JUDGMENT : Plaintiffs 1 to 3 and 5 to 10, who were non-suited in respect of 12 cents of property in a suit for partition are the appellants. 2. The parties to the suit are members of Achamada tarwad. It initially had two tavazhies, namely, Indan tavazhy and Saban Kakka tavazy. We are concerned in this suit with Saban Kakka tavazhy. That consisted of three sub tavazhies, namely Kadisumma's tavazhy, Haliyumma's tavazhy and Sainaba's tavazhy. 3. Kadeesumma's tavazhy consisted of daughter Sheref and her son Kidavu, Haliyumma's tavazhy consisted of her daughter by name Sainabi, who died on 25.6.1980 leaving the sub tavazhy extinct. The third tavazhy namely Sainaba's tavazhy consisted of herself and her sons Youseff and Ahamed. Plaintiffs in the suit are children and grandchildren of Ahamed except the 4th and 10th plaintiffs, who are the second and first wife of Ahamed respectively, Youseff, his children and grandchildren are the defendants in the suit. 4. The claim in the plaint was that the first defendant is the brother of late Ahamed and the suit properties were jointly held by Ahamed and Yousef and they were in joint possession. It is claimed that before the death of Ahamed in 1983, to be precise, on 5.12.1983, he had demanded partition and the first defendant had agreed to partition the property. But he had postponed it under one pretext or another. The plaintiffs claimed that on the death of Ahamed, his interests devolved on them and the parties continued their joint possession and enjoyment. The first defendant and his heirs are entitled to only half the share in the property and out of the 13 items of plaint schedule property. Since the first defendant is not agreeable to effect partition, the suit had to be laid. 5. The first defendant resisted the suit. He pointed out that the suit lacks bona fides and is a frivolous one. As per the personal law followed by the parties, who are residents of Androth Island, the plaintiffs are not entitled to any share. All the allegations in the plaint were disputed. According to him the suit properties are Velliyazcha properties and belonged to Achamada tarwad. The tavazhy of the first defendant is in possession of the property. He disputed that the first defendant and late Ahamed were the only members of tavazhy. According to him, the parties follow Pristine Marumakkathayam Law. All the allegations in the plaint were disputed. According to him the suit properties are Velliyazcha properties and belonged to Achamada tarwad. The tavazhy of the first defendant is in possession of the property. He disputed that the first defendant and late Ahamed were the only members of tavazhy. According to him, the parties follow Pristine Marumakkathayam Law. Achamada tarwad consists of two branches. The first defendant, late Ahamed and Sainabi were members of one branch and constituted one sub-tavazhy. Sherif formed another sub-tavazhy, Sainaba formed another sub-tavazhy and the first defendant and Ahamed formed another sub-tavazhy. Kidavu, the karanavan of Sherif's sub-tavazhy instituted O.S.13 of 1969 for partition and separated. Sainabi, member of one of the three sub-tavazhies died leaving the sub-tavazhy extinct and her rights devolved on first defendant's sub-tavazhy and Sherif's sub-tavazhy. On the death of Ahamed, his rights devolved by survivorship on first defendant's tavazhy. The first defendant had instituted O.S. 6 of 1987 against Kidavu for separation of 1/2 share of Sainabi's 1/3rd share as her tavazhy became extinct. Claiming that the first defendant alone is entitled to properties, he prayed for a dismissal of the suit. 6. On the above pleadings, issues were raised by the trial court. Evidence consists of the testimony of P.Ws.1 and 2 and documents marked as Exts.A1 to A6 from the side of the plaintiffs. The contesting defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and had Exts.B1 to B13 marked. On an appreciation the materials before it, and applying the law applicable to the parties, the trial court came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to plaint items 1 to 12 and are entitled to half share only in respect of items No.13. Consequently a preliminary decree was passed directing that item No.13 be divided into two halves by metes and bounds and one of such half share be given to the plaintiff. It is that portion of the decree which declined to give relief in respect of items 1 to 12 is assailed in this appeal. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants pointed out that the findings of the lower court that the sub tavazhy of Sainabi consisting of Sainabi and the first defendant and late Ahamed continues to exist till the last member in the tavazhy dies even though Sainabi has left behind only two male members cannot have the support of law. