Hon'ble MEHTA, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The instant misc. petition has been preferred by the petitioners seeking quashing of the proceedings of Criminal Regular Case No. 571/2003 pending in the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate No. 6, Jodhpur. 3. Succinctly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioners were both witnesses in a trial held by the learned Special Judge, Anti Corruption Cases, Jodhpur being Sessions Case No. 8/99 (State vs. Panna Lal). The petitioners turned hostile and accordingly, at the conclusion of the trial, the learned Special Judge while deciding the Sessions Case directed that the petitioners should be prosecuted for the offence under Section 193 I.P.C. as they had given false evidence in the Court and accordingly under the provisions of Section 195 Cr.P.C. read with Section 340 Cr.P.C., a direction was issued for filing a complainant in the Court of the concerned Magistrate against the petitioners and the complainant Hadmana Ram (decoy). In pursuance of the said direction, a complaint was filed in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate No. 6, Jodhpur. Pre-charge evidence was recorded and thereafter, the learned trial judge proceeded to frame charge against the petitioners by order dated 5.7.2005. Thereafter, evidence of the Presiding Officer (the complainant) has been recorded at the trial. 4. Now the petitioners have preferred the instant misc. petition seeking quashing of the proceedings of the complaint pending against them in the trial Court. 5. The ground of challenge in the petition is that the Special Judge before directing filing of the complaint against the petitioners did not hold any preliminary enquiry and directly, issued an order for filing the complaint against the petitioners without giving them the notice under Sec. 340 Cr.P.C. and without giving them an opportunity to be heard and explain the facts. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on a decision of Jaipur Bench of this Court in the case of Shiv Narayan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (SB Criminal Misc. Petition No. 1685/2008) reported in 2012(1) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 275 wherein this Court held that prior to proceeding under Section 340 Cr.P.C., the trial Court has to make a preliminary enquiry as per Section 340 Cr.P.C. and accordingly, the order of filing complaint for offence under Section 340 Cr.P.C. was quashed. 7. Learned P.P. has vehemently opposed the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners. 8. 7. Learned P.P. has vehemently opposed the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners. 8. Upon a consideration of the arguments advanced at the bar and after going through the orders impugned and the material available on the record, the question which arises before this Court is as to whether the holding of an enquiry before proceeding to direct filing of a complaint under Section 340 Cr.P.C. in relation to offence under Section 193 I.P.C. (giving false evidence) is mandatory? 9. Section 340 Cr.P.C. reads as below:- "340. Procedure in cases mentioned in section 195.- (1) When, upon in application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary,- (a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) sent it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, sent the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate. (2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under sub-section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of Section 195. (3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed,- (a) where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint; (b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court. (4) In this section, "Court" has the same meaning as in section 195." 10. (3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed,- (a) where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint; (b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court. (4) In this section, "Court" has the same meaning as in section 195." 10. As per Sub-Section (1) of Section 340 Cr.P.C., it is apparent that the Court before proceeding to direct initiation of the proceedings against the concerned person is simply required to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 195 I.P.C., which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court. The second part of the Section 340 Cr.P.C. postulates that such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary:- (a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction. 