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2012 DIGILAW 194 (KER)

T. P. Senkumar, Transport Commissioner, Transport Bhavan Vazhuthacaud, Thiruvananthapuram v. State of Kerala

2012-02-13

N.K.BALAKRISHNAN

body2012
ORDER : N.K. Balakrishnan, J. This petition is filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to expunge all adverse remarks made against the petitioner in the impugned Annexure A1 Order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam. Annexure A1 Order was passed by the learned Magistrate on an application filed by the Senior Assistant Public Prosecutor under Section 309 of Cr.P.C. to postpone the examination of the prosecution witnesses till the further report under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. is filed. 2. The petitioner was not a party to the proceedings before the Court below. According to the petitioner, some of the remarks and observations made by the learned Magistrate are totally unnecessary and irrelevant, besides, being passed without affording an opportunity to the petitioner of being heard. It is contended by the petitioner that if the adverse remarks made by the learned Magistrate are to remain on record it will cause hardship and irreparable injury to him and will affect his official career. 3. The petitioner was the Additional Director General of Police. When the adverse remarks were made he was working as Transport Commissioner, Government of Kerala. 4. On 10.5.2006, the offices of 'LIS', (a partnership firm) was searched by the Police, on the basis of the instruction given by the petitioner who was then working as Inspector General of Police, South Zone, Thiruvananthapuram. Pursuant thereto, Crime No:672/2006 was registered at Central Police Station, Ernakulam. It is also stated that thereafter, the petitioner was transferred, promoted and posted as Additional Director General of Police. 5. The report under Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. was stated to have been filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam on 9.9.2006. The charge against the accused in that case was stated to have been framed on 12.11.2008 and the case was posted for trial. 6. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the only sin committed by the petitioner is that he happened to send the letter dated 24.6.2011 to the Chief Minister of Kerala, who is also in charge of the Home Department, as per which he requested the Chief Minister to direct the Police authorities for further investigation into the case for bringing relevant and admissible evidence before the Court for a fair trail. It seems that letter was forwarded by the Chief Minister to the Home Secretary. 7. It seems that letter was forwarded by the Chief Minister to the Home Secretary. 7. In Annexure A1 Order, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had repeatedly said that this petitioner, who was the charge sheet witness no.1 (CW1) in the aforesaid case, C.C. No:219/2006, was responsible for causing the application for further investigation to be filed and it was the petitioner who was causing delay in the trial. 8. The learned counsel would submit that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was carried away by the submissions made on behalf of the accused to make unnecessary and unwarranted comments against the petitioner. The prayer made by the Investigating Officer in his application under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. was for further investigation. That petition was not dismissed. Along with that petition, an application was filed under Section 309 of Cr.P.C. to stop further examination of the witnesses who were yet to be examined. Those applications were not filed by the petitioner. 9. The learned Magistrate has observed that there is "no provision to add anything to the testimony of the witness so as to fill it with ingredients of the offence or to fill the lacuna". It was further observed by the learned Magistrate that the prayer made by the prosecution is to conduct further investigation "so as to correct the irregularities in the testimony given by the prosecution witnesses". The learned Magistrate then observed: "The interference of CW1 is very clear in this matter. Every now and then he is conducting press meetings. He filed a report addressed to the Hon'ble Chief Minister of Kerala on 24.6.2011 criticizing the trail going on before this Court. Very recently he hired a 'Paul' and 'Reporter' channel had a scare heading. His move is too dubious. It is seen that the Commissioner of Police, Kochi City, is only a tool in the hands of Sri. T.P. Senkumar. Even though he is the Transport Commissioner, he has the remote control of everything in this case. It was upon the direction given by Sri. T.P. Senkumar the earlier petition CMP No:229/2011 was filed by the D.D.P. which was declined by this court. Now he has selected a Joseph Saju. He was given the charge of Narcotic Cell and has directed the Commissioner of Police, Kochi City to issue an order directing him to conduct 'discrete enquiry'. Sri. T.P. Senkumar the earlier petition CMP No:229/2011 was filed by the D.D.P. which was declined by this court. Now he has selected a Joseph Saju. He was given the charge of Narcotic Cell and has directed the Commissioner of Police, Kochi City to issue an order directing him to conduct 'discrete enquiry'. Sri. Joseph Saju is not a predecessor in office of the earlier investigating officer Sri. Bernard Dev. He is still in service. Sri. Joseph Saju is not the Station House Officer of Central Police Station who earlier conducted the investigation in this case. Sri. Bernard Dev was appointed by Sri. T.P. Senkumar. He himself was leading the investigation team from the very inception of the registration of crime up to 19.9.2006. High Court had directed that a speed trial is to be conducted as far as possible in this case." 10. In paragraph 8, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has made the following remarks: "It is too unbecoming on the part of CW1 Sri. T.P. Senkumar to comment on the progress of the case in which he is yet to be examined. His conduct is likely to invite proceedings for contempt of court. He is showing over enthusiasm in this case by