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants pointed out that the findings of the lower court that the sub tavazhy of Sainabi consisting of Sainabi and the first defendant and late Ahamed continues to exist till the last member in the tavazhy dies even though Sainabi has left behind only two male members cannot have the support of law. According to learned counsel, for a tavazhy to exist and subsist, there must be a female member. A tavazhy or sub-tavazhy without a female is inconceivable. If that be so, according to learned counsel, on Sainabi's death, the properties devolved on the first defendant and late Ahamed as tenants in common and not as joint tenants. Their shares stand determined on the death of Sainabi, the female member of the sub-tavazhy. The claim of the first defendant and the finding of the court below that on the death of late Ahamed, the property devolved on the tavazhy consisting of the first defendant by survivorship has no support of law. According to learned counsel, the court below had grievously erred in coming to the above conclusion in respect of items 1 to 12. Considerable reliance was placed on the decision reported in Madhava Kurup v. Madhava Kurup ( 2006 (2) KLT 382 ) to contend for the position that in the circumstances mentioned above, a decree for partition in respect of items 1 to 12 also ought to have followed. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that the trial court is correct in its approach and has applied the correct law. The inhabitants of the Island are governed by Pristine Marumakkathayam Law, unadultered by the intervention of various Statutes in the mainland. Situate far too away from the main land, the Marumakkathayam Law with all its incidents continue to apply to the Islanders. This court on several occasions had considered the law relating to partition and succession in respect of the properties of islanders. There are two types of properties, namely, Velliyazcha property and Thingalazcha property. Learned counsel contended that Velliyazcha property is tarwad property and Thingalazcha property is the self acquired property. Velliyazcha property is governed by the Marumakkathayam Law and Thingalazcha properties are governed by the Muslim Law. Learned counsel referred to the definition of tavazhy and contended that in the case of a male member, tavazhy means tavazhy of his mother. Learned counsel contended that Velliyazcha property is tarwad property and Thingalazcha property is the self acquired property. Velliyazcha property is governed by the Marumakkathayam Law and Thingalazcha properties are governed by the Muslim Law. Learned counsel referred to the definition of tavazhy and contended that in the case of a male member, tavazhy means tavazhy of his mother. Learned counsel contended that the tavazhy or sub-tavazhy does not become extinct unless the last member in the said tavazhy passes away nor does the character of tavazhy changes merely because there is no female subsisting in that tavazhy. It is therefore contended that on the death of Sainabi, her sons the First defendant and Ahamed continue as members of tavazhy and continue to occupy joint status and are joint tenants and their legal relationship does not get converted into tenants in common. Learned counsel relied on the decisions reported in Buhari Koya v. Kasimkoya Haji (ILR 1979 (1) Kerala 730), Kunhipappada Beefathummabi v. Kunhipappada Kunhikoya ( 2006 (2) KLT 560 ) and Palliyat Mariyomma v. Palliyat Kidavu (ILR 2005 (1) Kerala 533). It was further contended that the tavazhy of Sainabi became extinct and the rights of that tavazhy have devolved on the other two tavazhies consisting of the first defendant and late Ahamed on one hand and Kidave on the other hand. The first defendant had instituted O.S. 6 of 1987 against Kidave for partition of 1/2 share of 1/3 share had obtained a decree. Since it is contended that on the death of the mother of the first defendant and late Ahamed, namely, Sainabi, the tavazhy still exists, according to learned counsel, the finding of the court below that on the death of Ahamed the property devolved on the first defendant by survivorship is only to be upheld. It is therefore contended that no grounds are made out to interfere with the judgment and decree of the court below. 9. The question that arises for consideration is whether the finding of the court below that consequent on the death of late Ahamed, his share in the tavazhy property devolved by survivorship on the first defendant is correct. 10. Once again the question regarding the law applicable regarding devolution and partition of property in the Island comes up for consideration. 9. The question that arises for consideration is whether the finding of the court below that consequent on the death of late Ahamed, his share in the tavazhy property devolved by survivorship on the first defendant is correct. 10. Once again the question regarding the law applicable regarding devolution and partition of property in the Island comes up for consideration. There can be no doubt that as far as tarwad properties are concerned, the Islanders are governed by Pristine Marumakkathayam Law. