86. In Ragabendra Singh, a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High court passed an interim order to the effect that the authorities will be at liberty to process the applications in respect of grant of licenses of excise shops but no final selection of such shops shall be made without obtaining specific leave of the Court. In spite of passing such an order of injunction, in deliberate and wilful disobedience of the order, the authorities have caused an advertisement to be published in newspapers for holding lottery for final selection of excise shops and ultimately, licenses were issued. When a contempt petition was moved, the High Court held that the authorities failed to understand the implications of the order and as such, their action cannot be construed as an act of contempt. The matter was thereafter taken up before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that the respondents had acted in clear violation of the order passed by the High Court. The Supreme Court also found that pursuant to the auction conducted by the respondents, violating the order passed by the High Court, the successful bidders were given privilege to conduct business. In the said context, the Supreme Court observed that in violation of a restraint order or an injunction against a party, something has been done in disobedience, it will be the duty of the Court as a policy to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrong doing. 87. The judgment in Ragabendra Singh has no application to the facts of the present case. The respondents have made detailed arrangements to comply with the order passed by this Court. In fact, even before issuing directions by this Court, respondents have taken action to provide video coverage to all the sensitive booths. The respondents were in a position to arrange video coverage in about 90% of the booths. Even with respect to the left out 10% of booths, it was done in a random manner. The writ petitioners have not produced any material to show that the selected candidates have taken undue advantage of the failure to provide video recording in about 10% of the booths. Even with respect to the left out 10% of booths, it was done in a random manner. The writ petitioners have not produced any material to show that the selected candidates have taken undue advantage of the failure to provide video recording in about 10% of the booths. The question of setting aside the election on account of the alleged violation on the part of the respondents to provide video coverage would arise only in case the failure materially affected the elections of the successful candidates. We are not therefore inclined to accept the submission made by the learned counsel to invalidate the election on the basis of the judgment in Ragabendra Singh. 88. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.24132 of 2011 cited the following judgments:- i. 1970 (3) SCC 147 – Rampakavi Rayappa vs. B.D. Jatti and ors. ii. 2000(8) SCC 216 – Election Commission of Indiavs. Ashok Kumar & Ors. iii. 2002(8) SCC 237 – In re Gujarat Assembly election case iv. 2005(2) SCC 1 – Janak Singh vs. Ram Das Rai & Ors. v. 2006(8) SCC 352 – Kishan Singh Tomar vs. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad. vi. 2006(7) SCC 1 – Kuldip Nayar & Ors. vs. Union of India and ors. vii. 2009(1) LW 140 – P.K.Sekar Babu vs. State Election Commissioner viii. W.P.(C)No.31830/2010 – Shalini vs. Kerala State Election Commission ix. 2002(5) SCC 294 - Union of India vs. Association for Democratic reform X. AIR 1975 Madras 270 – Century Flour Mills Ltd. vs. S.Suppiah and ors. xi. 2007(11) SCC 374 – All Bengal Excise License Association vs. Ragahabendra Singh and ors. xii. 1991(2) LW 295 – Vidya Charan Shukla vs. Tamil Nadu Olympic Assn. xiii. 2009(5) CTC 462 - R.Chandramohan vs. State Election Commissioner Xiv 2007(2) LW 1 – A.I.A.D.M.K., vs. State Election Commissioner 89. The Supreme Court, in RampakaviRayappa vs. B.D. Jatti and ors., 1970 (3) SCC 147 , indicated that free and fair elections are the very foundation of the democratic institutions. 90. The Supreme Court, in Election Commission of India vs. Ashok Kumar & Ors., 2000 (8) SCC 216 , observed that if Court's intervention sought for has the effect of interrupting, obstructing or protracting the election proceedings, then judicial remedy should be postponed till completion of the election. However, limited judicial review is possible on the ground of mala fide or arbitrary exercise of power. 91. In Re. However, limited judicial review is possible on the ground of mala fide or arbitrary exercise of power. 91. In Re. Gujarat Assembly Election, 2008 (2) SCC 237, the Supreme Court underlined the duty of the Election Commission to conduct free and fair election. 92. In JanakSingh vs. Ram Das Rai and others, 2005 (2) SCC 1 , Supreme Court issued various directions including direction to instal video cameras inside the polling booths to ensure free and fair election. 93. The Supreme Court in Kuldip Nayar and ors. vs. Union of India and ors. 2006(7) SCC 1 observed that right to vote derives its colour from right to free and fair elections, meaning thereby, the right to vote is empty without the right to free and fair elections. 94. The Supreme Court in B.C.Chaturvedivs. Union of India and ors., 1995(6) SCC 749 , observed that High Court could mould the relief to do complete justice between the parties even though there is no provision parallel to Article 142 of the Constitution of India relating to the High Court. 95. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2 in Contempt petition No.377 and first respondent in Contempt Petition No.1664/2011 placed reliance on the following judgments in support of his contention that in order to punish a person for contempt, his action should be wilful and deliberate. i. Kapildeo Prasad Sah v. State of Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 569 ii. Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha, (2003) 11 SCC 1 , 96. The Supreme Court in Kapildeo Prasad Sah v. State of Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 569 observed that a person who complaints of breach of Court order must allege deliberate or contumacious disobedience. The Supreme Court said :- "11.No person can defy the court's order. Wilful would exclude casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order. A petitioner who complains breach of the court's order must allege deliberate or contumacious disobedience of the court's order." WHETHER NON-COMPLIANCE OF COURT ORDER WOULD RENDER THE ELECTION VOID AUTOMATICALLY:- 97. The Supreme Court in KalyanKumar Gogoi v. Ashutosh Agnihotri, (2011) 2 SCC 532 , held that non-compliance of the provisions of the Representation of People Act by officers who were in charge of the election would not render the election of the returned candidate void. The Supreme Court observed:- "23. The Supreme Court in KalyanKumar Gogoi v. Ashutosh Agnihotri, (2011) 2 SCC 532 , held that non-compliance of the provisions of the Representation of People Act by officers who were in charge of the election would not render the election of the returned candidate void. The Supreme Court observed:- "23. It may be mentioned that here in this case non-compliance with the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the Elections Rules of 1961 was by the officers, who were in charge of the conduct of the election and not by the elected candidate. It is true that if clause (iv) is read in isolation, then one may be tempted to come to the conclusion that any non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of the 1951 Act or any rules of the 1961 Rules or orders made under the Act would render the election of the returned candidate void, but one cannot forget the important fact that clause (d) begins with a rider, namely, that the result of the election, insofar as it concerns a returned candidate, must have been materially affected. This means that if it is not proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the result of the election insofar as it concerns a returned candidate has been materially affected, the election of the returned candidate would not be liable to be declared void notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of the Act or of any rules of the 1961 Rules or orders made thereunder. 24.It is well to remember that this Court has laid down in several reported decisions that the election of a returned candidate should not normally be set aside unless there are cogent and convincing reasons. The success of a winning candidate at an election cannot be lightly interfered with. This is all the more so when the election of a successful candidate is sought to be set aside for no fault of his but of someone else. The success of a winning candidate at an election cannot be lightly interfered with. This is all the more so when the election of a successful candidate is sought to be set aside for no fault of his but of someone else. That is why the scheme of Section 100 of the Act, especially clause (d) of sub-section (1) thereof clearly prescribes that in spite of the availability of grounds contemplated by sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of clause (d), the election of a returned candidate shall not be voided unless and until it is proved that the result of the election insofar as it concerns a returned candidate is materially affected. The volume of opinion expressed in judicial pronouncements preponderates in favour of the view that the burden of proving that the votes not cast would have been distributed in such a manner between the contesting candidates as would have brought about the defeat of the returned candidate lies upon one who objects to the validity of the election. Therefore, the standard of proof to be adopted, while judging the question whether the result of the election insofar as it concerns a returned candidate is materially affected, would be proof beyond reasonable doubt or beyond the pale of doubt and not the test of proof as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant." 98. The Supreme Court SantoshYadav v. Narender Singh, (2002) 1 SCC 160 , reiterated the legal position that election of a successful candidate cannot be set aside on account of the fault committed by others. The Supreme Court said : 8.)It is well settled by a catena of decisions that the success of a winning candidate at an election should not be lightly interfered with. This is all the more so when the election of a successful candidate is sought to be set aside for no fault of his but of someone else. That is why the scheme of Section 100 of the Act, especially clause (d) of subsection (1) thereof clearly prescribes that in spite of the availability of grounds contemplated by sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of clause (d), the election of a returned candidate shall not be avoided unless and until it was proved that the result of the election, insofar as it concerns a returned candidate was materially affected. 99. 