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2012 DIGILAW 1999 (ALL)

RAJENDRA PANDIT v. STATE OF U. P.

2012-09-03

DILIP GUPTA

body2012
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dilip Gupta, J.—This petition seeks the quashing of the order dated 13th October, 2011 passed by the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar by which the application filed by the petitioner under Section 13 of the Arms Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) for grant of fire-arm licence was rejected. 2. It is stated that the petitioner had filed the application under Section 13 of the Act for grant of fire-arm licence for NBB Revolver/Pistol before the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar on 28th July, 2003 but as no orders were passed by the District Magistrate on the said application, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 2701 of 2004 which was disposed of on 28th January, 2004 with a direction to the District Magistrate to dispose of the application filed by the petitioner expeditiously but not later than six weeks from the date of presentation of the certified copy of the order. The order was served by the petitioner upon the District Magistrate but as the no order was passed, the petitioner filed Contempt Application No. 2178 of 2004 with Santosh Kumar Yadav, District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar as an opposite party. The Court by the order dated 8th November, 2004 issued notice to the opposite party but granted one more opportunity to the District Magistrate to ensure compliance of the order. The District Magistrate then, in the counter-affidavit to the Contempt Application, brought on record the order dated 17th March, 2004 by which the application filed by the petitioner for grant of fire-arm licence had been rejected. 3. The petitioner, however, asserts that the said order dated 17th March, 2004 was passed on a back date because the District Magistrate had sent a communication dated 30th October, 2004 requiring the Station House Officer to submit a report on the application filed by the petitioner for grant of fire-arm licence. In the order dated 17th March, 2004, the District Magistrate, while rejecting the application filed by the petitioner for grant of fire-arm application, referred to four criminal cases pending against the petitioner but according to the petitioner even the Police had reported that out of these four cases, the petitioner had been acquitted in three criminal cases and in the fourth case, a final report had been submitted by the police. The order dated 17th March, 2004 passed by the District Magistrate was assailed by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 57364 of 2005 which petition was dismissed by the Court on 25th August, 2005 on the ground that the petitioner could file an appeal before the Commissioner under Section 18 of the Act. The petitioner thereafter filed an appeal before the Commissioner. The appeal was partly allowed by the order dated 31st January, 2006 and the order dated 17th March, 2004 was set aside with a direction to the District Magistrate to pass a fresh order taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner had been acquitted in most of the criminal cases referred to in the order passed by the District Magistrate. 4. The District Magistrate, on remand, however, again rejected the application filed by the petitioner by the order dated 1st June, 2006 observing that though the petitioner may have been acquitted in the criminal cases but the acquittal was for the reason that either the witnesses had turned hostile or benefit of doubt had been given to the petitioner. The District Magistrate also observed that that the petitioner had a dispute with Niwas Sharma regarding land in the village and for maintenance of public peace and safety it was necessary in the public interest not to grant licence to the petitioner. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Commissioner but this appeal was also dismissed by the order dated 4th October, 2006. 5. These two orders passed by the District Magistrate on 1st June, 2006 and by the Commissioner on 4th October, 2006 were assailed by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 66237 of 2006. The District Magistrate filed a counter-affidavit in the said writ petition but it was ultimately allowed by the judgment and order dated 6th July, 2010 which order needs to be quoted below: “Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgement of this Court passed in the case of Harprasad v. State of U.P. and others, 2005(5) AWC 4939, wherein this Court while examining the identical issue had held that the cancellation/revocation of a fire-arm licence on the ground of involvement and pendency of a criminal case cannot be sustained. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State-respondent has made submission in support of the orders impugned, which are enclosed in the petition. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State-respondent has made submission in support of the orders impugned, which are enclosed in the petition. The question as to whether mere involvement in a criminal case or pendency of a criminal case can be a ground for revocation of the licence under Section 17 of the Arms Act has been considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sheo Prasad Misra v. District Magistrate, Basti and others, 1979 (16) ACC 6 (sum), wherein the Division Bench has relied upon the earlier decisions of this Court in Mast Uddin v. Commissioner, Allahabad, 1972 ALJ 573. In the aforesaid cases, it has been held that mere involvement in a criminal case cannot in any way effect the public security and public interest. In view of the this proposition of law, the order cancelling or revoking the arms licence of the petitioner on the aforesaid ground of involvement and pendency of a criminal case is not tenable. In Full Bench Decision of this Court rendered in Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1984 (10) ALR 223 and Kailash Nath and others v. State of U.P. and others, 1985 (22) ACC 353 and in case of Rana Pratap Singh v. State of U.P., 1994 JIC 72 (All); 1995 (Supp) ACC 235, it has been held that mere pendency of a criminal case(s) is no ground for cancellation of arms licence. The effect of the aforesaid Full Bench decisions was also considered in Sadri Ram v. District Magistrate, Azamgarh and others, 1998 (3) AWC 2102 : 1998 (37) ACC 830. This Court in the case of Harprasad (supra) held as hereunder : “Involvement and pendency of a case crime is no ground for cancellation of fire-arm licence. It is settled law that after acquittal the very basis for cancellation of the arm licence stands vitiated. In this regard reference of the decision rendered in Lalji v. Commissioner, Kanpur and another, 199 (4) AWC 2952, has been made.” Thus in view of the admitted facts and the settled legal position that a fire-arm licence cannot be cancelled on the ground of mere involvement of licensee in a criminal case, the impugned orders cannot be sustained. In the present case, the petitioner has also been acquitted of the charges which were made against him. For the above reasons, the present writ petition is allowed. In the present case, the petitioner has also been acquitted of the charges which were made against him. For the above reasons, the present writ petition is allowed. The order dated 4.10.2006 passed by learned Commissioner Meerut Division, Meerut (Respondent No. 4), as well as order dated 1.6.2006 passed by the District Magistrate, District Gautambudh Nagar (Respondent No. 2) is hereby quashed. The respondent No. 2 is directed to consider the petitioner’s claim for grant of fire-arm licence in accordance with law.” 6. The District Magistrate, however, did not pass any order pursuant to the aforesaid directions issued by the Court as a result of which the petitioner filed Contempt Application No. 4509 of 2011 with Sri Hridesh Kumar, District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar as an opposite party. The Court issued notice to the District Magistrate on 19th September, 2011. The District Magistrate then rejected the application filed by the petitioner for grant of fire-arm licence by the order dated 13th October, 2011. It is this order that has been assailed in this writ petition. 7. The District Magistrate has observed in the impugned order that the police had reported that nine criminal cases had been filed against the petitioner and in seven cases the petitioner had been acquitted but two cases being Case Crime No. 186 of 2008 under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and Case Crime No. 119 of 2009 under Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 were still pending and that there was an enmity of the petitioner with regard to the land dispute and, therefore, the chance of the fire-arm being used could not be ruled out. It is for these reasons mentioned in the police report that the District Magistrate rejected the application filed by the petitioner for grant of fire-arm licence. 8. Sri J.J. Munir, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order passed by Sri Hridesh Kumar, District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar on 13th October, 2011 deserves to be set aside as it is in the teeth of the directions given by the High Court in the judgment and order dated 6th July, 2010 rendered in Writ Petition No. 66237 of 2006 earlier filed by the petitioner. Elaborating his submissions, he pointed out that the High Court had made it clear to the District Magistrate that mere pendency of criminal cases against the petitioner cannot be made a ground by the District Magistrate to reject the application filed by the petitioner for grant of fire-arm licence but the District Magistrate again rejected the application filed by the petitioner by observing that two criminal cases were pending against the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the District Magistrate referred to the same land dispute which had not been accepted by the High Court in the earlier judgment rendered on 6th July, 2010 and that the District Magistrate had passed the order in a mala fide manner since the petitioner had filed a Contempt Application in which notice was issued to him and in this connection he placed reliance on the averments made in paragraph No. 34 of the writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that in such circumstances when all that has been stated by the District Magistrate while rejecting the application filed by the petitioner for grant of fire-arm licence is the pendency of two criminal cases against the petitioner and enmity with regard to the property of the petitioner in the village, it is a fit case where the Court itself should issue directions to the District Magistrate to grant fire-arm licence to the petitioner. On 17th July, 2012, when this petition was taken up, the Court directed the District Magistrate who had passed the order dated 13th October, 2011 to file his personal affidavit to explain why he had rejected the application filed by the petitioner for the same reasons which were contained in the earlier order, which order had been set aside by the High Court. Pursuant to the order passed by the Court, Sri Hridesh Kumar, District Magistrate has filed his affidavit. The