JUDGMENT Sunil Kumar Sinha, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 28th of September, 1996 passed in Sessions Trial No. 382/95 by the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Durg. By the impugned judgment, the appellant has been convicted u/ss 302/ 34 IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- with default sentence of imprisonment for 1 year. 2. The facts, briefly stated, are as under :- Deceased- Hari Udiya and Kaliya (PW-8) were employees of the Caterer engaged for supply of food in Bokaro Hostel situated in Sector 4, Bhilai. In the intervening night of 25th - 26th of August, 1995, they were sleeping on two benches in the premises of the hostel. The case of the prosecution is that in the late night, the appellant and a co-accused (who could not be traced) came there and assaulted the deceased by some sharp edged weapon. In fact, the assaults were given by co-accused and the appellant was holding 'the deceased at the time of assault. The deceased received multiple serious injuries and succumbed to those injuries. The incident was witnessed by Kaliya (PW-8). Kaliya (PW-8) did not disclose the incident to anyone, therefore, the First Information Report (F.I.R. - Ex.-P/1) lodged by Krishna Kumar Sharma (PW-1 - Hostel Manager) does not contain the name of the assailants and it was lodged against unknown person. Inquest (Ex.-P/10) was prepared on the dead body of the deceased. Dr. P.C. Deshmukh (PW-3) performed autopsy and gave his report (Ex.-P/7). According to him cause of death was shock and hemorrhage as a result of injury to the heart and it was homicidal in nature. Dog-party was called. The dog went to the house of the appellant, therefore, the appellant was taken into custody and on 30.8.95 his memorandum statement (Ex.-P/3) u/s 27 of the Evidence Act was recorded and a shirt was seized from his possession vide seizure memo Ex.-P/4 on the pretext that it was containing blood like stains. On 27.8.95, 161 Cr. P.C. statement of Kaliya (PW-8) was recorded. On 6.9.95 a Test Identification Parade (T.I.P.) was conducted by Executive Magistrate, G.R. Morey (PW-4). In the T.I.P., Kaliya (PW-8) identified the appellant. The T.I.P. memo is Ex.-P/9. The seized articles were sent for their chemical examination to Forensic Science Laboratory (F.S.L.), Raipur, from where, a report was received. On 27.8.95, 161 Cr. P.C. statement of Kaliya (PW-8) was recorded. On 6.9.95 a Test Identification Parade (T.I.P.) was conducted by Executive Magistrate, G.R. Morey (PW-4). In the T.I.P., Kaliya (PW-8) identified the appellant. The T.I.P. memo is Ex.-P/9. The seized articles were sent for their chemical examination to Forensic Science Laboratory (F.S.L.), Raipur, from where, a report was received. According to F.S.L. report blood stains were found on the shirt (Article-E) seized from the possession of the appellant. The articles were sent for Serologist Examination, but no report could be filed. The case of the prosecution was mainly based on eye-witness account of Kaliya (PW -8) and the circumstance of seizure of blood stained shirt from the possession of the appellant. The learned Sessions Judge relied on the testimony of Kaliya (PW-8) and convicted & sentenced the appellant as above. 3. Mr. M.D. Dhote, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, argued that the sole testimony of Kaliya (PW -8) was not reliable; he did not disclose the incident immediately to the Hostel In-charge; the T.I.P. was not properly conducted as Kaliya has seen the appellant; it was not proved that the blood stains found over shirt of the appellant were of human blood, therefore, conviction based on above evidence cannot be sustained. 4. On the other hand, Mr. J.A. Lohani, learned Panel Lawyer appearing on behalf of the State, opposed these arguments and supported the judgment passed by the Sessions Court. 5. We have heard, learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the records of the sessions case. 6. Kaliya (PW-8) deposed that in the fateful night, he was sleeping with the deceased in the verandah of the hostel. Two unknown persons came there. One person had gagged the mouth of deceased Hari and the other person attacked over him by knife. Hari woke up and ran towards outside. When Hari was running, the person who assaulted him said him to catch taking the name like Bantu. Both went outside and caught Hari and thereafter that person again gave 3-4 knife blows to him. Hari received multiple serious injuries. Both the assailants dragged Hari to the verandah and again assaulted him and thereafter they ran away. He did not cry at the time of the incident. He saw the incident while laying on the bench on which he was sleeping. Hari received multiple serious injuries. Both the assailants dragged Hari to the verandah and again assaulted him and thereafter they ran away. He did not cry at the time of the incident. He saw the incident while laying on the bench on which he was sleeping. He remained laying on the bed till 5.00 a.m. In the morning, a boy namely - Anand came to the mess for taking tea. He did not disclose the incident to him. Anand called the mess manager and his nephew (maternal) who met him, but he did not disclose the incident to them also. He remained quiet for 2 days and disclosed the incident to the police when he was caught by the police while sitting near overhead tank of Sector-5, Bhilai. Kaliya (PW-8) further deposed that he had identified the appellant in the T.I.P. conducted in jail premises. He proved his signature over T.I.P. memo (Ex.