99. The Supreme Court in ManganiLal Mandal vs. Bishnu Deo Bhandari [ 2012(3) SCC 314 ], held that mere non-compliance of the provisions of the Constitution or breach of the provisions of the Representation of People Act would not result in automatic invalidation of the election of the returned candidate. The relevant observation reads thus:- "A mere non-compliance or breach of the Constitution or the statutory provisions noticed above, by itself, does not result in invalidating the election of a returned candidate under Section 100(1)(d)(iv). The sine qua non for declaring election of a returned candidate to be void on the ground under clause (iv) of Section 100(1)(d) is further proof of the fact that such breach or non-observance has resulted in materially affecting the result of the returned candidate. In other words, the violation or breach or non-observation or noncompliance of the provisions of the Constitution or the 1951 Act or the rules or the orders made thereunder, by itself, does not render the election of a returned candidate void Section 100(1)(d)(iv). For the election petitioner to succeed on such ground viz., Section 100(1)(d)(iv), he has not only to plead and prove the ground but also that the result of the election insofar as it concerned the returned candidate has been materially affected. The view that we have taken finds support from the three decisions of this Court in (1) Jabar Singh Vs. Genda Lal; (2) L.R. Shivaramagowda and Others Vs. T.M.Chandrashekhar (dead) by LRs. and Others.4 and (3) Uma Ballav Rath (Smt.) Vs. Maheshwar Mohanty (Smt) and others." THE SUPREME COURT ON ONUS OF PROOF IN ELECTION CASES : 100. The Supreme Court in R.P. Moidutty v. P.T. Kunju Mohammad, (2000) 1 SCC 481 ,held that the onus of proof in election cases on the ground of corrupt practices are not discharged merely on preponderance of probabilities, standard of proof being akin to that of proving a criminal or quasi judicial authority. The Supreme Court observed:: 14.) It is basic to the law of elections and election petitions that in a democracy, the mandate of the people as expressed at he hustings must prevail and be respected by the courts and that is why the election of a successful candidate is not to be set aside lightly. The Supreme Court observed:: 14.) It is basic to the law of elections and election petitions that in a democracy, the mandate of the people as expressed at he hustings must prevail and be respected by the courts and that is why the election of a successful candidate is not to be set aside lightly. A heavy onus lies on the election petitioner seeking setting aside of the election of a successful candidate to make out a clear case for such relief both in the pleadings and at the trial. The mandate of the people is one as has been truly, freely and purely expressed. The electoral process in a democracy such as ours is too sacrosanct to be permitted to be polluted by corrupt practices. If the court arrives at a finding of commission of corrupt practice by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent then the election of the returned candidate shall be declared to be void. The underlying principle is that corrupt practice having been committed, the result of the election does not echo the true voice of the people. As the consequences flowing from the proof of corrupt practice at the election are serious, the onus of establishing commission of corrupt practice lies heavily on the person who alleges the same. The onus of proof is not discharged merely on preponderance of probabilities; the standard of proof required is akin to that of proving a criminal or a quasi-criminal charge. Clear-cut evidence, wholly credible and reliable, is needed to prove beyond doubt the charge of corrupt practice. (See Ram Chandra Rai v. State of M.P., Manphul Singh v. Surinder Singh, Rahim Khan v. Khurshid Ahmed, Bir Chandra Barman v. Anil Sarkar, Lakshmi Raman Acharya v. Chandan Singh and Amolakchand Chhazed v. Bhagwandas Arya.) The legislature has taken extra care to make special provision for pleadings in an election petition alleging corrupt practice. (See Ram Chandra Rai v. State of M.P., Manphul Singh v. Surinder Singh, Rahim Khan v. Khurshid Ahmed, Bir Chandra Barman v. Anil Sarkar, Lakshmi Raman Acharya v. Chandan Singh and Amolakchand Chhazed v. Bhagwandas Arya.) The legislature has taken extra care to make special provision for pleadings in an election petition alleging corrupt practice. Under Section 83 of the Act ordinarily it would suffice if the election petition contains a concise statement of the material facts relied on by the petitioner, but in the case of corrupt practice the election petition must set forth full particulars thereof including as full a statement as possible of (i) the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice, (ii) the date, and (iii) place of the commission of each such practice. An election petition is required to be signed and verified in the same manner as is laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the verification of pleadings. However, if the petition alleges any corrupt practice then the petition has additionally to be accompanied by an affidavit in Form 25 prescribed by Rule 94-A of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 in support of the allegations of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. Thus, an election petition alleging commission of corrupt practice has to satisfy some additional requirements, mandatory in nature, in the matter of raising of the pleadings and verifying the averments at the stage of filing of the election petition and then in the matter of discharging the onus of proof at the stage of the trial." 101. The Supreme Court in M.J. Jacob v. A. Narayanan, (2009) 14 SCC 318 , observed that election cannot be set aside on the basis of allegations and counter allegations alone. The Supreme Court said:- 42.) In a democracy many allegations and counter-allegations are made, and sometimes these are incorrect, but that does not mean that an election should be set aside straightaway on that account, as has been done in the present case, unless all the ingredients of Section 123(4) of the Act are clearly made out, otherwise almost every election will have to be set aside. 