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2012 DIGILAW 195 (CHH)

SHAILJA DWIVEDI v. FIRM KIRTI KUMAR CHUNNILAL PAREKH

2012-08-03

T.P.SHARMA

body2012
JUDGMENT As per Hon'ble Shri T.P. Sharma, J. :- 1. By this appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the appellants have challenged legality & propriety of the judgment & decree dated 2-3-95 passed by the 1st Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Bilaspur in Civil Appeal No.10-A/87 affirming the judgment & decree dated 10-2-87 passed by the Civil Judge Class-I, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No.49-A/76, whereby the Civil Judge Class-I has dismissed the civil suit for eviction filed by the appellants against the respondent. 2. Second appeal has been admitted for consideration on the following substantial question of law:- "Whether the Courts below erred in negativing the case of the plaintiff/appellant that they have not made out the case for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961?" 3. As per plaint allegation, the plaintiffs/appellants No.2 & 3 along with their father Dwarika Prasad were owners and landlords of the suit accommodation situate at Sadar Bazaar, Bilaspur. The suit accommodation was given to the respondent on rent for non-residential purpose. Partition took place between the members of the joint family and the tenanted accommodation had fallen into the share of Vinod Kumar, appellant No.2 herein, who was not having any suitable alternate accommodation in Bilaspur for his business. Therefore, suit for eviction was filed. By filing written statement, the respondent has admitted tenancy but has denied the pleading especially relating to partition and bona fide need. 4. After providing opportunity of hearing to the parties, suit was dismissed and compensative cost of Rs.2,000/- has been imposed upon the appellants, same was challenged before the appellate Court. During the pendency of appeal, application for further amendment in pleading was filed by both the parties and same has been allowed by the appellate Court. Additional issues were framed, opportunity of additional evidence was given to the parties and thereafter, the appeal was dismissed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused judgments & decrees of both the Courts below and records of both the Courts below. 6. Additional issues were framed, opportunity of additional evidence was given to the parties and thereafter, the appeal was dismissed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused judgments & decrees of both the Courts below and records of both the Courts below. 6. Learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants vehemently submitted that by examining themselves, the appellants have proved the fact that the tenanted accommodation had fallen in the share of appellant No.2 Vinod Kumar, he is not having any vacant alternate suitable accommodation within the city of Bilaspur and the part of accommodation in which appellant No.2 is running his business had fallen in the share of Dwarika Prasad, therefore, appellant No.2 has shifted his business to upper floor of said house which was not suitable to him. Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that the appellants have pleaded the factum of partition, thereafter, they have amended their pleading relating to memorandum of partition and by adducing evidence, they have proved the memorandum of partition Ex.P-6. The respondent has tried to dispute genuineness and admissibility of Ex.P-6, the memorandum of partition, on the ground that second page of memorandum of partition typed and prepared upon the watermark paper has been manufactured on 11-7-76 before the date of purchase of stamp i.e. 3-9-76 and the documents are suspicious. The respondent has also tried to dispute the evidentiary value of the memorandum of partition on the ground that same is insufficiently stamped. Learned Senior Advocate also submitted that the watermark paper i.e. second page of Ex.P-6 was manufactured on 11-7-76, first page of Ex.P-6 has been purchased on 3-9-76 after the manufacture of second page, both the pages have been manufactured by the Government Press and first page of Ex.P-6 has also been manufactured much prior to the date of its purchase dated 3-9-76, therefore, on account of date of manufacture of second page, entire document cannot be considered as suspicious. The Stamp Vendor is required to purchase stamps from the Treasury whom the Government Press used to supply. Watermark papers are also required to be purchased by the Stamp Vendor from the Treasury whom the Government Press used to supply. Watermark papers and stamp papers are not the same set of documents arid they are required to be purchased separately. The Stamp Vendor is required to purchase stamps from the Treasury whom the Government Press used to supply. Watermark papers are also required to be purchased by the Stamp Vendor from the Treasury whom the Government Press used to supply. Watermark papers and stamp papers are not the same set of documents arid they are required to be purchased separately. Even otherwise, it would not be possible to purchase stamp papers and watermark papers on the same date of manufacture. As regards evidentiary value of the memorandum of partition on the ground of insufficiency of stamp, initially, there was no requirement of registration of the memorandum of partition, but subsequently the law has been amended. As per Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, once the document is admitted in evidence, same shall not be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped. 7. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellants placed reliance in the matter of Munna Lal (Dead) by L.Rs. Etc. Vs. Suraj Bhan and others, AIR 1975 SC 1119 in which the Supreme Court has held that memorandum of partition not registered is admissible in evidence. Learned Senior Advocate further placed reliance in he matter of Santosh Kumar Jain Vs. Shambhulal Krishna Kumar Suhane, AIR 1993 MP 46 in which the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held that tenant inducted on joint family premises, after partition of premises suit for eviction for bona fide need may be filed and validity of partition cannot be challenged by tenant, question of title is not to be determined in landlord-tenant suit. Learned Senior Advocate also placed reliance in the matter of Lingala Klondala Rao Vs. Vootukkuri Narayana Rao, AIR 2003 SC 2077 in which the Supreme Court has held that alternate accommodation that disentitled landlord to eviction decree cannot be one which is owned/possessed by landlord as member of joint family. Learned Senior Advocate relied upon the matter of Smt. Vidya Devi and others Vs. Sat Prakash, 1981 MPRCJ Note 53 in which the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held that after partition the person to whom the house is allotted in partition becomes landlord and can bring suit for eviction. Learned Senior Advocate further relied upon the matter of Budhwanti and another Vs. Sat Prakash, 1981 MPRCJ Note 53 in which the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held that after partition the person to whom the house is allotted in partition becomes landlord and can bring suit for eviction. Learned Senior Advocate further relied upon the matter of Budhwanti and another Vs. Gulab Chand Prasad, AIR 1987SC 1484 in which the Supreme Court has held that High Court can interfere with the finding of fact relating to bona fide requirement of landlord when finding is vitiated by application of wrong tests or is based on conjectures. Learned Senior Advocate also relied upon the matter of Uday Shankar Upadhyay and Ors. Vs. Naveen Maheshwari, 2010 AIR SCW 1265 in which the Supreme Court has held that if landlord's need of suit shop on ground floor to establish his sons in business is proved, Court cannot dictate to landlord to shift business on upper floor, shops and business are usually conducted on ground floor, because customers can reach there easily. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent opposes the appeal and submits that evidence adduced on behalf of the parties, especially admission of the appellants and their witnesses, are sufficient to establish the fact that there is no partition between the parties, only with a view to evict the respondent, the appellants have prepared memorandum of partition Ex.P6. Accommodation possessed by appellant No.2 Vinod Kumar Mishra was given on rent not by other co-owner as a result of partition, but by all co-owners to Bank and Vinod Kumar Mishra himself has shifted his business on upper floor. Money has been deposited by Bank in the account of all co-owners, not in the account of anyone co-owner, alleged owner/landlord of aforesaid part. This negatives the factum of partition. Memorandum of partition was registerable, but it has not been registered, therefore, it cannot be looked into. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance in the matter of SK. Sattar Mohd. Choudhari Vs. This negatives the factum of partition. Memorandum of partition was registerable, but it has not been registered, therefore, it cannot be looked into. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance in the matter of SK. Sattar Mohd. Choudhari Vs. Gundappa Amabadas Bukate, 1996 STPL(LE) 22900 SC : AIR 1997 SC 998 in which the Supreme Court has held that in case of eviction showing partition of joint property only with a view to evict the tenant it will be open to the tenant to show that the partition was not bona fide and was a sham transaction to overcome the rigours of Rent Control laws which protected eviction of tenants except on specified grounds set out in the relevant statute. 10. As per initial pleading of the appellants made in the plaint dated 15-9-76, partition was already affected between the parties and tenanted accommodation had fallen in the share of appellant No.2 Vinod Kumar for whom the accommodation is bona fidely required. Ex.P-6, ;knnkLr bdjkjukek reveals that partition has been affected between the parties on 9-4-76 and they have executed such ;knnkLr bdjkjukek Ex.P-6 i.e. the memorandum of partition, on 5-9-76. Factum of partition has also been mentioned by the appellants in their notice of eviction dated 13-5-76 Ex.P-2, but Vinod Kumar Mishra (PW-1), for whose benefit the eviction has been sought for, has not proved the document Ex.P-6 during the course of evidence. He has deposed in para 4 of his evidence relating to preparation of such memorandum of partition, but for the reasons best known to him he has not exhibited the same. Last witness of the plaintiffs Arun Kumar Mishra (PW -7), has deposed relating to memorandum of partition Ex.P-6. 