JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Through this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 27.4.2012 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation (in short D.D.C) in Revision No. 531 Rajendra and others v. Lalji and others, by which the the respondents’ revision was allowed. In the revision, the order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation dated 3.5.2011 passed in Appeal No. 958 (Lalji v. Dayaram and others) was under challenge. 2. The facts giving rise to this case are as under: It appears, the petitioner has filed an objection under Section 20 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 before the Consolidation Officer, Bindki, Fatehpur. The said objection was rejected by the Consolidation Officer on 31.5.1993. Challenging the aforesaid order, the petitioner, herein, has filed an Appeal No. 958 (Lalji v. Dayaram and others). The said appeal was dismissed in default on 11.12.1997. The petitioner herein has filed restoration application which was allowed on payment of cost worth Rs. 100/- on 21.3.2005 with the condition, in case, the appeal is dismissed in default again, the same shall not be restored. 3. It appears, the case was again dismissed in default on 2.8.2005. The petitioner, herein has filed an application for recall of the order dated 2.8.2005. This application was filed after expiry of the period of limitation for filing the restoration application. The petitioner, herein, has also filed an application for condonation of delay. The Settlement Officer Consolidation vide order dated 3.5.2011 has allowed the application on payment of Rs. 200/- and restored the appeal on merit. 4. Aggrieved by this order, the respondent Nos. 3 to 8 have filed Revision No. 531 before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has allowed the revision and set aside the order passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation on the ground that earlier when the case was dismissed in default on 28.7.2003 it was restored on payment of Rs. 100/- cost with the condition that in case the appeal is again dismissed in default, the same shall not be restored. The Deputy Director of Consolidation took the view that earlier order passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation has got binding effect and the subsequent order allowing the restoration application should not have been passed in view of the conditions laid down in the order dated 21.3.2005. 5. The Deputy Director of Consolidation took the view that earlier order passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation has got binding effect and the subsequent order allowing the restoration application should not have been passed in view of the conditions laid down in the order dated 21.3.2005. 5. While assailing this order, Sri G.K.Maurya, learned counsel for the petitioner has made following submissions : (i) The revision itself was not maintainable as the same was passed against an interlocutory order allowing the restoration application by restoring the appeal on its original number. (ii) Any condition imposed in an order restoring the case on the earlier occasions will not operate either as res judicata or estoppel. In the submission of Sri Maurya, the impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is without jurisdiction and deserves to be quashed. 6. I have heard Sri G.K.Maurya, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned standing counsel for the respondents and perused the record. Considering the controversy in hand, I am not inclined to issue notice to the private respondents whose revision has been allowed. However liberty is given to them to file an application for recall of this order which I am going to pass today if they feel aggreived. This order is being passed without notice to the other side, for the reason, that the matter relates to the restoration of an order and keeping the writ petition pending here will take a long time in its disposal, which may ultimately defeat the purpose of litigation. Further, also in view of the fact that the petitioner is aged about 77 years and in case counter-affidavit is called for, the petitioner may not be able to get fruit of litigation. Reverting back to the facts of this case, as would appear from the record that the case was dismissed on two occasions : (1) On first occasions, the case was dismissed in default on 11.12.1997, which was recalled on 21.3.2005 on payment of Rs. 100/- cost with the condition that in case, the case is dismissed in default again, the same shall not be restored. (II) The case was again dismissed in default on 2.8.2005.The restoration application of the petitioner was allowed on payment of Rs. 200/- cost. 100/- cost with the condition that in case, the case is dismissed in default again, the same shall not be restored. (II) The case was again dismissed in default on 2.8.2005.The restoration application of the petitioner was allowed on payment of Rs. 200/- cost. Sri Maurya has submitted that the case was dismissed in default on 2.8.2005 which was restored on 3.5.2011 and the revision filed by the respondents was allowed on 27.4.2012. Sri Maurya has contended that the revision was filed against an interlocutory order therefore the same was not maintainable. For appreciating the controversy in hand, it would be useful to look into the provisions contained under sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the Act and explanation (2) thereto, which confers a right of revision under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. The same is reproduced hereinunder: “48(1). The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order other than an interlocutory order passed by such authority in the case or proceedings, may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, made such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit. Explanation (2).—For the purposes of this section thte expression ‘interlocutory order’ in relation to a case or proceeding, means such order deciding any matter arising in such case or proceeding or collateral thereto as does not have the effect to finally disposing of such case or proceeding.” From the perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the Act, it would transpire that the revision would be maintainable against any order except interlocutory order and the interlocutory orders have been explained in explanation (2), which means such order deciding any matter arising in such case or proceeding or collateral thereto as does not have the effect to finally disposing of such case or proceeding. The literal meaning of the word ‘interlocutory order’ has been defined in various dictionaries as under: (1) Law Lexicon (P. Ramanath Ayer) 1997 Edition: Interlocutory order: An interlocutory order is one which is made pending the case and before a final hearing on the merits. The literal meaning of the word ‘interlocutory order’ has been defined in various dictionaries as under: (1) Law Lexicon (P. Ramanath Ayer) 1997 Edition: Interlocutory order: An interlocutory order is one which is made pending the case and before a final hearing on the merits. An interlocutory order is made to secure some end and purpose necessary and essential to the progress of the suit, and generally collateral to the issues formed by the pleadings and not connected with the final judgment. (2) Halsbury’s Law of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 26, Paragraph 506: Interlocutory order: An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either.