Research › Search › Judgment

Delhi High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 1959 (DEL)

Richa Pardeshi v. State

2012-05-21

REVA KHETRAPAL

body2012
JUDGMENT : Reva Khetrapal, J. 1. By way of the present petition filed by the petitioner under Sections 270, 278 and 300 of Indian Succession Act, 1925, the petitioner seeks grant of Letters of Administration of the estate of the deceased, late Sh. Gian Parkash Kapur, being his daughter. 2. The deceased, Sh. Gian Parkash Kapur, son of late Sh. Ajudhia Parshad Kapur expired on 16.04.2006. At the time of his demise, he was residing at his own flat situated at S-473, Flat No. 3 (Ground Floor Rear Portion), Greater Kailash, Part-II, New Delhi-110048. The said flat was purchased by late Sh. Gian Parkash Kapur out of his own funds and constituted his self acquired property. The flat was purchased from Smt. Asha Kapur wife of Sh. M.M. Kapur vide Sale Deed dated 19.03.1993 registered with Sub-Registrar III for a sum of Rs. 8,00,000/- and since then till the time of his death, late Sh.Gian Parkash Kapur and the petitioner, Smt. Richa Pardeshi were living in the same. 3. The mother of the petitioner, Smt. Achla Kapur, that is, wife of Sh.Gian Parkash Kapur, pre-deceased him leaving behind the petitioner and son of the deceased, namely, Sh. Rajesh Kapur and late Sh.Gian Parkash Kapur. The son of late Sh.Gian Parkash Kapur and the brother of the petitioner also died on 14.07.2001 and, thus, pre-deceased late Sh.Gian Parkash Kapur. Thus, the petitioner is the only surviving legal heir of the deceased as per the Hindu Succession Act, who remained unmarried till the death of the deceased. The petitioner asserts that to the best of her belief, the deceased has left no Will or testament to his estate and, thus, she being the only surviving member of the family, is entitled to the estate of the deceased and there is no impediment to the grant of Letters of Administration in her favour. It is also submitted that the petitioner is in complete physical possession of the immovable property mentioned in Schedule B to the petition. The petitioner is, thus, entitled to have the property transferred/mutated in her favour. 4. Notice of the institution of the petition was issued to the respondent-State and orders passed for publication of citation in the daily, "The Statesman" which was duly published on 15.12.2010. A valuation report was also called for from the Revenue Controlling Authority of the Government of NOT of Delhi. 5. 4. Notice of the institution of the petition was issued to the respondent-State and orders passed for publication of citation in the daily, "The Statesman" which was duly published on 15.12.2010. A valuation report was also called for from the Revenue Controlling Authority of the Government of NOT of Delhi. 5. The petition being uncontested, the petitioner adduced her own evidence as PW-1 by tendering her affidavit by way of evidence Exhibit PWT1/A. 6. In her affidavit by way of evidence, the petitioner reiterated the contents of her petition and proved on record the Sale Deed pertaining to property bearing No. S-473, Flat No. 3 (Ground Floor Rear Portion), Greater Kailash, Part-II, New Delhi-110048 in favour of late Sh.Gian Parkash Kapur as Exhibit PW1/1; the death certificate of her mother, late Smt.Achla Kapur as Exhibit PW1/2; the death certificate of her brother, late Sh.Rajesh Kapur as Exhibit PW1/3; the death certificate of her father late Sh.Gian Parkash Kapur as Exhibit PW1/4; the photocopy of the ration card of the deceased with the name of the petitioner as his daughter as Exhibit PW1/5; the photocopy of the CGHS Card for the pensioners of the deceased as Exhibit PW1/6, which reflects the name of the petitioner, which has been scored out; the photocopy of the passport of the petitioner as Exhibit PW1/7 showing the name of the deceased as her father; the driving licence of the petitioner exhibited as Exhibit PW1/8 wherein the name of her husband is reflected; the Marriage Certificate of the petitioner exhibited as Exhibit PW1/9 showing the factum of her marriage with Sh.Gunjan Pardeshi. 7. PW-1, Smt.Richa Pardeshi stated in her sworn statement that the account of assets of the deceased, which are likely to come to her hands, have been detailed in 'Schedule B' and 'Schedule C' annexed with the petition. The value of the estate referred to in 'Schedule B', she stated was approximately Rs. 30,00,000/- (Rupees thirty lakhs only), and in 'Schedule C' was Rs. 81,576.68/- (Rupees eighty one thousand five hundred seventy six and paise sixty eight only). She produced and proved on record the Passbook entry of her individual bank account bearing No. 0149000100177332 in Punjab National Bank, Khan Market, New Delhi reflecting the credit of Rs. 22,576.68 (Rupees twenty two thousand five hundred seventy six and paise sixty eight only) from the pension account of Sh.Gian Parkash Kapur (Exhibit PW1/10). She produced and proved on record the Passbook entry of her individual bank account bearing No. 0149000100177332 in Punjab National Bank, Khan Market, New Delhi reflecting the credit of Rs. 22,576.68 (Rupees twenty two thousand five hundred seventy six and paise sixty eight only) from the pension account of Sh.Gian Parkash Kapur (Exhibit PW1/10). She further produced and proved on record the LIC Senior Citizens Policy dated 27th September, 2003 of the deceased reflecting an amount of Rs. 58,650/- (Rupees fifty eight thousand six hundred and fifty only), exhibited as Exhibit PW1/11. 