102. In JeetMohinder Singh vs. Harminder Singh Jassi, 1999(9) SCC 386 , the Supreme Court cautioned that setting aside of an election involves serious consequences to the public at large. 102. In JeetMohinder Singh vs. Harminder Singh Jassi, 1999(9) SCC 386 , the Supreme Court cautioned that setting aside of an election involves serious consequences to the public at large. The Supreme Court said : "40.(i) The success of a candidate who has won at an election should not be lightly interfered with. Any petition seeking such interference must strictly conform to the requirements of the law. Though the purity of the election process has to be safeguarded and the court shall be vigilant to see that people do not get elected by flagrant breaches of law or by committing corrupt practices, the setting aside of an election involves serious consequences not only for the returned candidate and the constituency, but also for the public at large inasmuch as re-election involves an enormous load on the public funds and administration.” 103. In SantoshYadav v. Narender Singh, (2002) 1 SCC 160 , the Supreme Court indicated the burden of proof placed on the election petitioner as under: "3.) The burden of proving such material effect has to be discharged by the election petitioner by adducing positive, satisfactory and cogent evidence. If the petitioner is unable to adduce such evidence the burden is not discharged and the election must stand. This rule may operate harshly upon the petitioner seeking to set aside the election on the ground of improper acceptance of a nomination paper, but the court is not concerned with the inconvenience resulting from the operation of the law. Difficulty of proof cannot obviate the need of strict proof or relax the rigour of required proof. 4.) The burden of proof placed on the election petitioner is very strict and so difficult to discharge as nearing almost an impossibility. There is no room for any guesswork, speculation, surmises or conjectures i.e. acting on a mere possibility. It will not suffice merely to say that all or the majority of wasted votes might have gone to the next highest candidate. The law requires proof. How far that proof should go or what it should contain is not provided by the legislature." 104. The Supreme Court in NandSingh v. Ajit Inder Singh, (2001) 10 SCC 685 , considered the corrupt practices alleged against the respondents by the Appellant. The law requires proof. How far that proof should go or what it should contain is not provided by the legislature." 104. The Supreme Court in NandSingh v. Ajit Inder Singh, (2001) 10 SCC 685 , considered the corrupt practices alleged against the respondents by the Appellant. According to the appellant before the Supreme Court, the election agent of the respondent/selected candidate along with others forcibly entered into a polling station and snatched away the ballot papers from the Presiding Officer. The polling agent of the respondent and two other agents of Congress and CPM candidates of booth no.66A who were present there, were folding the ballot papers and putting the same in the ballot boxes. They were also putting thumb impression on counter-foil of ballots. The nephew of the respondent who was having a revolver in his hand, asked the Presiding Officer and other polling officers on duty and the polling agents of other candidates to stand quietly on one side of the polling booth and threatened that in case they interfere, they would be killed. The polling staff and the other persons were frightened while the two above mentioned armed persons in police uniform who were the gunmen of the respondent and his election agent stopped the security personnel and the voters from entering into polling booth. Thereafter, the election agent of the respondent and his supporters put about 100 votes into the ballot boxes. These ballot boxes were not having the signature of Presiding Officer. In the meanwhile, people started collecting there. After putting the votes they started firing in the air and ran away outside the boundary wall of the school where they had parked the car. The security personnel tried to prevent them but they ran away. Though the witnesses have given a detailed version before the Election Tribunal, Supreme Court disbelieved the evidence adduced on the side of the appellant. The Supreme Court indicated that there should be positive materials to prove the charge of corrupt practices. The Supreme Court said:- "13.A charge of corrupt practice is in the nature of a quasi-criminal charge. Though the witnesses have given a detailed version before the Election Tribunal, Supreme Court disbelieved the evidence adduced on the side of the appellant. The Supreme Court indicated that there should be positive materials to prove the charge of corrupt practices. The Supreme Court said:- "13.A charge of corrupt practice is in the nature of a quasi-criminal charge. Evidence to be led in support of corrupt practice has not only to be cogent and definite but for an election petitioner to succeed, he must also establish definitely to the satisfaction of the court that the charge of corrupt practice, which he levels against the returned candidate, has been positively established. The onus lies heavily on the election petitioner to establish a charge of corrupt practice. The standard of proof required to set aside election of a returned candidate on a charge of corrupt practice requires strict proof of the charge — beyond reasonable doubt." 105. The Supreme Court in Kalyan Singh Chouhan v. C.P. Joshi, (2011) 11 SCC 786 , very clearly stated that roving enquiry is not permissible during the trial of an election petition. The Supreme Court said : "17.) During the trial of an election petition, it is not permissible for the court to permit a party to seek a roving enquiry. The party must plead the material fact and adduce evidence to substantiate the same so that the court may proceed to adjudicate upon that issue. 