Judgment : This second appeal arises out of the decree and judgment dated 20.10.2003 passed by the VI Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), East Godavari, Rajahmundry in A.S.No.107 of 1998 confirming the decree and judgment dated 25.04.1998 passed by the I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry in O.S.No. 90 of 1991. The 5th defendant before the trial Court filed the present second appeal. For the sake of convenience, I would like to refer the parties as the ‘plaintiffs and the defendants’ i.e. as they were originally arrayed in the suit. The plaintiffs instituted the suit against the defendants for mandatory injunction directing the defendants 1 to 3 to grant quarry lease/licence in their favour to quarry granite metal in the land of Ac.2.44 cents covered by R.S.No.327/2 of Duddukuru village, Devarapalli Mandal, West Godavari District. The said suit was decreed by the learned trial Court. The learned first appellate Court confirmed the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court. Against the concurrent findings of both the Courts below granting the relief of mandatory injunction directing the defendants 1 to 3 to grant quarry/licence, the present second appeal is filed by the 5th defendant. I have heard Sri B.Adi Narayana Rao, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/5th defendant and Sri M.Sivananda Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/defendants. Originally the suit was filed against the defendants 1 to 3. Subsequently, the defendants 4 and 5 have been brought on record by the trial Court by allowing the petitions to implead them as defendants. The case of the plaintiffs is that they are absolute owners of dry land of an extent of Ac.2.44 cents in R.S.No.327/2 of Duddukuru village, Kovvur mandalam, West Godavari District, having purchased the said land under the registered sale deed, dated 24.08.1984 believing the representation made by their vendors that it is their private land. They asserted that they have been in possession and enjoyment of the said land since the date of purchase and on coming to know that the granite metal is available in the said land and with a view to excavate the same, they made an application to 3rd defendant to grant necessary licence/lease on 07.10.1985. They asserted that they have been in possession and enjoyment of the said land since the date of purchase and on coming to know that the granite metal is available in the said land and with a view to excavate the same, they made an application to 3rd defendant to grant necessary licence/lease on 07.10.1985. After keeping the application pending for a long time, the 3rd defendant informed the plaintiffs through letter dated 16.01.1986 that the plaintiffs’ application dated 07.10.1985 could not be disposed of within 90 days and hence it may be treated as rejected as per the Mines and Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957 and A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966. Against the said order, the plaintiffs filed revision before the Government of Andhra Pradesh (the first defendant) herein and challenged the order of deemed rejection. The first defendant in turn vide its order dated 05.03.1986 directed the defendants 2 and 3 to dispose of the application within a reasonable time. The plaintiffs’ version is that in respect of the order passed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the revision, the third defendant informed the plaintiff No.1 that due to change in the policy of the government, the quarry lease can be granted only to the professional stone cutters and accordingly required the plaintiffs to produce a certificate showing that they are professional stone cutters. The first plaintiff who claims to be the professional stonecutter obtained a certificate from the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rajahmundry and submitted the same to the plaintiff along with the letter dated 17.12.1990. In spite of submitting the said certificate, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants 2 and 3 kept quiet without passing any order on the application withholding the grant of quarry/licence. The plaintiffs asserted that the inaction on the part of the defendants 2 and 3 is arbitrary, illegal and ultra vires of the rules due to which they are not able to utilize the land to the best of its advantage. Under these circumstances, they said that they filed the suit seeking the relief of mandatory injunction after issuing notice under Section 80 of CPC. In the written statement the third defendant inter alia contended that the Court of I Additional Junior Civil Judge at Rajahmundry has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit since the disputed property is situate in West Godavari District. In the written statement the third defendant inter alia contended that the Court of I Additional Junior Civil Judge at Rajahmundry has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit since the disputed property is situate in West Godavari District. The third defendant, however, admitted the filing of the application by the plaintiffs seeking grant of quarry lease for road metal in the suit schedule land. The third