-P/9). 7. Kaliya (PW -8), in cross-examination, admitted that he did not disclose the incident to any person in the hostel. He did not disclose even to the mess malik and his nephew (bhanja). He quietly went to the house of his uncle namely - Birulal whose house was situated in Sector-5. He admitted that he did not lodge report in police station. On 26.8.95, he was sitting near Sector 5 overhead tank along with his friend- Dhana, but he did not disclose about above facts. He only disclosed that murder has been committed in the hostel, but he did not disclose that how the incident took place. In Para-12 of his cross-examination, he admitted that he was caught by police in the afternoon of 26.8.95 and was detained in the police station for 15 days. He admitted that during the period of his detention, the appellant was caught and was also brought in the police station. We find that his 161 Cr. P.C. statement was recorded on 27.8.95. He has not given any reason as to why he did not disclose the above fact to anyone till his case diary statement was recorded. There was delay of 2 days in recording his statement. We find that his 161 Cr. P.C. statement was recorded on 27.8.95. He has not given any reason as to why he did not disclose the above fact to anyone till his case diary statement was recorded. There was delay of 2 days in recording his statement. Though °no straight-jacket formula can be applied in all cases of late disclosure by the eye-witness and the credibility of the witness is to be judged in the prevailing facts and circumstances of each case, however, that judgment should be arrived at keeping in mind the normal human conduct and the probable circumstances including the explanation offered regarding non-disclosure of the facts relating to commission of heinous offence like murder. The delay gives an opportunity to concoct a different version than the actual incident which took place. Kaliya (PW-8) admitted that he was kept in police custody for 15 days. What was the reason for the police to keep him in long custody when according to case diary, his statement was already recorded on 27.8.95. This creates a doubt on the conduct of the investigation agency and also on the date of recording of his case-diary statement. If Kaliya (PW-8) would• have witnessed the incident, in normal human conduct, he would have immediately disclosed it to the hostel In-charge or to the caterer by whom he was employed along with the deceased. We are of the view that in the above facts and circumstances of the case, non-disclosure for such a long period was fatal to the prosecution. 8. The conduct of Kaliya (PW-8) during the alleged incident also appears to be unnatural. According to him he immediately woke up when the first attack was made. After the first attack, the deceased ran away and was chased by the assailants. He was caught in the verandah. There also he was assaulted. Then he was dragged to the hostel room and again was assaulted by knife. Kaliya (PW-8) claims that during this period he remained lying throughout on the bench on which he was sleeping. Even he did not raise-alarm and continued to watch entire incident by sleeping/laying down on the bench. This conduct also appears to be unnatural. In normal circumstance, he would have raised cries which he did not do. Kaliya (PW-8) claims that during this period he remained lying throughout on the bench on which he was sleeping. Even he did not raise-alarm and continued to watch entire incident by sleeping/laying down on the bench. This conduct also appears to be unnatural. In normal circumstance, he would have raised cries which he did not do. He would have run away from the place of occurrence with a view to call other persons or he would have tried to do something to rescue the deceased. All this was not done. The learned Sessions Judge has not taken into consideration his above conduct which makes his evidence suspicious. 9. Now we shall consider the evidence of identification. 10. In Mulla and Another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, while deliberating on the Test Identification Parade (T.I.P.) and the dock-identification, the Supreme Court held as under (Paras 41 to 55) : "41. Now, let us consider the arguments of the learned amicus curiae on the delay in conducting the test identification parade. The evidence of test identification is admissible under Section 9 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The identification parade belongs to the stage of investigation by the police. The question whether a witness has or has not identified the accused during the investigation is not one which is in itself relevant at the trial. The actual evidence regarding identification is that which is given by witnesses in court. There is no provision in Cr PC entitling the accused to demand that an identification parade should be held at or before the inquiry of the trial. The fact that a particular witness has been able to identify the accused at an identification parade is only a circumstance corroborative of the identification in court. 