11. Vinod Kumar Mishra (PW-1) has specifically deposed that aforesaid tenanted accommodation has fallen in his share. In para 23 of his cross-examination he has admitted that in the year 1976, he was running the business of radio in part of the said house where the tenanted accommodation also situate. He has denied that partition never took place between the parties. Vinod Kumar Mishra (PW-1) has specifically deposed that aforesaid tenanted accommodation has fallen in his share. In para 23 of his cross-examination he has admitted that in the year 1976, he was running the business of radio in part of the said house where the tenanted accommodation also situate. He has denied that partition never took place between the parties. In para 24 of his evidence, he has further admitted that part of the said house has been given on rent to Punjab National Bank and prior to such agreement, he was running the business of radio in the said part of the house, thereafter, he has shifted his business on first floor and he had run the business of radio till 1980. He has specifically denied the suggestion that he is running the business of bricks. In para 32 of his cross-examination, he himself has voluntarily deposed that rent of part of the accommodation given to Oswal Dhamaka Sale is on daily basis and out of the said rent, his brother Arun received 60%, he himself received 30% and his sister i.e. appellant No.1 herein Shailaja received 10%. He denied the suggestion that he was receiving rent from Oswal Dhamaka Sale. 12. In paras 28 & 29 of the evidence of Vinod Kumar Mishra (PW 1), he has deposed that he is member of Coal Merchants Association and has been appointed as Vice-President of Coal Merchants Association, but has denied that he became member of Coal Merchants Association at his instance by filing application. He has specifically deposed that he has been made member and Vice-President of Coal Merchants Association without any application from his side. In para 30 of his evidence, he has admitted that before starting coal business, he was running the business of bricks, but he has stopped aforesaid business also since last 6-7 years. 13. Arun Kumar Mishra (PW-7), co-appellant, has also denied the fact that Vinod is running business of coal or bricks. In para 24 of his cross-examination, he has admitted the fact that daily rent of part of accommodation initially given to Punjab National Bank is Rs.300/- which they received from Oswai Dhamalca-Sale even in the year 1991 & 1992. He has specifically admitted in para 24 of his evidence about the portion of rent received from Bank i.e. Rs.l,850/- per month. He has deposed that out of Rs. He has specifically admitted in para 24 of his evidence about the portion of rent received from Bank i.e. Rs.l,850/- per month. He has deposed that out of Rs. 1,850/-, Rs.700/ - was required to be given to his father, he himself used to take Rs.500/-, Rs.150/- was required to be given to appellant No.2 Vinod Kumar and remaining amount was being deducted towards recovery of loan. He has further deposed about apportionment of rent received from Oswal Dhamaka Sale. He has also deposed that from Oswal Dhamaka Sale, he used to receive Rs.180/- per day out of which appellant No.2 Vinod Kumar used to receive Rs.90/- and appellant No.1 Shailaja used to receive Rs.30/-. Further, he has denied that they have jointly given aforesaid part on rent to Punjab National Bank and Oswal Dhamaka Sale. 14. As per Ex.P-6, partition took place on 9-4-76 and the alleged document was prepared on 5-9-76. As per Ex.P-6 and the alleged factum of partition, appellant No.2 Vinod Kumar Mishra is owner of the tenanted accommodation and other part which was given on rent to Bank and other institutions had fallen in the part of his father, but they have received rent from different institutions jointly. Although they have deposed that after death of their father Dwarika Prasad, they have received rent jointly and in the year 1976 after filing of civil suit and even before the judgment impugned, they have given the same to different institutions on rent jointly. 