11. Thus, from a bare reading of the said Section, it is apparent that the procedure which is required to be followed by the learned trial court before directing filing of the complaint under Section 340 Cr.P.C. is that it should form an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice to proceed under Section 195(1)(b) I.P.C. For the purpose of forming an opinion, the Court, if it thinks proper, may make a preliminary enquiry but the formation of the opinion is not mandatorily required to be preceded by any enquiry. The language of the Section is clear that the Court may make such enquiry as may be necessary. Thus, holding of the enquiry is left to the discretion of the Court and is not mandatory requirement. 12. A Single Bench of this Court in the case of Geegraj vs. State of Raj. reported in 1982 Crl. L.J. 2079 has held that a preliminary enquiry under this Section is discretionary. The view taken by the Single Bench of this Court in the case of Geegraj (supra) appears to be a logical and just view. The Section itself reads that such enquiry may be held, if thought necessary. reported in 1982 Crl. L.J. 2079 has held that a preliminary enquiry under this Section is discretionary. The view taken by the Single Bench of this Court in the case of Geegraj (supra) appears to be a logical and just view. The Section itself reads that such enquiry may be held, if thought necessary. Thus, it is the discretion of the Court to make a preliminary enquiry, if it thinks necessary. The necessary corollary of the above proposition is that the formation of opinion is necessary for filing complaint can be arrived at even without holding an enquiry and the Court can very well proceed to direct the prosecution of the accused without holding the preliminary enquiry. 13. A three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court had the occasion of considering the import of Sections 340 and 341 Cr.P.C. and the question as to whether a preliminary enquiry has to be mandatorily conducted before initiation of the proceedings as per Section 340 Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pritish vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in AIR 2002 SC 236 held as under:- "8. Chapter XXVI of the Cod contains provisions "as to offences affecting the administration of justice." Among the 12 sections subsumed therein we need consider only three. Section 340 consists of four sub-sections of which only the first sub-section is relevant for the purpose of this case. Chapter XXVI of the Cod contains provisions "as to offences affecting the administration of justice." Among the 12 sections subsumed therein we need consider only three. Section 340 consists of four sub-sections of which only the first sub-section is relevant for the purpose of this case. Hence the said sub-section is extracted below: "When upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary,- (a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate." 9. Reading of the sub-section makes it clear that the hub of this provision is formation of an opinion by the court (before which proceedings were to be held) that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into an offence which appears to have been committed. In order to form such opinion the court is empowered to hold a preliminary inquiry. It is not peremptory that such preliminary inquiry should be held. Even without such preliminary inquiry the court can form such an opinion when it appears to the court that an offence has been committed in relation to a proceeding in that court. It is important to notice that even when the court forms such an opinion it is not mandatory that the court should make a complaint. This sub-section has conferred a power on the court to do so. It does not mean that the court should, as a matter of course, make a complaint. It is important to notice that even when the court forms such an opinion it is not mandatory that the court should make a complaint. This sub-section has conferred a power on the court to do so. It does not mean that the court should, as a matter of course, make a complaint. But once the court decides to do so, then the court should make a finding to the effect that on the fact situation it is expedient in the interest of justice that the offence should further be probed into. If the court finds it necessary to conduct a preliminary inquiry to reach such a finding it is always open to the court to do so, though absence of any such preliminary inquiry would not vitiate a finding reached by the court regarding its opinion. It should again be remembered that the preliminary inquiry contemplated in the sub-section is not for finding whether any particular person is guilty or not. Far from that, the purpose of preliminary inquiry, even if the court opts to conduct it, is only to decide whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to inquire into the offence which appears to have been committed. 