directing his subordinates, to prolong the trial even after 5 years of filing the charge sheet. The conduct of learned Sr. A.P.P. in giving a letter to the investigating officer without producing a copy of that letter is not proper. It will ruin the concept of a fair trial. Prosecution has no case that they have obtained further evidence in this case. The intention to correct the depositions of witnesses already examined and to fill those depositions with the ingredients of offences as they like is unheard of. There is no such provision in the Indian Evidence Act and Code of Criminal Procedure to correct a deposition after the examination of the witnesses. Prosecution cannot continue to go on further investigation to plug the loop holes in the deposition of the witnesses during the trial or to expand those depositions. Section 309 Cr.P.C. envisages to continue a speedy trial and for adjournment of a case cogent reason is to be recorded and that too for a limited period. Prosecution cannot continue to go on further investigation to plug the loop holes in the deposition of the witnesses during the trial or to expand those depositions. Section 309 Cr.P.C. envisages to continue a speedy trial and for adjournment of a case cogent reason is to be recorded and that too for a limited period. Now what has happened is the Assistant Public Prosecutor directing the investigating officer to conduct further investigation and a petition under Section 309 Cr.P.C. is filed stating that police authorities have decided to conduct further investigation and trial is to be stopped till filing of the further report. The whole move on the part of prosecution is ill-motivated, malafide and misconceived. The Transport Commissioner and his aids are exploring the possibility to scare the Court. The news item in 'Reporter' channel is only a damp squib. Let them have the good sense not to unleash any more paper tigers. The newspapers and documents filed before Court on the guise of a further investigation will be kept separately. It goes against the mandate in Section 173(8) of Criminal Procedure Code. It pertains to 'Jyothis'. Moreover they want to incorporate provisions of Reserve Bank of India Act which was earlier declined by Apex Court." 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the afore quoted portion contains so many factually incorrect statements. The learned counsel submits that because the petitioner was the officer who happened to register the F.I.R. and to direct/conduct search in the offices of the accused therein, when he later realised that the investigation was not conducted properly and that relevant documents were not seized and proper statements were not recorded but charge sheet was laid without such documents, the petitioner happened to bring that fact to the notice of the Hon'ble Chief Minister. No doubt, if the Police Officer or any other person interferes in the trial or make any unnecessary comments amounting to interference in the administration of justice, then it may have to be condemned. But the petitioner contends that he had no intention to interfere with the trial of the case or in any other way to interfere with the judicial proceedings or to interfere in the investigation of the case, but what was done by him was to bring that fact to the notice of the Chief Minister. But the petitioner contends that he had no intention to interfere with the trial of the case or in any other way to interfere with the judicial proceedings or to interfere in the investigation of the case, but what was done by him was to bring that fact to the notice of the Chief Minister. This, according to the petitioner, would in no way amount to interference in the proper investigation or trial of the case, but the learned Magistrate has made unnecessary scathing remarks against the petitioner. 12. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that even in the petition filed by the accused against the order framing charge, the accused had made blistering attack on the petitioner attributing mala fides in his action. But this Court observed : "I am certainly of opinion that the Inspector-General of Police who registered the crime has not acted beyond his jurisdiction in registering the crime. He has the obligation under Section 149 of the Criminal Procedure Code to interpose the commission of cognisable offences. The aggressive advertisement campaign resorted to by the accused must have aroused doubts and dis-satisfaction in the mind of right thinking members of the police as to why the State and its functionaries were sleeping and inactive. That the I.G. of Police registered the crime during the transition of power from one Government to other - after the elections were declared, does not, many way, affect the validity of the charges raised. That at least one Police Officer opened his eyes and slung into action belatedly while all the other powers that be feigned slumber is no evidence of his malafides." 13. It is also pointed out that the aforesaid order was confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. That judgment was reported in Kuriachan Chacko v. State Of Kerala 2008(3) KHC, 155. Still disregarding the same the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has chosen to make such unnecessary comments against the petitioner and that too without issuing any notice to the petitioner to ascertain the correctness of the allegations made by the accused against the petitioner. It is argued by the learned senior counsel, Sri. Still disregarding the same the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has chosen to make such unnecessary comments against the petitioner and that too without issuing any notice to the petitioner to ascertain the correctness of the allegations made by the accused against the petitioner. It is argued by the learned senior counsel, Sri. M.K. Damodaran, appearing for the accused that the accused, who got themselves impleaded as additional respondents in this matter, had made available the paper cuttings etc before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and that was the reason the learned C.J.M. has made such comments. The learned Magistrate was not expected to rely upon such news items or paper cuttings without getting evidence on the point. No such document is seen marked or exhibited in the impugned order. No person was examined nor even affidavit of the press persons were obtained to ensure whether any such press statement was made by the petitioner or that he had participated in any interview so as to telecast the same. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that so many news items which are untrue or only partly true appear in print and electronic media and if such news items are relied upon by the Courts to pass orders, the whole justice administration system would be at peril. The mind of the Court should not be perturbed or prejudiced by such reports and statements, submits the counsel. It is further submitted that a news paper is not one of the documents referred to in Section 78(2) of Evidence Act. As such the presumption of genuineness as prescribed under Section 81 of the Evidence Act is not available to such news items or paper cuttings. Therefore, such paper reports cannot be treated as proof of facts reported therein. 15. It is further submitted that the statement of fact contained in the newspaper is only the edited version which most often is based on hearsay information and, therefore, it is inadmissible in evidence. Therefore, such paper reports cannot be treated as proof of facts reported therein. 15. It is further submitted that the statement of fact contained in the newspaper is only the edited version which most often is based on hearsay information and, therefore, it is inadmissible in evidence. Here, not only that there was no proof of the authenticity of the paper reports or what appeared in the electronic media, but also that, not even a notice was issued to the petitioner herein as to whether he had given any such press statement or any statement to the print or electronic media; and if any such statement was given what was the context or the reason for giving such statement. Without resorting to such procedure known to law an unusual procedure was adopted by the learned Magistrate and he jumped to a conclusion that what was stated by the accused before the Court was the gospel truth, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that a reading of the impugned Annexure A1 Order would show that the learned Magistrate has spent more time to express his indignation against the petitioner exceeding all bounds of judicial restraint and made scurrilous attack and scathing remarks against the petitioner, that too, in a petition filed under Section 309 Cr.P.C., where it was absolutely unnecessary for the Magistrate to enter into any such area. 17. The learned senior counsel appearing for the additional respondents/accused has relied upon the decisions in R. Jayaraja Menon v. K. Gheevarghese 1972 K.L.T. 691, In the matter of : 'K' a Judicial Officer 2001 (1) KLT 707 (SC) and Sudheer v. Susheela 2009 (4) KLT 29 (F.B.), in support of his submission that even if there is violation of principles of natural justice that will not ipso facto vitiate the order. The learned senior counsel submits that hearing need not always be personal hearing but the facts dealt with in those cases are entirely different. Here, the adverse comments were made without giving notice and without hearing the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that had the petitioner been given notice, he could have offered his explanation, but that was unjustly denied and therefore, serious prejudice was caused to the petitioner. 18. Here, the adverse comments were made without giving notice and without hearing the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that had the petitioner been given notice, he could have offered his explanation, but that was unjustly denied and therefore, serious prejudice was caused to the petitioner. 18. The learned counsel for the petitioner has cited so many decisions to fortify his submissions that harsh and disparaging remarks should not be made against persons and authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before the courts of law unless it is really necessary for the decision of the case as integral part thereof to animadvert on that conduct. 19. In Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhusan Kar and Another (1986) 2 SCC 569 it was held: "It is, therefore, settled law that harsh or disparaging remarks are not to be made against persons and authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law unless it is really necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof to animadvert on that conduct. We hold that the adverse remarks made against the appellant were neither justified nor called for. Having regard to the limited controversy in the appeal to the High Court and the hearsay nature of evidence of the appellant it was not at all necessary for the Appellate Judge to have animadverted on the conduct of the appellant for the purpose of allowing the appeal of the first respondent. Even assuming that a serious evaluation of the evidence of the appellant was really called for in the appeal the remarks of the learned Appellate Judge should be in conformity with the settled practise of courts to observe sobriety, moderation and reserve. We need only remind that the higher the forum and the greater the powers, the greater the need for restraint and the more mellowed the reproach should be." This decision was followed by the apex Court In The Matter Of : 'K' A Judicial Officer (2001) 3 Supreme Court Cases 54. 20. We need only remind that the higher the forum and the greater the powers, the greater the need for restraint and the more mellowed the reproach should be." This decision was followed by the apex Court In The Matter Of : 'K' A Judicial Officer (2001) 3 Supreme Court Cases 54. 20. In Manish Dixit And Others v. State Of Rajasthan AIR 2001 SC 93 , it was held: "Even those apart, this Court has repeatedly cautioned that before any castigating remarks are made by the Court against any person, particularly when such remarks could ensue serious consequences on the future career of the person concerned he should have been given an opportunity of being heard in the matter in respect of the proposed remarks or strictures. Such an opportunity is the basic requirement, for, otherwise the offending remarks would be in violation of the principles of natural justice." 