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, there are two types of properties, namely, Velliyazcha property and Thingalazcha property. Velliyazcha property is the tarwad property and Thingalazcha property is the self acquired property. Law governing Valliyazcha property is the Pristine Marumakkathayam Law while succession, devolution etc., of the self acquired property, namely, Thingalazcha property is governed by the Muslim Law. It is unnecessary to trace the history of the law relating to property in the Island, for, that has already been done by the courts on various occasions referring to passages by renowned scholars on the subject. Suffice to say that there is no dispute that the old Pristine Marumakkathayam Law with all its incidents continue to govern the Island undiluted or unadultered, though various legislations have brought about changes in the Marumakkathayam Law in the main land. 11. As already noticed, there are two properties, namely Velliyazcha property and Thingalazcha property. Valliyazcha property can be converted into Thingalazcha property only on consent of all the members of the tarawad. In some of the Islands, Thingalazcha property is also known as Thursday property. Partition of the tarwad property is possible only with the consent of all the members of the tarwad. In fact, the partibility of the tarwad property by the consent of all the members of the tavazhy is a modification of the system to suit the changing times. But the change stops there. Thingalazcha property or Thursday property as the case may be can be dealt with in any manner which suits its owners. Intestacy of Thingalazcha property is governed by Muslim Law. 12. The basic unit is a tarwad. It consists of female with descendants in the female line. A tarwad may consists of tavazhies and sub tavazhies. Usually, the eldest member acts as Karanavan. But instances are not rate when the eldest female acts as Karanavathi. Intestacy of Thingalazcha property is governed by Muslim Law. 12. The basic unit is a tarwad. It consists of female with descendants in the female line. A tarwad may consists of tavazhies and sub tavazhies. Usually, the eldest member acts as Karanavan. But instances are not rate when the eldest female acts as Karanavathi. Even as on today, individual members have no right to seek partition. The concept of tavazhy came into existence when it becomes impossible to manage due to the large number of members in the tarwad. A tavazhy in the strict sense is a group of persons consisting of a female, her children in the female line. Every member of a tarwad acquires a right by birth in the tarwad property. 13. The powers and duties of a Karanavan, rights of junior members, rights of tavazhy etc., make interesting topics for discussion, but it is unnecessary to go into those aspect. 14. Currently in this case, we are concerned with the consequences of tavazhy being left with two surviving male members. The question that arises for consideration is what happens to the property of a tavazhy which is left with no female member. According to the appellants, the surviving male members take the property as tenants in common. While the respondents would say that until the last member of that tavazhy dies, it continues as a tavazhy property and on the death of one of the male members, the property will devolve on the other members by survivorship. In other words, the counsel for the respondents contented that Velliyazcha property to which the tavazhy acquires right continues as Velliyazcha property in the hands of the two surviving male members and even if there is no female member left in the tavazhy. 15. If the proposition advanced by the appellants is to be accepted, then the decree of the court below in respect of items 1 to 12 will have to be set aside. If on the other hand the contention of the respondents is to be accepted, then the appeal is only to be dismissed. 16. Fortunately, I need not go in search of precedents on the law relating to property right of Islanders, since in 1979 the issue has been considered in considerable detail in the decision reported in Muhari Koya v. Kasimkoya Haji (ILR 1979 (1) Kerala 730). 16. Fortunately, I need not go in search of precedents on the law relating to property right of Islanders, since in 1979 the issue has been considered in considerable detail in the decision reported in Muhari Koya v. Kasimkoya Haji (ILR 1979 (1) Kerala 730). This decision is considered to be a classic on the topic and holds good even today. After a meticulous survey of the law relating to the property among the Islanders, this court had occasion to hold as follows : "34. The customary law relating to partition prevailing in the Amini and other Islands of the Lakshadweep has to be appreciated in the above setting. The expression 'partition' has also to be understood in the background that property in the island, at any rate, until recently, consisted of trees and not the land wherein they stood. If the right to the usufructus of the trees and not the land itself form the basis of partition, the concept of partition in early times could not have taken in a division of the land where the trees stood. If the people in the island originally consisted of those who migrated from the west-coast such migration must have taken place at a time when the Marumakkathayam Law did not recognize partition. If that be so, the people who migrated could have carried to the island only the law as it existed in the main land at the time of migration. It is possible that when the number of members of individual tarwads increased, some of them started living separate from the main tarwad houses and by arrangement among the members, the members who left the tarwad houses must have taken with them particular properties for their maintenance. From the fact that right of reversion vests in the branches and concurrence of the other branches is required for alienation of the Velliazcha properties of a branch, it is clear that the members of each of the branches or units of the tarwad retained rights in the properties of the tarwad held by the other branch tarwads. In other words, the tarwad must be deemed to be in existence so far as those properties are concerned. Such properties remain properties of the main tarwad and the possession thereof by individual branch tarwads is only for the purpose of convenient living. 