42. Failure to hold test identification parade does not make the evidence of identification in court inadmissible, rather the same is very much admissible in law. Where identification of an accused by a witness is made for the first time in court, it should not form the basis of conviction. 43. As was observed by this Court in Matru Vs. State of U.P., (1971) 2 SCC 75 identification tests do not constitute substantive evidence. They are primarily meant for the purpose of helping the investigating agency with an assurance that their progress with the investigation into the offence is proceeding on the right lines. 43. As was observed by this Court in Matru Vs. State of U.P., (1971) 2 SCC 75 identification tests do not constitute substantive evidence. They are primarily meant for the purpose of helping the investigating agency with an assurance that their progress with the investigation into the offence is proceeding on the right lines. The identification can only be used as corroboration of the statement in court. (Vide Santokh Singh Vs. Izhar Hussain, (1973) 2 SCC 406 .) 44. The necessity for holding an identification parade can arise only when the accused persons are not previously known to the witnesses. The whole idea of a test identification parade is that witnesses who claim to have seen the culprits at the time of occurrence are to identify them from the midst of other persons without any aid or any other source. The test is done to check upon their veracity. In other words, the main object of holding an identification parade, during the investigation stage, is to test the memory of the witnesses based upon first impression and also to enable the prosecution to decide whether all or any of them could be cited as eyewitnesses of the crime. 45. The identification proceedings are in the nature of tests and significantly, therefore, there is no provision for it in the Code and the Evidence Act, 1872. It is desirable that a test identification parade should be conducted as soon as possible after the arrest of the accused. This becomes necessary to eliminate the possibility of the accused being shown to the witnesses prior to the test identification parade. This is a very common plea of the accused and, therefore, the prosecution has to be cautious to ensure that there is no scope for making such allegation. If, however, circumstances are beyond control and there is some delay, it cannot be said to be fatal to the prosecution. 46. In Subash Vs. State of U.P., (1987) 3 SCC 331 , the parade was held about three weeks after the arrest of the accused. Therefore, there was some room for doubt if the delay was in order to enable the identifying witnesses to see him in jail premises or police lock-up and thus make a note of his features. Moreover, four months had elapsed between the date of occurrence and the date of holding of the test identification parade. Therefore, there was some room for doubt if the delay was in order to enable the identifying witnesses to see him in jail premises or police lock-up and thus make a note of his features. Moreover, four months had elapsed between the date of occurrence and the date of holding of the test identification parade. The descriptive particulars of the appellant were not given when the report was lodged, but while deposing before the Sessions Judge, the witnesses said that the accused was a tall person with shallow (sic sallow) complexion. The Court noted that if on account of these features the witnesses were able to identify the appellant Shiv Shankar at the identification parade, they would have certainly mentioned about them at the earliest point of time when his face was fresh in their memory. 47. It is important to note that since the conviction of the accused was based only on the identification at the test identification parade, the Court in Subash case gave him the benefit of doubt while upholding the conviction of the co-accused. This is also a case where the conviction of the appellant was based solely on the evidence of identification. There being a delay in holding the test identification parade and in the absence of corroborative evidence, this Court found it unsafe to uphold his conviction. 48. In State of A.P. Vs. Dr. M V. Ramana Reddy, (1991) 4 SCC 536 the Court found a delay in holding the test parade for which there was no valid explanation. It held that in the absence of a valid explanation for the delay, the approach of the High Court could be said to be manifestly wrong calling for intervention. 