21. Similar observations were made by the Apex Court in Kishan Singh v. State Of Punjab 2007 (4) KLT SN 70 (C.NO.79) SC. It was observed thus: "Judges should not use strong and carping language while criticizing the conduct of parties or their witnesses. They must act with sobriety, moderation and restraint. They must have the humility to recognize that they are not infallible and any harsh and disparaging strictures passed by them against any party may be mistaken and unjustified and if so, they may do considerable harm and mischief and result in injustice. Here, in the present case, the observations made and strictures passed by B.M. Lal, J. were totally unjustified and unwarranted and they ought not to have been made. The judges Bench is a seat of power. Not only do Judges have power to make binding decisions, their decisions legitimate the use of power by other officials. The Judges have the absolute and unchallenged control of the Court domain. But they cannot misuse their authority by intemperate comments, undignified banter or scathing criticism of counsel, parties or witnesses. The judges Bench is a seat of power. Not only do Judges have power to make binding decisions, their decisions legitimate the use of power by other officials. The Judges have the absolute and unchallenged control of the Court domain. But they cannot misuse their authority by intemperate comments, undignified banter or scathing criticism of counsel, parties or witnesses. We concede that the Court has the inherent power to act freely upon its own conviction on any matter coming before it for adjudication, but is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that derogatory remarks ought not to be made against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for the decision of the case to animadvert on their conduct." 22. In Testa Setalvad And Another v. State Of Gujarat and Others (2004) 10 Supreme Court Cases 88 it was contended that the observations made by the High Court were unnecessary and contrary to the truth but were also made against persons who were not even given an opportunity to justify their action. And so it was contended that principles of natural justice were grossly violated. As such the prayer made before the apex Court was for deletion of the offending portion from the judgment. It was found that the appellants therein, were not parties in the case before the High Court. It was held by the apex Court thus: "It is not in dispute and the records also reveal that the appellants were not parties in the case before the High Court. It is beyond comprehension as to how the learned Judges in the High Court could afford to overlook such a basic and vitally essential tenet of the "rule of law", that no one should be condemned unheard, and risk themselves to be criticized for injudicious approach and/or render their decisions vulnerable for challenge on account of violating judicial norms and ethics." 23. It was further held: "Time and again this Court has deprecated the practise of making observations in judgments, unless the persons in respect of whom comments and criticisms were being made were parties to the proceedings, and further were granted an opportunity of having their say in the matter, unmindful of the serious repercussions they may entail on such persons. It was further held: "Time and again this Court has deprecated the practise of making observations in judgments, unless the persons in respect of whom comments and criticisms were being made were parties to the proceedings, and further were granted an opportunity of having their say in the matter, unmindful of the serious repercussions they may entail on such persons. Apart from that, when there is no relevance to the subject-matter of adjudication, it is certainly not desirable for the courts to make any comments or observations reflecting on the bona fides or credibility of any person or their actions. Judicial decorum requires dispassionate approach and the importance of issues involved for consideration is no justification to throw to the winds basic judicial norms on mere personal perceptions as saviours of the situation." It is incomprehensible why in spite of such directions issued or law laid down by the apex Court, the learned Magistrate has chosen to ignore the same, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits. 24. The learned State Prosecutor also submits that the observations made by the Court below were totally unnecessary and unwarranted. The contention that there was no necessity to issue a notice to the petitioner to explain his position is seen to be rather unsound and untenable. No notice was given to the petitioner before making such adverse remarks against him. The impugned order does not show that documents were marked or proved to show that any press statement was issued by the petitioner or that he had participated in any interview. In any event the petitioner should have been given opportunity to explain his position. That was not done. 25. That apart, there was no necessity to go into all those aspects since the only question for consideration before the learned Magistrate was whether the request for postponement of the examination of the witnesses should be allowed or not. In view of the facts stated before that Court, that further investigation was being conducted in the matter, it was only to be found whether it was just and proper that the examination is postponed or not. For that purpose it was not at all necessary for the learned Magistrate to travel beyond the limits and make those unnecessary comments. 26. Hence, I find that all the adverse remarks passed against the petitioner are to be expunged. In the result this petition is allowed. For that purpose it was not at all necessary for the learned Magistrate to travel beyond the limits and make those unnecessary comments. 26. Hence, I find that all the adverse remarks passed against the petitioner are to be expunged. In the result this petition is allowed. All the adverse remarks passed against the petitioner by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam, in the impugned Annexure A1 Order are expunged.