relevant paragraphs of the affidavit are quoted below : “6. That, in reply to the contents of paragraph Nos. 32, 33 and 34 of the writ petition, it is submitted that petitioner had filed a Contempt Petition No. 5509 of 2011 for the non compliance of the judgment and order dated 6.7.2010, passed by the Hon’ble Court in Civil Misc. That, in reply to the contents of paragraph Nos. 32, 33 and 34 of the writ petition, it is submitted that petitioner had filed a Contempt Petition No. 5509 of 2011 for the non compliance of the judgment and order dated 6.7.2010, passed by the Hon’ble Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 66237 of 2006 Rajendra Pandit v. State of U.P. and others, in which the answering respondent was sole respondent and had filed counter-affidavit on 2.11.2011 and passed an order dated 13.10.2011 in compliance of the judgment and order dated 6.7.2010 and rejected the pending representation of the petitioner pursuant to the public report of the police station concerned due to pendency of the criminal cases. 7. That, the contents of paragraph Nos. 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40 of the writ petition are incorrect and as such are denied. In reply it is stated that had already submitted its report dated 16.5.2011 against the petitioner; disclosing that there is enmity in the village of the petitioner on account of land dispute and there is gigantic tension between the parties and in case petitioner has granted Fire-arm License, there will be possibility to misuse the arm license. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Gautam Budh Nagar has specifically recommended for not granting fire-arm license to the petitioner and same was also taken into consideration at the time of rejecting the application of the petitioner vide its order dated 13.10.2011.” 9. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that the petitioner has a statutory alternative remedy of filing an appeal to the Commissioner against the order passed by the District Magistrate as provided under Section 18 of the Act. It is also his submission that the District Magistrate committed no illegality in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner for grant of fire-arm licence and in support of his contention he has placed reliance upon the averments made by the District Magistrate in the paragraphs quoted above. 10. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. The application for grant of fire-arm licence is required to be filed under Section 13 of the Act and the relevant provisions are quoted below : 13. 10. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. The application for grant of fire-arm licence is required to be filed under Section 13 of the Act and the relevant provisions are quoted below : 13. Grant of licences.—(1) An application for the grant of a licence under Chapter II shall be made to the licensing authority and shall be in such form, contain such particulars and be accompanied by such fee, if any, as may be prescribed. (2) On receipt of an application, the licensing authority, shall call for the report of the officer in charge of the nearest police station on that application, and such officer shall send his report within the prescribed time. (2A) The licensing authority, after such inquiry, if any, as it may consider necessary, and after considering the report received under sub-section (2), shall, subject to the other provisions of this Chapter, by order in writing either grant the licence or refuse to grant the same: Provided that where the officer in charge of the nearest police station does not send his report on the application within the prescribed time, the licensing authority may, if it deems fit, make such order, after the expiry of the prescribed time, without further waiting for that report.” Section 14 of the Act which deals with refusal of license is quoted below : “14. Refusal of licences.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in Section 13, the licensing authority shall refuse to grant— (a) a licence under Section 3, Section 4 or Section 5 where such licence is required in respect of any arms or prohibited ammunition; (b) a licence in any other case under Chapter II,— (i) where such licence is required by a person whom the licensing authority has reason to believe— (1) to be prohibited by this Act or by any other low for the time being in force from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition, or (2) to be of unsound mind, or (3) to be for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act; or (ii) where the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to refuse to grant such licence. (2) The licensing authority shall not refuse to grant any licence to any person merely on the ground that such person does not own or possess sufficient property. (3) Where the licensing authority refuses to grant a licence to any person it shall record in writing the reasons for such refusal and furnish to that person on demand a brief statement of the same unless in any case the licensing authority is of the opinion that it will not be in the public interest to furnish such statement.” 