49. In Brij Mohan Vs. State of Rajasthan, (1994) I SCC 413 the test identification parade was held after three months. The argument was that it was not possible for the witnesses to remember, after a lapse of such time, the facial expressions of the accused. It was held that generally with lapse of time memory of witnesses would get dimmer and therefore the earlier the test identification parade is held it inspires more faith. It was held that no time-limit could be fixed for holding a test identification parade. It was held that generally with lapse of time memory of witnesses would get dimmer and therefore the earlier the test identification parade is held it inspires more faith. It was held that no time-limit could be fixed for holding a test identification parade. It was held that sometimes the crime itself is such that it would create a deep impression on the minds of the witnesses who had an occasion to see the culprits. It was held that this impression would include the facial impression of the culprits. It was held that such a deep impression would not be erased within a period of three months. 50. In Rajesh Govind Jagesha Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 8 SCC 428 the accused was apprehended on 20-1-1993, while the identification parade was held on 13-2-1993. It was also not disputed that at the time of identification parade the appellant was not having a beard and long hair as mentioned at the time of lodging of the first information report. It was also not disputed that no person with a beard and long hair was included in the parade. The witnesses were alleged to have identified the accused at the first sight despite the fact that he had removed the long hair and beard. This Court held that the Magistrate should have associated 1-2 persons having resemblance with the persons described in the FIR and why it was not done was a mystery shrouded with doubts and not cleared by the prosecution. In these circumstances, the Court observed that the possibility of the witnesses having seen the accused between the date of arrest and the test identification parade cannot be ruled out. This case also rests on its own facts, and mere delay in holding the test identification parade was not the sole reason for rejecting the identification. 51. In Daya Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (2001) 3 SCC 468 the test identification parade was held after a period of almost eight years inasmuch as the accused could not be arrested for a period of 7½ years and after the arrest the test identification parade was held after a period of six months. It was pointed out that the purpose of test identification parade is to have the corroboration of the evidence of the eyewitnesses in the form of earlier identification. It was pointed out that the purpose of test identification parade is to have the corroboration of the evidence of the eyewitnesses in the form of earlier identification. It was held that the substantive evidence is the evidence given by the witness in the court and if that evidence is found to be reliable then the absence of corroboration by the test identification is not material. It was further held that the fact that the injured witnesses had lost their son and daughter-in-law showed that there were reasons for an enduring impression of the identity on the mind and memory of the witnesses. 52. This Court in Lal Singh Vs. State of U.P., (2003) 12 SCC 554 while discussing all the cases germane to the question of identification parades and the effect of delay in conducting them held that (SCC p. 571, para 43): "43. It will thus be seen that the evidence of identification has to be considered in the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. Though it is desirable to hold the test identification parade at the earliest possible opportunity, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in this regard. If the• delay is inordinate and there is evidence probabilising the possibility of the accused having been shown to the witnesses, the court may not act on the basis of such evidence. Moreover, cases where the conviction is based not solely on the basis of identification in court, but on the basis of other corroborative evidence, such as recovery of looted articles, stand on a different footing and the court has to consider the evidence in its entirety." 53. In Anil Kumar Vs. State of U.P., (2003) 3 SCC 569 this Court observed as under (Para-9) : "9. ........It is to be seen that apart from stating that delay throws a doubt on the genuineness of the identification parade and observing that after lapse of such a long time it would be difficult for the witnesses to remember the facial expressions, no other reasoning is given why such a small delay would be fatal." A mere lapse of some days is not enough to erase the facial expressions of assailants from the memory of father and mother who have seen them killing their son. 54. In another case of Pramod Mandal Vs. 54. In another case of Pramod Mandal Vs. State of Bihar, (2004) 13 SCC 150 placing reliance on Anil Kumar this Court observed that (Pramod case, Para-20) : "20. It is neither possible nor prudent to lay down any invariable rule as to the period within which a test identification parade must be held, or the number of witnesses who must correctly identify the accused, to sustain his conviction. These matters must be left to the courts of fact to decide in the facts and circumstances of each case. If a rule is laid down prescribing a period within which the test identification parade must be held, it would only benefit the professional criminals in whose cases the arrests are delayed as the police