8. The aforesaid testimony of PW-1, Smt. Richa Pardeshi is unrebutted and unchallenged on record as none appeared to contest the petition. In the circumstances, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rajiv Aneja, Advocate contends that the petitioner, being the only legal representative of the deceased, late Sh.Gian Parkash Kapur, is entitled to the grant of Letters of Administration to the estate of late Sh.Gian Parkash Kapur, being the sole surviving legal heir of her father. He further submitted, relying upon the judgment of this Court in Sanjay Suri v. State and Ors. AIR 2004 DELHI 9 that the court should not insist upon the petitioner furnishing an administration bond/surety bond for the administration of the estate of her late father being the sole beneficiary and legal heir to the estate of her late father. 9. It may be noted at this juncture that as per the valuation report submitted by the Office of the Sub Divisional Magistrate (Hauz Khas), Old Tehsil Building, Mehrauli, New Delhi dated 01.03.2012, the total value of the immovable property bearing No. S-473, Flat No. 3 (Ground Floor Rear Portion), Greater Kailash, Part-II, New Delhi-110048 is stated to be Rs. 30,10,268/- (Rupees thirty lakhs ten thousand two hundred and sixty eight only). 10. 30,10,268/- (Rupees thirty lakhs ten thousand two hundred and sixty eight only). 10. Adverting to the contention of the petitioner's counsel that the petitioner should not be required to submit an administration bond/surety bond, it would be apposite to note the provisions of Section 291 of the Indian Succession Act of 1925, which are as under:- Section 291 : "(1) Every person to whom any grant of letters of administration, other than a grant under section 241, is committed, shall give a bond to the District Judge with one or more surety or sureties, engaging for the due collection, getting in, and administering the estate of the deceased, which bond shall be in such form as the Judge may, by general or special order, direct. (2) When the deceased was Hindu, Muhammadan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina or an exempted person- (a) the exception made by sub-section (1) in respect of a grant under section 241 shall not operate; (b) the District Judge may demand a like bond from any person to whom probate is granted." 11. Thus, Section 291 of the Act, except in the exceptional circumstances enumerated in the said Section, requires furnishing of an administration bond by every person to whom any grant of letters of administration is made. The object of an administration bond is to secure due and proper administration of the estate of the deceased in which the executors and administrators have to discharge the duties enjoined upon them in respect of the estate so as to ensure that after the estate has been administered, the residue of the estate of the deceased is paid to the legatee or the next of kin. The issue which arises, however, in the present case is regarding the necessity and validity of the requirement of furnishing administration bond by a sole beneficiary and legal heir of the deceased and the intentment of Section 291 of the Act in this regard. While determining this issue, it is to be borne in mind that none of the duties of the administrator are required to be performed by a person, who is the sole beneficiary of the estate of the deceased. While determining this issue, it is to be borne in mind that none of the duties of the administrator are required to be performed by a person, who is the sole beneficiary of the estate of the deceased. It is also not in dispute that in cases where the deceased leaves behind a Will naming an executor or executors in the said Will, there is no requirement or insistence on furnishing a surety of administration bond by such executor or executors. It is only on account of the statutory bar created by Section 222 of the Act that in cases where there is a sole beneficiary under the Will, the said sole beneficiary and natural heir not being an executor is not granted probate. To require such a sole beneficiary under a Will to furnish administration/surety bond would be meaningless in view of the fact that he cannot be asked to give an indemnity against himself. 12. The aforesaid aspect of the matter has been dwelt with at length in the case of Sanjay Suri (Supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the following manner:- "23. On a question of proper interpretation of Section 291 of the Act, reference is invited to the following paras from Halsbury's Laws of England:- Paragraph 898 at page 551 of Volume 44: "The construction of ancient statutes may be elucidated by what in the language of the Courts is called contemporanea expositio, that is, by saying how they were understood at the time when they were passed." Paragraph 860 at page 524 of Volume 44: "Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it should not be reduced to a nullity by a literal following of language, which may be due to want of skill or knowledge on the part of a draftsman, unless such language is intractable." 