JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Through this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for issuing writ of certiorari quashing the orders dated 21.3.1975 and 27.7.1976 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation (in short, “DDC”) in revision No. 854/199 and revision No. 855/200, in between Rehman v. Sanjira. vide order dated 21.3.1975, the DDC has set aside the order dated 3.1.1974 and decided the case in terms of the compromise, whereas vide order dated 27.7.1976, the restoration application, filed by the petitioners, who claim themselves to be the purchasers of the land in dispute from Sanjira, who was the respondent in the aforesaid revisions. 2. Heard Sri S.L. Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel. It is stated in the writ petition that Chak No. 21 Village Sonughat and plots in chak No. 14 Village Pipra Chandrabhan were recorded in the basic year in the name of Kurban S/o Bandhoo. During the consolidation proceedings the chaks were formed in the name of Kurban and respondent Nos. 3 to 5 did not lay their claim till the allotment of the chaks in the name of Kurban. On 9.11.1977, after death of Kurban, his mother Sanjira (widow of Bandhu) filed objection under Section 12 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 before the Assistant Consolidation Officer, Deoria for being recorded over the plots in dispute in place of late Bandhu, being widow of Bandhu (father of Kurban and mother of deceased). The Assistant Consolidation Officer vide order dated 29.7.1972, decided the case in favour of Sanjira holding her to be the mother of Kurban, deceased and widow of Bandhu and ordered her name to be recorded over the chaks belonging to deceased Kurban. Against the order dated 29.7.1972, the respondent No. 3 filed an appeal before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation on the ground that Smt. Sanjira was not mother of Kurbaan and he was only heir, hence name of Sanjira may not be entered in place of the deceased. The appeal was allowed vide order dated 29.7.1972 and by setting aside the order of Assistant Consolidation Officer, the matter was remanded back before the Consolidation Officer. 3. After remand, it appears, Sanjira and Rehman have entered into compromise, but the Consolidation Officer did not accept the compromise and the case was decided on merit. The appeal was allowed vide order dated 29.7.1972 and by setting aside the order of Assistant Consolidation Officer, the matter was remanded back before the Consolidation Officer. 3. After remand, it appears, Sanjira and Rehman have entered into compromise, but the Consolidation Officer did not accept the compromise and the case was decided on merit. The Consolidation Officer, vide order dated 12.2.1973, directed to record the name of Sanjira over the chaks in dispute, copy of this order has been brought on record as annexure 1 to the writ petition. The Consolidation Officer has also recorded that the compromise was not in accordance with the rules, therefore, he declined to accept the compromise and passed the order on the basis of material produced before him on merit. 4. Thereafter, two appeals were preferred by the respondent Rehman before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation and the appeals were dismissed on 25.6.1973. The copy of the judgment has been brought on record as Annexure 2 to the writ petition. Against the order passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, dismissing the petitioners’ appeals, two revisions were filed by the respondent No. 3 before the DDC. The revisions were heard and decided vide order dated 3.1.1974, by which the revisions were dismissed. 5. It appears, thereafter restoration/review application was filed before the DDC and the review application was dismissed vide order dated 15.3.1975, holding that earlier order was passed on merit, therefore, there was no question to recall the order. This order has been brought on record as Annexure 4 to the writ petition. 6. The petitioners herein have purchased the land in dispute through registered sale-deed on 22.10.1973 for the consideration of Rs. 20,000/- and applied for mutating his name. The said proceeding is still pending and in this proceeding, Rehman has filed objection. 7. However, after the order dated 3.1.1974, by which the revisions filed by respondent No. 3 were dismissed and order dated 15.3.1974 dismissing the review application of respondents, Sanjira died on 6.3.1975. After her death, it appears, a compromise was entered in between Sanjira (showing her to be alive), Rehman and Islam (the respondent Nos. 3 and 4) on 14.3.1975, in which it was agreed upon that in place of Kurban (deceased), only respondent No. 3 was the heir. The copy of the compromise has been brought on record as Annexure 6 to the writ petition. 3 and 4) on 14.3.1975, in which it was agreed upon that in place of Kurban (deceased), only respondent No. 3 was the heir. The copy of the compromise has been brought on record as Annexure 6 to the writ petition. It is stated, in paragraph 14 of the writ petition, that when the compromise was entered into, Sanjira had already died and on the basis of the compromise, the same DDC, Sri Sukhdeo Prasad Tripathi, set aside the earlier order dated 3.1.1974 and decided the case in terms of the compromise. This order was passed on 21.3.1975. The petitioners, who are purchasers of the land, have filed the restoration application, but the same was dismissed. 8. Sri Yadav contends that once the revision was dismissed on 3.1.1974 on merit and the review application was also dismissed on 15.3.1974, it was not open for the DDC to re-open the issue in terms of the compromise, particularly, in the circumstances when the petitioners have already purchased the land on 22.10.1973 and in the application for mutating his name, respondent No. 3 has already filed objection. On the date of compromise, it was in the notice of the respondents that third party right has already been created in the meantime. 