35. In other words, the tarwad must be deemed to be in existence so far as those properties are concerned. Such properties remain properties of the main tarwad and the possession thereof by individual branch tarwads is only for the purpose of convenient living. 35. In the passage quoted already, from the Book by Ellis, it is mentioned that in Aminidivis, a man without male issue could constitute Belasha properties as Belliazcha properties of his daughters in which case the daughters would become a tarwad within a tarwad so far as hereditary rights in that particular property are concerned. It is not unlikely that the branch tarwads who live away from the main tarwad also have similar properties of their own which are different from the properties of the main tarwad. There are no materials available which suggest that the other members of the main tarwad have any right in such properties unless they are left un- disposed of by the tavazhy or branch tarwad concerned or the last member thereof, on its becoming extinct. Leaving such properties apart, what emerges from the above details is that the reversionary right that vests in the members of one tarwad in respect of the properties in the possession of another tarwad is by virtue of their being branches of one main tarwad to which the properties still belong. There is no evidence that regular partition in, the sense in which it is understood in the main land has taken place among the branches." 17. Before going further, it is necessary to notice the decision reported in Achuthan Nair v. Chinnammu Amma ( AIR 1966 SC 411 ), wherein it is held as follows : "7. A family governed by Marumakkathayam law is known as a tarwad: it consists of a mother and her children, whether male or female, and all their descendants, whether male or female, in the female line. But the descendants, whether male or female, or her sons or the sons of the said descendants in the female line do not belong to the tarwad - they belong to the tarwads of their mothers. A tavazhi is a branch of a tarwad. It is comprised of a group of descendants in the female line of a female common ancestor who is a member of the tarwad. It is one of the units of the tarwad. A tavazhi is a branch of a tarwad. It is comprised of a group of descendants in the female line of a female common ancestor who is a member of the tarwad. It is one of the units of the tarwad. It may own separate property as distinct from tarwad property. The management of a tarwad or tavazhy ordinarily vests in the eldest male member of the tarwad or tavazhi, as the case may be. But there are instances where the eldest female member of a tarwad or a tavazhi is the manager thereof. The male manager is called the karanavan and the female one, karanavathi. A karanavathi or karanavan is a representative of the tarwad or tavazhi and is the protector of the members thereof, he or she stands in a fiduciary relationship with the members thereof. In such a system of law there is an inherent conflict between law and social values, between legal incidents and natural affection, and between duty and interest. As the consort or the children of a male member, whether a karanavan or not, have no place in the tarwad, they have no right to the property of the tarwad. Whatever might have been the attitude of the members of a tarwad in the distant past, in modern times it has given rise to a feeling of unnaturalness and the consequent tendency on the part of the male members of a tarwad to divert the family properties by adopting devious methods to their wives and children. Courts have recognized the difference between a joint Hindu family under the Hindu law and a tarwad under the Marumakkathayam law in the context of acquisition of properties and have adopted different principles for ascertaining whether a property acquired in the name of a member of a family is a joint family property or the self acquired property of the said member. Under Hindu law, when a property stands in the name of a member of a joint family, it is incumbent upon those asserting that it is a joint family property to establish it. Under Hindu law, when a property stands in the name of a member of a joint family, it is incumbent upon those asserting that it is a joint family property to establish it. When it is proved or admitted that a family possessed sufficient nucleus with the aid of which the member might have made the acquisition, the law raises a presumption that it is a joint family property and the onus is shifted to the individual member to establish that the property was acquired by him without the aid of the said nucleus. This is a well settled proposition of law. But the said principle has not been accepted or applied to acquisition of properties in the name of a junior member of a tarwad (anandravan). It was held that there was no presumption either way; and that the question had to be decided on the facts of each case......... But it is settled law that if a property is acquired in the name of the karanavan, there is a strong presumption that it is a tarwad property and that the presumption must hold good unless and until it is rebutted by acceptable evidence." 