11. The petitioner had filed the application under Section 13 of the Act for grant of fire-arm licence for Revolver/Pistol on 28th July, 2003. The application was rejected by the District Magistrate by the order dated 17th March, 2004. The appeal filed by the petitioner before the Commissioner for setting aside the aforesaid order was partly allowed and the matter was remanded to the District Magistrate to pass a fresh order after taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner had been acquitted in most of the criminal cases referred to in the order passed by the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate, however, again rejected the application filed by the petitioner by the order dated 1st June, 2006 and the appeal filed by the petitioner before the Commissioner was also dismissed by the order dated 4th October, 2006. Writ Petition No. 66237 of 2006 filed by the petitioner to assail these two orders was allowed by the judgment and order dated 6th July, 2010 holding that no criminal cases were pending against the petitioner and even mere pendency of criminal cases cannot be made a ground to reject the application. The District Magistrate was directed to decide the application filed by the petitioner in the light of the observations made by the High Court but what is seen is that the District Magistrate has placed reliance upon the police report which mentions that two criminal cases namely Case Crime No. 186 of 2008 under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and Case Crime No. 119 of 2009 under Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 are pending against the petitioner and that there is some enmity of the petitioner regarding the land of the petitioner in the village and, therefore, the use of fire-arm cannot be ruled out. As noticed hereinabove, the District Magistrate had earlier passed the order dated 1st June, 2006 by which the application filed by the petitioner for grant of fire-arm licence had been rejected. In this order, there was a reference to seven criminal cases but the petitioner had been acquitted in all the criminal cases. The District Magistrate had, however, observed that the petitioner had been acquitted because either the witnesses had turned hostile or benefit of doubt was given to the petitioner. The District Magistrate had also observed that there was enmity with regard to the land dispute between the petitioner and Niwas Sharma. The High Court was not satisfied with the reasons given by the District Magistrate and, accordingly, Writ Petition No. 66237 of 2006 that was filed by the petitioner for assailing the order of the District Magistrate and the Commissioner was allowed and the orders were set aside. 12. It is seen from the judgment of the High Court rendered on 6th July, 2010 that reliance was placed on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1984 (10) ALR 223, in which it was held that the fire-arm licence cannot be cancelled on the ground of mere involvement of the licensee in a criminal case. 13. It is surprising that inspite of the position of law having been made clear to the District Magistrate by the High Court in the judgment and order dated 6th July, 2010, the District Magistrate again rejected the application filed by the petitioner for the reason that two criminal cases were pending against the petitioner. There is no observation in the impugned order that it was necessary to reject the application for the purpose of public peace and public safety. The District Magistrate has clearly acted in defiance of the order passed by the High Court. What is further surprising is that in the counter-affidavit the District Magistrate has proceeded to defend the order on the ground that as he is in charge of the district and he had properly assessed the records and recorded his own subjective satisfaction for rejecting the application filed by the petitioner by a reasoned order. What is further surprising is that in the counter-affidavit the District Magistrate has proceeded to defend the order on the ground that as he is in charge of the district and he had properly assessed the records and recorded his own subjective satisfaction for rejecting the application filed by the petitioner by a reasoned order. In this connection, the District Magistrate has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Parvez Ahmad v. State of U.P. and others, 2006 (55) ACC 669 and a copy of the judgment has also been enclosed with the counter-affidavit. The relevant portion of the judgment relied upon by the learned Standing Counsel is quoted below : “The arms licence should be granted very rarely on a strict enquiry about the person who has applied for the arms licence. If there is little doubt about the activity and the conduct of the person and the arms being misused, the arms licence should be refused. Normally the arms should be in possession of Military, police or any other Government agency involved in maintaining law and order situation and to protect the life of the citizens of the country. Casual issuance of arms licence to the private persons lead to the crime and terrorism. Court cannot shut its eyes to the present situation prevailing in the Country. It appears that the issuance of the arms licence has become a casual feature. It is casually given even to those persons whose conduct are not good and they are involved in the criminal activity. Arms licence and the arms should be periodically checked even after the issuance of the arms licence. District Magistrate is under the obligation to maintain law and order in the District. He has a better knowledge about the conducts and the activities of the person residing in the district. It may happen that against a person, there is no FIR but if it is gathered that the person conduct is not good and he is involved in the communal or anti-social activities, the arms licence should not be given to such persons. The satisfaction of the District Magistrate with regard to above may not be interfered with unless found to be perverse or mala fide. It may be mentioned here that the above observation may not be misunderstood. Under the statute, the licencing authority is empowered to grant licence. The