15. Evidence of both the witnesses Clearly reveals that appellant No.2 Vinod Kumar Mishra is also co-owner of aforesaid part of accommodation which has been given on rent to different institutions and even on temporary rent to Oswal Dhamaka Sale on daily basis which is equally suitable accommodation. These statements show that alleged second part of accommodation which had fallen vacant on different times was owned by all the appellants, but instead of starting business in said part of accommodation by appellant No.2 Vinod Kumar Mishra, he has decided to choose not to run business since 1980, and his source of earning is only the rent which he received from the respondent and the part of rent which he used to receive from Oswal Dhamaka Sale. This evidence is sufficient to show that alleged suit accommodation is not required bonafidely by the appellants or any of the appellants or appellant No.2 Vinod Kumar Mishra, but only with a view to evict the respondent, they have filed I present suit. 16. Evidence of Vinod Kumar Mishra (PW-1) clearly reveals that at the time of alleged partition and filing of civil suit, he was running business of radio, thereafter, he started business of bricks and then he started business of coal, but, he has tried to suppress the factum of aforesaid businesses which he has continued at least for 6-7 years. Business of coal and bricks requires room for running office. Coal and bricks cannot be stored in a room. Therefore, for the purpose of running business of coal or bricks, aforesaid accommodation where the respondent is running business of jewellery was not required. On the date of filing suit, requirement of suit was for running radio business, but he himself has stopped aforesaid business which shows that on the date of judgment or on the date of appeal, such requirement for radio business was not in existence. 17. As held by the Supreme Court in the matter of Munna Lal (supra), memorandum of partition can be received in evidence though not registered. As per Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, once the document is admitted in evidence, it cannot be subsequently questioned on the ground of insufficiency of stamp. However, only on the ground that the document has been admitted in evidence, it is not sufficient to prove the contents/terms of the document. Contents and terms of the document are required to be proved by necessary evidence in case of eviction on the ground of partition. 18. As held by the Supreme Court in the matter of SK. Sattar Mohd. Choudhari (supra), the respondent/tenant has right to show that the partition was not bona fide and was a sham transaction to overcome the rigours of Rent Control laws which protected eviction of tenants except on specified grounds set out in the relevant statute. 19. As held by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Santosh Kumar Jain (supra), after partition, suit by co-owner for eviction relating to his part is maintainable. 20. 19. As held by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Santosh Kumar Jain (supra), after partition, suit by co-owner for eviction relating to his part is maintainable. 20. As held by the Supreme Court in the matter of Lingala Kiondala Rao (supra), accommodation owned and possessed by landlord as member of joint family cannot be treated as alternate suitable accommodation of co-owner ( who has filed suit for eviction on the ground of his business and absence of suitable alternate accommodation. However, in the, present case, evidences of appellant No.2 Vinod Kumar Mishra (PW -1) and his brother are sufficient to show that at the time of such claim of eviction, appellant No.2 Vinod Kumar Mishra was not in bona fide need of accommodation for running radio business. The case of Lingala Kiondala Rao (supra) is distinguishable on facts to that of the present case. 21. As held by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Smt. Vidya Devi (supra), after partition the person whom the share has been allotted is competent to file suit for eviction, but as per law, he is required to prove the bona fide need. 22. As held by the Supreme Court in the matter of Budhwanti (supra), High Court can interfere in the finding when it is vitiated by application of wrong tests or is based on conjectures. In the present case, the appellants were under obligation to prove the fact that the accommodation is required bona fidely, but their evidence reveals that they were not in bona fide need of suit accommodation. 23. As held by the Supreme Court in the matter of Uday Shankar Upadhyay (supra), the Court below has not dictated landlord to shift his business on upper floor. 24. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any ground to prove the fact that both the Courts below have erred in negativing the case of the plaintiffs/appellants that they have not made out the case for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh (Chhattisgarh) Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 25. Consequently, the substantial question of law formulated for the decision of this appeal is decided as negative. 26. On the basis of aforesaid decision on the substantial question of law, the appeal deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. 27. Parties shall bear their own costs. 28. Advocate fees as per schedule. 25. Consequently, the substantial question of law formulated for the decision of this appeal is decided as negative. 26. On the basis of aforesaid decision on the substantial question of law, the appeal deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. 27. Parties shall bear their own costs. 28. Advocate fees as per schedule. 29. Decree be drawn up accordingly. Appeal Dismissed.