9. A counter-affidavit has been filed by Sri A.K. Singh. At some stage, Sri H.S.N. Tripathi has also filed Vakalatnama. The case has been taken in the revised list, neither Sri A.K. Singh nor Sri H.S.N. Tripathi has appeared in the Court. In the counter-affidavit, filed by the respondents, it is stated that the order dated 15.3.1975, dismissing the review application for reviewing the order dated 3.1.1974, was passed in the absence of the counsel for the respondents. It is also stated that the alleged sale-deed dated 22.10.1976 was executed during the pendency of the revision, therefore, the same is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Otherwise also, the aforesaid sale-deed was not brought in the notice of the DDC. It is also stated that the order dated 3.1.1974 was passed ex parte. The death of Sanjira has also been disputed by stating that she died on 28.4.1975, instead of 6.3.1975. 10. The short question involved in this case is as to whether the DDC has got power of review to review his own order once the order has been passed on merit. The death of Sanjira has also been disputed by stating that she died on 28.4.1975, instead of 6.3.1975. 10. The short question involved in this case is as to whether the DDC has got power of review to review his own order once the order has been passed on merit. In the submissions of Sri Yadav, the review application was not maintainable as the DDC has no power to review his own judgment which was passed on merit after hearing all concerned. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance upon the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Shivraji and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1997 (88) RD 562, where this Court has held that the DDC is not vested with any power of review of his order, therefore, cannot re-open the proceedings and cannot review or revise his earlier order. 11. Here in this case, the factum of the judgments, either passed by the Consolidation Officer or the DDC dated 3.1.1974 has not been denied by the respondents. The DDC, while rejecting the restoration application filed by the petitioners, has observed that Sanjira has not died on 6.3.1975, but she died on 28.4.1975. For deciding the case, it is not material as to whether Sanjira has died on 6.3.1975 or 28.4.1975, the crucial point is as to whether, after the dismissal of the revisions on 3.1.1974 and rejection of the review applications on 15.3.1975, was it open for the DDC to re-open the issue on the basis of the compromise and decide the same in terms of the compromise, when Sanjira, assuming has entered into the compromise after executing the sale-deed in the year 1973. It may be noticed that the order dated 21.3.1975, setting aside the order dated 3.1.1974, was passed on the basis of compromise in between Sanjira, Rehman and Islam dated 14.3.1975, whereas the review application filed by the respondents was dismissed on 15.3.1975 by the same DDC in presence of both the parties. It is surprising that when the parties have entered into compromise on 14.3.1975, why it was not brought in the notice of the DDC on 15.3.1975, on which date review application was rejected, after hearing both the parties. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Shivraji (supra), in paragraph 36, has held as under: “36. It is surprising that when the parties have entered into compromise on 14.3.1975, why it was not brought in the notice of the DDC on 15.3.1975, on which date review application was rejected, after hearing both the parties. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Shivraji (supra), in paragraph 36, has held as under: “36. Coming to the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, it is our considered view that the consolidation authorities, particularly the Deputy Director of Consolidation while deciding a revision petition exercises judicial or quasi judicial power and, therefore his order is final subject to any power of appeal or revision vested in superior authority under the Act. The consolidation authorities, particularly the Deputy Director of Consolidation, is not vested with any power of review of his order and, therefore, cannot reopen any proceeding and cannot review or revise his earlier order. However, as a judicial or quasi judicial authority he has the power to correct any clerical mistake/arithmetical error, manifest error in his order in exercise of his inherent power as a tribunal.” In view of the Full Bench decision of this Court, it is now well-settled that the DDC has no power of review, and once the order dated 3.1.1974, by which the revision was dismissed after hearing both the parties and the review application filed by the respondents was also dismissed after hearing both the parties on 15.3.1974, there was no occasion for the DDC to entertain the review application and set aside the earlier order on the basis of compromise. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 21.3.1975, passed by the DDC is without jurisdiction and the same is liable to be set aside. 12. The matter may be examined from another angle also. It is well-settled that when the rights and liability are created under the statute then in that eventuality, the same has to be seen and decided in accordance with the provisions contained under the aforesaid statute and if the statute becomes silent at particular stage, meaning thereby the statute intends to attach finality to the proceeding at that very stage and after that, in absence of any provision, the proceeding cannot be re-opened under that statute, as at one stage finality has to be attached to the proceeding. However, it can be challenged before the higher forum. However, it can be challenged before the higher forum. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders dated 21.3.1975 and 27.7.1976 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in revision No. 854/199 and revision No. 855/200, (Rehman v. Sanjira) are hereby quashed. ——————