is committed for the purpose of coercing a woman or any other person related to her to meet an unlawful demand for property etc., that it amounts to “cruelty” punishable under Section 498-A I.P.C.” 17. In Balram Prasad Agrawal Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (1997) 9 SCC 338, the Apex Court has held cruelty to mean torture to be so unbearable in the common course of human conduct that a young lady having commitments to life could take a drastic steps to end her life leaving behind her infant children in the lurch and at the mercy of the accused husband who was found to be in contemplation of remarrying. 18. In Arvind Singh Vs. State of Bihar (2001) 6 SCC 407, the Apex Court has held as under:- “The word ‘cruelty’ in common English acceptation denotes a state of conduct which is painful and distressing to another. The legislative intent in Section 498-A is clear enough to indicate that in the event of there being a state of conduct by the husband to the wife or by any relative of the husband which can be attributed to be painful or distressing. The same would be within the meaning of the section. Torture is a question of fact. There must be a proper effort to prove it.” 19.Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The accused must by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct create such circumstances that the deceased is left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. [Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhatisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618] 20. The concept of cruelty and its effect varies from individual to individual, also depending upon the social and economic status to which such person belongs. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. [Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhatisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618] 20. The concept of cruelty and its effect varies from individual to individual, also depending upon the social and economic status to which such person belongs. “Cruelty” for the purposes of constituting the offence under the aforesaid section need not be physical. Even mental torture or abnormal behaviour may amount to cruelty and harassment in a given case. [Gananath Pattnaik vs. State of Orissa, (2002) 2 SCC 619] 21. Prosecution evidence has to be appreciated in the backdrop of the aforesaid legal position. 22. Dr. Nirdosh Gupta (PW-1) could not ascertain the actual cause of death. The body was found in the shape of a skeleton. He opined that circumstantial evidence suggested a case of hanging. However, it was difficult to opine whether it was ante-mortem or post-mortem as neck structures were missing. The time between death and injury could not be ascertained. 23.However skeletal body is that of Smt. Meera Devi is not in dispute as parts of her clothes were found on the body. 24. HC-Jai Chand (PW-10) has deposed that Sh. Jagdish Chand had come to the police station on 12.3.2002 to lodge a report that his daughter was missing. He admits to have reduced the same into writing, copy of which is Ext. PW 10/A. Significantly this witness also admits that on 10.3.2002 Sh. Jagdish Chand (PW-4) had also come to the police station for the very same purpose. But in Court PW-4 states that he reported the matter to the police on 11.3.2002 when accused Sh. Mehar Chand, Sh. Subhash Chand, Sh. Rattan Lal and Sh. Hari Singh were present with him in the police station. But in this regard Sh. Amar Singh (PW-3) has a different version to state. He states that on 10.3.2002 a written application was made to the police about missing of the girl. Now prosecution has not placed on record this written complaint. This document attains significance in view of the fact that it was on 12.3.2002, for the first time, allegations of alleged cruelty surfaced against accused No. 1. Significantly PW-2 got recorded her statement only after dead body was recovered on 22.4.2002. Now prosecution has not placed on record this written complaint. This document attains significance in view of the fact that it was on 12.3.2002, for the first time, allegations of alleged cruelty surfaced against accused No. 1. Significantly PW-2 got recorded her statement only after dead body was recovered on 22.4.2002. Why is it that complainant party remained quite and did not pursue the matter against the accused between this period is not clear. This question remains unanswered by the prosecution. We find that this fact acquires significance in view of the fact that PW-2 partly disowned her own previous statement (Ext. PW 2/A) recorded by the police with which she was confronted with. She also admits that she did not make any complaint to the police or the Panchayat with regard to the alleged demands of dowry/cruelty. All this renders the prosecution case to be shaky. 