Sudhir Agarwal, J.;— 1. Heard Sri M.D.Singh 'Shekhar' learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri S.C.Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Divakar Rai Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents No.2 and 3 and perused the record. 2. The petitioner Shanker Lal Agarwal own the building in question namely the shop having purchased the same in November, 1991. He filed an application under Section 21(1)(a) of Act, 1972 (registered as U.P.U.B. Case No.5 of 1992), for release of the said building which is under the tenancy of respondents No.2 and 3. The application was allowed by Prescribed Authority vide order dated 4th January, 1997 whereagainst respondents No.2 and 3 filed appeal i.e. U.P.U.B. Appeal No.3 of 1997. The appeal was allowed vide judgment dated 9th April, 1999 and Prescribed Authority's order dated 4th January, 1997 was set aside by Appellate Court i.e. District Judge, Aligarh. It is this judgment which has caused the petitioner-landlord to approach this Court under Article 226/227 by filing the present writ petition assailing the aforesaid appellate order. 3. The respondent no.3 is said to be proprietor of firm M/s New Everlite Electrical Works which is running in the tenanted accommodation in question. A release application was filed on 7th January, 1992 on the ground that landlord wants the above accommodation for the benefit of his second son Ganesh Vishal who will start his business of electrical goods namely Televisions, Transistors etc.. The building in which the shop in question is situated has several other shops also but they are/were all already occupied by various tenants. Therefore the landlord filed application for release of the shop in question, opting the same to get it vacated for his son. 4. The Appellate Court has reversed the order of Prescribed Authority on the ground that in the meantime the landlord Shanker Lal Agarwal got another shop which was in occupation of one Dr. Harish Raizada, released and vacated, which he intended to use for himself and his elder son Sarvesh Kumar for starting wholesale Khadi business but instead of commencing joint wholesale business, Sarvesh Kumar independently used some part of that shop for the purpose of running Khadi business and some part has been used as godown. Harish Raizada, released and vacated, which he intended to use for himself and his elder son Sarvesh Kumar for starting wholesale Khadi business but instead of commencing joint wholesale business, Sarvesh Kumar independently used some part of that shop for the purpose of running Khadi business and some part has been used as godown. Meaning thereby, the other part could have been used by the landlord for settling his second son and having not done so, the claim of the tenant in question that landlord's need is not genuine stands fortified. 5. Sri M.D.Singh Shekhar, learned counsel for petitioner contended that the above findings of lower Appellate Court are imaginary, clearly perverse and shows that Appellate Court has tried to dictate the landlord to settle his affairs in a manner as thought fit by him (Appellate Court) and not according to his (landlord's) own requirement. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents-tenants has endeavoured to support the impugned appellate order founded on the reasons stated therein. 7. It cannot be disputed that it is for the landlord(s) to decide as to how and in what manner he should live and adjust and arrange his affairs. He/they cannot be compelled to live in a particular manner either by tenants or even by the Courts. 8. In Prativa Devi Vs. T.V.Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353 , the Apex Court said that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to dictate to the landlord how and in what manner he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. Therein the Court considered the age of landlord and doubted his need on the ground that in such advanced age, he would be requiring somebody to take care and therefore should live with other family members instead of alone. The Apex Court observed that High Court is rather solicitous about the age of the appellant and thinks that because of her age she needs to be looked after. That is a lookout of landlord and not of High Court. The Apex Court disapproved the approach of High Court and observed: "We fail to appreciate the High Court giving such a gratuitous advice which was uncalled for. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property." 9. That is a lookout of landlord and not of High Court. The Apex Court disapproved the approach of High Court and observed: "We fail to appreciate the High Court giving such a gratuitous advice which was uncalled for. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property." 9. In Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, AIR 1999 SC 2507 the Apex Court said: "Once the court is satisfied of the bonafides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the court. The court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited.for the purpose." 