1. Registration of the case as Crime No. 46/2005 P/S Crime Branch, on completion of investigation has culminated in presenting the charge sheet for commission of offences punishable under Section 409,420,467,468,471 RPC. Trial court vide order dated 26.11.2011, for the commission of same offences has framed the charge against the accused. Dissatisfied therewith, instant petition has been filed. 2. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, he has not been heard before passing the order impugned. Further added that though in the order.accused is shown present along with counsel but in fact he, being the counsel, has not appeared before the trial court, therefore, right of hearing, which is guaranteed in terms of Section 269 Cr. P. C, has been violated. 3. The contention raised has to be out rightly rejected. Perusal of the interim orders recorded by the trial court would reveal that on 27.12.2010, accused sought time for engaging the counsel, same was granted. On 15.3.201 1, one Advocate, namely, Mr. Ali Mohammad Bhat, appeared on behalf of the accused but accused was not present, however, at the request of said counsel personal appearance for the said date was dispensed with. On 11.8.2011 accused had appeared but Advocate had not appeared and at his behest case was adjourned. Then on 24.10.2011 accused along with same Advocate had appeared but submission was made to the effect that Mr. Mian Ahmad Qayoorn is engaged counsel who is not available. On such request case had been adjourned and after recording the said order, the accused had appeared which is also recorded. Now to say that when the impugned order was passed, counsel for accused was not present is unacceptable. 4. It is settled that at the stage of framing or otherwise of the charge, meticulous sifting or roving enquiry into pros and cons is not permissible, it is also settled that the prosecution theory has not to be accepted blindly. Sifting of the material, for ascertaining as to whether ground exist for presuming commission of offence, is permissible for.that limited purpose only. At the stage of charge the test which is to be applied is altogether different as to what is to be applied at the final stage i.e. at the conclusion of trial. At this stage suspicion favours prosecution and at the final stage same favours accused. 5. At the stage of charge the test which is to be applied is altogether different as to what is to be applied at the final stage i.e. at the conclusion of trial. At this stage suspicion favours prosecution and at the final stage same favours accused. 5. Learned counsel is correct in submitting that the purpose of giving proper hearing to the defence at the stage of framing or otherwise of the charge has an objective i.e. if there is possibility of discharge, accused in the name of trial shall not be put to trial. The scope and the position as has to be considered at the stage of charge is well settled. In this connection learned counsel relied on the judgments reported in 2001 Cr. L. J. 1987, 2002 Cr. L. J. 2851, Mohd. Aslam Malik v. State 2011(1) S.L.J. 287 : 2011 (1) JKJ 9, 1996(9) SCC 766 , 2002 (2) SCC 135 & AIR 2006 SC 2065. 6. The principle, as has been laid down, to be followed at the stage of framing or otherwise of the charge, is not disputed, it is in the same background learned counsel would contend that if counsel for the accused would have been heard before passing the order, the object of hearing would have been achieved and added that the correctness of the judicial record is rebuttable. In support of this submission, relied on the judgment reported in AIR 1995 SC 350 , wherein it has been held that "the factual recitals or observations made in a judgment or order are taken to be correct unless rebutted. The burden to rebut is on the person who challenges it." 7. In the instant case only grievance projected is that the counsel for the accused was not present but same is unbelievable. May be some Advocate on behalf of Mr. Qayoom might have appeared before the trial court. When Court had waited for the counsel for the accused on number of occasions, there can be no reason to say that the trial court has recorded presence of the Advocate even in his absence. Same in view of interim orders recorded on the file from time to time appears to be unbelievable. 8. When Court had waited for the counsel for the accused on number of occasions, there can be no reason to say that the trial court has recorded presence of the Advocate even in his absence. Same in view of interim orders recorded on the file from time to time appears to be unbelievable. 8. In the judgment reported in (2007) 5 SCC 359 , the Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with the question of correctness of the records as to what transpired at hearing has held as under:- "4. If really there was no concession, the only course open to the appellants was to move the High Court in line with what has been said in State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. the view in the said case was reiterated by observing that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in the court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judge who has made the record. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. It is not open to the appellants to contend before this Court to the contrary." 9. Learned Deputy Advocate General, Mr. N.H. Shah, also opposed the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner by stating that even if presuming, Advocate had not appeared, then nothing preventing him from filing an application for re-call of the order and such application would not be termed to be an application for review which otherwise is not permissible in view of Section 369 Cr.P.C. Supporting this contention, has relied on the judgment reported in AIR 2011 SC 1232 . 10. In the reported judgment such type of application, as filed, was held to be an application for re-call of the order and not for review which has been permitted so that injustice is not occasioned. 10. In the reported judgment such type of application, as filed, was held to be an application for re-call of the order and not for review which has been permitted so that injustice is not occasioned. The said order Avas challenged and it was contended that it amounts to review but the Hon'ble Apex Court ruled that such application for re-call of the order shall not amount to review. 11. In case no counsel would have appeared before the trial court when impugned order was passing, nothing prevented the counsel from filing an application for re-call of the order because factual position could be better known to the learned Presiding Officer. 12. Next it was contended by learned Deputy Advocate General that exercise of inherent power, so as to interfere with the order framing charge, has to be by way of an exception and such power is exercisable so as to do substantial justice. In support of this contention relied on the judgment reported in AIR 2004 SC 4087. 13. It is true that in view of law laid down, interference with the order framing charge is permissible only in exceptional cases so as to do substantial justice. While going through the material as placed on record the order impugned could not be found fault with. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that framing of charge offends the right of liberty, therefore, hearing the petitioner and his counsel was imperative, supporting this submission, learned counsel relied on the judgment reported in (1996)4 SCC 659 . 15. There can be no quarrel on the preposition that the accused has a right of hearing and the object of hearing at the stage of framing or otherwise of the charge is to enable the accused to project that he is not involved in the commission of offence. According to learned counsel in case counsel for the petitioner would have been heard, then trial Judge would have recorded in the order as to what is the case against the accused. The submission is without any substance. Trial court while recording order regarding framing or otherwise of the charge is not required to appreciate the evidence as a whole. According to learned counsel in case counsel for the petitioner would have been heard, then trial Judge would have recorded in the order as to what is the case against the accused. The submission is without any substance. Trial court while recording order regarding framing or otherwise of the charge is not required to appreciate the evidence as a whole. If the trial court at such stage considers the material, hears the counsel for the accused, that is sufficient compliance, which means trial court has derived satisfaction from the records so as to be satisfied about the existence of grounds for presuming commission of the offence. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner was pointedly asked as to what is the merit in his submission to say that the accused is innocent and no ground exist for presuming commission of offence but he insisted that in fact trial court should have heard him so as to enable him to project all his grievances, that too, after charge would have been described against, the accused, as is a requirement in terms of Section 267 Cr. P.C. 17. While sifting the record for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether grounds exist for proceeding against accused, it is found that the trial court has not erred in passing the order framing charge against the accused. 18. Lastly learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the case may be transferred to some other Court for disposal under law but no ground is made out for such transfer, as such, same is impermissible. Submission, accordingly rejected. 19. Considered from all angles, no illegality is found to have been committed by the trial court, therefore, petition is without merit, dismissed accordingly along with connected Cr. M. P. 20. Trial court record along with copy of the order be send back forthwith.