18. In the decision reported in Palliyat Mariyomma's case (supra), it was held as follows: "In fact this court in Neelathupura Saikoya v. Attakoya (2003 (2) KLT SN 41 (C.No.53) has already given judicial recognition of the custom in Androth and Kalpeni islands of Lakshadweep that neither the tavazhi nor a member of the thavashi or tarwad has any right of alienation of the tarwad properties. The existence of such a custom has been judicially recognised in the Kavarathi Island of Lakshadweep while it may be necessary for a party setting up a custom for the first time to prove the same in conformity with the requirements of continuity, antiquity, notoriety, in a case where such custom has been judicially recognised, the same can be followed without the necessary of independent of proof in subsequent cases where such custom arises for determination. Thus, when this court has accepted the existence of such a custom in the decisions noted earlier, the same can be readily accepted and applied to the case on hand even without insisting on any independent proof. Thus, when this court has accepted the existence of such a custom in the decisions noted earlier, the same can be readily accepted and applied to the case on hand even without insisting on any independent proof. If so, by executing Ext.B2 gift deed in respect of tarwad properties, Katheesumma was sacrilegiously violating the established custom of the land rendering herself liable for her action. The result of the foregoing discussion is that the plaint schedule properties are the tarwad (Velliazcha) properties of the Palliyat tarwad and neither Kadeesumma nor any member of the tarwad was entitled to deal with any of those properties as their self-acquired (Thinkalazcha) properties." 19. In the decision reported in 2006 (2) KLT 560 it was held as follows: "9. The provisions of Ss.17 of the Mappilla Marumakkattayam Act (Act XVII of 1939) and Section 40 of the Madras Marumakkattayam Act, 1933 provided that partition should be effected per capita. These Statutes cannot apply to the Islanders as such. But, they relate to the area and what is more have been specifically Muslims, who follow the Marumakkattayam system hailing from the area in the main land where the predecessor in interest of the islanders migrated. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Akavande Mulahur Vatakkethil Kizhekke Navar Veetil Kama Vastri Sreedevi Nethiar & Ors. v. Akavande Mulahur Elayat Vatakke Nair Veetil Karnavan Peruvunni Nair & Ors. (AIR 1935 Madras 71) as followed in Avvammada Pathummabi & Ors. v. Avvammada Sarommabi & Ors. ( AIR 1992 Ker. 56 ), takes the view that partition among Marumakkattayees on the main land, has to be done per capita. This is the view expressed in Mayne's Hindu Law also, and P.R. Sundara Aiyar on Malabar & Aliyasanthana Law which we have referred to reflects this view. But the learned Author does refer to some divergence in opinion mainly on the basis of the decision of the Madras High Court in Nani Kutti and Others v. K.P.P.P. Achuthan Kutti Nair & Ors. (AIR 1919 Madras 573). But apparently, the learned Author did not have the benefit of referring to the later decision of the Madras High Court in Akavande Mulahur Vatakethil Kizhekke Nayar Veetil Kama Vastri Sreedevi Nethiar & Ors. v. Akavande Mulah Elayat Vatakke Nair Veetil Karanavan Peruvunni Nair & Ors. (AIR 1935 Madras 71), which we have already referred to. (AIR 1919 Madras 573). But apparently, the learned Author did not have the benefit of referring to the later decision of the Madras High Court in Akavande Mulahur Vatakethil Kizhekke Nayar Veetil Kama Vastri Sreedevi Nethiar & Ors. v. Akavande Mulah Elayat Vatakke Nair Veetil Karanavan Peruvunni Nair & Ors. (AIR 1935 Madras 71), which we have already referred to. The view that it should be per capita has gained acceptance by a Division Bench of this Court in Kunhamma alias Kalliani Amma v. Kunhiparvathi Amma & Ors. ( 1972 KLT 319 ). Thus, there is a very strong body of judicial opinion and which stands referred to by the learned Authors that a division at least in the Malabar region must take place per capita. This appears to have been the position even prior to the decision of the law contained in the Statutes. This view is in consonance with the juridical concept of a proprietor which is what a member of a tarwad is in regard of the property of the tarwad. In such circumstances, it is clear that each member of a tarwad is a co-owner. It will be inconsistent with the concept of a co-ownership to predicate that a partition on terms which do not vouchsafe for the member a share who is not in keeping with his possession as co-owner with equal rights. 