24. Following are the well recognized principles of interpretation:-Statutes must be so construed as to make them operative. If it is possible, the words of a statute must be construed so as to give them a sensible meaning. A statute must, if possible, be construed in the sense which makes it operative and does not defeat the manifest intentions of the legislature and nothing short of impossibility so to construe it should allow a court to declare a statute unworkable. A statute must, if possible, be construed in the sense which makes it operative and does not defeat the manifest intentions of the legislature and nothing short of impossibility so to construe it should allow a court to declare a statute unworkable. If the Court is to avoid a statutory result that flouts common sense and justice, it must do so not by disregarding the statute or overriding it, but by interpreting it in accordance with the judicially presumed parliamentary concern for common sense and justice. But the possibility of injustice which leads the Court to adopt a particular construction must be a real one. 25. These are instances, where the entitlement though fully covered under the statute has been denied on ground of public policy. In R. Chief v. National Insurance Commissioner, ex parte Connor reported in (1981) 1 All ER 769 (770) was a case under the Social Security Act, 1975. A widow though entitled to the insurance as per condition of the statute for grant of social security was denied the allowance on public policy as she had created a status of widowhood by killing her husband. This is a case, where on ground of public policy the applicant fulfilling the entitlement under the statute was denied relief on grounds of public policy. 26. Reference at this stage may also be made to the MaxwelLon interpretation of statutes with regard to the "golden rule". The learned author noticed as under: "The so called 'golden rule' is really a modification of the literal rule". 27. It was stated in this way by Parke B: "It is a very useful rule, in the construction of a statute, to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature, to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified, so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further". 28. 28. Considering the nature of the Testamentary and Intestate succession, the object and purpose sought to be achieved by Section 291 and thus applying the aforesaid principles of interpretation of statutes, it would be seen that Section 291 of the Act is not intended to cover within its ambit the cases of a sole beneficiary and legal heir under a Will being required to furnish administration/surety bond. One cannot administer the estate or his own estate against himself, for which he be required to give an indemnity or administration bond. Besides, none of the purposes and objectives of Section 291 of the Act are covered or fulfilled by the execution of an administration/surety bond by the sole inheritor or beneficiary under the Will duly proved. Such an exercise would be an exercise in futility. In the instant case if the petitioner's grand son was to mismanage or maladminister, he would be doing so only against his own and personal interests. A right that clearly vests in him by virtue of the bequest. Hence insistence of furnishing the administration bond in the present case would not only be meaningless and without any purpose, but inconsistent with succession. Section 291 in the light of the foregoing principles of interpretation, as noticed, has to be interpreted so as not being applicable to a case of a sole beneficiary and legal heir, under a duly proved Will insofar as requirement of furnishing an administration bond is concerned. 29: In the light of the foregoing discussion, petitioner is exempted from furnishing of an administration bond................" 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits, and I think rightly so, that there is no reason why the enunciation of the law relating to aforesaid case dispensing with furnishing of administration/surety bond in the case of a sole beneficiary under a Will should not be made applicable to the case of a sole beneficiary upon whom the estate of the deceased devolves by intestate succession. The object of the law of Succession, be it testamentary or intestate in nature, is to enable the Court to lend its seal of approval to the succession of the estate of the deceased. It is trite that the judgment given in the exercise of both testamentary and intestate succession is a judgment "in rem". 14. The object of the law of Succession, be it testamentary or intestate in nature, is to enable the Court to lend its seal of approval to the succession of the estate of the deceased. It is trite that the judgment given in the exercise of both testamentary and intestate succession is a judgment "in rem". 14. Indubitably, a greater degree of care is required in the case of intestate succession while appointing an administrator to take care of the estate of the deceased, but in all other respects the exercise of testamentary and intestate succession is predicated on the duty cast upon the Court to ensure that the estate of the deceased devolves in a proper manner upon the heirs of the deceased and is not frittered away. It is with this intentment that Section 291 of the Act requires furnishing of an administration bond both in the case of intestate succession and testamentary succession. As a matter of fact, the opening words of said Section are significant, which state "Every person to whom any grant of letters of administration, other than a grant under Section 241, is committed, shall give a bond to the District Judge with one or more surety or sureties, engaging for the due collection, getting in, and administering the estate of the deceased, which bond shall be in such form as the Judge may, by general or special order, direct." 15. In view of the aforesaid, it is crystal clear that to hold that Section 291 envisages the furnishing of an administration bond by a sole beneficiary or a sole legatee would lead to absurd consequences, for, the said sole beneficiary/sole legatee would then he standing surety for the estate of the deceased, which has exclusively devolved upon him, and it would be paradoxical to hold that a person can stand surety for himself. 16. In the result, the petition is allowed by granting Letters of Administration in favour of the petitioner, Smt Richa Pardeshi, exempting the petitioner from furnishing of an Administration Bond. 17. Test Case No. 80/2010 stands allowed in the above terms.