satisfaction of the District Magistrate with regard to above may not be interfered with unless found to be perverse or mala fide. It may be mentioned here that the above observation may not be misunderstood. Under the statute, the licencing authority is empowered to grant licence. Such power should be exercised fairly, honestly and on objective considerations. The person genuinely required licence should not be denied. It is expected from the licencing authority to make a fair enquiry and consider the matter objectively. His decision is always open to be scrutinized by the appellate authority and Court.” (emphasis supplied) 14. The District Magistrate was bound by the judgment and order delivered by this Court on 6th July, 2010 in the earlier Writ Petition No. 66237 of 2006 filed by the petitioner in which the District Magistrate was a respondent and the judgment had attained finality as it was not challenged in appeal by the District Magistrate. There was, therefore, no option with the District Magistrate but to pass an order in accordance with the observations and directions issued by the Court in the said judgment but the District Magistrate has shown defiance by making an attempt to place reliance upon another judgment rendered in Parvez Ahmad (supra) when even the said judgment does not give a blanket power to the District Magistrate to reject an application for grant of fire-arm licence as the Court had also observed that the observations made in the earlier paragraphs of the judgment should not be misunderstood and the power to grant the licence should be exercised fairly and honestly and the person who requires a fire-arm licence genuinely should not be denied such permission. What the District Magistrate has done is to pick up a sentence from the said judgment that the District Magistrate is under an obligation to maintain law and order and if a person is involved in a communal and anti-social activities, the arms licence should not be given to such person. The impugned order does not even mention that the petitioner is involved in communal or anti-social activities. The submission of the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents that the petitioner should be asked to avail of the alternative remedy of filing an appeal, in the circumstances narrated above, cannot be accepted. 15. It is, therefore, just not possible to sustain the impugned order passed by the District Magistrate. The submission of the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents that the petitioner should be asked to avail of the alternative remedy of filing an appeal, in the circumstances narrated above, cannot be accepted. 15. It is, therefore, just not possible to sustain the impugned order passed by the District Magistrate. The question now is what relief should be granted to the petitioner and whether strictures should be passed against the District Magistrate for deliberately acting in defiance of the judgment of this Court. The facts narrated above clearly show that thrice the High Court had directed the District Magistrate to decide the application for grant of fire-arm licence which the petitioner had filed way back in July, 2003. Inspite of the clear observations made by the High Court in its last judgment and order dated 6th July, 2010 that mere pendency of criminal cases should not be made a ground to reject the application filed by the petitioner for grant of fire-arm licence in view of the earlier judgment of this Court and the provisions of Sections 13 and 14 of the Act, the District Magistrate proceeded to ignore the observations made in the said judgment and has stated that the fire-arm licence cannot be granted to the petitioner because of the pendency of two criminal cases against the petitioner. The District Magistrate could not have cancelled the application filed by the petitioner for grant of fire-arm licence for this reason. 16. What further needs to be noticed in this case is that in paragraph 34 of the writ petition, the petitioner made a categorical statement which is quoted below : “34. That upon receipt of notice of the contempt application through the police, Hirdesh Kumar, District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, summoned the petitioner to his office under the pretext of inquiring from him regarding issues connected with his claim for a licence. The petitioner appeared before the District Magistrate on 13.10.2011. The District Magistrate did not ask any question regarding the bona fides of the petitioner’s claim. He flatly told the petitioner that since the petitioner had the audacity to prosecute respondent No. 4 for contempt, he would reject the petitioner’s application on the self-same grounds as those taken in his predecessor’s orders dated 1.6.2006, since quashed by this Hon’ble Court vide judgment and order dated 6.7.2010. He flatly told the petitioner that since the petitioner had the audacity to prosecute respondent No. 4 for contempt, he would reject the petitioner’s application on the self-same grounds as those taken in his predecessor’s orders dated 1.6.2006, since quashed by this Hon’ble Court vide judgment and order dated 6.7.2010. Shri Hirdesh Kumar also told the petitioner that he will see how the Hon’ble High Court would issue a licence to the petitioner or force the 4th respondent to grant him a licence even though there were no other grounds available to deny him a licence besides those already considered by the Hon’ble High Court and disapproved. So saying, Shri Hirdesh Kumar instructed his steno to type out an order of rejection of the petitioner’s application and sent the same to the Hon’ble High Court for being filed in contempt proceedings and, accordingly, he proceeded to pass the impugned order dated 10.10.2011, rejecting the petitioner’s application once again for grant of a fire-arm licence.” (emphasis supplied) The reply to paragraph 34 of the writ petition is contained in paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit filed by Sri Hridesh Kumar, District Magistrate. This paragraph has been quoted in the earlier part of this judgment and it is seen that there is no specific denial of this fact. The pleadings of the petitioner in paragraph 34 of the writ petition and the reply of the District Magistrate in paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit, therefore, leave no manner of doubt that the District Magistrate passed the order as a result of malice since notice had been issued to him in the contempt petition filed by the petitioner. 