10. We find that as far as the facts in this case are concerned, the learned counsel for the appellants would be justified in contending that the Suit itself, at the instance of the first respondent, is not maintainable with regard to B Schedule property. This is because the plaintiff is only a member of a thavazhy. A member of a thavazhy by himself cannot enforce partition through a court of law as he does not by himself represent the thavazhy, going even by the decision in Avvammada Pathummabi & Ors. v. Avvammada Sarommabi & Ors. ( AIR 1992 Ker. 56 ). Going by the genealogical tree referred to hereinbefore, it is clear that while he is a member of a sub-thavazhy, there are other members in the same thavazhy. The thavazhies consist of the '' members of the thavazhy of the grandmother of the second defendant and the plaintiff on the one hand and the grandmother of the 13th defendant on the other hand. The thavazhies consist of the '' members of the thavazhy of the grandmother of the second defendant and the plaintiff on the one hand and the grandmother of the 13th defendant on the other hand. The thavazhy of the grandmother of the plaintiff and the second defendant consists of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 12. The plaintiff is only one of the members of the thavazhy, even though he may be the sole member of the sub-thavazhy, besides being a member of the tharawad. 'B' Schedule is the property of the tharawad. The view that has been taken by this Court as reflected in the decision in Avvannada Pathummabi & Ors. v. Avvammada Sarommabi & Ors. ( AIR 1992 Ker. 56 ), is that partition is permitted between thavazhies, even though in the matter of allocation of shares, the number of members in each thavazhy has to be reckoned and in that sense, it is done per capita. It related to the Androth Island. In the Gazetteer, it is stated that in Kalpeni and Androth Islands, partition is permitted among thavazhies. Therefore, at any rate, the Suit at the instance of the first respondent as regards 'B' Schedule, is not maintainable. Thus, while declaring that partition is to be effected per capita in a Suit successfully brought within the meaning of Avvammada Pathummabi's case ( AIR 1992 Ker. 56 ), in the facts of this case, since it is found that the Suit is at the instance of the first respondent alone, we feel that the suit is liable to be dismissed as regards 'B' Schedule property. As regards 'C Schedule property, in the light of the principle which we have accepted, namely the partition should be effected per capita, we order that in so far as it relates to 'C Schedule property, there will be a preliminary decree for partition of 'C schedule property per capita, i.e. the plaintiff shall be entitled to 1/12 share while defendants 1 to 12 shall take 1/12 share each." 20. The law regarding the right of members over tavazhy property, the right to seek partition etc are by now well settled. There are slight variations in the custom followed from Island to Island, but the essential features are almost the same. The law regarding the right of members over tavazhy property, the right to seek partition etc are by now well settled. There are slight variations in the custom followed from Island to Island, but the essential features are almost the same. At the risk of repetition, one may notice that while the Marumakkathayam Law in the main land went through several changes and modifications, the Marumakkathayam Law followed in the Island retains its original form. In the case of female members, property devolves on their children and in the case of male members, after death, it reverts to the original tarwad. The last surviving member cannot alienate the property without the consent of the reversioners. 21. Initially partition was unknown in the Islands and the common way of enjoying properties separately was by means of maintenance arrangements. Partition means living separately from the original tarwad with some property. But that arrangement did not amount to severance of status. In such cases, the share of a person at a given point of time could not be ascertained and his share was liable to fluctuation consequent on the births and deaths in the tarwad.) We get some useful information from the book Traditional Futures - Law and Custom in India's Lakshadweep Islands by Sri. V. Vijayakumar, wherein at page 147 it is mentioned as follows: "Therefore, [the term bhagam was used in those days to indicate the condition that each branch could manage and enjoy the property allotted to it, without interference from other branches, so long as the last member of the branch was live. The other branches became entitled to the rights regarding those properties only on the death of the last member. So the essence of these two terms as understood in ancient times can be summarized as the following: bhagam means division of Friday property among several branches with the right of enjoyment alone, which is also known as maintenance arrangement. The other branches became entitled to claim possession of the properties only on the death of last surviving member of that branch and this right to get the properties back in the other family is called maranavakasam or attaladukkam." 