10. "Inquiry" is defined in Section 2(g) of the Code as "every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Cod by a magistrate or court." It refers to the pre trial inquiry, and in the present context it means the inquiry to be conducted by the magistrate. Once the court which forms an opinion, whether it is after conducting the preliminary inquiry or not, that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence the said court has to make a complaint in writing to the magistrate of first class concerned. As the offences involved are all falling within the purview of "warrant case" [as defined in Sec. 2(x)] of the Code the magistrate concerned has to follow the procedure prescribed in Chapter XIX of the Code. As the offences involved are all falling within the purview of "warrant case" [as defined in Sec. 2(x)] of the Code the magistrate concerned has to follow the procedure prescribed in Chapter XIX of the Code. In this context we may point out that Section 343 of the Code specifies that the magistrate to whom the complaint is made under Section 340 shall proceed to deal with the case as if it were instituted on a police report, That being the position, the magistrate on receiving the complaint shall proceed under Section 238 to Section 243 of the Code. 11. Section 238 of the Code says that the magistrate shall at the outset satisfy that copies of all the relevant documents have been supplied to the accused. Section 239 enjoins on the magistrate to consider the complaint and the documents sent with it. He may also make such examination of the accused, as he thinks necessary. Then the magistrate has to hear both the prosecution and the accused to consider whether the allegations against the accused are groundless. If he finds the allegations to be groundless he has to discharge the accused at that stage by recording his reasons thereof. Sec. 240 of the Code says that if the magistrate is of opinion, in the aforesaid inquiry, that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence he has to frame a charge in writing against the accused. Such charge shall then be read and explained to the accused and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or not. If he pleads not guilty then the magistrate has to proceed to conduct the trial. Until then the inquiry continues before the Magistrate. 12. Thus, the person against whom the complaint is made has a legal right to be heard whether he should be tried for the offence or not, but such a legal right is envisaged only whom the magistrate calls the accused to appear before him. The person concerned has then the right to participate in the pre-trial inquiry envisaged in Section 239 of the Code. It is open to him to satisfy the magistrate that the allegations against him are groundless and that he is entitled to be discharged. 13. The person concerned has then the right to participate in the pre-trial inquiry envisaged in Section 239 of the Code. It is open to him to satisfy the magistrate that the allegations against him are groundless and that he is entitled to be discharged. 13. The scheme delineated above would clearly show that there is no statutory requirement to afford an opportunity of hearing to the persons against whom that court might file a complaint before the magistrate for initiating prosecution proceedings. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that even if there is no specific statutory provision for affording such an opportunity during the preliminary inquiry stage, the fact that an appeal is provided in Section 341 of the Code, to any person aggrieved by the order, is indicative of his right to participate in such preliminary inquiry. 14. Section 341 of the Code confers a power on the party on whose application the court has decided or not decided to make a complaint, as well as the party against whom it is decided to make such complaint, to file an appeal to the court to which the former court is subordinate. But the mere fact that such an appeal is provided, it is not a premise for concluding that the court is under a legal obligation to afford an opportunity (to the persons against whom the complaint would be made) to be heard prior to making the complaint. There are other provisions in the Code for reaching conclusions whether a person should be arrayed as accused in criminal proceedings or not, but in most of those proceedings there is no legal obligation cast on the court or the authorities concerned, to afford an opportunity of hearing to the would be accused. In any event appellant has already availed of the opportunity of the provisions of section 341 of the Code by filing the appeal before the High Court as stated earlier. 