Saeed-Uz-Zaman Siddiqi, J.— By means of this revision, the revisionist-Insurance Company, who was opposite party in Motor Accident Claim Petition No.11 of 2008, has sought for to set aside the order dated 02.07.2012 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Additional District Judge, Court No.1), Lucknow in MACP No.11 of 2008 (Smt. Geeta Singh Vs. Yashwant Kumar Singh and another). A very brief point is involved in this revision; that the Insurance Company moved application, bearing Paper No.37-C, to the effect that three documents may be admitted in evidence and, also moved another application under Section 169 of Motor Vehicles Act, bearing Paper No.42-C to the effect that the claimant has got appointment under "Dying-in-harness" rules in Siddiqia Inter College, Kotwari, Ballia in place of his father and is getting salary. The Insurance Company made an attempt to get the certificate from the school, in question, to this effect, but he failed, hence the application for discovery was made, which has been rejected by the Tribunal. The application Paper No.37-C for filing of the documents was allowed. I have heard learned counsel for the revisionist and have gone through the records. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not a civil Court, inasmuch as all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are not applicable. Moreover, the claim petitions are meant to be dealt with quickly in a summary manner so that the affected persons may be compensated. Rule 221 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 runs as follows : "221. Code of Civil Procedure to apply in certain cases.- The following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall so far as may be apply to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, namely, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30 of Order V; Order IX, Rule 3 to 10 of Order XIII, Rules 2 to 21 of Order XVI, Order XVII; and Rules 1 to 3 of Order XXIII." Order XI of the fist Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is not applicable to claim petitions. Another aspect of the matter is that if the Insurance Company bonafide required the appointment of the claimant, it could have been proved, by summoning the clerk concerned of the College, who could have been summoned along with the records. Another aspect of the matter is that if the Insurance Company bonafide required the appointment of the claimant, it could have been proved, by summoning the clerk concerned of the College, who could have been summoned along with the records. The Insurance Company did not resort to the direct mode of evidence and, has resorted to delay the proceeding by serving upon the claimant discovery. The records show that no affidavit has been filed by the Insurance Company before the Tribunal along with the paper no.42-C, which is a mandate of law. The learned Tribunal has acted wisely in rejecting paper no.42-C because quick disposal is an attempt by the legislature, which is evident from Rule 212 of U.P. Motor Vehicle Rules, 1998, which clearly provides that 'the Claims Tribunal shall, make a brief memorandum of the substance of what is deposed and such memorandum shall be written and signed by the Claims Tribunal and shall form part of the record'. Recording of any evidence has not been prescribed and, under this Rule, this much is provided that 'where the Claims Tribunal is unable to make a memorandum, it shall cause the reason of such inability to be recorded and, shall cause the memorandum to be made in writing from its dictation'. Interestingly, learned counsel for the Insurance Company has argued that there is nothing like Rule 229 as mentioned in the order of the claims Tribunal. It is true that Rule 229 has been typed in the order of the Tribunal as a clerical error, but the learned Tribunal has actually mentioned Rule 221 of U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998. Learned counsel has cited before this Court the Central Rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act and he was having no knowledge of U.P. Motor Vehicle Rules, 1998. Lastly, Revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not maintainable against an interlocutory order passed by the Tribunal. A Full Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pandurang Dhondi Chougule and others Vs. Maruti Hari Jadhav and others, reported in AIR 1966 SC, 153, has held as under : ".................It is well-settled that a plea of limitation or a plea of res judicata is a plea of law which concerns the jurisdiction of the Court, which tries the proceedings. Maruti Hari Jadhav and others, reported in AIR 1966 SC, 153, has held as under : ".................It is well-settled that a plea of limitation or a plea of res judicata is a plea of law which concerns the jurisdiction of the Court, which tries the proceedings. A finding on these pleas in favour of the party raising them would oust the jurisdiction of the Court, and so, an erroneous decision on these pleas can be said to be concerned with questions of jurisdiction which fall within the purview of Section 115 of the Code. But an erroneous decision on a question of law reached by the subordinate Court which has no relation to questions of jurisdiction of that Court, cannot be corrected by the High Court under Section 115." For the reasons mentioned, as aforesaid, the revision has no force and is accordingly dismissed. _