22. A tarwad may consists of several tavazhies and sub tavazhies. When a partition takes place in the tarwad, it splits up into tavazhies, i.e., branches in the female line. A tarwad may consists of several tavazhies and sub tavazhies. When a partition takes place in the tarwad, it splits up into tavazhies, i.e., branches in the female line. The split up group forms a new group of tavazhy separately. As per the law and custom followed in the Islands, male members are also entitled to a share as that of the female subject to the rider that on his death his share reverts to the tarwad. 23. Having thus had a view of the law relating to property in the Island, one may now turn to the issue on hand. 24. Though the issue may appear to be quite simple, answer seems difficult. The essential question is when a tavazhy consists of a female and two male members, what happens to the property enjoyed by the tavazhy on the death of the female and how are the properties thereinafter to be enjoyed by the two male members or in other words one has to determine the status of the two male members when the tavazhy left with no female member. Does the tavazhy ceases to exist till the last female member of the tavazhy is no more? On behalf of the appellants, it is contended that on the death of the last female member of the tavazhy, the male member in the tavazhy takes the property thereafter as tenants in common. 25. Regarding the facts of this case, the court below found that consequent on the death of Sainabi, one of the sub-tavazhies of Saban Kakka tavazhy became extinct and the share of that tavazhy devolved in equal shares on the other two tavazhies. Sainabi died on 25.6.1980. It is interesting to note that by that time, the tavazhy of which Kadave was the Karanavan had obtained partition and separated from the tavazhy. Then again in 1987 the first defendant herein sued Kidavu claiming 1/3rd of 1/2nd share consequent on the death of Sainabi. According to the respondents in this case, Youseff and late Ahamed, even after the death of their ancestoress Sainabi, continued as a tavazhy while the appellant would say otherwise. 26. One fact is very clear. The property from which the shares are available to Youseff and Ahamed continues as Velliyazcha property even on the death of Sainabi, their common ancestor. 27. 26. One fact is very clear. The property from which the shares are available to Youseff and Ahamed continues as Velliyazcha property even on the death of Sainabi, their common ancestor. 27. The proposition advanced by the respondents that even after the death of Sainabi, the female ancestoress of the tavazhy of which Youseff and Ahamed are members continued to exist cannot be accepted. It is necessary to refer the decision reported in Madhava Kurup v. Madhava Kurup ( 2006 (2) KLT 382 ). Before doing so, one aspect may be noticed. The decision which gave rise to the decision reported in Madhava Kurup v. Madhava Kurup ( 2006 (2) KLT 382 ) was the subject matter of a decision reported in Madhava Kurup v. Madhava Kurup (ILR 2001 (2) Kerala 585). First one may refer to the decision reported in Madhava Kurup v. Madhava Kurup (ILR 2001 (2) Kerala 585). The facts of the case are that the plaint schedule property in the said case belonged to the tavazhy of Ummamma Amma. She had a son by name Krishnan Nair and daughter by name Mathu Amma. Mathu Amma had four children namely Balakrishnan Nair, Appa Nair, Karunakaran Nair and Meenakshi Amma. The plaintiffs in the said suit were Balakrishnan Nair's daughter's children. Defendants 1 to 4 are the children of Appa Nair. Karunakaran Nair and Meenakshi Amma died issueless. Their rights over the property devolved on the tavazhy consisting of Mathu Amma, Krishnan Nair, Balakrishnan Nair, and Appa Nair. Mathu Amma died in 1944 and thereafter only two members of the tavazhy survived namely, Balakrishnan Nair and Appa Nair. Balakrishnan Nair died in 1950. 28. The contention raised in the case was that on the death of Mathu Amma, the tavazhy ceases to exist because the said tavazhy does not have any female member and all that is left are two male members, namely, Balakrishnan Nair and Appa Nair. Thereafter Balakrishnan Nair and Appa Nair became co-owner of the property. Thus, on the death of Balakrishnan Nair in 1950 his rights would devolve on his legal heirs under the law of succession. According to the contesting defendants in the suit, since as long as there is no division, the tavazhy will continue to exist and the property will devolve on the surviving member and the last member of the tavazhy becomes the absolute owner of the property. According to the contesting defendants in the suit, since as long as there is no division, the tavazhy will continue to exist and the property will devolve on the surviving member and the last member of the tavazhy becomes the absolute owner of the property. Hence according to them, after the death of Balakrishnan Nair, his share in the property will go to Appa Nair and at the time when he died in 1967 the property becomes his absolute property. 