17. The decision of the Supreme Court in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, JT 1993 (6) SC 307, also needs to be noticed: “An Ordinary citizen or a common man is hardly equipped to match the might of the State or its instrumentalities. That is provided by the rule of law....... A public functionary if he acts maliciously or oppressively and the exercise of power results in harassment and agony then it is not an exercise of power but its abuse. No law provides protection against it. He who is responsible for it must suffer it...........Harassment of a common man by public authorities is socially abhorring and legally impermissible. A public functionary if he acts maliciously or oppressively and the exercise of power results in harassment and agony then it is not an exercise of power but its abuse. No law provides protection against it. He who is responsible for it must suffer it...........Harassment of a common man by public authorities is socially abhorring and legally impermissible. It may harm him personally but the injury to society is far more grievous.” (para 10) Similarly, in Registered Society v. Union of India and others, (1996) 6 SCC 530 , the Supreme Court observed : “No public servant can say “you may set aside an order on the ground of mala fide but you cannot hold me personally liable” No public servant can arrogate in himself the power to act in a manner which is arbitrary”. 18. It will also be appropriate to refer to the decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 16565 of 2012 (Dinesh Kumar Pandey v. State of U.P. and others) connected with Writ Petition No. 15883 of 2012 (Rajesh Pandey v. State of U.P. and others) decided on 25th July, 2012 in which the Court after analyzing Sections 13 and 14 of the Act observed : “52. The grant or refusal of licence by licensing authority is not his absolute discretion but is further subjected to other provisions of Chapter III. It takes the Court to sub-section (3) of Section 13 and Section 14. ................... 62. I have no hesitation thus in observing that a cumulative and harmonious reading of Sections 13 and 14 leave no manner of doubt that an objective consideration is mandated on the part of licensing authority. He cannot deny grant of license to a person on his sheer whims, caprices, imagination etc. Here it answers the requirement of reasonableness also. The procedure is consistent with the requirement of principle of natural justice. To some extent, it brings into consideration Article 14 of the Constitution. One cannot say that under the garb of the words, “any reason”, “unfit for grant of licence”, or the absence of a “good reason” for obtaining license, a licensing authority is empowered to deny licence on sheer flimsy grounds, namely, he will grant it only to those who have white hair or blue eyes or having a particular height and like. Similarly, the licensing authority cannot discover within “good reasons” for obtaining licence certain ex facie absurd reasons, namely, if a person belongs to a particular political party, or, that a person if belongs to a particular class or caste, and so on. These considerations are impermissible and cannot be construed a “good reason”. In the garb of “good reason” for obtaining licence, one also cannot stretch to a situation which would be virtually impossible to be performed or placed on record. ................ 126. The Court also cannot ignore the fact that the licensing authority did not fail in harassing the petitioner-applicants by not taking a decision on their application and keeping the matter pending for unreasonable length of time. In the present case, one of the petitioners applied in 1999 and the order was passed in 2011. No justification whatsoever has come, why for almost 12 years the application for grant of fire-arm licence and that too, on the ground of personal safety and security, was kept pending and undecided for more than a decade. In another matter it has remained pending for almost two years. Here also no explanation came forward for extraordinary delay. 127. In the fact situation as above, contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that respondents have found out a ground to reject petitioners’ applications on getting annoyed of petitioners daring to approach this Court with complaint of inaction on their part, whereupon this Court mandated to pass final order within a specified time, deserves to be accepted. The licensing authority in fact has tried to penalize the petitioners by rejecting their applications on fanciful grounds. I find force in the above submission but refrain from recording a final opinion on this aspect since the concerned officers have not been impleaded in person. 