defendant further submitted that on the letter addressed by the second defendant to the Mandal Revenue Officer, Devarapalli for classification of the suit schedule land of an extent of Ac.2.44 cents in R.S.No.327/2 of Duddukuru village, the Mandal Surveyor inspected the land and reported that as per the records of the Mandal Revenue Officer, Devarapalli, the land in respect of which the lease was sought stands in possession of West Godavari District Scheduled Caste Service Society Limited, Eluru and subsequently the second defendant also called for a report from the Executive Officer, S.C. Corporation, West Godavari and that there was no response to the letters addressed by respondents 2 and 3. According to the third defendant, the lease could not be granted for want of report relating to the classification of suit schedule land. The third defendant further contended that quarry lease is required to be granted according to the provisions contained in A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 and because of the non-availability of the area as per the said rules, the licence could not be granted and as soon as the report is received, the application of the plaintiffs will be disposed of according to rules. The defendants 1 and 2 filed a memo before the trial Court adopting the written statement of the third defendant. After the 4th defendant was impleaded in the suit, he filed written statement stating that no lease was granted in his favour to excavate the granite metal from the suit land. He filed the application seeking lease of the suit land, but the same was rejected and he has not preferred any appeal or revision against the same. He also stated specifically that he had no interest in the suit land and he has nothing to do with the subject matter of the suit. He filed the application seeking lease of the suit land, but the same was rejected and he has not preferred any appeal or revision against the same. He also stated specifically that he had no interest in the suit land and he has nothing to do with the subject matter of the suit. After the 5th defendant was brought on record, he filed written statement denying that the plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment of the suit land by virtue of the alleged sale deed dated 24.08.1984 and contended that the suit schedule property belongs to government and the 5th defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the same since 1985 under the lease hold rights vide G.O.Ms.No.525, dated 18.12.1985. It was further contended that the 5th defendant has been excavating the minerals and paying necessary duties and royalties to the Mines Department. The 5th defendant also took the plea that the Court of I Additional Junior Civil Judge at Rajahmundry has no jurisdiction to entertain the non-consideration of the alleged application of the plaintiffs, that the suit is premature and liable to be dismissed. According to the 5th defendant he is the lessee for the limestone dolomite for a period of 20 years over an extent of Ac.39.56 cents in R.S.Nos.327, 328, 340, 341 and 342 situate at Duddukuru village, Devarapalli mandal of West Godavari District vide G.O.Ms.No.525, dated 18.12.1985 granted by the Government of Andhra Pradesh and accordingly the lease was executed on 11.06.1986 under the proceedings of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology. The 5th defendant further submitted that it surrendered Ac.29.43 cents of land as there was no mineral available and it was uneconomical and the government accepted a part of the land surrendered by it vide G.O.Ms.No.340, dated 04.10.1991 and since then it has been in possession and enjoyment of the land in an extent of Ac.10.88 cents in the said survey numbers. It is also submitted that the suit land in R.S.No.327/2 of an extent of Ac.2.44 cents is being quarried by it since 1986 and it was paying necessary duties and royalties to the mines department. According to the 5th defendant, the plaintiffs have no manner of right, title or interest over the suit land. It is also submitted that the suit land in R.S.No.327/2 of an extent of Ac.2.44 cents is being quarried by it since 1986 and it was paying necessary duties and royalties to the mines department. According to the 5th defendant, the plaintiffs have no manner of right, title or interest over the suit land. The 5th defendant being legitimate entity to continue in possession of the suit land by virtue of the lease granted in its favour and it has every right to continue in possession of the suit land and it invested lakhs of rupees for conducting mining operations. The 5th defendant further contended that by suppressing the real facts, the plaintiffs filed the suit with a view to obtain favourable orders by misleading the Court and since the plaintiffs did not approach the Court with clean hands, they are not entitled for equitable relief of mandatory injunction and thus prayed to dismiss the suit. The second appeal was admitted considering that the following substantial questions of law would arise for consideration: 1. Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit for grant of a quarry lease in respect of a mineral covered by The Mines & Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957, since the said Act forming a complete code, by necessary implication ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil Court? 2. Whether a suit for mandatory injunction directing the authorities under the Mines & Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957, and the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, for grant of a quarry lease is maintainable? 3. Whether the suit for mere mandatory injunction for grant of a quarry lease is maintainable when a lease in respect of the very area was already granted in favour of another person and is subsisting and grant of such lease is not in question? 4. Whether the Court at Rajahmundry had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit, as the suit property is admittedly situate outside its territorial jurisdiction? Since the substantial questions of law referred above relate to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit and to grant the relief of mandatory injunction directing the defendants 1 to 3 to grant quarry lease in respect of mineral available in the subject matter of the suit, this Court has to render its decision only in regard to the said issue relating to jurisdiction and nothing else. The respondents did not raise any other substantial question of law to be considered by this Court while disposing of this second appeal. This Court, therefore, cannot travel beyond its jurisdiction conferred by the provisions of Section 100 of CPC. On the jurisdictional issue the learned Courts below having accepted the fact that the subject matter of the suit is situate in Duddukuru village, Devarapalli Mandal of West Godavari District, within the local limits of jurisdiction of Junior Civil Judge’s Court, Kovvur, West Godavari District, took the view that since the suit is not with regard to any dispute relating to the property and the cause of action in the suit being in respect of grant of mining lease/licence and as the plaintiffs indicted the defendants 1 to 3 with mala fides for not passing orders on the application submitted by the plaintiffs, the Court at Rajahmundry can assume jurisdiction to entertain the suit and grant the reliefs prayed for in the suit. According to both the Courts below to decide the jurisdictional issue in the present case, Section 16 of CPC will not apply, but, Section 20 of CPC will apply, meaning thereby, since the defendants 2 and 3 reside out side the jurisdiction where the subject matter of the suit is situate within local limits i.e. at Kakinada and Rajahmundry respectively and in view of the fact that the cause of action had arisen owing to the inaction on the part of the defendants 2 and 3 and mala fides and arbitrariness being attributed by the plaintiffs to defendants 2 and 3, the Court of Junior Civil Judge, at Rajahmundry will have jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. Both the Courts below further were of the view that since the relief asked for is a mandatory injunction in the nature of direction to the respondents 2 and 3 and the third respondent’s office being within the jurisdiction of the trial Court, the plaintiffs can maintain the suit as per the provisions of Section 20 of CPC. Another view expressed by both the Courts below to justify their decision in relation to their jurisdiction is that the suit does not require determination of rights or interest in immovable property and therefore, even if the subject matter of the suit is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of Junior Civil Judge, at Rajahmundry, the suit is maintainable. According to me, both the Courts below have misdirected themselves in considering the jurisdictional issue in this case. Since the relief asked for is mandatory injunction in the nature of direction to the respondents 2 and 3 to grant mining lease in favour of the plaintiffs and more particularly, when the 5th defendant specifically contended that the land belongs to the government and the plaintiffs have no title to the property and they have never been in possession of the property, it cannot be said that the suit does not involve determination of any right or interest in the immovable property. The suit is instituted asking the Court to determine the rights of the parties in relation to grant of lease which is basically nothing but asking to adjudicate the rights and interest of the parties in the immovable property which is situated in Duddukuru village, Devarapalli mandal of West Godavari District. The subject matter of the suit is admittedly situate in the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of Junior Civil Judge, at Kovvur in West Godavari District. Therefore, as required by Section 16(d) of CPC, which deals with the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, the suit if at all is maintainable has to be instituted in the Court of the Junior Civil Judge, at Kovvur but not in Junior Civil Judge’s Court at Rajahmundry. The 5th defendant in its written statement specifically contended that the Junior Civil Judge’s Court at Rajahmundry has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. A specific issue has been framed in that regard and both the Courts