15. Once the prosecution proceedings commence the person against whom the accusation is made has a legal right to be heard. Such a legal protection is incorporated in the scheme of the Code. Principle of natural justice would not be hampered by not hearing the person concerned at the stage of deciding whether such person should be proceeded against or not. 16. Such a legal protection is incorporated in the scheme of the Code. Principle of natural justice would not be hampered by not hearing the person concerned at the stage of deciding whether such person should be proceeded against or not. 16. Be it noted that the court at the stage envisaged in Section 340 of the Code is not deciding the guilt or innocence of the party against whom proceedings are to be taken before the magistrate. At that stage the court only considers whether it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence affecting administration of justice. In M.S. Sheriff and Anr. vs. State of Madras and Ors. (A.IR 1954 SC 397) a Constitution Bench of this Court cautioned that no expression on the guilt or innocence of the persons should be made by the court while passing an order under Section 340 of the Code. An exercise of the court at that stage is not for finding whether any offence was committed or who committed the same. The scope is confined to see whether the court could then decide on the materials available that the matter requires inquiry by a criminal court and that it is expedient in the interest of justice to have it inquired into." 14. In the Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Shiv Narayan Singh (supra) relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner, the above referred decision of Hon'ble the Apex Court was not considered and, therefore, the decision rendered by a Single Bench of this Court cannot be said to be laying down correct proposition of law. 15. In the Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Shiv Narayan Singh (supra) relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner, the above referred decision of Hon'ble the Apex Court was not considered and, therefore, the decision rendered by a Single Bench of this Court cannot be said to be laying down correct proposition of law. 15. In the case at hand, the learned trial judge for forming the necessary opinion that it was expedient to file a complaint gave the following reasoning in his order:- ^^mYys[kuh; gS fd bl ekeys esa ifjoknh ih-M- 1 guqekukjke ,oa eksrfcjku ih-M- 2 iq[kjkt ,oa ih-M- 3 xaxkjke us U;k;ky; esa 'kiFk ij vlR; c;ku fn;k gSA ifjoknh us Lo;a }kjk izLrqr nj[okLr iz-ih- 2 rFkk bl nj[okLr ij vk/kkfjr Vªsi dk;Zokgh ls lEcfU/kr QnkZr esa of.kZr rF;ksa ds foijhr c;ku fn;k gSA ;gh ugha ifjoknh us /kkjk 164 na-iz-la- ds rgr 'kiFk ij c;ku ds foijhr Hkh c;ku U;k;ky; esa fn;k gSA nksuksa eksrfcjku us Hkh Vªsi dk;Zokgh ls lEcfU/kr QnkZr ij vius gLrk{kj Lohdkj djrs gq, Hkh bu QnkZr esa of.kZr rF;ksa ds foijhr c;ku 'kiFk ij vlR; fn;s gSaA 'kiFk ij vlR; dFku nsus dh izo`fr fdlh rjg ls izksRlkgu ;ksX; ugha gSA bl lEcU/k esa U;kf;d fofu'p; fj-lqvkseksVks izksflfMax cuke feLVj ds- d:iUu 2001 fØ-yk-fj- ¼,l-lh-½ ist 532 esa ekuuh; mPpre U;k;ky; dh rhu lnL; ihB dk ;g fu.kZ; mYys[kuh; ,oa vuqdj.kh; gSA ekuuh; mPpre U;k;ky; us vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k fd vkt dy ;g lkekU; /kkj.kk cu xbZ gS fd U;k;ky; esa vf/kdka'k xokgku 'kiFk ysus ds ckotwn vlR; c;ku nsrs gSaA U;k;ky; esa 'kiFk ij vlR; c;ku nsus dh cqjkbZ dks jksdus ds fy, dBksj dk;Zokgh dh vko';drk gSA bl lEcU/k esa n.MkRed izko/kku ekStwn gksus dk dksbZ vFkZ ugha gS tc rd fd U;k;ky; vijk/k ds lEcU/k esa] Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk ds v/;k; 11 ds rgr leqfpr dk;Zokgh ugha djsA ;fn U;k; iz.kkyh dks thfor j[krk gS rks izHkkoh dk;Zokgh le; dh ekax gSA fopkjk/khu ekeys esa Hkh U;k;fgr ,oa le; dh ekax ds vuq:i ih-M- 11 guqekukjke o eksrfcjku ih-M- 2 iq[kjkt o ih-M- 3 xaxkjke ds fo:) /kkjk 193 Hkk-na-la- ds rgr vfHk;ksx i= is'k fd;k tkuk lehphu gS vr% fu;ekuqlkj vfHk;ksx i= rS;kj dj l{ke U;k;ky; esa is'k fd;k tkosA** 16. A perusal of the judgment of the learned trial judge dated 27.2.2002 reveals that the petitioners resiled from their earlier version given to the police and have also resiled from the documents which they themselves signed during the course of recovery of the tainted currency notes. Therefore, the learned trial Judge was very well justified in directing the complaint to be filed against the petitioners for the offence under Section 193 I.P.C. In view of the aforesaid facts, it is clear that the learned trial judge has formed the necessary opinion which is required for directing filing of the complaint under Section 340 Cr.P.C. against the accused who had given false evidence in the Court. 17. The upshot of the above discussion, the instant misc. petition being bereft of any force, is hereby rejected. 18. Stay petition also stands dismissed. 19. Since the decision is on an important issue of law which the trial courts are faced with frequently, it is hereby directed that a copy of the judgment be circulated to all Sessions Judges in Rajasthan.