25. Coming to the alleged demands of dowry/cruelty we find that statements of Smt. Shakuntla Devi (PW-2), Sh. Jagdish Chand (PW-4), Sh. Duni Chand (PW-5) and Sh. Amar Singh (PW-3) are vague and unspecific. Except for the bald assertions there is nothing specific against the accused persons. In fact these witnesses admit that accused No. 2, 3 and 5 were living separately and maintaining separate kitchens. There is no iota of evidence against these persons with regard to such dowry demands or acts of cruelty. 26. Smt. Shakuntla Devi (PW-2) simply states that her daughter complained that accused used to give her beatings and also taunt her that dowry articles given by her were not original but fake. However, when confronted with her previous statement (Ext. PW 2/A) recorded by the police, she admits that there is no mention about this fact. Statement of Sh. Jagdish Chand (PW-4) is also to this effect. But then he admits that he also did not get this fact recorded with the police in his previous statement. Thus there are material improvements in their statements rendering their testimonies to be unreliable and shaky. 27.PW-3 has simply deposed that though Smt. Meera Devi had informed him about the harassment caused by the in-laws but the reason thereof was not told to him. 28.On the aspect of dowry demands prosecution has also relied upon the statement of Sh. Thus there are material improvements in their statements rendering their testimonies to be unreliable and shaky. 27.PW-3 has simply deposed that though Smt. Meera Devi had informed him about the harassment caused by the in-laws but the reason thereof was not told to him. 28.On the aspect of dowry demands prosecution has also relied upon the statement of Sh. Duni Chand (PW-5) who has simply deposed that the parents of the deceased had been complaining that the accused had been harassing their daughter on the issue of dowry. This witness however admits that this fact was not got recorded by him in his previous statement (Mark-DZ). We find testimony of this witness to be totally uninspiring and the witness to be unreliable. In Court he states that when he went to the house of the accused he saw that the floor had been cleaned and painted afresh with cow dung. His testimony suggests that accused had in fact murdered the deceased which in fact is not even the case of the prosecution. In fact trial Court put a specific question to this witness that when he suspected murder why is it that he did not get the case registered against the accused persons to which he simply replies that the apprehension is based on suspicion. 29. On the other hand we find that there is uncontroverted testimony of Sh. Hari Ram (PW-9) to the effect that the deceased never complained about the harassment caused by the accused. Incidentally this witness is Ward Member of the concerned area. 30. Except for this evidence there is nothing on record toshow that accused had made any demands of dowry or had subjected the deceased to cruelty. 31. Coming to the incident of 10.3.2002 we find that there is contradiction in the statement of PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4. According to PW-3 he received a telephone call from accused Mehar Chand asking Sh. Jagdish Chand to take away the daughter along with dowry articles. This witness states that he passed the message to Sh. Jagdish Chand as none came from the house of Sh. Jagdish Chand to answer the telephone call. But this version stands contradicted by PW-4 according to whom he had gone to the house of Sh. Amar Singh (PW-3) to attend the telephone call. In this backdrop who is telling lies or the truth is not discernable. 32. Jagdish Chand as none came from the house of Sh. Jagdish Chand to answer the telephone call. But this version stands contradicted by PW-4 according to whom he had gone to the house of Sh. Amar Singh (PW-3) to attend the telephone call. In this backdrop who is telling lies or the truth is not discernable. 32. That apart, it is a common case of all the relevant prosecution witnesses that accused accompanied the parents of the deceased to search for the deceased. The matter was also reported to the police but the deceased could not be found anywhere. His conduct does not remotely raise suspicion of complicity. On 22.4.2002 when the dead body was discovered the matter was immediately brought to the notice of all concerned. 33. SI-Naratu Ram (PW-13) admits that the accused, relatives of the deceased and other villagers searched for the deceased in the jungle which is thick forest but however they had not reached the particular point/place where dead body was actually found. 34. The prosecution has failed to prove its case by not leading clear, cogent and convincing material to prove the guilt of the accused to establish the charge against the accused. 35. The accused have had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohammed Ankoos and others versus Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, (2010) 1 SCC 94, it cannot be said that Court below incorrectly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the accused has resulted into travesty of justice. No ground for interference is called for. Present appeal is thus dismissed. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are discharged.