below answered the said issue by holding that since one of the defendants is residing in Rajahmundry and the cause of action relates to inaction in the matter of granting mining lease, the suit is maintainable before the Junior Civil Judge’s Court at Rajahmundry. Another important question requires consideration in the second appeal is whether the Junior Civil Judge’s Court at Rajahmundry suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction to decide the dispute relating to the subject matter of the suit. When the Court is incompetent to adjudicate upon the subject matter involved in the suit, it is a case wherein it lacks inherent jurisdiction, which means it has no power to try the dispute between the parties to the suit. When the Court is incompetent to adjudicate upon the subject matter involved in the suit, it is a case wherein it lacks inherent jurisdiction, which means it has no power to try the dispute between the parties to the suit. Under Section 9 of CPC a civil Court is competent to try all disputes of civil nature, cognizance of which is either expressly or impliedly not barred. To decide the question as to whether the learned trial Court is competent to adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties, it requires to look into Rules 12, 35-A of A.P. Mines Mineral Concession Rules, 1966. As per Rule 12, the Assistant Director, Deputy Director or the Joint Director of Mines and Geology are competent to grant mineral lease. Against the order passed by the Assistant Director or Deputy Director an appeal is provided to the Director under Rule 35 of A.P. Minor and Mineral Concession Rules, 1966. Section 35-A empowers the State Government to entertain revision against the order of the Director either suomotu or on the application made by the party. The Explanation to Rule 35-A lays down that where the Deputy Director has failed to dispose of an application for grant or renewal of a quarry lease within the period specified in respect thereof, the Deputy Director shall be deemed to have made an order refusing the grant or renewal of such lease on the date on which such period expires. Therefore, if no orders have been passed on the application filed by the plaintiffs, it is deemed that grant of quarry lease has been refused to them and their remedy if at all is in revision before the government. However, in this case, the plaintiffs contended that in the revision filed against the order of Deputy Director before the government, the government directed the Deputy Director to dispose of the application of the plaintiffs, but the defendants in spite of the orders in the revision protracting the issue without taking any decision on the application of the plaintiffs, even then I would say that the remedy lies with the appellants is again to file a revision before the government under Section 35-A of the A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 which constitute a complete code in relation to granting of quarry lease. The appropriate remedies have been provided for in the Act and Rules at various stages. The appropriate remedies have been provided for in the Act and Rules at various stages. Therefore, by necessary implication, the Mines and Minerals Development and Regulation Act, 1957 and the Minor and Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 oust the jurisdiction of the civil Court to grant a quarry lease in respect of a mineral covered by 1957 Act. If it is the case of the plaintiffs that the defendants 1 to 3 have not been exercising the powers vested in them or that their actions are arbitrary or ultra vires, the provisions of the Act and Rules, they cannot institute a regular civil suit for reddressal of their grievance. If at all, that is the case of the plaintiffs, their remedy only lies to invoke writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the considered view that the Court at Rajahmundry (I Additional Junior Civil Judge) has not only no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit but also does not have the competence or power to adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties. The said Court, therefore, suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction. Both the Courts below under misconception of law and facts and in utter ignorance of the provisions of 1957 Act and 1966 Rules assumed jurisdiction in themselves and granted mandatory relief of injunction in favour of the plaintiffs by decreeing the suit filed by them. The judgment rendered by the trial Court, which is confirmed by the first appellate Court is a nullity for want of competence to adjudicate upon the dispute in relation to the subject matter. The judgment of the first appellate Court, which confirmed the judgment of the trial Court is liable to be set aside in the second appeal. Consequently, the decree and judgment dated 20.10.2003 passed by the VI Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), East Godavari, Rajahmundry in A.S.No.107 of 1998 confirming the decree and judgment dated 25.04.1998 passed by the I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry in O.S.No. 90 of 1991 is set aside. The second appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.