29. It appears that in the above case, the trial court took the view that consequent on the death of Matha Amma, the tavazhy ceases to exist and Balakrishnan Nair and Appa Nair take the property as tenants in common or as co-owners. On the basis of that finding a decree was passed. It was the said decree that was challenged before this court which resulted in the decision cited above. This court after considering a number of decisions came to the conclusion that the conclusion drawn by the trial court is incorrect and held that the lower court was not correct in holding that after the death of Mathu Amma the tarwad becomes extinct and the two remaining members became co-owners. This court accepted the view raised before this court that even after the death of the female member, tavazhy continues to exist and the property devolved by survivorship and the property became the absolute property of the last surviving male member. It was the said view taken by this court was challenged before the Apex Court which resulted in the decision reported in Madhava Kurup v. Madhava Kurup ( 2006 (2) KLT 382 ). 30. The Apex Court after referring to the facts in detail held that the principle laid down by this court could not be accepted and held as follows: "13. In the instant case the High Court distinguished the decision in Balachandran (supra) observing that the question which arose for consideration in that case related to devolution of self acquired property of a Manimakkathayi female, and not in relation to Tavazhi property, and the question whether the tarwad can consist of only two male members did not expressly arise for consideration. If further drew support from the decision of this court in Gowli Buddanna v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore, wherein in the context of the Income Tax Act, it was observed that under Hindu Law a joint family may consist of a single male member and widows of deceased male members. Inferentially, the High Court concluded that under the Marumakkathayam Law as well, a single male member could constitute a tarwad. In doing so, the High Court lost sight of the vital distinction between the two that while under the Hindu Law descent is traced through females. In the case of a Hindu Joint Family a single male coparcener may continue the coparcenary with his sons who may be born later, but in the absence of a female member a Tavazhi cannot be continued by male members alone. The comparison is, therefore, not apposite. Different considerations may arise if the sole surviving member of the Tavazhi is a female. 14. We find that the observations in Balachandran are supported by good reason. If the descent is traceable only through females, in the absence of a female member, the Tavazhi must come to an end with no chance of there being a female member to continue the line. The rule of survivorship in such circumstances ceased to operate and the surviving male members, in the absence of a tavazhi, must inherit the property as tenants in common, and share it equally. No authority as cited before us which takes a different view." 31. It is to be noticed that going by the above decision, a tavazhy ceases to exist when there is no female in the tavazhy and thereafter the male members take the properties as tenants in common and the question of devolution by survivorship does not arise. It also needs to be noticed that the decision was rendered on the principle of Pristine Marumakkathayam Law and not on the basis of any statutory provision. In the light of the above decision holding that the tavazhy can exist only so long as a female member exists and the tavazhy cannot exist in the absence of a female member, the view taken by the lower court does not appear to be correct. 32. It is true that the Islanders followed Pristine Customery Marumakkathayam Law. In the light of the above decision holding that the tavazhy can exist only so long as a female member exists and the tavazhy cannot exist in the absence of a female member, the view taken by the lower court does not appear to be correct. 32. It is true that the Islanders followed Pristine Customery Marumakkathayam Law. But that does not mean that the principle laid down in the decision reported in Madhava Kurup v. Madhava Kurup ( 2006 (2) KLT 382 ) cannot apply. It may also be true that the share held by Sainabi's tavazhy consisting of herself, Youseff and Ahamed are in Velliyazcha property. Even on the death of Sainabi, the property still be Velliyazcha property but the mode of devolution thereafter changes. Their joint tenancy now transforms into tenancy in common and after the death of common ancestress, Youseff and Ahamed enjoy the property as tenants in common. It follows that the court below was not justified in declining to grant partition in respect of items 1 to 12. 33. In the result, this appeal is allowed and tried finding so far as items 1 to 12 are concerned is set aside and it is held that the plaintiffs are entitled to 1/2 share over plaint items 1 to 12 also. 34. The judgment and decree of the lower court are set aside and the decree is passed in the following terms. Items 1 to 13 will be divided into two equal shares and one such share shall be given to the plaintiffs. Costs will come out from the estate.