128. Now comes the question of relief. Can a Court’s judgment, mere quashing the impugned orders, would do complete justice and balance the scales of justice or these cases justify something more. The answer I find in a recent verdict of Apex Court, though it relates to Article 21 of the Constitution but to a case involving the question of individual rights of safety and security, the principle thereof can be extended. 129. The answer I find in a recent verdict of Apex Court, though it relates to Article 21 of the Constitution but to a case involving the question of individual rights of safety and security, the principle thereof can be extended. 129. In Delhi Jal Board v. National Campaign for Dignity and Rights of Sewerage and Allied Workers and others, JT 2011(8) SC 232, the Court said that Article 21 which guarantees the right to life and liberty will be denuded of its significant content if the power of this Court were limited to passing orders of removing executives illegal orders/action only and nothing more than that. The Court further said that one of the telling ways in which violation of that right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violators in payment of monetary compensation. Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements of fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt. The right to compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest and which present for their protection the powers of the State as a shield. If civilisation is not to perish in this country as it has perished in some others, it is necessary to educate ourselves into accepting that, respect for the rights of individuals is the true bastion of democracy. Therefore, the State must repair the damage done by its officers to the Petitioners’ rights. It may have recourse against those officers. 130. For the reasons aforesaid, in my view, both the writ petitions deserve to be allowed with exemplary costs. 131. The writ petitions are allowed. Impugned orders dated 14.11.2011 and 18.7.2011 passed by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 respectively in the matter of Dinesh Kumar Pandey, petitioner of writ petition No. (C) 16565 of 2012 and Rajesh Pandey, petitioner of writ petition No. (C) 15883 of 2012 are hereby quashed. 132. The licensing authority is directed to consider the petitioners’ application for grant of fire-arm licence in the light of observations made above and in accordance with law. It shall pass fresh order within two months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order before him. 133. The petitioners shall be entitled to costs which I quantify to Rs. It shall pass fresh order within two months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order before him. 133. The petitioners shall be entitled to costs which I quantify to Rs. One Lac per set of writ petition, which shall be paid by the respondents to the petitioner within three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order to them. However, the respondent State of U.P. shall have liberty to recover the said amount from the official concerned who are responsible for creating such situation, after making such inquiry as permissible under law.” (emphasis supplied) 19. In the present case, it is seen that the High Court by its judgment and order dated 6th July, 2010 in the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner for assailing the order passed by the District Magistrate, had issued directions to the District Magistrate to decide the application filed by the petitioner for grant of fire-arm licence in accordance with the directions contained in the order. No useful purpose would, therefore, be served by again directing the District Magistrate to decide the application in the light of the observations made in the said judgment and it is a fit case where the High Court should now issue a direction to the District Magistrate to grant fire-arm licence to the petitioner since the reasons mentioned by the District Magistrate in the impugned order are in the teeth of the directions given by the High Court that the grant of fire-arm licence cannot be refused merely because of the pendency of the criminal case particularly when the District Magistrate has not referred to any of the grounds contained in Section 14(1)(b)(ii) of the Act. It is also a fit case where costs should be imposed upon Sri Hridesh Kumar, District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar with a warning to him that the Court will not hesitate to initiate appropriate proceedings against him in future should he act in defiance of the judgment and orders passed by the Court. The order dated 13th October, 2011 passed by the District Magistrate is, accordingly, set aside with a direction to the District Magistrate to issue the fire-arm licence to the petitioner within a period of four weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is filed by the petitioner before the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar. The order dated 13th October, 2011 passed by the District Magistrate is, accordingly, set aside with a direction to the District Magistrate to issue the fire-arm licence to the petitioner within a period of four weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is filed by the petitioner before the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar. It is also a fit case where cost of Rs. 20,000/- should be imposed upon Sri Hridesh Kumar, the then District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar which shall be deposited by him with the present District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar within one month from today and on deposit of the cost it shall be paid to the petitioner. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. ——————