10. Similarly, in R. C. Tamrakar Vs. Nidi Lekha, AIR 2001 SC 3806 , the Court in paras 10 and 11 said: "10. Law is well settled that it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirement. In deciding the question of the bonafide requirement, it is unnecessary to make an endeavor as to how else landlord could have adjusted himself. 11. Though the son of the landlady is a doctor and has constructed his own house, the landlady wants to stay in the suit premises. It is not the case of the tenant that landlady has any other suitable accommodation. Therefore, the High Court rightly set aside the finding of the First Appellate Court holding that landlady could not be compelled to reside with her son as her case was that she wanted to stay by herself in the suit premises because of her health condition and the climatic condition of that place suit her." 11. This court following the above dictum laid down by the Apex Court, in Writ Petition No.33466 of 1998 (Sri Chhannu Lal (since deceased) & others Vs. Vth A.D.J., Varanasi and others) decided on 26.7.2012 and in para 5 the Court said: "5. As a matter of proposition, it cannot be disputed that it is the privilege of landlord to determine his way of living and accommodate himself and his family according to his status, requirement etc. Vth A.D.J., Varanasi and others) decided on 26.7.2012 and in para 5 the Court said: "5. As a matter of proposition, it cannot be disputed that it is the privilege of landlord to determine his way of living and accommodate himself and his family according to his status, requirement etc. He cannot be compelled to live in a particular manner either by tenant or any other agency. Even the Court of law must not dictate such terms to a landlord to live an a particular manner and adjust his needs accordingly." 12. Having said so, I find that earlier shop got vacated by the landlord on the ground that he along with is eldest son Sarvesh Kumar would be running a Khadi business therein. It is not in dispute that the said business has been started by Sri Sarvesh Kumar, the elderest son of the landlord. It is a different thing that relations of father and son did not continue to be conducive enough so that both could have joined the business. The elder son himself has started wholesale Khadi business by using some part of shop and other part has been used as godown. It was open to the father and son both to arrange business by using entire shop as a showroom or office or by dividing the same in office and godown or by having some further addition in residential part also, but, the fact remains, that purpose for which earlier shop got vacated, has not been deviated. The business has been started in the aforesaid shop by the elder son of landlord. It does not mean that landlord cannot decide to settle his second son by getting another and an independent shop available for him. It is not the case of the respondent-tenants that landlord has any other shop available in a vacant state in which second son of landlord could have started his own business separately. 13. The Appellate Court, in the manner it has discussed the adjustment made by the landlord with his eldest son, has virtually attempted to dictate him that while making such adjustment, he ought to have accommodated his second son also instead of deciding to provide an independent shop to the second son for settling him in a different business. 13. The Appellate Court, in the manner it has discussed the adjustment made by the landlord with his eldest son, has virtually attempted to dictate him that while making such adjustment, he ought to have accommodated his second son also instead of deciding to provide an independent shop to the second son for settling him in a different business. In my view, approach of appellate Court is thoroughly erroneous and not only it has committed a manifest error of law in entering into this arena but its order has also caused grave miscarriage of justice to the petitioner landlord. 14. In the words of the Apex Court, as said in Prativa Devi (supra) such gratuitous advice of the Court is wholly uncalled for. Law cannot be construed in a manner so as to deprive the landlord beneficial enjoyment of his property. The Appellate court ought not to have endeavoured as to how else landlord should have adjusted himself while deciding the question of bona fide requirement. This was wholly unnecessary, as said by the Apex Court in R.C.Tamrakar (supra). I am clearly of the view that above observation fully apply in this case rendering the appellate order bad in law. 15. Now so far as comparative hardship is concerned, once it is clear that landlord did not possess any other alternative accommodation in a vacant state and there was nothing to show that the tenant has made any attempt to find out any alternative accommodation, the issue of comparative hardship also lean in favour of the landlord. 16. In view thereof, appellate order dated 09.4.1999 impugned in this writ petition cannot sustain. 17. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned appellate order dated 09.4.1999 (Annexure No.15 to the writ petition) is hereby set aside and Trial Court's judgment and order dated 04.01.1997 is restored and confirmed. 18. The petitioner shall be entitled to cost which I quantify to Rs.5,000/-. _____________