have no clear clue about their identity, they being persons unknown to the victims. They, therefore, have only to avoid their arrest for the prescribed period to avoid conviction. Similarly, there may be offences which by their very nature may be witnessed by a single witness, such as rape. The offender may be unknown to the victim and the case depends solely on the identification by the victim, who is otherwise found to be truthful and reliable. What justification can be pleaded to contend that such cases must necessarily result in acquittal because of there being only one identifying witness? Prudence therefore demands that these matters must be left to the wisdom of the courts of fact which must consider all aspects of the matter in the light of the evidence on record before pronouncing upon the acceptability or rejection of such identification." 55. The identification parades are not primarily meant for the court. They are meant for investigation purposes. The object of conducting a test identification parade is twofold. First is to enable the witnesses to satisfy themselves that the accused whom they suspect is really the one who was seen by them in connection with the commission of the crime. Second is to satisfy the investigating authorities that the suspect is the real person whom the witnesses had seen in connection with the said occurrence. First is to enable the witnesses to satisfy themselves that the accused whom they suspect is really the one who was seen by them in connection with the commission of the crime. Second is to satisfy the investigating authorities that the suspect is the real person whom the witnesses had seen in connection with the said occurrence. Therefore, the following principles regarding identification parade emerge: (1) an identification parade ideally must be conducted as soon as possible to avoid any mistake on the part of witnesses; (2) this condition can be revoked if proper explanation justifying the delay is provided; and (3) the authorities must make sure that the delay does not result in exposure of the accused which may lead to mistakes on the part of the witnesses." 11. In the instant case, the appellant was arrested on 30.8.95 and the Test Identification Parade (T.I.P.) was conducted on 6.9.95. According to the T. I. P. memo, Kaliya (PW-8) identified the appellant in T.I.P. Kaliya (PW-8) admitted in Para-29 of his cross-examination that police has detained Nemai, Keshal Sarkar and 2-3 other persons in the police station. He was also detained in police station and was interrogated by the high police official who threatened him during the interrogation. In Para-34, he admitted that he had seen the appellant in police station. The above evidence of Kaliya (PW-8) cannot be ignored because he clearly deposed that he was detained in police station for 15 days and admittedly the appellant was brought to the police station in between this period. It vitiates the sanctity of the T.I.P. Moreover, there is no evidence that there was sufficient light in the room or in the verandah, so that Kaliya (PW-8) would have easily identified the assailants. We are of the view that in the above facts and circumstances of the case, the evidence of identification of the appellant by Kaliya (PW-8) was shaky and was not worthy of credence. 12. On appreciation of entire evidence on record, we do not find the evidence of Kaliya (PW-8), solitary eye-witness, to be trustworthy. 13. The circumstance of memorandum and seizure of the shirt would assume no importance for the reason that it could not be established that the blood stained found over the shirt of the appellant was of human blood. 12. On appreciation of entire evidence on record, we do not find the evidence of Kaliya (PW-8), solitary eye-witness, to be trustworthy. 13. The circumstance of memorandum and seizure of the shirt would assume no importance for the reason that it could not be established that the blood stained found over the shirt of the appellant was of human blood. In absence of proof of the 'origin' and the 'group' of the blood stains the above circumstance would not be an incriminating circumstance as it was capable of being explained and was not of conclusive nature and tendency. 14. During the course of arguments, we have been told that the second assailant was not at all traced by the police. Even the police could not know as to who was the second assailant. In the memorandum statement of the appellant, it has been mentioned that he was accompanied by the other assailant, but it is not mentioned that who the other assailant was. This also appears to be unnatural. If out of 2 assailants one was arrested, normally the name of the other is likely to be disclosed by him. No investigation in this regard, further creates doubt on the case of the prosecution. 15. For the foregoing reasons, we are unable to sustain the conviction of the appellant. 16. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentences awarded to the appellant u/s 302/34 IPC are set-aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges framed against him. It is stated that the appellant is on bail. His bail bonds are cancelled and sureties stand discharged. Appeal Allowed.