106. The petitioner in W.P.No.24132 of 2011 has no personal knowledge about the facts stated in the affidavit. His case was essentially based on hearsay evidence. The author of the statement is not before the Court. Therefore, a question would arise whether such a statement which is in the nature of hearsay, would satisfy the term "material evidence" in an election matter. THE SUPREME COURT ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE : 107. The Supreme Court in KalyanKumar Gogoi v. Ashutosh Agnihotri, (2011) 2 SCC 532 , indicated the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence. The Supreme Court said : 35.) The term “hearsay” is used with reference to what is done or written as well as to what is spoken and in its legal sense, it denotes that kind of evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credit given to the witness himself, but which rests also, in part, on the veracity and competence of some other person. The word “hearsay” is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say. Sometimes it means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else and sometimes it is treated as nearly synonymous with irrelevant. The sayings and doings of the third person are, as a rule, irrelevant, so that no proof of them can be admitted. Every act done or spoken which is relevant on any ground must be proved by someone who saw it with his own eyes and heard it with his own ears. 37.) Here comes the rule of appreciation of hearsay evidence. Hearsay evidence is excluded on the ground that it is always desirable, in the interest of justice, to get the person, whose statement is relied upon, into court for his examination in the regular way, in order that many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness can be brought to light and exposed, if they exist, by the test of cross-examination. The phrase “hearsay evidence” is not used in the Evidence Act because it is inaccurate and vague. It is a fundamental rule of evidence under the Indian law that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. A statement, oral or written, made otherwise than by a witness in giving evidence and a statement contained or recorded in any book, document or record whatsoever, proof of which is not admitted on other grounds, are deemed to be irrelevant for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter stated. An assertion other than one made by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evidence of any fact asserted. That this species of evidence cannot be tested by cross-examination and that, in many cases, it supposes some better testimony which ought to be offered in a particular case, are not the sole grounds for its exclusion. Its tendency to protract legal investigations to an embarrassing and dangerous length, its intrinsic weakness, its incompetence to satisfy the mind of a judge about the existence of a fact, and the fraud which may be practised with impunity, under its cover, combine to support the rule that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. 108. In fact, in Kalyan Kumar, the Supreme Court indicated the reasons as to why hearsay evidence is inadmissible. 108. In fact, in Kalyan Kumar, the Supreme Court indicated the reasons as to why hearsay evidence is inadmissible. "38.) The reasons why hearsay evidence is not received as relevant evidence are: (a) the person giving such evidence does not feel any responsibility. The law requires all evidence to be given under personal responsibility i.e. every witness must give his testimony, under such circumstance, as expose him to all the penalties of falsehood. If the person giving hearsay evidence is cornered, he has a line of escape by saying “I do not know, but so and so told me”, (b) truth is diluted and diminished with each repetition, and (c) if permitted, gives ample scope for playing fraud by saying “someone told me that…”. It would be attaching importance to false rumour flying from one foul lip to another. Thus statements of witnesses based on information received from others is inadmissible. 109. Therefore, on a careful consideration of the background facts in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court in All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Vs. State Election Commissioner [ 2007 (1) CTC 705 ], we are of the considered view that the petitioners have not made out a case to entertain a writ petition in an election matter. CONTEMPT PETITIONS: 110. The petitioner in Contempt petition No.377 of 2012 and 1664/2011 alleges violation of the order passed by this Court on 14 October 2011 in W.P.No.22859/2011 etc. batch. 111. Contempt is a serious matter. The petitioners were expected to plead and prove that there was a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondents to disobey the orders passed by this Court. There is nothing on record to prove the wilful disobedience of the order passed by this Court. We have already considered this issue in the connected writ petitions and answered the same against the writ petitioners. 112. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act defines Civil Contempt :- "wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court" 113. The very definition given to the word "civil contempt" indicates that the violation complained of should be intentional and deliberate. There should be an element of wilfulness so as to make the contemnor liable for action. The very definition given to the word "civil contempt" indicates that the violation complained of should be intentional and deliberate. There should be an element of wilfulness so as to make the contemnor liable for action. The conduct should be deliberate, or to put it otherwise, it should be with necessary mens rea. In case, the contemnor requires the assistance of third parties to comply with the orders and he failed in his attempt to get such assistance in spite of his best efforts, it cannot be said that still he was liable for contempt. THE PRECEDENT ON LAW OF CONTEMPT : 114. The Supreme Court in KapildeoPrasad Sah v. State of Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 569 observed that deliberate or contumaciousdisobedience of the Courts order is a must to punish the contmenor. The Supreme Court said :: "11.)No person can defy the court's order. Wilful would exclude casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order. A petitioner who complains breach of the court's order must allege deliberate or contumacious disobedience of the court's order." 115.The Supreme Court in Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha, (2003) 11 SCC 1 , observed that in order to constitute contempt, the order passed by the Court should not require any extraordinary effort for its compliance. The Supreme Court said :: "17.)Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act defines “civil contempt” and it means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of undertaking given to a court. “Wilful” means an act or omission which is done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids or with the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. It signifies a deliberate action done with evil intent or with a bad motive or purpose. Therefore, in order to constitute contempt the order of the court must be of such a nature which is capable of execution by the person charged in normal circumstances. It should not require any extraordinary effort nor should be dependent, either wholly or in part, upon any act or omission of a third party for its compliance. Therefore, in order to constitute contempt the order of the court must be of such a nature which is capable of execution by the person charged in normal circumstances. It should not require any extraordinary effort nor should be dependent, either wholly or in part, upon any act or omission of a third party for its compliance. This has to be judged having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case." 116.The Supreme Court in Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh, (2002) 4 SCC 21 , observed that an element of unwillingness is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Supreme Court said :: "15.) It may also be noticed at this juncture that mere disobedience of an order may not be sufficient to amount to a “civil contempt” within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act of 1971 — the element of willingness is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of the Act and lastly, in the event two interpretations are possible and the action of the alleged contemnor pertains to one such interpretation — the act or acts cannot be ascribed to be otherwise contumacious in nature. A doubt in the matter as regards the wilful nature of the conduct if raised, question of success in a contempt petition would not arise." 117. The factual matrix clearly shows that there was no intentional disobedience and the respondents have made sincere efforts to implement the order passed by this Court. The petitioners have failed to prove that the respondents intentionally violated the order passed by this Court. OVERALL CONCLUSION : 118. For all these reasons, we hold that: i. A writ petition questioning the election can be entertained and the same is maintainable before this Court in the event exceptional or extraordinary circumstances are established, as has been held earlier in All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v State Election Commissioner [ 2007 (1) CTC 705 ]. ii. In the event a decision is called for on questions of fact not involving exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, this Court would not be justified in entertaining the writ petition and the questions involving factual aspect could be resolved only in an election petition. iii. ii. In the event a decision is called for on questions of fact not involving exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, this Court would not be justified in entertaining the writ petition and the questions involving factual aspect could be resolved only in an election petition. iii. The grievance of the petitioners that the order passed by the Division Bench on 14 October 2011 had been violated and it would result in automatic invalidation of election is unacceptable since there are no materials to prove large scale violations, poll related irregularities, booth capturing, rigging, bogus voting or any other exceptional and extraordinary circumstances to set aside the election by entertaining the writ petitions. iv. The directions of this Court dated 14 October 2011 to provide video recording in all polling booths had been substantially complied with, barring only a few polling booths even where random video recording had been done. v. There are no materials to suggest that the failure to provide video recording in about 542 polling booths out of 4875 polling booths had materially affected the election of the returned candidates warranting this Court to interfere with the local body elections. vi. The respondents have taken every possible effort and made all the necessary arrangements to comply with all the directions issued by the Division Bench on 14 October 2011 in W.P.No.22859/2011 etc., batch and as such, they are not liable for contempt. THE RESULT : 119. In the upshot, we dismiss all the Writ Petitions and the related contempt petitions. No costs. Consequently, all connected miscellaneous applications are also dismissed.