—(1) is made before judgment and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declarations of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out, is termed ‘interlocutory’. An interlocutory order, even though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinates matter with which/ideals. (3) Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th Edition: Interlocutory: (of a decree or judgment) given provisionally during the course of a legal action.” 7. On bare perusal of the meaning of the word ‘interlocutory order’, it would transpire that an order, which does not have the effect of finality of the proceedings and it is an order in a pending proceeding, which is made during the progress of an action and which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties. The word ‘interlocutory order’ has also been used in Section 397 of Code of Criminal Procedure and the same came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2185 , where the Apex Court has held that the term ‘interlocutory order’ merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. In the case of V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI, AIR 1980 SC 962 , the Apex Court held that the interlocutory order has to be construed in contradiction to or in contrast with final order, it means not a final order, but an intermediate order. In the case of V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI, AIR 1980 SC 962 , the Apex Court held that the interlocutory order has to be construed in contradiction to or in contrast with final order, it means not a final order, but an intermediate order. It is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. 8. Here in the present case, the order dated 3.5.2011 passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, was challenged by which the Settlement Officer of Consolidation has set aside the order dated 2.8.2005 passed by him by which the appeal was dismissed in default and the Deputy Director of Consolidation has set aside the aforesaid order on the ground that allowing the restoration application would amount to abuse of the process of the Court as the inconvenience has been caused to the other side. 9. It is not in dispute that revision was filed under Section 48 of the Act, which provides that revision would not be maintainable against an interlocutory order. From the perusal of the meaning of the word ‘interlocutory order’, as has been defined in various dictionaries and several pronouncements of the Apex Court that an order which does not have the effect of finality and has been passed in pending proceeding will fall in the ambit of the interlocutory orders. I am of the view that an order restoring the appeal on its original number does not have any effect of finality, as the effect of such order would be the revival of the appeal and the same would be adjudicated after hearing all concerned. Therefore, in my opinion, the revision itself was not maintainable and the Deputy Director of Consolidation has erred in entertaining the revision and setting aside the order passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation dated 3.5.2011, as the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation would be an order without jurisdiction. It is well-settled that any order passed by the Court/authority, which has no jurisdiction to pass such order, would be a nullity. Reference may be given to Managing Director, Army Welfare Housing Organization v. Sumangal Services Pvt. Ltd., (2004) 9 SCC 619 , Sarup Singh and another v. Union of India and another (2011) 11 SCC 198 . It is well-settled that any order passed by the Court/authority, which has no jurisdiction to pass such order, would be a nullity. Reference may be given to Managing Director, Army Welfare Housing Organization v. Sumangal Services Pvt. Ltd., (2004) 9 SCC 619 , Sarup Singh and another v. Union of India and another (2011) 11 SCC 198 . A Division Bench of this Court, in which I was a member, in the case of Committee of Management Shri Jawahar Inter College and another v. State of U.P. and others in Special Appeal No. 164 of 2012 decided on 25.1.2012 has held as under: “Jurisdiction can neither be assumed nor presumed nor conferred nor acquired by acquiescence of the parties” Otherwise also, the condition imposed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, while recalling the earlier order by which the appeal was dismissed in default with the condition that in case, the appeal is dismissed again, the same shall not be restored, would neither amount as res judicata nor estoppel. 10. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 27.4.2012, passed by District Deputy Director of Consolidation, Fatehpur is hereby quashed. However, this fact cannot be brushed aside that the petitioner is only pursuing restoration application for the last 15 years and on two occasions, the case was dismissed in default, which is self indicative of the fact that the petitioner is not interested in disposal of the appeal and getting the appeal dismissed in default. Due to this action on the part of the petitioner, certainly some inconvenience has been caused to the other side, but looking into the purpose of establishment of the Court, which are established to impart substantial justice to the parties and not to scuttle the process of justice on technicalities, even if some inconvenience has been caused to the other side, the same could very well be compensated by imposing cost on the petitioner. Therefore, taking note of the observation made in this order, a cost of Rs. 3,000/- is imposed upon the petitioner, which shall be paid to the other side. The petitioner shall deposit Rs. 3,000/- alongwith certified copy of the order of this Court before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, giving an undertaking that he will argue the case on merit and will not seek any unnecessary adjournments. 3,000/- is imposed upon the petitioner, which shall be paid to the other side. The petitioner shall deposit Rs. 3,000/- alongwith certified copy of the order of this Court before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, giving an undertaking that he will argue the case on merit and will not seek any unnecessary adjournments. In case such undertaking is given and the cost is deposited, the Settlement Officer of Consolidation shall proceed to decide the appeal on merit expeditiously, preferably, within a period of six months from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order of this Court without granting any unnecessary adjournments to the parties. ——————