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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 194 (MP)

Mohanlal v. State of M. P.

2012-02-13

M.C.GARG

body2012
ORDER 1. This is petition filed by the petitioners, who are accused in Criminal Case No.35113/08 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore instituted on a complaint filed by the respondent No.2 (Sunil Grover) under sections 63 and 63B of the Copyright, 1957 (amended 1994) Act (for short ‘the Act’). 2. In fact on the basis of the complaint lodged by the respondent No.2, an FIR was registered in this case being FIR No.258/08. On that basis challan was filed by the prosecution, i.e., by the respondent No.1. 3. Charges are also levelled against petitioner on 6.8.2010. Thereafter a compromise was arrived at between the complainant and the petitioners. Petitioners have filed an application under sections 320 and 320(2) of the CrPC for permission for compromise and to record the compromise arrived at between the parties. However, said application was dismissed by the Court below on the ground that as per Code of Criminal Procedure, offences disclosed were compoundable. 4. Petitioners have approached this Court by filing this petition under section 428, CrPC. They have also placed on record an original Memorandum of Understanding, which has been arrived at between the parties for settling their dispute which is taken on record as Ex.C-1. 5. Counsel appearing for both the parties including that of complainant, submit that in terms of aforesaid Memorandum of Understanding, the dispute raised by the complainant against the petitioners stands settled and they do not wish the petitioners to be further prosecuted and have no objection if the complaint and the FIR registered against them are quashed by this Court by exercising power under section 482, CrPC. 6. Besides, the original Memorandum of Undertaking, a Resolution has also been placed on record to the fact that respondent No.2 Sunil Grover is entitled to take all necessary steps for compromising the dispute arose with the petitioner. 7. The affidavits have also been filed on record by the two petitioners as well as complainant supporting the averments made in the original Memorandum of Undertaking regarding compromise entered into between the parties. 8. 7. The affidavits have also been filed on record by the two petitioners as well as complainant supporting the averments made in the original Memorandum of Undertaking regarding compromise entered into between the parties. 8. Petitioners have also submitted that in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as reported in Jagdish Chanana and others v. State of Haryana and another [2008 Cri.LJ 2237], once parties have entered into a settlement and the dispute is purely of personal in nature arising out of the commercial transaction, the public policy requires that such a dispute has to be brought to an end by taking compromise on record. They also rely upon the paragraph 2 of the judgment, which reads as under : “The appeal is directed against the order dated 24th July, 2006, rejecting the prayer for quashing of FIR No.83, dated 12th March, 2005, P.S. City Sonepat registered under sections 419, 420, 465, 468, 469, 471, 472, 474 read with section 34 of the IPC. During the pendency of these proceedings in this Court, Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.42/2008 has been filed putting on record a compromise deed dated 30th April, 2007. The fact that a compromise has indeed been recorded is admitted by all sides and in terms of the compromise the disputes which are purely personal in nature and arise out of commercial transactions, have been settled in terms of the compromise with one of the terms of the compromise being that proceedings pending in Court may be withdrawn or compromised or quashed, as the case may be. In the light of the compromise, it is unlikely that the prosecution will succeed in the matter. We also see that the dispute is a purely personal one and no public policy is involved in the transactions that had been entered into between the parties. To continue with the proceedings, therefore, would be a futile exercise. We accordingly, allow the appeal and quash FIR No.83, dated 12th March, 2005, P.S. City Sonepat and all consequent proceedings.” 9. In similar case where parties entered into a settlement in Trade Mark matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court took a similar view. The said judgment has been reported in Shiji @ Pappu and others v. Radhika and another [¼2011½10 SCC 705]. 10. In similar case where parties entered into a settlement in Trade Mark matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court took a similar view. The said judgment has been reported in Shiji @ Pappu and others v. Radhika and another [¼2011½10 SCC 705]. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the State, however, objected by stating that on the basis of a complaint lodged by the complainant, prosecution has to undergo the process of investigation and collect evidence including filing of challan. He submitted that even if compromise is to be accepted, some cost must be imposed upon the petitioners to be paid to the State for the purpose of compensating; the efforts made by the State in having filed the challan after investigation. The compromise arrived at between the parties vide Ex.C-1, their affidavits have been placed on record. The offence involved in the matter is not part of IPC, but is in the nature of offence under section 420 of the IPC, which is compoundable. As such merely because provisions under section 320, CrPC does not include the offence in Copyright Act and Trade Mark Act, the request for taking compromise on record, cannot be denied. Consequently, the petition filed by the petitioners is allowed. 11. The complaint lodged by respondent No.2 against the petitioner under sections 63 and 63B of the Act, dated 20.9.2008 and the FIR registered on the basis of said complaint being FIR No.258/08 and the proceedings arising from them are quashed but subject to the condition that the petitioners will pay a sum of Rs,5,000/- as costs to be deposited with the Indore Legal Services within one week from today. The bail bonds of the petitioners, if any, would stand discharged. A copy of the order be sent to the Court of JMFC, Indore for information. S.H. Sen for applicants; J.N. Tiwari for complainant; Deepak Rawal, Government Advocate for State. .......... The bail bonds of the petitioners, if any, would stand discharged. A copy of the order be sent to the Court of JMFC, Indore for information. S.H. Sen for applicants; J.N. Tiwari for complainant; Deepak Rawal, Government Advocate for State. .......... selected for the post of the President for five District Forums, had been selected on the basis of merit, as was also the case in respect of the other candidates kept in the waiting list.The learned Additional Solicitor General contended that, in any event, the petitioner has no cause for grievance since Shri M.C. Mehra, who had been selected to be the President of the Shalimar Bagh District Consumer Forum, joined his post within the time specified and hence the petitioner could not claim the post of President for the said District Forum. As far as the respondents No.4 to 6 are concerned, the learned ASG pointed out that they were all serving in the District Judiciary when the appointment letters were issued to them. As indicated hereinbefore, at the relevant point of time the respondent No.4 was functioning as the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Delhi, while the respondents No.5 and 6 were functioning as the District Judge II Delhi, and as the Additional District Judge, Mathura. The learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that on receipt of their appointment letters the respondents No.4 to 6 had written totheir respective High Courts to be relieved so that they could join their new posts. A request was also made to the Lt. Governor of Delhi on behalf of the High Court to extend the time of joining toenable the said respondents to join their respective District Forums. Mr. Chandhiok submitted that the delay in joining their respective District Forums was not on account of any deliberate design on the part of the said respondents to delaysuch joining, but such delay resulted on account of the exigencies of the situation which had been considered by the High Court and had been decided in favour of the said respondents on the principle that the power to fix the time limit also includes the power to extend in the State Government. The learned ASG submitted that the selection had been done by the Selection Committee consituted under section 10(1A) of the Act and the petitioner could not, therefore, have any grievance in that regard. 9. The learned ASG submitted that the selection had been done by the Selection Committee consituted under section 10(1A) of the Act and the petitioner could not, therefore, have any grievance in that regard. 9. Having considered the submissions made by the petitioner appearing in person and the learned Additional Solicitor General and also counsel appearing for one of the private respondents, we see no reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. The selection was done in accordance with the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act and the placement of the candidates was also done by the Committee in a completely fair manner on assessment of individual performance. The first five selectees having opted to join their posts, those who were in the waiting list can have no claim for appointment in the said posts.Since the time limit for joining was extended by the State Government on account of the facts as narrated hereinabove, the joining of the respondents No.4 to 6 cannot also be questioned. 10. The Special Leave Petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.